PLANNING FOR SUSTAINABLE TOURISM DEVELOPMENT

An Investigation into Implementing Tourism Policy
In the North West Coast Region of Egypt

The unspoiled natural environment in the NWC region of Egypt, as yet!

Thesis Submitted for Examination for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

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ABSTRACT

“Policy analysis is one activity for which there can be no fixed program, for policy analysis is synonymous with creativity, which may be stimulated by theory and sharpened by practice.”

(Wildavsky 1979: 3)

This study is concerned with analyzing the tourism public policy process within the framework of institutional arrangements, power arrangements, values, interests, and motivations of the principal actors involved in the process. It aims to explain and analyze the development process of the North West Coast (NWC) region of Egypt which experienced the implementation of a tourism public policy that was employed to assist with the resolution of Egypt’s human settlement and economic problems. Accordingly, it examines the national development challenges, the policies adopted to address them and the coherent history of the tourism policy process executed in the NWC region.

The study evaluates the tourism policy in terms of how far it achieved its promises. The findings of the research support the research hypothesis, which postulates that short-term political expediency constrained the implementation of national and regional policy objectives. Political expediency was examined in both the policy formulation and policy implementation stages of the policy process and was manifested when the actors involved were found seeking special advantage through public policy. In addition, it was manifested when institutions (each with its own preferences) struggled to control resources and implement their agendas. Furthermore, it was manifested when certain concessions to a powerful clan or a kin were awarded to gain more political powers.

Accordingly, the theoretical framework is based on analyzing three dynamic and interrelated fields: First, the politics of public policy implementation, with particular reference to tourism as an instrument for development. Second, the concept of sustainable tourism which is utilized as an analytical tool and as an idealized model against which tourism development in the NWC region can be evaluated, particularly because it was an overall objective for the region’s tourism policy. Third: the extent of government activity in formulating tourism public policy and managing tourism development.

The research shows that much of the deviations from achieving the national and regional policy objectives can be explained through institutional arrangements, power arrangements and the differences in values, motivations, and interests of the actors and institutions involved in formulating and implementing the tourism policy in the NWC region.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Over the years, a number of individuals and organizations have been affiliated with this Ph.D. I would like to thank Professor Patrick Wakely for his supervision. He allowed me the space to develop the ideas contained in this research. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Nigel Harris, Dr. Sheilah Meikle, Dr. Nadia Taher, Adriana Allen and Michael Safier for their time and effort.

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**ABBREVIATIONS**

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<tr>
<td>ANUC</td>
<td>Authority for New Urban Communities</td>
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<td>APO/ANUC</td>
<td>Agency for Protection of Ownership of ANUC in the NWC Region</td>
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<td>ARP</td>
<td>Agency for Research and Projects</td>
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<td>ATV</td>
<td>Agency for Touristic Villages</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPMAS</td>
<td>Center Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>Central Organization for Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GOPP</td>
<td>General Organization for Physical Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDTM</td>
<td>Marakia for Development and Tourism Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
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<td>MOC</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
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<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>Ministry of Electricity and Energy</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
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<td>MOR</td>
<td>Ministry of Reconstruction, Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities</td>
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<td>MOT</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
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<td>National Tourism Authority</td>
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<td>New Town Development Agency</td>
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<td>TDA</td>
<td>Tourism Development Authority</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Tourism Organization</td>
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Chapter 1

THE CASE FOR AN INQUIRY INTO TOURISM POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE NWC REGION OF EGYPT
1.1 Context and Aims

This study aims to contribute to increasing the understanding of how development planning is carried out; and the inherent difficulties associated with implementation. It aims to explore and analyze what happened in Egypt when the government adopted a policy for promoting tourism development to assist with the resolution of the country’s human settlements and economic problems. Specifically it analyzes the tourism development of the North West Coast (NWC) region of Egypt as a means for understanding the performance in implementing tourism public policy.

While it is concerned with discovering what occurred during the formulation and implementation stages of the policy process, this study is not simply confined to evaluating the tourism policy of the NWC region. Rather, in its analysis of the policy process, the research aims to obtain an insight into the reasons for differences and conflicts between the national and regional policy objectives and the outcomes of development. Especially in terms of the relevance of promoting tourism development to assist in meeting Egypt’s human settlement objectives, the efficiency of government and accountability of government officials throughout the decision-making cycle, the effectiveness of the plans and policies’ structures and their suitability for replication.

Therefore, this study attempts to identify and analyze the factors affecting the development of the NWC region. It compares planning and implementation of the region’s development and attempts to identify the conditions, which changed the course of implementation and caused its divergence from national and regional planning objectives. It will look at the processes of translating objectives to outcomes and investigate why those processes failed to translate many objectives to practice.
1.2 The Research Settings

Figure: 1.1. Map of Egypt

Egypt has an area of about one million sq. km.; and in 1996 had a population of around 62 millions (CAPMAS 1997). Because of the scarcity of water, the population crowds into the Nile Valley and Delta, giving it a density of 3900 person per square mile (1250 person per square km), one of the highest in the world. More than 98 percent of the population live on about five percent of its total area along the Nile Valley and its Delta. The national development policy that emerged after the October 1973 war entitled the ‘October Working Paper’ (President Sadat 1974) realized that the expected addition of about 1.2 million people a year would exert enormous pressure on the five percent of the country’s land area available for agriculture along the Nile. In addition, the rural to urban migration to the existing urban centers along
the Nile Valley resulted in severe overcrowding and breakdown in the delivery of urban services.

This has led Egypt to look to its virgin land, the desert regions, to accommodate its ever-increasing population. According to President Sadat (1974), the only way to accommodate the existing population and future expansion is to encourage and spread development outside the Nile Valley into the desert by promoting alternative economic activities to agriculture. Accordingly, a crescent of new towns, with Cairo as its pivot, was planned around the periphery of the Delta. The Western axis, which includes Sadat City and New Ameriyah City (NAC),¹ culminates in the North West Coast (NWC) Region.

![Figure 1.2. The Crescent of New Towns in Lower Egypt](source: PUD and ORplan (1978))

The national development policy (October Working Paper) formulated a new policy for the development of Egypt and was based on the following:

- land suitable for agricultural production must not be used for non-agricultural purposes, urban settlements, built-up areas, transportation networks, etc;

- the only land suitable for agriculture is the narrow strip of the low land along the Nile. This area cannot be expanded under the conventional agricultural methods of Egypt. Therefore, new agricultural land should be found away from the Nile Valley in the desert and new agricultural methods will also be necessary;

---

¹ Now called New Burg El-Arab City
• the creation of new settlements in the desert regions (relying on agriculture, industry, agro-industries, and tourism) to cope with the population growth, to ease the pressure on existing cities, to raise the national income and provide employment.

These development strategies had taken a definitive pattern with the determination of the sites for the 10th of Ramadan City, Sadat City, New Ameriyah City and the planned developments of the Suez Canal area. Since 1974, the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) was given the overall responsibility for the implementation of the reconstitution process and in so doing to provide a thrust to urbanization away from the Nile Valley, the Delta and Cairo.

As shown on Figure 1.2, there are two crescents of development, on the eastern and western desert edges of the Nile Delta, both pivoting on Cairo. The eastern one runs from Cairo to the 10th of Ramadan City and the Suez Canal zone, relying on industrial development (10th of Ramadan), land reclamation (around Ismailia), and industry, port activities and tourism (in Port Said and Ismailia). The western crescent starting from Cairo and includes 6th of October City (industry and tourism), Sadat City (industry), and New Ameriyah City (industry and services).

The development of the North West Coast (NWC) region is a part of this national strategy. It is the culmination of the western crescent and links it to the developed possibilities of the western desert coast extending westwards to the Libyan boarders (Figure 1.3). According to a Governmental Decree (Number 540 in 1980), the NWC region was included among the new urban settlements.
Because tourism has the ability to shift development away from the densely populated areas towards less developed regions (Inskeep 1991; Gunn 1988; McIntosh and Goeldner 1990); tourism has been promoted and adopted as the mainstay of planned economic development in the NWC region. The NWC region is one of the most important regions selected in the national policy statements for new development and has been given priority for development over other regions because of its natural and economic resources. According to the planners of the region the projected development of the NWC region would help to balance the national economic base and achieve the national goal of enhancing the economic self-sufficiency of regions as the region has potential for promoting tourism, land reclamation, agro-industries and fisheries (Ilaco and Pacer 1976; PUD and ORplan 1978). The achievement of this national goal was difficult in other regions of the country because they lack such potential and diversity of resources.

Accordingly, the NWC regional development planning was formulated by the joint efforts of an Egyptian and a Dutch private consulting firm: Ilaco and Pacer (1976). ‘The Regional Plan of the Coastal Zone of Western Desert’ covered the area between the 34th km from Alexandria to the Egyptian western boarders (450 km. from East to West) and with depth (from North to South) from the Mediterranean Sea until the contour line of +200 meters above the sea level (between 35-50 km). According to the regional planning, the NWC region was divided into four sub-regions, as Figure 1.4 shows. The logic of this selection will be explained in Chapter 4.
I. Alex-Imayid sub-region: From the west of Alexandria city to the Alamein village with length of about 70 km. along the Mediterranean coast. This sub-region is selected as the study area of this research because it has been the only region that experienced the implementation of the public policy of the NWC region.

II. Alamein - Ras Al-Hekma sub-region: From Alamein village till Ras Al-Hekma with length of about 130 km. along the Mediterranean coast. The regional planning suggested that this region is more suitable than the others for international tourism because it is rich in natural resources.

III. Mersa Matrouh sub-region: It includes the coastal area west and east of Matrouh city, with length of about 90 km. along the Mediterranean coast.

IV. Nakhela - Salloum sub-region: From Nakhela village west of Matrouh to Salloum city, with length of about 120 km.

Figure: 1.5. Alexandria-Imayid Sub-region.
Source: Ilaco and Pacer (1976)

Below the level of the regional planning, further studies were undertaken for the first sub-region (Alex-Imayid) shown in Figure 1.5. The tourism planning for Alex-Imayid
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was formulated by the joint efforts of an Egyptian and a German consulting firm: PUD and ORplan (1978) which determined the sub-region’s development programme. In addition, the structural planning for Alex-Imayid sub-region was formulated by the two Egyptian firms who were involved in the preparation of the regional planning and the tourism plan (PUD and Pacer 1983). The three studies (the regional, tourism, and structure plans) were statutorily adopted by the government to constitute the NWC region’s politically determined tourism policy.

The government, represented by the Ministry of Reconstruction, New Communities, Housing and Utilities (MOR) took the overall responsibility for carrying out the urbanization strategies mentioned in the October Working Paper. The Ministry became responsible for site selection, planning and implementing new settlements and the reconstruction of the towns that were destroyed after the October 1973 War along the Suez Canal. Because the NWC region was considered a new urban settlement by a governmental decree in 1980, this, therefore, increased the control of the MOR over the development of the region. The MOR was the authority responsible for commissioning the planning studies for the NWC region, and the Ministry approved and authorized the regional, tourism and structural plans.

Following the planners’ recommendations, tourism became the economic mainstay of the region. The Ministry financed the implementation of infrastructure and carried out three pilot projects (Marakia, Marabella and Marina Al-Alamein) in the region to stimulate and encourage the private sector’s investment and to act as an example for any future projects, see Figure 1.6. The projects were named ‘touristic villages’ because they offer holiday homes for Egyptian and Arab tourists. The projects were supposed to include several hotels for encouraging international tourism as well as domestic tourism.
1.3 The Problem Identification

As mentioned above, the NWC of Egypt is one of the regions selected in the national policy for new urban developments to accommodate the rapid expansion of population. The national policy for development projected the NWC as an important region for urban expansion and for the creation of new settlements to absorb significant components of the continuously increasing population densities in major cities, which had been causing congestion, infrastructure problems and decreasing agricultural lands. Therefore, the government gave priority for the development of this region over other new development areas because of its natural physical characteristics and economic features, such as:

- a long, attractive beach on the Mediterranean which extends some 450 km. It provides the opportunities for tourist activities to be accommodated;

- it contains significant amounts of raw materials such as limestone, gypsum, clay, sand and other raw materials. Such materials can be used for building purposes;

- the availability of water resources encourages the potential for new activities to be created in the region. These water resources can be found in the

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2 These were identified in the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Regional Planning (cited by Ilaco and Pacer 1976).
form of underground water dispersed in different parts of the region and the Nile water canals, which have recently been erected;

- the nature of the sub-soil in most of the region’s areas has been found suitable for bearing construction foundations at minimum costs;

- in addition to the availability of some cultivated lands, vast areas of land have recently been reclaimed which provide a base for the establishment of rural agricultural settlements;

- the distinct topography of the region, with its different levels, could provide opportunities for individual settlements to make the most of the prevailing environment and its natural characteristics;

- the availability of a transportation system is an incentive for potential development to take place in the region.

The physical characteristics and natural economic resources available in the NWC region were of sufficient importance to be taken into account in the tourism policy and the regional development strategy. As mentioned above, several studies were commissioned by the government based on the region’s resources and potential activities. These studies began in 1975 and ended in 1983 with the production of the final physical Master Plan, which was approved by the government to constitute the politically determined public policy for the development of the NWC region. The implementation of the policy has been taking place since the early 1980s.

The public policy for the development of the NWC region ‘promised’ to ensure four key principles, which will be discussed in further detail in chapter four. The first is that of environmental protection, where the physical and socio-cultural resources were recognized as the region’s resource base and that the development should be in harmony with such environments. The second principle related to the concern for future generations (futurity), that is, to ensure the preservation and enrichment of the environment for the benefit of future generations. The third is to achieve equity among the population by, for example, allowing all sectors of the population to access the region and benefit from the regional development, as well as ensuring the participation of the community in the decision making and assuring their satisfaction.
The fourth principle concerned the efficient use of the resources by ensuring that the implemented projects in the region would be manageable, feasible and realistic where the appraisal of present and future costs of projects would be undertaken before and during their implementation (PUD and ORplan 1978). It is necessary to point out here that the four main principles mentioned above adhered to the principles and objectives of sustainable development, as Chapters 2 and 4 argue.

However, most of the ‘promises’ of the tourism public policy of the NWC region did not see light. What is witnessed today is an urban sprawl, an ad hoc piecemeal development, a failure to preserve open space or parks near the beach and a general deterioration and erosion of the beach. It became evident that when the development planning of the NWC region was implemented, various deviations and divergence from national and regional planning objectives are witnessed. First, the NWC region did not attract the population from the Delta and Nile valley despite the government’s investment in infrastructure, accommodation, and services, and thus the region did not contribute to resolving the country’s human settlement problem. Second, the region failed to attract international tourists which, in turn, had economic consequences and affected employment, income generation, government revenues etc. Third, the development of the region did not achieve the regional planning goals, which are, environmental protection, local integration, visitors’ (tourists’) satisfaction and long term economic gain. Fourth, tourism development in NWC region is threatening the sustained use of limited resources, and, as a consequence, the opportunities for the growth of the industry are decreasing. In brief, most of the dangers and deficits that were perceived in the policy have come to pass and become increasingly worse, if not out of hand.

The above discussion recognizes the need for an inquiry into the cycle of tourism policy formulation and implementation. Why policy did not achieve its objectives? And, why the government and policy makers did not deliver their promises? Such questions call for an analysis of the tourism policy process of the NWC region. Research relating to these questions must seek to overcome the simplistic and tautological explanations, which currently attempt to explain why policy outcomes are different from what was conceived for it. Lack of political will or weak institutional capacity usually dominates the literature that set to explain why action is different
from policy as Chapter 2 points out. However, the analysis of the tourism policy process of the NWC region reflects what are perceived as core issues, both in tourism and public policy studies. The approach is to consider the politics of tourism development and introduce the recent developments in public policy analysis and to indicate their relevance to tourism issues through illustrative case studies.

1.4 The Research Hypothesis

In the light of the previous discussion, this study seeks to gain an understanding of the politics of the policymaking and decision taking, as well as the causes and consequences of policy. With particular reference to tourism as an instrument for development, the research aims to increase the understanding of the processes of formulating and implementing tourism public policies in Egypt in the period between 1974 and 1994.

It is postulated that short-term political expediency constrained the implementation of national/regional development objectives in the NWC region.

In order to substantiate this contention the following research issues will be addressed:

- the national and regional development objectives;
- the political, economic and social contexts within which development policies were made;
- the extent to which the objectives of the national and regional policies had been achieved;
- the extent to which the environmental, socio-cultural and long-term economic effects were taken into account as vital to the quality of life of residents and tourists in decision-making processes;
- factors affecting the decision-making process during policy formulation and policy implementation;
- the characteristics of policy actors (their power arrangements, values, interests and motivation)
the institutional arrangement of organizations involved in formulating and implementing the NWC development policy; and

- the politics of sustainable tourism development and of tourism public policy-making and the inherent difficulties associated with implementation.

1.5 The Academic and Theoretical Disciplines

The substance of this research relates to a range of academic and theoretical disciplines including tourism analysis, political science, public administration, public institutions, public policy analysis, and sustainability. Due to constraints of time and space, emphasis has been given to the politics of tourism development, tourism policy analysis, tourism and economic development, spatial aspects of tourism, sustainable tourism, public sector management, institutional arrangements, and the extent of governments’ involvement in tourism. All of these areas provide ample scope for further research. This section, however, traces the development of tourism analysis and relates it to the politics of policy making and implementation within the perspective of sustainable development principles. No attempt is made to conduct a comprehensive review of the tourism literature as this has been carried out elsewhere (for example, Sheldon 1990; Eadington and Redman 1991; Sinclair 1991a). The aim is to identify the gap in the literature, which this research attempts to reduce.

The Development of Tourism Analysis

With very few exceptions, notably Gray (1966), there was little analysis of tourism until the 1970s and even then much research still tended to be uncritically descriptive, employing inadequately defined goals and techniques (Pearce and Butler 1993). The main themes which have been studied are the cultural, economic, environmental and social effects of tourism, travel patterns and modes between origins and destinations, tourism’s relationship with economic development, tourism’s motivations and behavior, forecasting trends and practical aspects of planning, management and marketing. The volume by Lawson and Baud Bauvy (1977) highlighted the spatial dimension of tourism and tried to establish universal carrying capacities and standards for tourism projects through the prescription of how tourism planning should be undertaken. The volume edited by De Kadt (1979) introduced some perspectives on

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3 Young (1973) reviews the history of the evolution of tourism. See also Burkart and Medlik (1981).
the social and cultural effects of tourism through case studies from the developing world. It also initiated the arguments around the conflict between the state and private sector’s control of tourism where it highlighted the contribution of tourism policy to reconciling this (and many other) conflict(s). Reference to the studies of tourism policy and the politics of tourism development are discussed in Chapter 2.

Most journal papers deal with specific aspects of tourism, very often case studies, without relating the topic to a particular analytical framework or theory. Indeed the tourism journal literature has been ‘curiously un-contentious’ (Sinclair and Stabler 1997). Several texts have provided descriptions of the structure and operation of different sectors of tourism. A well-known example is the volume by Burkart and Medlik (1989) saw a surge in such contributions to the literature, representative texts being those of Cleverdon and Edwards (1982), Hodgson (1987), Holloway (1994) and Lundberg (1989).

A trend in the 1990s has been the collection of papers or readings in edited texts, some of which are essentially reviews of the state of the art. Typical examples of publications that deal with both analysis and evidence are those by Johnson and Thomas (1992a, 1992b), Seaton (1994) and Theobold (1995). Cooper (1989), Cooper and Lockwood (1992) and Cooper et al (1993) provide useful reviews of several tourism topics from the perspectives of different disciplines. There is considerable variation in the rigor of contributions to such collections, particularly where there is a strong applied content reflecting the interests of practitioners.

Volumes which are directed at a more academic audience and have a stronger theoretical foundation have concentrated on spatial factors, the impact of tourism, economically, environmentally, socially and politically, tourist behavior, planning and development. A relatively early contribution to the spatial literature, which considered both the patterns of development and origin-destination linkages, was Robinson (1976) and Lawson and Baud Bauvy (1977). Later texts by Mill and Morrison (1985) and Pearce (1987, 1989) and Smith (1983) continued these two related themes.

**Impact of Tourism**

The impact of tourism is an area of analysis, which have attracted considerable interest. In fact, it is the most extensive area in the literature of tourism. Some studies
analyzed the economic, physical and socio-cultural impacts (Mathieson and Wall 1982). For example, Murphy (1985) and Smith (1989) investigated social factors, Cohen (1978) and Shelby and Heberlein (1984) concentrated respectively on the physical environment and carrying capacity and OECD (1981a, 1981b) concerning the environment. Selwyn (1996) looks at how tourism subtly alters and commodifies the cultures of both the hosts and guests. Pearce (1989) provides a useful review of the many forms of impact arising from tourism. In general, tourism impact studies commonly examine issues of tourism-generated revenue or employment, social changes induced by the expansion of tourism or the environmental impacts of tourism projects (Attia 1994). These issues are seen in terms of the impacts of tourism, but such impacts, as van Doorn (1979) has noted, are not usually set in any broader context of development, however defined (cited by Pearce 1989). For a variety of reasons, most studies also focus on a limited range of impacts and few pretend to be exhaustive or comprehensive. Moreover, these impacts, as Pearce (1989) argues, are often divorced from the processes, which have created them. As far as the economic perspective is concerned, it is probably fair to say that the ‘impact’ literature is now reasonably well established. Economic impact studies, using a variety of methodologies and data sources, will continue to be undertaken, and in increasing numbers as tourism grows in significance. The basic methodology used for the measurement of the economic impact of tourism is also well established (see, for example, Archer, 1977; Henderson and Cousins, 1975; Oosterhaven and Van der Knijff, 1987; and Vaughan, 1977).

The belief that the economic contributions of tourism can help to moderate the social difficulties seem to dominate the literature in the field of the impact literature. Social problems, as McIntosh and Goeldner (1990) argue, cannot be solved without a strong and growing economy that tourism can help to develop. While many of the negative effects, as McIntosh and Goeldner (1990) and Gunn (1988) for example argue, can be moderated or eliminated by “intelligent planning and progressive management methods. Planning can ensure that tourist development has the ability to realize the advantages of tourism and reduces the disadvantages.” The evil consequences of tourism development are not inherent in the development of tourism, as Young (1973) argues, they just happen when tourism is developed in a thoughtless and casual way.
Economic issues in tourism are seen as arising from trends towards the increasing “commoditization and privatization of leisure” (Sinclair and Stabler 1997). Shaw and Williams (1994) acknowledge that tourism has the capability of generating export earnings and facilitating economic growth and diversification, they consider that it has caused acute environmental problems and initiated the reconstruction, economically, physically and socially, of localities to serve tourists and private sector. Earlier researchers such as Greenwood (1976) and Burkart and Medlik (1989) recognized that tourism issues should not be addressed in isolation but must be set in the wider context of all development sectors. Aspects of tourism in which economics has hardly begun to be involved concern the environment, fiscal policy, and regulation. There is a growing literature regarding tourism and the environment but most studies lack a strong economic base, concentrating on cultural, physical and social aspects or on business initiatives regarding sustainability. Although Sinclair and Stabler (1997) recognize the need for rigor in tourism analysis and use economics as a means for achieving this, they oppose the notion that tourism should be treated as an economic activity. They suggest that the analysis of some aspects of tourism requires a multidisciplinary approach which acknowledges its political, physical and social contexts. Sinclair and Stabler (1997) suggest economic policy instruments to measure the impact of tourism on the environment where they provide valuation techniques for Cost Benefit Analysis to physically measure the environmental costs of tourism.

**Tourism and the Environment**

The literature on tourism and the environment and its many facets, such as alternative/cultural/eco/green tourism and sustainability, has burgeoned since the mid-1980s, paralleling the increasing awareness of problems arising from economic growth and, with it, the expansion of tourism. Consideration of this issue has broadly gone in two directions. The first is tourist behavior and its impact on the environment, with noteworthy contributions to analysis by Krippendorf (1987), Cater (1993) and Wheeller (1994). The second is related to initiatives aimed at attaining sustainable development and focuses on tourism firms. Much attention has been paid to voluntary actions by businesses and much of the literature emanates from, or is directed at, practitioners, for example, Beioley (1995), Dingle (1995), Eber (1992), Hill (1992), so that the emphasis is on prescriptions for management and practice. The academic literature is more rigorous and has endeavored to drive principles (see Chapter 2), as
well as to indicate feasible policies for achieving sustainability, for instance, Cater (1993), Wight (1993), Murphy (1994) and Hunter and Green (1995).

**Sustainable Tourism Development**

Tourism’s interest in sustainable development is logical given this is one industry that sells the environment\(^4\) as its product. Owing its origins to the general concept of sustainable development, Sustainable Tourism Development (STD) can be thought of as meeting the needs of tourists and host regions while protecting and enhancing opportunity for the future generations. However, the concept of sustainable tourism as a planning and management tool creates an ongoing controversy. On the one hand, it appeals to a recognized need to limit and control tourism, which may threaten the sustained use of limited resources (Butler 1991; Wheeller 1993; Cater 1993). Simultaneously, it runs at odds with other desires for maximizing opportunities for growth, and the benefits associated with increased visitor use (McKercher 1993a). However, reaching a balance between maximizing the benefits from tourism and protecting the physical and social resources from excessive use, can thus achieve sustainable tourism (Farrell 1994; Owen et al 1993), which, as the WTO (1993b) points out, ensures a fair distribution of benefits and costs. However, Hunter (1997) describes the vision of acquiring a balance in the development system between economy, environment, and society as rather ‘naive’. Farrell (1994) as well sees that ultimate balanced sustainability is not achievable. However, Hunter (1997) then contends that at least a vision is offered. Owen et al (1993), on the other hand, adopt the ‘balanced’ approach to sustainable tourism, arguing, and through case studies ‘proving’ that sustainable tourism can be achieved in practice.

In order to extend the discussion about what is really meant by STD, some writers place the literature that defines STD within two categories (Godfrey 1996), while others place them along a continuum starting from very weak sustainability to very strong sustainability (Hunter 1997; Brookfield 1991). Godfrey (1996) points out that while there exists a number of definitions, the key objectives and rationale underpinning these many different terms have been similar and generally can be

\(^4\) As Green and Hunter (1992) point out, it is necessary to take a very broad view of what constitutes the environment. The term may be taken as referring not only to the atmosphere and the natural environment (e.g. mountains, countryside and coast) but also to social relationships, the cultural heritage and the built environment.
placed within one of two broad schools of thought. One school tends to support sustainability as representing an alternative to, or replacement of, conventional (evil) mass tourism with new (good) green products (the product approach), for example Krippendorf (1987) and Lane (1994). The other argues that mass tourism is inevitable due to sheer tourist demand, and what is needed is a way to make all tourism more sustainable (the industry approach). For environmentalists, to take just one example, the problem is one of degradation of the world’s natural resources that activities such as tourism have caused. And the meaning attached to sustainability in this case, as its core, ecological: the need to preserve and protect the natural environment. To industrialists, by contrast, sustainability may represent the opportunity to reduce costs and increase profit margins. Much of what has transpired in the literature exemplifies the product approach, resulting in an examination of ‘either-or’ choices, for example Butler (1991) and Wheeller (1994). Frequent reference is made to issues concerning concentration versus dispersion of development, the scale of development (small versus large), degree of control and ownership (local versus foreign), rate of development (slow versus rapid), types of tourists (high spend versus low spend), and the type of interaction taking place within the destination area (hosts and guests versus tourist anonymity). Butler (1991) and Wheeller (1994) argue that the real value of this softer outlook does not lie in replacing mass tourism, which it could not in any case, but rather in helping to ‘reform the tourist establishment and mass tourism from within’ (Cohen 1978). Alternatively, the industry approach suggests that, while there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the development of new small-scale ‘green products’, this alone fails to address a number of inherent aspects of tourism such as its diversity, scale, and ownership, none of which operate in isolation (Godfrey 1996). While there are obvious ecological advantages to keeping the number of tourists down, attention is also being paid to measures that can both increase tourist carrying capacity and improve the capacity to protect the environment. Luxury tourism, for example, tends to require more imports, to be more capital-intensive, to be more dependent on outside control of capital, to encourage more of a sense of conspicuous consumption, and to result in a greater sense of relative deprivation than more modest facilities (Richter, 1989). Between these two extreme positions (the industry and the product approaches), Hunter (1997) argues that there exist a more central vision of the meaning and implications of sustainable tourism development. Hunter (1997) criticizes both the extreme resource exploitative (the industry approach) and extreme
resource preservationist (the product approach) worldviews; or as he calls them the very weak and very strong sustainability positions respectively. However, as Hunter (1997) contends that different interpretations of STD will have applicability according to circumstance, involving a different set of trade off decisions between the various components of sustainability.

**Tourism Policy and Planning**

Tourism development, planning, and policy-making has not been extensively investigated. A relatively early contribution was by de Kadt (1979) as mentioned. Inskeep (1991), Gunn (1988), Johnson and Thomas (1992b) and Pearce (1989) contain a good overview of the subject. Interest in tourism planning is a recent phenomenon. Possibly because of not only growing recognition of the need of it to be more systematic in the face of greater competition between destinations, but also recognition that the growth of tourism may need to be ‘constrained’ because of its environmental and socio-cultural impacts (Sinclair and Stabler 1997). Examples of the literature of tourism planning are Gunn (1988), Getz (1986, 1987, 1992), Murphy (1985), WTO and UNEP (1983) and Inskeep (1991).

Examination of the tourism literature reveals that the more rigorous development, with a concomitant extension of aspects of the subject studies, is under way. However, it is evident that more in-depth analysis of tourism is required and further examination of particular issues is necessary. Shaw and Williams (1994) who expressly set out to consider critical issues in tourism have taken steps towards these objectives. They argue that to date, the tourism literature has developed in a compartmentalized fashion and that points of contact between disciplines are uncommon, recognizing that many aspects of tourism have been neglected.

**The Political Dimension of Tourism Development**

The mainstream of tourism research has either ignored or neglected the political dimension of the allocation of tourism resources, the generation of tourism policy, and the politics of tourism development. Hall (1994) points out that apart from the notable efforts of Matthews (1978, 1983), and Richter (1983a, 1983b, 1989), political science has all but ignored the role of tourism in modern society. Politics is a fundamental component of tourism development and tourism studies. Research into the political
dimensions of tourism is in a relatively poor state. More than twenty years ago, Matthews (1975) wrote, ‘the literature of tourism is grossly lacking the political research’. Today, the same comment still holds true. The politics of tourism is still the poor cousin of both tourism research and political science.

Detailed tourism policy studies are few and far between (Richter, 1989; Pearce, 1992), and the few there are have tended to focus on notions of prescription, efficiency and economy rather than ideals of equality and social justice. If one agrees with Weber’s (1968) dictum that the essence of politics is struggle, then it can be safely stated that the vast majority of researchers in tourism have failed to detect it or have deliberately chosen to ignore it. The lack of research on policy implications of tourism is perhaps even more surprising given the emphasis by politicians on tourism as a means of economic and regional development (Mathieson and Wall 1982; Shaw and Williams 1988; Pearce 1989; Hall D., 1991; Hall 1994).

Research on the politics of tourism is concentrated in several areas. Including studies of individual countries’ (or regions’) tourism development policies (e.g. Richter 1985; Shaw and Williams 1991; Richter and Richter 1985; Hall D., 1991); the political economy of tourism development (e.g. De Kadt 1979; Richter 1980; Britton 1982a, 1982b; Jenkins and Henry 1982; Britton and Clarke 1987; Harrison 1992a); the ideological nature of tourism (Urry 1990a; Hollinshead 1992); and the creation of appropriate frameworks or methodologies with which to analyze tourism’s political and administrative impacts (Getz 1977; Ritchie 1984).

There is a prevalence of prescriptive models of planning and policy making in the tourism literature, which tend to indicate a clear, rational process to tourism development. According to Edgell (1990), ‘tourism is, or can be, a tool used not only for economic but for political means’. However, it must still be noted that Edgell’s account of tourism policy presented a rational, prescriptive account of how tourism policy making should be conducted, not how it actually is conducted. Elliott (1997), Hall (1994), Hall and Jenkins (1995), and Richter (1989, 1992) called for empirical analysis of tourism policy and the examination of the political dimensions of tourism development.
In an attempt to highlight some of the key fields of analysis in understanding the relationship between politics and tourism, Hall (1994) identified a number of central political themes in tourism studies. For example, public policy and international relations, which are, in turn, related to the scale (international, national, regional/local, the individual) at which they occur (Figure 1.7). However, the various fields should not be seen as being mutually exclusive. Hall (1994) reveals the interconnection between key concepts in political analysis. Indeed, one of the great challenges in tourism policy research is to relate patterns and processes of tourism development at the micro-scale to the social, political and economic processes, which are occurring at the national and global levels.

The politics of tourism development can be examined in terms of who are the winners and losers in the processes of tourism policy formulation and implementation. It can also be examined at the macro level, in terms of concepts such as dependency5 (Britton 1982b), and at the micro level, through examination of the interests, values and power of significant individuals and groups within the development process:

“At the micro level the notion of the rules of the game was regarded as being significant in terms of equity of access of individuals and communities to the decision making process. In addition, the processes occurring at the macro and micro political level should not be regarded in isolation but should be seen as being entwined within broader global patterns of tourism development” (Hall 1994).

The politics of tourism development at the micro level has been a special interest of Hall (1994). He provides an analysis of the factors which influence tourism policy and decision making within the tourism policy environment, such as institutional arrangements, roles, interest and pressure groups, the influence of significant individuals and the critical roles of values and power in the tourism policy-making process. These will be taken in Chapter 2.

5 Dependency can be conceptualized as a historical process, which alters the internal functioning of economic and social subsystems within a developing country. This conditioning causes the simultaneous disintegration of indigenous economy and its reorientation to serve the needs of exogenous markets (Hall 1994). “By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development” (Santos 1968 in Hall 1994). The clear concern in most studies of dependency is that the locus of control over the development process shifts from the people that are most affected by development, the host community, to the tourism-generating regions.
1.6 Scope of the Thesis

Because it is the concern of this study to explore and analyze the implementation process of public policy for tourism in the NWC region of Egypt, it is necessary to provide, at this stage, a background to how such analysis can take place. First, it is necessary to point out that tourism has become central to the machinery of many governments, and of many governments’ programmes in both the Northern and Southern countries (Lea 1988; Pearce 1992; Richter 1989; Shaw and Williams 1991; Hall 1995; Hall and Jenkins 1995). Second, at the same time, several authors have noted increasing skepticism and uneasiness about the effectiveness of government, and the intended consequences and impacts of much government policy (Gunn 1988; Dye 1992) including tourism public policy (Richter 1989; Jenkins 1993; Johnson and Thomas 1992b; Hall 1994, 1995). For instance, Richter (1989) reported that critics of current tourism policies are becoming aware and are more than a little cynical about the excesses and ‘mistakes’ occasioned by national and regional tourism development.
schemes. Tourism policy analysts are slowly coming to center “on a search for
patterns and relationships that explain as well as describe the actions of government”
(Atkinson and Chandler 1983 cited by Hall and Jenkins 1995) and the first step of
analysis is evaluating what has been done. Meanwhile, given the dynamic nature of
tourism in developed and developing societies, it has become increasingly critical for
tourism policies to be monitored and understood.

However the aim of this study is not confined to the evaluation of policy outcomes, as
mentioned before, but to explore, explain and analyze the process of formulating and
implementing the tourism public policy in the NWC region. The aim is to penetrate
the political system or what Hall and Jenkins (1995) call the ‘black box’ of decision
making. Institutional arrangements, values, interests, power and evaluations are keys
to opening the black box of decision making. In general, evaluation primarily poses
the question whether, and if so, how far, results achieved stated goals. In order to
analyze the development process in the NWC region of Egypt, this study argues that
the tourism policy objective has been to abide by the principles of sustainable tourism
development. Thus, the parameters of the sustainable tourism development approach
as a management tool will be identified, and the objectives of sustainable tourism
development will be defined in order to assist in the assessment of the development
process in the Egyptian case (see Chapter 2). Because the concept of planning for
sustainable tourism development, as well as for sustainable development in general
for all types of activities, is being given increasing emphasis internationally, its
principles are chosen to provide the criteria necessary for evaluating the development
process of the NWC region. According to Vries (1989), ‘sustainable development
then becomes a methodology, as well as a normative goal, a model for planning, a
strategy involving purposeful management of the social and physical environments’.

What is political about the NWC tourism development? How political expediency was
manifested in the region’s development? And how does tourism affect and can be
affected by politics? And what does tourism add to the challenges of penetrating the
black box of decision making? It is necessary to point out, at this stage, the

6 Scrutton (1982) provides a comprehensive definition of institutions where he sees institutions as “an
established law, custom, usage, practice, organization, or other element in the political or social life of
a people; a regulative principle or convention subservient to the needs of an organized community or
the general needs of civilization”.
relationship between tourism and politics in order to justify the choice of tourism as a case example to test the research hypothesis.

Both tourism and development are political processes. The political issue is the control and benefit from development through promoting tourism. Hall (1994) and Richter (1989) argue that tourism development is an essentially political concept. The pursuit by governments around the world of various states of tourism development, and the perceived benefits of such development, raise questions about the economic, social and political dimensions of the development process and the directly political manner in which overt and covert development objectives are pursued at the expense of other objectives. Tourism development is political in terms of the issue of control of the development process and also in terms of its outcomes. For example, who are the winners and losers in terms of the goals of government development policies?

‘Politics is, the use of power by public organizations in their management of tourism’ (Elliott 1997). Controlled tourism development begs the question, controlled by whom? However, the question of who benefits should be fundamental to the assessment of development policies. Particularly when sustainable development is primarily concerned with the issue of equity among present and future generations, which requests the inquiry of who controls and who benefits from development.

The study of politics is inexorably the study of power. ‘Politics is about power, who gets what, where, how and why’ (Lasswell, 1958). Decisions affecting tourism policy, the nature of government involvement in tourism, the structure of tourist organizations, and the nature of tourism development evolve from a political process. This process involves the values, interests, and control of actors (individuals, interest groups, and public and private organizations) in a struggle for power (Hall 1994).

Tourism will have positive or negative effects depending on the scale of analysis and the perceptions, interests and values of those who are impacted and those who study such impacts (Hall 1989a). Indeed this should be a critical point in the study of the effects of tourism, as the question of for what and for whom tourism activities are promoted and allocated should be central to the analysis of benefits and costs. The benefits and costs of tourism are not evenly spread throughout a host community. Thrift and Forbes (1983) declared ‘any satisfactory account of politics and the political must contain the element of human conflict; of groups of human beings in
constant struggle with each other over resources and ideas about the distribution of resources’ (cited by Hall 1994).

Politics is about control. At the local, regional and national levels, various interests attempt to affect the determination of policy, policy outcomes and the position of tourism in the political agenda (Hall 1991). In addition, politics is essentially about power. The study of power arrangements is therefore vital in the analysis of the political impacts of tourism because power governs ‘the interplay of individuals, organizations, and agencies influencing, or trying to influence the direction of policy (Lyden et al 1969).

Therefore, the scope of this research concerns the politics of regional development, with particular reference to tourism, as an instrument for development in the NWC region. It aims to investigate the role of institutional arrangements, values, interests, power, motivation and behavior of the actors involved in determining tourism policy outcomes. It is about political expediency and the implementation of tourism policy objectives. Political expediency is manifested, for example, when the actors involved in the policy process seek special advantage through public policy and individual officials seek to benefit from public offices through re-election and rents. Political expediency may necessitate awarding certain concessions to a powerful clan or kin to gain more political powers. Political expediency is also manifested when several institutions (each with its own preferences) struggle to control resources and implement their agendas.

1.7 Contributions and Limitations

Empirically the research has much to offer because integrated approaches to tourism public policy analysis are still in their infancy. As illustrated above, there is a general need for research, which can inform efforts to involve a wider range of actors in the analysis of tourism public policy. This is more especially in Egypt where policy changes are currently being pressed. Studies on tourism policy analysis conducted to date have tended to ignore the role of institutional arrangements, roles of interest and pressure groups, the influence of significant individuals, and the critical roles of values, interests and power in the tourism policy-making process (Hall 1994), with some notable exceptions (Richter 1989; Jenkins 1993; Johnson and Thomas 1992b;
Hall 1994, 1995). In particular the research directly addresses the call for more empirical studies, which might support theoretical analyses of the role of governments in tourism public policy formulation and implementation.

Conceptually the research demonstrates both the value and limitations of state intervention as an analytical approach. While it emphasizes tourism development and political decisions it can do so at the expense of sufficient attention being paid to the impacts of tourism development based on power and politics deriving from them. The research also makes a contribution to exploring both analytically and empirically, the concept of sustainable tourism development (STD). It does so by demonstrating the value of applying STD principles to policy analysis. For STD in Egypt, applying STD principles is shown to be essential for understanding the nature of synergy along the public-private divide.

In terms of policy implications, the research makes two contributions. First, it provides an example of how social and environmental concerns can be integrated into a sustainable development approach to regional development. Second, it demonstrates the value of local government involvement as legal representatives of communities in tourism policy formulation and implementation, both in terms of resource protection and operational effectiveness.

The research is based on a case study approach and therefore has the attendant limitations associated with generalizing the findings. Research findings are specific to Egypt, and in some aspects to the NWC region. Thus, they are not necessarily applicable countrywide or in the Middle East as a whole. In its policy recommendations, therefore, the thesis does not offer a blueprint but rather guidelines for policy analysis and for formulating and implementing environmental aware (political, socio-economic and physical) policy change with respect to regional development, particularly in relation to tourism.

**1.8 The Research Methodology**

The approach was firstly to untangle the story of the development of Egypt from the web of events which had occurred in the period between 1974 and 1994 and thus obtain the coherent history of Egypt’s economic and human settlement problems and the policies adopted to resolve them.
Secondly, the study aimed to understand the politics of implementing development policies with particular reference to tourism in environmentally sensitive areas. Then, the NWC region was selected as the case study to understand the performance of plans, policies, and projects through analyzing the involvement and relationships of the institutional actors.

**Research Objectives**

This study is both explanatory and descriptive. It aims to identify the implications of the Egyptian State’s involvement in formulating and implementing the tourism policy in the NWC region. As mentioned before, it seeks an understanding of the process of policy implementation, and thus, adopts the basic research technique, which focuses on refuting or supporting theories that explain how the social world operates (Neuman 1997).

“Description, analysis and explanation, and the use of appropriate theory to help explain events, are necessarily influenced by the researcher’s ability and desire to manipulate data, and by his/her intellectual bias” (Hall and Jenkins 1995).

However, the study does not aim to answer a policy question or solve a pressing social problem, but rather explain the causes and consequences of planning and policy decisions. It aims to recount and analyze the development process in the NWC region when a policy for promoting tourism development was adopted to assist with the resolution of Egypt’s human settlement problem. Therefore, the study discusses the development process of the NWC region, exploring what determined the development? Why was the policy unsuccessful in meeting its objectives? Who were the decision-makers? And what were the factors that affected those decisions? Were the decision-makers and interest groups influencing the direction of development? Why couldn’t the government and policy makers deliver their promises? Did the development meet the national and regional objectives? And why the processes of translating objectives to outcomes failed to translate most objectives to practice? These are the key issues that will lead to understanding the experience of policy formulation and implementation in the NWC region.

The fieldwork devised the argument of the research in which the government was politically motivated on accruing a fast return on investment, which negatively impacted the development process. The government’s intervention in developing the
NWC region was in the form of speculating in the real estate market like a private
developer, rather than adopting a strategy which is based on a long term approach to
tourism development that is in balance with all other economic sectors. Public sector
managers had been concentrating too much on market effectiveness to the neglect of
the wider issues of public interest and social needs.

The fieldwork revealed that what determined the development decisions and
outcomes had been the political values and interests of the actors involved in the
decision making, implementation, and management processes. In their struggle for
power; long-term management objectives had been displaced for short-term political
advantages. Most of the decisions had involved political choices: choices between
competing interests or claims; choices between alternative policies with varying
advantages for different groups; choices between different organizations which
decide, manage and implement policies and objectives; and choices between
alternative uses of resources.

Accordingly, a framework was developed to facilitate the analysis of the facts relating
to both the wider Egyptian context and the development process of the NWC region.
This framework sees the institutional arrangements and the motivations, values, and
interests of the actors and organizations in their struggle for power as being the basic
variables explaining the action environment in the NWC region between 1974 and
1994.

The adherence to the principles of Sustainable Tourism Development (STD) was used
as a secondary analytical tool, to evaluate the performance of the policy process in
regard to its objectives and outcomes. Particularly because the policy ‘promised’ to
adhere to such principles as futurity, environmental protection, equity and efficiency
in the use of resources.

**Actor Groups**

The fieldwork recognized that the actors involved in the policy formulation and
implementation fall into three categories: the government officials, the interest groups
and the consultants. The **government officials** included officials in the Ministry of
Housing, Reconstruction and New Communities (MOR), the Ministry of Tourism, the
Ministry of Planning, Alexandria and Matrouh Governors, and local city councils.
The government officials included politicians and administrators, permanent staff, consultants and advisors. The interest groups included developers, community groups particularly landowners and local economic organizations, housing cooperatives, and environmentalists. The consultants included Egyptians and expatriate planning consultants. In addition, they employed professionals who, for convenience in this study, are called experts.

Hence, the fieldwork aimed to interview representatives of the three major groups. It was designed using a series of semi-structured interviews with key actors. Appendix I describes the processes involved in the design of the interviews.

The survey was based on interviewing people in authority (or were in authority), directly or indirectly involved in decisions taken affecting the development of the NWC region. In general, the purpose of the interviews was to identify the decisions that influenced the regional development and the factors affecting those decisions. In particular, the interviews attempted to understand why many policy decisions were not translated to action and why policy objectives were not achieved.

As mentioned above, among the people interviewed were officers of governmental bodies and consultants commissioned by the government to assist in the formulation of the development policy for the region. Personal contact with the policy makers, planners, and implementers of the NWC region during the fieldwork facilitated informal discussions. The opportunity to interview the consultants arose from personal contacts and led to spend extended times with them, and to discuss pertinent issues with them and their staff, amongst whom were architects, planners, sociologists, economists, environmentalists, lawyers, tourism experts, etc. The opinions of these qualified people were solicited, together with accounts of their professional experiences and the practices adopted in the evolution of their proposals from the earliest days to the completion of the policy.

Discussions and interviews were carried out with directors of the cooperatives and private sector developers involved to identify the obstacles and facilitation that were offered to them, as well as their opinions about the output of the development process. Discussions also were carried out with academics, experts, and scientists from the
Universities, Research Institutes, and private planning offices to identify their involvement and contributions as well as their opinions.

Discussions also took place with some community leaders including Bedouins and peasants. The interviews provided the initial evaluation of site locations, land use distribution, and the stages of development, as well as choice of proposed locations for different economic activities with respect to the life styles, movement and needs of the inhabitants.

**The Fieldwork**

A list was prepared prior the fieldwork of those identified as key actors in the development process, to be interviewed. The original list was amended in the course of the fieldwork. Most of those approached readily agreed to participate, seeing the research as both interesting and worthwhile, and gave their time unstintingly. The two refusals, disappointing in view of the willing participation of very senior officials and administrators, were the new vice president of ANUC\(^7\), (the Authority for New Urban Communities), and the President of Al-Hammam City Council. They were concerned both about their organization’s confidential information and the politically sensitive nature of the discussion.

In most cases it was possible to hold a relaxed discussion with the subject, even with the most senior politician or administrator. The researcher’s intervention was limited to prompting as necessary to ensure that the key issues were covered.

When appropriate, the discussion was recorded on tape thus freeing the researcher from detailed written record keeping during the discussion. In all cases full records were kept of the discussions, either on tape or in writing. These records provide an original database and were a major source material for this research. The discussions generally took between one and two hours, occasionally they were longer, and in some cases more than one discussion was held with the same person. The aim was to test accuracy by checking such discussions for internal consistency and checking for consistency between stories as reported by others who were interviewed and had been involved.

\(^7\) The President of ANUC is the Minister of Reconstruction, Housing and New Communities.
By arranging discussions with representatives of the actor groups, it was possible in most cases, to obtain at least three interpretations of the situation. The research utilized only the information that was consistent in discussions with at least three different interviewees in order to guarantee the reliability and quality of data. Where there was a mismatch between stories presented, this was of particular interest. In addition, cross checking also indicated both differences and similarities among the various issues involved. Meetings with those involved with more than one project gave additional insights.

**Data Collection**

The data collection technique utilized field research as a research strategy to collect qualitative data because of the complexities of the issues involved including tourism development, politics, implementing public policies, state intervention and sustainability. The research adopted the case study of the NWC region by undertaking a cross sectional research to examine the features of the state’s involvement in managing tourism and implementing the tourism public policy, based on in-depth detailed knowledge of the regional development process. The research focused on the performance of the three public pilot projects (Marakia, Marabella and Marina Al Alamein) which the government decided to implement to act as an example and stimulate the private sector’s initiative. The performance of the three projects recognized the extent of realization of the national and regional objectives and measured the similarities and differences between policy objectives and implementation outcomes.

Observation and semi-structured interviews had been the main sources of qualitative data. It is necessary to point out that the techniques for gathering qualitative data are “less wedded to specific theory or research question”, as Neuman (1997) argues. “Qualitative research tends to be more open to using a range of evidence and discovering data” (ibid.). Especially when the aim is not to answer a policy question or solve a pressing social problem, but, as this research aims, to advance fundamental knowledge about the social world; and to focus on refuting or supporting theories that explain how the social world operates.

The research utilized primary data, in a form of open ended and semi-structured discussions with the prime actors, to explain what determined, in general, the growth
patterns, direction of development and distribution of land uses in the NWC region; and in particular, the types of projects, settlements, tourists activities and services, the choice of tourism types and attractions and their locations in order to test whether such decisions had been determined by policy recommendations or by the motivations and interests of the decision makers. The primary data was collected through interviewing the region’s planners, Egyptian planning experts, tourism planners, developers, local communities, and government officials. Secondary Data Sources were from reports, studies, site plans (obtained from Ministry of Reconstruction, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Planning, consultants, planners, and experts) to support primary data.

In order to determine the actual methods for collecting data it becomes essential to identify its availability and the practicality of actually collecting it. ‘The most cost effective data collection is to collect only the data you need’ (Aranoff, 1985). In the NWC region there is a general lack in the availability of published information and documentation. What is available was collected with great difficulty and is very often out of date and inaccurate. This has meant that this study has had to rely mainly on collecting information from the two principal sources mentioned above: (From the primary sources: subjective semi-structured, in-depth discussions with the actors involved as discussed above. And from secondary sources: where information was collected from the reports and published materials). The few published and unpublished studies and reports that were available were consulted to obtain the necessary information related to the subject and area of concern. The documentary information was collected from two principle sources. The first was the official sources from some public and private institutions, for example:

- Ministry of Reconstruction, Housing and New Communities (MOR)
- Ministry of Tourism (MOT)
- North West Coast Development Authority (NWCDA)
- Building Research Institution
- Alexandria Governorate
- Matrouh Governorate
- Central Agency for Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS)
- General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP)
- Authority for New Urban Communities (ANUC)
- Private Consultants’ Offices (PUD, Ilaco, Pacer, ORplan)

The second source was published and unpublished academic works. Some of the information was collected from published and unpublished studies related to the subject and the study area. Such studies had proven to be useful to justify the
information collected from interviews and to guarantee the reliability and quality of data. It also provided information over a wide time span although sometimes the availability of records affected the time-scales.

The disadvantage of this data collection method was that the information was diverse and had varied quantities and qualities especially across different geographical areas. Some information appeared to be intense at some parts and too little at others.

As noted above, direct observation and photographic recording were among the main methods on which the survey and data collection were dependent. Photographs, sketches, and measured drawings were the principle method for recording information in order to provide a clear understanding of the existing physical environment of the area. Observation was valuable in situations where there was no other documented source available. However, this method was sometimes subject to two types of errors. The first comes from the observer and the selection of features to be observed. Observation technique tends to give too much scope to the subjective influence of the individual investigator. Thus, the observer may have to observe features of which he himself is part, or to which his knowledge and experience direct him. The second type of error stems from the observed matters and consisted of the effects being observed, such as suspicion, embarrassment or increased motivation. An attempt was made in this research to minimize both types of errors. Observing as many as possible of the features, to ensure that the essential features had been observed, minimized the first type. Regarding the second potential error, it was necessary during each observation visit to be accompanied by a well-known official of the local government authority and accordingly suspicion and embarrassment were minimized. In addition, the observation concentrated on physical configurations rather than social or cultural aspects and that helped to minimize both potential errors. The observation and photographic survey concentrated on the following:

- settlements’ physical characteristics such as building forms, architectural styles, building densities, building materials and visual pollution;

- settlements and housing locations with respect to the natural environment and land use distribution;
different land uses such as stone quarries, industrial activities, tourist projects and power plants;

- topography and natural resources such as beaches, rock formations, hills, slopes, vegetation and wild life;

- congestion and overcrowding in tourist centers and settlements.

The observation of such physical features was necessary to identify the extent of realization of policy recommendations and to measure the impact of policy decisions on the physical environment.

**Problems and Solutions**

Semi-structured discussions were held with a total of 60 persons (see Appendix I). As mentioned above, these included representatives of the government officials, the consultants, and the interest groups. In addition, discussions were held with others, already known or recommended in the course of the research, as able to contribute to an understanding of the context.

As mentioned above, the research aimed to collect data mainly from semi-structured, in depth discussions with the actors involved in the development process of the NWC region of Egypt between 1974 and 1994 and to amplify this data as necessary as possible with information from published and unpublished documents. Different interview techniques were adopted for the different groups and for the different sites in which the research took place. These ranged from semi-structured and informal interviews to interviews as conversation and idle chat. Data was sought in this way primarily because most of the information, which was perceived as relevant to the study, was not easily or directly available from written resources either because of the recent nature and political sensitivity of the issues examined. When written resources could be expected to be available, they could not be expected to include the level of detail which was available from talking to individuals, and especially details which were felt to be significant for understanding the development process of the NWC region of Egypt. Furthermore, the subject area of the study was so broad and the sources so dispersed that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to have researched the subject satisfactorily, solely or primarily from written records.
Using semi-structured discussion, it was anticipated that it would be possible to seek data in an organized way from the actors involved in the development process. Such an approach would have the added benefit that the structure and content of the discussion would be pre-determined and could include those issues which were perceived as important, i.e. issues touching the nature of the actors, their motivations, values and interests.

It was acknowledged from the beginning that there would be problems associated with this research method. It was anticipated that it could be difficult to obtain access to the key actors, and that it might be difficult to carry out long, politically, and possibly personally, sensitive discussions with those involved. However, it was believed that these difficulties could, in the main, be overcome.

This proved to be correct, the researcher’s pre-knowledge of Egypt as well as of most actors was invaluable. Without this it would have been difficult to obtain access to many of those interviewed or to have completed the fieldwork in the time available, or indeed, at all. As mentioned above, the researcher was fortunate either to obtain introductions to, or know personally, a number of key individuals.

Although all the discussions were carried out relatively long after the events in question, most of those interviewed found it easy to recall relevant information as all of them were interested in the subject being considered. In fact, formal institutional memories often proved more difficult to tap. Relevant written records in some cases having been consigned to dead files or, in some cases, never having been systematically maintained. Access to such information, where it existed, was in all cases the result of introductions to the interviewees and execute a part of the relevant material by those who were interviewed. Indeed, it was clear from the discussions held that such information would not otherwise have been readily available to an individual from an outside organization. Moreover, in some cases, where information was systematically maintained and recorded, employees of the relevant organization itself found such information difficult to trace and obtain.

The discussion outlines were derived from the understanding of the influence of the political environment. They were designed to elicit information which would help to explain how the political environment of implementing policies affected the way it
was carried out. The discussion outlines pursued issues and sought data, which threw light on the nature, values, interests, and motivations of the actors and how they were organized to carry out and execute policy decisions and the nature of the actors’ involvement in the policy-making cycle.

The sequence of the questions asked and issues pursued broadly followed that of the policy process. Discussion outlines started with issues relating to the problem(s) identification, then examined issues relating to policy formulation and implementation, and ended with an opportunity for subjects to comment on and evaluate their experience (see Appendix I).

Although the underlying structure of the outline and the issues covered were the same for each person interviewed, whatever the person’s position, the specific emphasis had to vary for different actors. Therefore, while it was directly relevant under the general heading of ‘policy formulation’ to ask senior government officials questions relating to the selection of consultants, terms of reference and contractual arrangements with the government, it would have been less useful to ask the individual expert the same questions. Here, the aim was to ask questions, or discuss issues, which they, as individuals, could be expected to have knowledge of or an opinion on. Likewise the questions asked and issues discussed with members of the government officials also had to be tailored to match their ability to answer them.

1.9 Thesis Organization

The aim of this first chapter has been to provide a background to the case study of the research, the NWC region of Egypt. The chapter introduces the urban development trends in Egypt and its national and regional policy objectives. It reviews the academic disciplines that are involved in this research and argues that tourism literature lacks the analysis of the political dimension of tourism development. The function of the literature review has been to inform the theoretical basis of analysis, demonstrate the gap in knowledge that the research fills, and to create links to a developing body of knowledge. This is according to Neuman (1997) a ‘background or a context’ review. This means placing a specific project in the big picture and summarizing what is known in the field at a point in time; and tracing the development of relevant issues over time in order to point out how the current
research continues a developing line of thought. As mentioned above, the issues relevant to this study include the literature concerning tourism policy analysis, the politics of tourism development, the role of the state in managing tourism development, and the issues related to sustainable tourism development. However, the chapter outlined that the scope of this research is about political expediency and the implementation of tourism policy objectives. Thus, it has called for an inquiry into the process of tourism policy implementation by focusing on the influence of power arrangements, values and interests, motivation and behavior of the actors involved in determining policy decisions and outcomes. Accordingly, it describes the research methods and outlines the rationale, objectives, analysis techniques, and the fieldwork methodology, as well as posing key research questions to be addressed in the chapters, which follow.

Chapter 2 places the study within a wider context of current debates on tourism policy analysis, the politics of tourism development, Sustainable Tourism Development (STD) and the role of governments in implementing tourism development policies. It aims to settle the theoretical framework in order to gain support for the theoretical position that underpins this study. This includes the interaction of values, interests and resources in formulating and implementing tourism public policies, specifying how they are shaped by prevailing institutional arrangements and exploring the way politics can intervene to confirm or upset the expected results. Therefore, the chapter reviews the literature that defines and explains the tourism public policy process and the influence of power arrangements, values and interests of actors and institutions on that process. It recognizes that implementation is a major constituent of the process on which the success and failure of policy depend. The chapter identifies the politics of formulating and implementing tourism development policies and the methods of translating policy objectives to action.

Because the development objectives for the NWC region were firmly based on sustainable development principles, the literature on STD is then reviewed identifying key themes, approaches, and principles. The chapter focuses on identifying the underpinnings of the STD paradigm and the role of the government in achieving it. It analyzes the muddle in the literature that occurs between what sustainable development fundamentally involves and what is desirable in the pursuit of it. This
CHAPTER 1

The Case for an Inquiry into Tourism Policy Implementation in the NWC Region of Egypt

identification is necessary to provide the criteria necessary for analyzing the formulation and implementation of the tourism policy in the NWC region. The chapter argues that the STD provides an implementable strategic approach to development that could meet many, if not all the national and planning goals of development in the NWC region. Lastly, the chapter elaborates on the analytical framework used in the research, locating the concept of STD, state intervention and the notion of implementing tourism public policy in theoretical traditions and debates. The ideas developed in the first two chapters are tested empirically in what follows.

Chapter three provides a brief introduction to political and economic change in Egypt and a picture of the political, social, economic and institutional context in which the research took place. The aim is to relate patterns and processes of tourism development at the micro-scale to the social, political and economic processes, which are occurring at the national level. The purpose of the chapter, therefore, is to highlight the structural and systemic factors, which affected tourism development, and the political relations on which it was based. The chapter discusses in detail the Egyptian national development policy and identifies the national and regional objectives for the country’s development in general and the objectives of tourism development in particular. It shows, through illustrative examples, the policy and practice differentiation highlighting the influence of institutional arrangement, power, and control on such differentiation.

Chapter four analyzes the findings of the case study and evaluates the development of the NWC region in the light of the national and regional policy objectives and the principles of STD. It aims to explain what had happened during the processes of policy formulation and implementation. The official picture of the NWC tourism public policy is drawn both from documentary sources and interview material. Here, the investigation is informed by the semi-structured interviews conducted in Egypt during the fieldwork. It attempts to identify, at the regional level, whether the national and regional development objectives were achieved. In addition, it examines the performance of the three public pilot projects (Marakia, Marabella and Marina Al Alamein) being the instrument used for translating policy decisions to action. The chapter evaluates the performance of the three projects in the light of the NWC tourism policy guidelines and objectives to investigate, at the project level, whether
policy objectives were achieved. Such evaluation is also informed by the semi-structured interviews as well as by observation and secondary data sources.

Chapter five focuses on explaining why had the policy failed to achieve the national and regional objectives. Thus, it takes up the political issues, discussing the actors as a key variable, as well as relations between the different government levels, the interest groups, and the consultants. As such, the chapter identifies critical issues of institutional arrangements, power arrangements, and the motivations, values, and interests of the principal actors and organizations within the decision making process and how such issues affected the policy process. It illustrates how decisions affecting tourism policy implementation, and the nature of government involvement, evolve from a political process. This process involves the conflicts of values, interests, and control of actors (individuals, interest groups, and public and private organizations) involved in a struggle for power. Accordingly, the chapter empirically confirms, through illustrative examples, that political expediency constrained the implementation of the national and regional objectives.

The final chapter sums up the principal conclusions of the study and examines their significance for the relevant analytical and operational debates. It goes on to make suggestions for policy processes and identifies questions for future research.
Chapter 2

THE POLICY PROCESS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR TOURISM PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS
2.1 Introduction
The economics of tourism (e.g. Bull 1991), its geographical features (e.g. Pearce 1987), its recreational characteristics (e.g. Ryan 1991), and its economic, social and physical impacts (e.g. Mathieson and Wall 1982) have recently received considerable attention in the literature. However, as mentioned in chapter one, studies of the politics of tourism and the public policy process are scant. Indeed, the implications of the politics of tourism ‘have been only rarely perceived and almost nowhere fully understood’ (Richter 1989). Except for the notable efforts of Richter (1983a, 1983b, 1985, 1989, 1992), Hall (1994); Hall and Jenkins (1995) and Elliott (1997) the politics and public policy studies of tourism development have received very little attention. The majority of the studies of tourism policy have been analysis for policy rather than analysis of policy¹ (e.g. Edgell 1990). In other words they are prescriptive studies of what governments should do rather than examination of what happened and why. Prescriptive studies have some utility, as Hall and Jenkins (1995) point out, but they ‘yield little insight into the political dimensions of tourism, and certainly lack the potency and impact of studies which raise critical questions concerning whose interests and values are being served by particular policy settings’ (Hall and Jenkins 1995).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study aims to analyze the policy process of the NWC region of Egypt to contribute to the effectiveness of tourism public policy studies. Hence, it is the aim of this chapter to explore the tourism policy process and the politics of tourism development. Section 2.2 attempts to put tourism development in the perspective of the public policy process. It acknowledges that implementation is a major constituent in the public policy process; while the success and failure of the policy depends, in large, on whether the policy objectives are translated into action.

¹ Refer to Gordon et al. (1993) for the distinction in varieties of policy analysis, separating analysis for policy from analysis of policy. Refer also to Jenkins (1978) for further discussion on the issue.
Section 2.3 discusses the political dimension of tourism development where it argues that the values, norms, behavior, interests, control and power of the actors involved in tourism policy formulation and implementation play the larger part in translating policy to action. From this, a framework is developed to facilitate the analysis of the tourism policy process of the NWC region (to explain what happened and why). The framework sees the institutional arrangements, and the values, interests and control of the actors and organizations in their struggle for power as being the basic variables explaining the behavior of policy.

The adherence to the principles of Sustainable Tourism Development (STD) is used as a secondary analytical tool to assist in the analysis of the NWC region’s development and to evaluate the performance of the policy process in regard to its objectives. Therefore, Section 2.4 reviews the underpinnings of the STD paradigm and highlights the areas of debate. It progresses to consider the implications for the principles of STD and the extent of government involvement to achieve sustainability.

### 2.2 The Policy Process

Public policy varies across sectors. Institutional patterns observed in some public policy arenas (e.g. health or immigration) cannot be assumed to be repeated in the tourism public policy process, nor can it be assumed that those processes are similar between countries and regions. However, explanations of decision-making and policy-making processes, as well as the description and explanation of the causes and consequences of government activity have similarities. Therefore, this study acknowledges that although there are some similarities, policies and institutional arrangements will differ within and between countries and there may be little integration among tourism organizations (Hall and Jenkins 1995). This means that the analysis of a specific policy process in a particular place, the NWC region of Egypt for example, is a contribution to the global wisdom.

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2 In studying the politics of tourism, the analyst is forced to recognize the ‘questions of political theory and political values’ which ‘underlie explicitly or implicitly, public policy decisions’ (Stillman 1974 in Hall 1994). Different analytical frameworks contain different strengths and weaknesses, and the analyst chooses between theoretical approaches to attack the issues of policy (Jenkins 1978).
This study defines policy as a process. That means that it is a long-term matter starting with problem identification and diagnosis and moving through policy formulation (objective setting and decision making) to implementation and evaluation (Figure 2.1). Jenkins (1978) argues:

“for many process is a central, if not the central focus, to the extent that they argue that a conceptual understanding of the policy process is fundamental to an analysis of public policy.”

Although there are multiple meanings to the word policy (see Turner and Hulme 1997), none is wrong. It is, however, necessary for analytical purposes, to adopt a meaning in which ‘process’ is emphasized, because this study aims to explain what happened and why in the tourism policy process of the NWC region where policy analysis, as Wuyts (1992) argues, helps such explanation within specific historical and institutional contexts.

**2.2.1 What is Tourism Public Policy?**

There is little agreement in public policy studies as to what public policy is; how to identify it; and how to clarify it. As Cunningham (1963) suggested, ‘policy is like the elephant, you recognize it when you see it but cannot easily define it’. Public policies stem from governments or public authorities (Hall and Jenkins 1995). People everywhere expect governments to formulate and implement policy. Dye (1992) defines public policy as ‘whatever governments choose to do or not to do’. Therefore, tourism public policy can be defined as whatever governments choose to do or not to do with respect to tourism. This definition, as Hall and Jenkins (1995) argue, covers government action, inaction, decisions, and no decisions as it implies a deliberate choice between alternatives. ‘A policy is deemed a public policy not by virtue of its impact on the public, but by virtue of its source’ (Pal 1992). According to Roberts (1971) public policy is “a set of related decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve” (cited by Hall and Jenkins 1995). ‘For a policy to be regarded as public policy, at the very least it must have been processed, even if only authorized or ratified, by public agencies’ (Hall and Jenkins 1995). This is an important caveat.

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3 Policy is a statement of intent that sets guidelines and limits to courses of action. A plan is required to translate policy into courses of action. The strategy defines the processes for implementing the policy.
because it means that the policy may not have been significantly developed within the framework of government (Hogwood and Gunn 1984).

From the tourism studies perspective, Acerenza (1985) defines tourism policy as ‘the complex of tourism related decisions which, integrated harmoniously with the national policy for development, determines the orientation of the sector, and the action to be taken’. Akehurst (1992) defines tourism policy as ‘a strategy for the development of the tourism sector at community level that establishes objectives and guidelines as a basis for what needs to be done’. Abdel-Wahab (1997) defines tourism policies as ‘those policies which serve as a framework specifying the national tourism goals, objectives, priorities and actions that will provide the basis for future development of tourism in the destination area’.

Therefore, for the purposes of this research, the tourism public policy is a process for development instituted by the government (even if only approved or authorized by the government) to establish some objectives and guidelines for developing tourism at the regional or local levels in the light of the national development policy. Figure 2.1 depicts the different stages involved in the policy process.

The Figure 2.1 The Policy Process

From the former discussion, it can be argued that planning for the development of a particular country, region, or local area, when approved by the government,
constitutes a public policy. Fainstein and Fainstein (1996) point out that a plan once enacted constitutes a politically determined public policy. However, it differs from other kinds of political decisions in that it is based on formal rationality and is explicit about ends and means (*ibid.*), in which plans define ends and strategies define means. This specifically is in sharp contrast to many other public decisions, which are left purposefully vague and ambiguous so as to mitigate controversy. Moreover, political decisions directed at long term goals, as Fainstein and Fainstein (1996) point out, are rarely made except under the auspices of a planning group. The old view of planning is that of a neutral, technical exercise, in which the planner is regarded as an objective expert, who is able to recommend professionally determined solutions to technical problems (Keeble 1964). In such a model, as Devas and Rakodi (1993) point out, the task of making choices belongs to the democratically elected politician to whom the planner can provide neutral, professional advice on the technical merits of those choices. Increasingly, though, such idealized models have come to be seen as inadequate (Smith 1987; Low 1991). Most of the issues, in fact, involve political choices: choices between competing interests or claims; choices between alternative policies with varying consequences for different groups; choices between alternative uses for resources. Thus, planning and management are not about producing a technically perfect plan or devising a policy to bring about an ideal situation in which all will benefit equally. Rather it is about assessing conflicting claims and making choices (Devas and Rakodi, 1993). The choices are certainly in the favor of the interests, including private interests, of policy makers, as well as of planners, and implementers. These issues are discussed further in Section 2.3.

In order to understand the public policy process, it is necessary to review the literature that provides the frameworks for policy analysis. Some literature argue that it may be more productive to consider policy process in terms of an adapted input-output model of the political system derived from the work of Easton (1965), Dye (1972), and Sharkansky (1971). Such perspective is favored by Sharkansky, Dye and others. Its major dimensions are indicated in Figure 2.2, from which it will be clear that the focus of this approach is the dynamics and processes of a political system operating in its environment.
The approach defines the environment to include social, economic and political influences on inputs, system variables, policy outputs, and policy outcomes. It differentiates between:

- **Policy demands**: demands for action arising from both inside and outside the political system.

- **Policy decisions**: authoritative rather than routine decisions by the political authorities.

- **Policy outputs**: what the system does, thus, while goods and services are the most tangible outputs, the concept is not restricted to this.

- **Policy outcomes** (or impacts): consequences intended or unintended resulting from political action or inaction.

In this way, it becomes possible to define and explore the process of policy while becoming aware of the various interconnections existing within this process. However, the model may be too neat and too simplistic (Jenkins 1978). Still, granted such caveats, a systems model indicates possibilities of coping with some of the conceptual problems of policy analysis. Thus, via systems approach, policy analysis can clearly be seen as an activity involved in disaggregating and understanding the specific policy related aspects of the political process.

Jenkins (1978) argues that public policy is best understood by considering the operation of a political system in its environment and by examining how such a
system maintains itself and changes over time. He adopts a broader perspective for policy analysis. The perspective recognizes that the operational environment is not structureless:

“It may be made up of individuals, groups, and organizations with values and interests, operating alone or together over time. Further, the strength of environmental influences may vary with their proximity to the political system, although this is not to argue for a linear relationship between proximity and demand pressure” (ibid.).

Interestingly enough, as Jenkins (1978) points out, arguments concerning environmental change and environmental structure have been a feature of organizational sociology for some years, the thesis being that, to account for organizational behavior, one requires a better conceptualization of environmental influences. The environment surrounds the whole process, influencing anything and everything, (see Figure 2.3). The Environmental Variables include political, socio-economic, and physical variables. The approach recognizes that the environmental variables vary with time and context. While useful as a first approximation, this is too gross a representation of environmental influences. A more detailed focus on environmental variables may be crucial for policy analysis.

Figure 2.3. Amended Systems Model of the Policy Analysis
Source: Jenkins (1978)
In brief, the argument here is that policy analysis needs to disaggregate and explore the political system. This point is illustrated in Figure 2.3 in which a distinction is made between decision systems and organizational networks, and to this should be added another often ignored factor, the capacity of political systems to influence their environment directly (indicated by (a) in Figure 2.3). The tendency to see the relationship between decisions and outcomes as a discrete sequence, initiated by changes in demand or support inputs, is problematic in that it may lead to the neglect of the possibility of a direct relationship between outcome and decision (see (b) in Figure 2.3). In fact, one key to implementation problem may be the gap between policy pronouncement and policy achievement, which is a neglected yet crucial area of concern for analysis. Thus the policy analyst needs to explore in more detail the nature of the political system and the relationship between such variables as decision processes and outcomes (this is carried out in Chapter 3). The above discussion shows that such frameworks for policy analysis are prescriptive and yield little insight to the explanation of how the policy process actually operate in practice. They are useful to indicate the complexity of analysis and the significance of the environment, particularly the political one, in the policy process.

Who is responsible for policy formulation and implementation? The formulation, and to various degrees the implementation, of policy is identified by both the public and development professionals, as the prime task of governments. Therefore, to explain tourism policy maintenance and tourism policy change, as Jenkins (1978) states:

“one needs to explore the socio-political conditions in which the political system operates, examining in particular the extent to which outputs are conditioned by external influences”.

The external influences may include the relationship between central and local governments, private and public sectors, decision-makers and implementers, tourism departments and other state departments, etc. For example, Shaw and Williams (1988) observed that the study of policy formulation is made more complex ‘because the aims of the local state may diverge from those of the central state’, especially if they concern decisions for tourism development. However, Hall (1994) argues that the lack of central authority may also create difficulties in coordinating and controlling tourism development. De Hanni (1984) has argued that the quality and quantity of tourist development must be controlled in the interests of regional development, but
he also noted that there is a lack of political will in the communes to curtail further development and concluded that the chances for an effective control of tourist development are not likely to improve significantly in the near future. Jansen-Verbeke (1989) noted that:

> “the fragmentation of the municipal organization over numerous departments, all dealing with different aspects of tourism and recreation, is very much seen as an obstacle to the construction of an overall development plan. The more people that are involved, the greater is the risk that no consensus can be obtained, and the views of decision makers will differ from one another.”

Moreover, the administrative and political tools for implementing the tourism policy are constantly being changed, divided, regrouped, centralized, and decentralized.

Part of the role of governments should be, therefore, to provide a suitable legal, regulatory and fiscal framework enabling the tourism industry to develop efficiently.

> “Governments are the legitimate holders of power in the political system and are responsible for making policy and establishing policy guidelines” (Elliott 1997).

Lickorish et al (1991) identified two roles of government in tourism policy formulation. The first is an active role when a deliberate action by government introduced to favor the tourism sector. For example, stimulating the tourism development in undeveloped regions by carrying out pilot tourism projects and investing in the tourism sector. The second is a passive role where government undertakes an action, which may have implications for tourism, but is not specifically intended to favor or influence tourism development, for example building regional infrastructure. Those two roles can easily be identified in the case of the NWC region of Egypt. The active role of government was in the form of implementing three tourism projects to stimulate private sector initiatives, while the passive role was the government’s investment in roads and infrastructure, for example, to benefit the regional development and consequently tourism development. Therefore, the elaboration and implementation of a tourism policy is a government responsibility because ‘public policy is the focal point of government activity’ (Elliott 1997) and ‘tourism has become an integral part of the machinery of many modern governments, and of many government programmes in both developed and developing countries’ (Lea 1988). According to the World Tourism Organization (WTO 1985a) tourism policy provides the basis for determining tourism development options. Which should
be the priorities (environmental, economic or social priorities) and strategies in developing tourism products and services? Luxury or middle range accommodation? Which geographic regions to develop? Which products to promote? Which category of foreign visitors to attract? These are the types of decisions to be taken by the Government.

Having reviewed the definitions of tourism public policy, the frameworks for understanding public policy and the responsibility of governments in policy formulation and implementation, the objectives of the policy formulation are not yet clear. The World Tourism Organization states that the objectives of tourism policy are:

“trying to decide on priorities for future development, for blending economic benefits (foreign exchange earnings, creation and distribution of incomes) with social effects (generation of employment, improvement of the quality of life), and for developing and preserving the country’s natural and cultural heritage” (WTO 1985a).

Hall (1994) argues that much tourism policy only stresses the benefits of tourism rather than the potential negative impacts. According to Shaw and Williams, (1988) tourism is a good thing, nevertheless, there is a need to look not just at tourism but at the opportunity costs of its development, and the alternative strategies which could be pursued by a region or community. The overall objective of tourism policy is:

“guaranteeing maximum satisfaction of the tourism needs of individuals from all social strata within efficient tourist plant and an unspoiled environment” (WTO 1985b; Hall and Jenkins 1995; Elliott 1997).

Acerenza (1985) suggests that three fundamental elements underlie all tourism policies: visitor satisfaction, environmental protection, and adequate rewards for developers and investors. The tourism policy will be ineffective if it failed to define those elements. In addition, a tourism policy can itself fail for a number of reasons, as Akehurst (1992) argues. Firstly, there may be insufficient identification and articulation of policy problems (objectives) that are agreed by all parties, at supranational, national, regional and local levels. Secondly, all parties may not agree as to what a policy or policies are seeking to achieve or, indeed, whether there should

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4 Keogh (1990) tells about the negative impacts of tourism where rapid tourism development has been associated with such costs as congestion, noise, crime, price inflation, visual pollution of the man-made and natural environment and an over dependence on a single sector of the economy.
be a policy at all. Thirdly, there may be disagreement about which policy problems are most important. Fourth, there may be disagreement on how each problem can be solved and on the roles to be played by public and private sector organizations. Finally, there may be disagreement about how to monitor and evaluate implementation and action programmes. Those issues require the involvement of governments to coordinate and resolve the disagreements. Indeed, there is an agreement in the literature that it is only the government that can regulate the tourism development by formulating tourism public policy with clear and implementable objectives and guidelines and make sure that the policies succeed and the sustainability of development is achieved (Elliott 1997; Hall 1994; Hall and Jenkins 1995). This is reflected in the IUOTO (1974) report which stated that: “it is necessary to centralize the policy making powers in the hands of the state so that it can take appropriate measures for creating a suitable framework for the promotion and development of tourism by the various sectors concerned.” This study fully concurs with these opinions.

But what about the reasons for studying the tourism public policy? As has been pointed out above, public policy making is first and foremost a political activity (Hall and Jenkins 1995), and tourism also is ‘a highly political phenomenon’ (Richter 1989). Dye (1992) points out that the focus of political science is shifting to public policy (to the description and explanation of the causes and consequences of government activity) and, thus, public policy can be studied for political purposes so as to ensure that the nation adopts the right policies to achieve the right goals. Governments and their critics have become more aware of, and interested in, the study of the process, outcomes and impacts of tourism public policies. Hence, the evaluation of government decisions, actions and programmes, and therefore of tourism public policy is receiving growing recognition. Public policy is influenced by the economic, social and cultural characteristics of society, as well as by the formal structures of government and other features of the political system. Public policy theory serves as the basis for explaining decision-making and policy-making processes, and for identifying the causal links between events. “A theory serves to direct one’s attention to particular features of the world, thus performing the essential task of distinguishing the significant from the irrelevant” (Brooks 1993). Policy research, and indeed, research throughout the sciences, can be built up on two main types of theory: that
which adopts prescriptive models and that which adopts descriptive models (Mitchell 1989). Prescriptive or normative models seek to demonstrate how policy-making should occur relative to pre-established standards, whereas descriptive models document the way in which the policy process actually occurs (Mitchell 1989). Prescriptive (normative) models serve as a guide to an ideal situation. However, a descriptive approach is preferred when exploring a new territory in a particular policy arena. Descriptive (positive) theories/models give rise to explanations about what happened during the decision making and policy making processes (see section 2.3.2). They help analysts to understand the effects that choice, power, perception, values and process have on policy-making. This study advocates a descriptive approach in the hope that among other things, it will provide an information base for future research.

2.2.2. Policy Implementation

Non implementation of policy means there has been a wastage of resources, time and expertise spent in formulating policy, expectations have been raised and not realized and the standing of managers, as well as political leaders, has been damaged, and, in addition, the problems which the policy was designed to solve may become more acute (Elliott 1997). This reflects the importance of recognizing the policy as process and including policy implementation as a major constituent of that process. The importance of implementation in the policy process has recently been given greater attention in the literature (e.g. Hill 1993; Turner and Hulme 1997; Grindle and Thomas 1991a; 1991b; Hogwood and Gunn 1993). According to Minogue (1993), implementation relates to ‘specified objectives’, the ‘translation into practice’ of the policies that emerge from the complex process of decision making.

Thinking about implementation has evolved from a starting point in which the translation of policy into action was seen as being, under normal circumstances, an unproblematic process so long as bureaucracies were clearly ‘subservient to their political masters’ (see Hill 1993). Grindle (1980) sees implementation as

“...an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of actors, the ultimate outcome of which is determined by the content of the programme being pursued and by the interaction of the decision makers within a politico-administrative context.”
The previous definition accords with the researcher’s views. However, in practice, implementation, as Elliott (1997) argues, “is one of the most difficult management tasks because of politics, power struggles, vested interests and rationality.”

The politics of implementation has been a special interest of Grindle over many years. There has been a persistent myth that anticipates implementation as it is simply about doing what has already been decided. Failure to implement is interpreted either as a lack of political will, or as weak institutional capacity. Much effort has gone into resolving the latter in programmes designed to strengthen institutions and to improve policy analysis. Grindle and Thomas (1991b) see that such efforts are necessary and often valuable but that they represent only a partial solution to the search for successful policy implementation. Perhaps the contention of Turner and Hulme best describes the necessary action at the political front:

“...We should move beyond the shrugging of shoulders accompanied by references to lack of political will and attempt to construct a politics of policy improvement, or actively encourage wider participation like the advocates of public action. The politics is not going to be removed from the policy process but it can be made to produce policies and outcomes which are more equitable and effective and which make more efficient use of scarce resources” (Turner and Hulme 1997).

Hogwood and Gunn (1993) discuss the preconditions, which would have to be satisfied if ‘perfect implementation’ was to be achieved. The principal of those preconditions relates to policy objectives.

“There should be complete understanding of, and agreement on, the objectives to be achieved, and that these conditions should persist throughout the implementation process” (Hogwood and Gunn 1993).

However, in the case of the tourism public policy in the NWC region of Egypt, the objectives were forgotten throughout the years and were replaced with other objectives especially because most of key officials were changed and replaced with others who had different values, interests and political motivations. That is in addition to the power struggles between different state organizations and even different departments of the same organization during the implementation phase (see Chapters 4 and 5). This accords to the view of Grindle (1980) that the implementation process
resources. It may even be the principal nexus of the interaction between the government and the citizenry, between public officials and their constituents.”

Moreover, the outcome of this competition and interaction can determine both the content and the impact of programmes established by government ‘elites’, and thus influence the course of a country’s development (Grindle 1980). Thus, in order to have any impact on decision making, then, many in both developed and developing countries have found the implementation phase of the policy process to be particularly suited to their needs. In attempts to acquire government goods and services, individuals and groups find it especially rewarding to focus their demand making efforts on officials and agencies empowered to distribute benefits, or on politicians who may have influence on individual allocations (ibid.).

Therefore, implementation is not easy and straightforward and cannot be simply classified as a technical exercise involving calculated choices of appropriate techniques (Turner and Hulme 1997).

“Implementation is frequently a highly political process” (ibid.).

By emphasizing the importance of choices and decision making, it is not meant to suggest that the implementation process is entirely predictable and always capable of management, nor it is claimed that all possible influences on it are considered in this research. What is considered here is to present a general explanation of the dynamics of implementation and decision making in the NWC region, indicating where important types of choices cluster in the process.

Often, in practice, the process of implementation leads to outcomes quite different than those intended and anticipated by analysts and decision-makers. Review of the literature of implementation only suggests this complexity, focuses on examples of faulty implementation, and most important, provides little guidance to those directly involved.

‘What is implemented may be the result of a political calculus of interests and groups competing for scarce resources’ (Grindle 1980).

Meikle (1992) demonstrates her understanding of what leads to variable performance in projects assigned to solve some human settlement problems in Egypt and Iraq. She concludes that central to the performance of projects is the ‘operational environment’
(socio-economic, political and cultural) in which it is carried out. Such operational environment is influenced by two sets of interconnected variables, the dynamic and contextual. The dynamic set comprises the actors involved with planning and management, together with their motivations. The contextual variable comprises a number of subsidiary variables, four of which can be summarized under the headings political, institutional, cultural, and individual. All of them can change over time and are sometimes affected by chance circumstances. According to Meikle (1987), the most valuable projects are those which contribute in broad terms to a developing country’s overall development and in specific terms to the needs of its (the project’s) beneficiaries.

Traditionally, when the outcomes of policies were found to be different from what policies aimed to achieve, this has been narrowly regarded to ill procedures of governments, institutional capacities and/or behavioral norms of public officials. The words of Grindle (1980) have explained these beliefs:

“Explicit considerations of the frequent disparity between goals and outcomes in the implementation of public policy, however, have tended to focus more narrowly on the administrative apparatus and procedures of implementing bureaucracies or on the characteristics of bureaucratic officials. There has been little attention given linking characteristics of policy and programmes to their subsequent implementation of the political regimes in which they are pursued, or to exploring the general nature of implementation in the Third World” (Grindle 1980).

This reflects the importance of understanding the political and institutional contexts within which policies are formulated and implemented (see Chapter 3). Several studies in Grindle (1980) indicate that the process of implementation may vary considerably depending upon whether the political regime is an authoritarian one, or a more open system where elections impose a greater degree of responsiveness on both political and administrative officials and limit the capacity for imposed solutions. Therefore, Grindle and Thomas (1991b) developed an interactive model of implementation that contrasts with the linear model that is frequently implicit in efforts to bring about changed policy and institutional contexts for development. This linear model (Figure 2.4) has encouraged international agencies to support substantial efforts to strengthen policy analysis in countries of the South in the expectation that good analysis will translate into good decision making and thus into good policy.
International financial and development agencies also make implicit use of the linear model of reform in their dealings with developing country\(^5\) governments. Their strategy for influencing the decision process is consistent, whether it is called structural adjustment, programmes lending, conditionality, leverage, or policy dialogue.

The approach is straightforward: the donor will lend or grant funds if the recipient agrees to make certain policy reforms. Once a decision to change policy is made by the recipient government, donors tend to consider that their job is largely accomplished. While the central element in the interactive model developed by Grindle and Thomas (1991b) is that policy reform initiative may be altered or reversed at any stage in its life cycle by the pressures and reactions of those who oppose it. Unlike the linear model, the interactive model (Figure 2.5) views policy reform as process, one in which interested parties can exert pressure for change at many points. Some interests may be more effective in influencing high level officials in government, others at affecting the managers of the implementation process or those who control the resources needed for implementation. Understanding the location, strength, and stakes involved in these attempts to promote, alter, or reverse policy reform initiatives is central to understanding the outcomes.

\(^5\) The definitions of Developing countries, less developed countries, the Third World, Countries of the South are now being updated and still under question.
In short, Grindle and Thomas (1991b) have suggested an alternative approach that may increase the probabilities of implementing reforms as planned. Their framework requires looking at policy reforms as a long-term process of decision making, and it focuses attention on the fact that all policy reforms will encounter antagonistic reactions, which acknowledges how central the implementation process is to politics.
2.2.3. Tourism Policy Evaluation

The literature on evaluation is extensive, but there is no widely accepted definition of evaluation (Hall and Jenkins 1995). Thus, evaluative studies vary greatly in their comprehensiveness, methodologies, and analysis of data. Although definitions of evaluation confine evaluation to the ‘what happened after the policy was implemented phase’, policy evaluation, as Hall and Jenkins (1995) argue:

“must go beyond simply measuring outcomes and impacts with respect to goals and objectives. Evaluation of policy must consider why who got what and where, and the outcomes and impacts of policy” (ibid.).

Hogwood and Gunn (1984) argue that to evaluate the policy in terms of its original objectives might lead to a conclusion that the policy was a failure, yet this might be misleading since the policy, as originally envisaged, might not actually have been put into effect. Policy failure or success could be the result of various aspects of policy design (e.g. ambiguous statements of objectives and intent), policy implementation (e.g. bureaucratic discretion or uncontrollable global forces), or from unforeseen forces (e.g. economic, political and social) creating changes in public need6.

In the case of tourism policies, Jenkins and Sorensen (1994) argue that it is difficult to assess the merits of government investments in regional tourism development and other such programmes, not least because their effects:

“...They will often be substantially influenced by a vast number of exogenous factors, many of which are beyond the control of any government, and they involve opportunity costs which are difficult to measure” (ibid.).

Nevertheless, such factors are rarely taken into account in the tourism public policy evaluation. There is also a real possibility that many tourism policies will be deemed to have failed if they are assessed simply in terms of their primary objectives, yet they may have generated positive benefits overall. However, Elliott (1997) argues that the ‘ultimate test of performance’ of tourism policies is the ‘impact of tourism’ that can be measured and evaluated after the policy is implemented.

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6 Refer to Wuyts (1992) for definitions of public need. It is necessary to note Wuyts’s argument that ‘the state does not define public need for people or on their behalf. Rather, public need is defined through active participation, or exclusion, of various groups in society’.
Rossi et al (1979) discuss four main features or categories of evaluation of tourism policies. First, government intervention is a response to a problem to which research effort is directed in terms of assessing and specifying the degree of need for policy and action. Second, there are questions pertaining to monitoring, as information is required on the policy process. Third, at some stage evaluation must be given to specifying policy outcomes and impacts. Finally, questions may be raised regarding the efficiency of tourism policy and its opportunity costs. Hence, the evaluation of policy is not easy. As mentioned above, the actual intention of government to intervene may be hidden behind several political and socio-economic interests. The information required on the policy process is determined by the criteria adapted by analysts and can sometimes be misleading. Moreover, the opportunity cost of tourism development is very difficult to measure. However, policy evaluation in terms of specifying policy impacts and outcomes with respect to its perceived objectives may throw some light on the success or failure of the policy.

The evaluation of policy means, according to Mayer and Greenwood (1980), to see to what extent the original goals have been fulfilled:

“...the evaluation of policy outcomes involves their inherent comparison with objectives” (ibid.)

However, as Mayer and Greenwood (1980) note, objectives are not the means by which goals are attained, they are the operational expressions of goals. The question whether, and if so, how far, results achieved staged goals is central to evaluation of tourism public policies especially because, and as Sussman (1980) argues, that difference in perspective can change the criteria by which success is measured. According to Bracken (1981) the concept of policy must embrace both the intention of achievement and the outcome of a particular intention. Any attempt to analyze a policy situation must begin by recognizing these components. Therefore, this study while recognizing the several dimensions of policy evaluation, centers its evaluation of the tourism policy in the NWC region of Egypt to whether the policy was successful in meeting its pre-identified objectives. The following section discusses how policies are translated to action to achieve their objectives.
2.2.4. From Policy to Action: Policies, Programmes and Projects

Public policies (broad statements of goals, objectives, and means) are translated to action programmes that aim to achieve the ends stated in the policy (Grindle 1980). Action programmes themselves may be disaggregated into more specific projects to be administered. The intent of action programmes and individual projects is to cause a change in the policy environment; a change that can be considered an outcome of the programme. As a consequence, the study of the process of policy implementation almost necessarily involves investigation and analysis of concrete action programmes that have been designed as a means of achieving broader policy goals.

“The successes and failures are the outcomes of specific programmes but they also serve as partial measures of the success or failure of overall policy implementation” (Grindle 1980).

This statement completely concurs with the researcher’s view. For example, a general statement that the tourism policy of the government is to develop the NWC region of Egypt may be translated into a policy of providing government aid to infrastructure development and implementing pilot projects. This in turn may be translated into a policy of providing transportation and water facilities to these areas. At this last phase of definition, the terms: policy and programme are frequently used interchangeably. In addition, because policy implementation is considered to depend on programme outcomes, it is difficult to separate the fate of policies from that of their constituent programmes. Therefore, implementation is considered to be a general process of administrative action that can be investigated at the specific programme level (Grindle 1980). Its success or failure can be evaluated in terms of the capacity actually to deliver programmes as designed. In turn, overall policy implementation can be evaluated by measuring programme outcomes against policy goals. The same is true for projects where policy and programme implementation can be evaluated by measuring projects’ outcomes.

Projects offer more advantages than programmes to implement policy. Projects are seen as an instrument of development administration. They may not only be effective in implementing infrastructure or physical construction activities, but in managing social and human development as well. According to Rondinelli (1983a) projects have

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7 In the case of the NWC region, the pilot projects implemented by the government are Marakia, Marabella and Marina El-Alamein, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.
become an important instrument of international assistance and of development administration because they seem to offer major advantages over other forms of planning and management. The project is bounded in time and cost, and unlike programmes it must be completed within a given period and within a limited budget. They are more attractive to international agencies, to central planning and finance ministries and private organizations to inform policy. Projects end when their objectives are reached or when they have expended their allocated resources, while programmes often continue indefinitely. Rondinelli (1983a) points out that recognizing that all development projects are policy experiments is one way of coping with "uncertainty, complexity and ignorance" if control-oriented planning and management are neither effective nor appropriate in coping with them. Improving the relationship between projects and programmes is necessary to implement policy. Policies are translated to action through projects where a pilot project is usually utilized to test the new ideas incorporated in the policy. According to Rondinelli (1983b) projects can be defined narrowly as financial investments or broadly as organized activities for promoting social and economic change. Sussman (1980) sees pilot projects as a useful means to test ideas, to develop technical, organizational, and "behavioral knowledge," and to save on resources. He contends that if the pilot project is successful, it could provide a model for the further design of broader implementation efforts. Pilot projects can test the applicability, feasibility and acceptability of innovations in new environments and if succeeded, they can then extend the innovation range (Rondinelli, 1983a). Pilot projects are usually small scale, highly exploratory, risky ventures that do not always provide immediate or direct economic returns. Usually pilot projects perform valuable political functions by allowing governments to test new ideas or methods under local conditions without committing national leaders to large-scale, uncertain ventures, the failure of which would threaten their prestige and political support (ibid.).

Effective policy implementation is rarely realized when projects are not part of a programme. Programmes are important because they can monitor the objectives of projects. Programmes rely on projects to inform policies because projects are more attractive and are better instruments of implementation, but without a programme projects could do little to implement policy. It is obvious that projects offer major advantages over programmes, but realizing this can improve the relationship between
projects and programmes as well as trying to shape up programmes that could have the advantages of projects.

One way of improving the relationship between projects and programmes is taking a project and building others around it to shape up a programme. Chapter 4 presents the case study of a pilot project (Marakia) in tourism development in the NWC region of Egypt. It was designed to implement the tourism public policy of the NWC region. In this context, the project has been focusing on a specified group of beneficiaries in a specific location (the NWC region) to channel development resources to the group. The Marakia project aimed at offering recreation facilities for the region’s suppressed inhabitants who do not have access to the Mediterranean beaches; as well as to stimulate and act as an example for other private sector tourism projects. The ability of projects to focus on specified group of beneficiaries is offering a special advantage, as Rondinelli (1983:b) points out, to public and private organizations because projects have the ability to be flexible in targeting specific groups. Unlike most programmes that usually lack such flexibility (ibid.), especially if they are strongly influenced by an "entrenched clientele." However, if the project was a part of a programme, it will still have the advantage it offers to these organizations in addition to the advantages of programmes especially in being comprehensive. Rondinelli (1983:b) points out that interest groups often form "coalitions" to maintain programmes in existence regardless of their effectiveness or the degree to which they meet their goals. He adds that once they develop a sphere of influence over programmes, these coalitions often exclude other potential interests from sharing in the benefits of the programme. Rondinelli’s observation has been found in the case of the NWC region as Chapter 5 points out. The interest groups8 in the NWC were able to deviate the course of policy implementation for their benefits and accordingly this impacted policy outcome.

Rondinelli, (1983:a) argues that planning projects "incrementally and adaptively" happens by disaggregating problems and formulating responses through a process of decision making that joins "learning with action", where alternative courses of action can evolve through what Korten (1981) considers to be the three basic stages of

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8 Interest groups in the NWC region include housing cooperative societies, members of the community who formulated coalitions to protect their land, owners of stone quarries who wanted to protect their economic activities from tourism development and environmentalists who have been concerned with conserving the natural environment.
learning. The first is learning to be effective in assisting intended beneficiaries to improve their living conditions. The second is learning to be efficient in eliminating ineffective, unnecessary, overly costly or adverse activities. The third is learning to expand the application of effective methods by creating appropriate and responsive organizations to carry out development tasks. The Marabella and Marina projects that were implemented prior to the Marakia project are good examples of taking a project and building others around it to form a programme. However, the implementation of Marabella and Marina had been influenced by the financial returns that Marakia had achieved to the government rather than its success to implement and inform policy as argued in Chapter 5. The government had been focusing on the ‘return’ on its investment and neglected the wider social and environmental goals of the tourism public policy of the NWC region. If Marakia, Marabella, and Marina were implemented as part of a programme, the implementation of the tourism public policy of the NWC would have been more effective.

The three basic stages of learning, mentioned above, are a way of improving the relationship between projects and programmes. Learning about implementation of policies and strategies by using pilot and experimental projects is necessary to respond to policies or to build up a new one. It is preferable for international assistance agencies, to central planning and finance ministries and to private organizations to use projects rather than programmes to inform policies (Rondinelli, 1983:b). Therefore programmes in the form of projects could gain the necessary support. It is important to point out the importance of preparing the development administration with technical and managerial assistance for eventual take over of the project. Staff training and exposure to new methods and techniques may be of substantial benefit even if the project prove inconclusive. Rondinelli (1983a) argues that if pilot projects change cultural norms or values, diffuse new technologies or methods, or increase the willingness of people to consider new ideas, they may well be worth their cost if they did not achieve enough financial returns. Encouraging staff to accept broader responsibilities and commitments than those prescribed by their functional roles is necessary to achieve what Rondinelli (1983:b) calls the "organic structure.” He argues that organizations must be structured deliberately to promote innovation, creativity, and responsiveness under conditions of uncertainty.
Analysis of the implementation of specific policies may imply assessing the power capabilities of the actors, their interests and the strategies for achieving them, and the characteristics of the regime in which they interact. For example, a policy’s success may easily be affected by the priorities of political officials and an agency’s commitment to one policy rather than another, or its decision to expand the number of targeted beneficiaries without expanding the amount of resources available, may lead quickly to an inability to achieve policy objectives. Thus, this study attempts to move from the policy making phase to policy implementation and examine the fierce political battles, which can be fought at this stage in the policy process. A brief listing of those who might be involved in the implementation of any particular policy would include national level planners; national, regional and local politicians; economic elite groups, especially at the local level, recipient groups and bureaucratic implementers at middle and lower levels. Each may have a particular interest in the policy and each may seek to achieve it by making demands on allocation procedures. Frequently, the goals of the actors will be in direct conflict with each other and the outcomes of this conflict and consequently of who gets what, will be determined by the strategies, resources and power positions of each of the actors involved (Grindle 1980). Therefore, rather than treating implementation as the transmission of policy into a series of consequential actions, the policy-action relationship needs to be regarded as ‘a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends’ (Barrett and Fudge 1981). As mentioned above, the policy content is considerably affected by the political context of implementation. Organizational, administrative and management factors also affect implementation. However, the primary focus of this study is not these, but the complexities of power, influence, manipulation and coercion that condition who gets what in terms of the benefits of distributive and re-distributive policies. Accordingly, political expediency could be outlined.

2.3. The Politics of the Tourism Policy Process
As mentioned before, in order to understand the tourism policy process, it is necessary to relate it to the political system and the power structure of a society as a whole because policy is the product of the exercise of political influence. According to Dahl (1970), a political system:
“is any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power and the rule of authority.”

Each particular policy development should also be set within the context of a policy arena in which interest groups (e.g. industry associations, conservation groups and community groups), institutions (e.g. government departments and agencies responsible for tourism), significant individuals (e.g. high profile industry representatives) and the institutional leadership (e.g. Ministers responsible for the tourism portfolio and senior members of government departments) interact and compete in determining tourism policy choices (Hall 1994). However, in highlighting the competing aspirations of the actors within the policy making process one is also forced to recognize the existence of the broader environment within which policy making occurs and which includes institutional arrangements, values and power arrangements. Hall (1994) points out the different elements in the tourism policy process as shown in Figure 2.6.

![Figure 2.6. Elements in the tourism policy making process](Image)

Source: Hall, (1994)

A consideration of actors and the system of constraints that impinges upon these actors is central to an understanding of the behavior and performance of public organizations. Indeed, Crozier (1964) argues that ‘the behavior and attitudes of people
and groups within an organization cannot be explained without reference to the power relationships existing among them’. Similarly, Crenson (1971) noted, ‘political issues have an organizational aspect’. Hence, attempts to connect the substance of tourism policy to the process of tourism policy making require the adoption of analytical techniques that merge organizational analysis with policy analysis (Jenkins 1978).

Therefore the study of power arrangements is a vital part of the analysis of tourism policy because power governs the interaction of individuals, organizations and agencies influencing, or trying to influence, the formulation of tourism policy and the manner in which it is implemented. Tourism is therefore part of the struggle for the control of space and time in which social groups are continually engaged, “a struggle in which the dominant group seeks to legitimate, through statute and administrative fiat, its understanding of the appropriate use of space and time, and the subordinate groups resist this control through individual rebellion and collective action” (Wilson 1988 cited by Hall 1994).

Attempts to define and describe power are complex. To identify some key areas of power⁹, Lukes (1986) raises three questions to help such identification. These questions relate first to the interests of the actors and groups involved; second, to their abilities to control each other; and, third, to the distribution effects of power, that is, who receives what. Locating power among these different groups is, however, problematic because of the many actors involved (Collins 1996). Lukes (1986) suggests identifying sources of change as a way of identifying the location of power. These, he argues, constitute exposure points where power is used to either resist or instigate change and will therefore determine the extent to which individuals or agencies could have engendered and set upon a new path (cited by Collins 1996).

In the light of the elements of the policy process shown in Figure 2.6, this section discusses the politics of tourism development; that is, the use of power by public organizations in their management of tourism development. The section extends to examine the role of values and interests in the tourism policy process. It also discusses the role of government and state institutions. Governments control the industry and its activities in order to ‘ensure that activities and safety standards are maintained in the

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⁹ This study concentrates on the practice of power, rather than power as an abstract philosophic notion.
public interest’ (Elliott 1997). Ensuring the adherence of such general principles and priorities as public interest, public service, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability is the responsibility of government, as Elliott (1997) for example argues, (which accords with the researcher’s views) while the private sector has its own principles and priorities.

It can be relatively easy to describe why governments are involved in and how they manage tourism development (see Appendix II). However, the real significance of government’s management of tourism development can only be assessed by an evaluation of its performance (Elliott 1997). It is an evaluation of the role of government officials, leaders, politicians, and managers, in addition to the evaluation of the results achieved and policy outcomes. Grindle (1980) argues that the determination of who is to receive government goods and services and the degree to which they will benefit from them is crucially affected by political factors. For example, the commitment of national, regional, or local officials to the policies and projects under consideration may be of utmost importance.

Appropriate tourism policy decisions are dependent on knowledge of how such decisions are made in the real world of policy and how they are, in turn, implemented (Hall 1994). It therefore becomes vital that further studies are undertaken which illustrate how policies are made and whose interests they favour, studies that examine tourism policy formulation and implementation within the framework of power, values, institutional arrangements and interests. This is what this research attempts to fulfil.

2.3.1. Politics and Power

As mentioned in Chapter 1, decisions affecting tourism policy, the nature of government involvement in tourism, the structure of tourist organizations, and the nature of tourism development evolve from a political process. This process involves the values of actors (individuals, interest groups, and public and private organizations) in a struggle for power.

According to Hall (1994), there are five major elements to politics. First it is concerned with the activity of making decisions in and for a collection of people, whether it be a small group, a community, an organization or a nation. Secondly it is
about decisions and the various policies and ideologies, which help establish the various choices which affect decisions. *Thirdly*, it is concerned with the question of who makes the decisions, one person, or an elite, and how representative they are. *Fourthly*, politics is interested in the processes by which decisions are made and the various institutions within which they are made. *Finally*, politics is concerned with how decisions are implemented and applied to the community.

Therefore, tourism politics is mainly about decisions concerning types and numbers of tourists, choice of attractions and destinations, the relationships between the tourism sector with all other economic sectors, who decides, who manages the development, how tourism can be managed and implemented, and who benefits and who loses in the process. These decisions have been, and as this study argues, should remain, the responsibility of governments. However, the implications of government intervention in formulating tourism policies and managing tourism development in the NWC region of Egypt are not encouraging, as shown in this research. Thus, what should be considered is determining the extent of government involvement in managing tourism development, establishing the framework within which public and private sectors can perform, and allocating the tasks among the different state organizations. For example, politics, as mentioned above, is about power in its various forms, and local governments, for instance, try to reconcile the various conflicting power groups and forces within the local administrative system as well as in the local community. Although upper tier governments have almost all the power, financial and legal, that power has to be used with caution (Elliott 1997), for local governments have authority, as this study advocates, as the legitimate legal representatives of the local people.

Government and ministers establish the objectives of policy but these are not always clear and can be contradictory. Political considerations, as Elliott (1997) argues, can take precedence over rational policy and consistency. Caiden (1991) puts it more strongly, ‘in the public sector¹⁰, political values have always overridden managerial values.’ Long term management objectives in practice can be displaced for short-term political advantage. For example, as Hall (1994) argues, that at times political leaders

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will push ahead with projects and investment without an efficient appraisal of the economic and social benefits to the local community. Elliott (1997) argues that it is difficult to gauge the benefits from tourism investment, and often-political leaders are more interested in gaining political benefits from projects rather than evaluating their efficiency.

The study of politics and power involves investigating the allocation of political power in society and the impact of the political system on the structure and performance of institutions (Bates 1995). However, the very notion of power, one of the cornerstones of political analysis, is an ineradicably evaluative and essentially contested concept (Gallie 1955, cited by Hall 1994). Power, as Dugger (1992) suggests, refers to:

> “the ability to tell other people what to do with some degree of certainty that they will do it.”

For the purposes of this study, power can be understood as:

> “the ability to influence change for private and/or public gains”

(Salem 1997).

Ideas of power have been little explored in tourism studies (Britton 1991; Hall and Jenkins 1995), yet the concept of power is a central concept in the social sciences including tourism studies. In addition, tourism policy formulation and implementation are undertaken within institutional and organizational contexts. In this case,

> “the behavior and attitudes of people and groups within an organization cannot be explained without reference to the power relationships existing among them” Crozier (1964).

Therefore, research on tourism policy needs to connect the substance of tourism to the process of policy-making including the relationship between power, structure, and values (Hall and Jenkins 1995). This research attempts to illustrate the relationship of the politics of national and local tourism development and highlights the significance of local elites, the allocation of power, institutional arrangements, and significant individuals in the tourism development process.

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11 In the context of tourism development, Hall (1994) defines power as including the ownership of land, financial sources, input from local people, and the relation of local traditions to tourism development projects.

12 It has to be noted that the value position of the researcher will have an enormous bearing on the results of any research.
2.3.2. Understanding Public Policy: Values and Interests

Much current theorizing about development policy making begins with an assumption of narrowly defined self interest as the basis of all political action (Grindle and Thomas 1991b), an assumption that leads to pessimistic conclusions about the potential for change and the ability of policy elites and citizens to conceptualize and act upon some broader vision of the public interest. Grindle and Thomas (1991b) explain the perceptions and behavior of policy elites and the constraints on their actions. They recognize that a systematic understanding of the values, experiences, and perceptions of policy elites and the historical, political and institutional context within which they operate is essential for policy analysis. Hall and Jenkins (1995) also argue that value and value change ‘lie at the heart of our understanding of public policy’.

Grindle and Thomas (1989) constructed a typology of policy models to explain why some policies have been effective in one place and not in others, and policy success in one sector contrasts with failure elsewhere. Such policy models attempt to explain “policy behavior,” especially the apparent paradoxes in that behavior. Grindle and Thomas (1989) draw a distinction between society centered and state centered models of policy change. In society centered models, explanations of the policy process are based in terms of the power relations between social groups. The mechanics of decision-making take a minor role. By contrast, in state-centered models, analysis focuses on ‘decision making within the organizational context of the state’ (ibid.). The decision maker is awarded ‘considerably more capacity for choice’ while societal constraints are less emphasized as investigators debate complex actor motivation and delve into the organizational politics of the state (see also Turner and Hulme 1997). Both models serve to explain the performance of the policy process in the NWC region of Egypt.

In society-centered models, there are three modes of analysis. First, the social class analysis where policy is the outcome of the conflicts between social classes. A major concern is to delineate dominant and subordinate classes. Policy is seen as the prerogative of the former and is one method of securing the reproduction of the

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13 Grindle and Thomas (1991b) use the term policy elites to refer to those who have official positions in government and whose responsibilities include making or participating in making and implementing authoritative decisions for society.
existing inequitable societal relations of the capitalist mode of production. The state is seen in this mode as an instrument of domination used by the ruling classes and policy is a reflection of dominant class interests.

The second mode of analysis is the pluralism approach\(^\text{14}\) where public policy results from the conflict, bargaining and coalition formation among a potentially large number of societal groups, organized to protect or advance particular interests common to their members. Turner and Hulme (1997) describe this model as an idealized model of Western democracy (as in the USA), in which assumptions are made about power being widely distributed among a variety of groups, and that channels for expression of grievances are numerous and open. Pluralism, as Hall and Jenkins (1995) point out, refers to the belief that power is relatively dispersed in a society and the policy-making institutions are open to influence by a wide range of interest groups. As a result, political decisions are reached through a process of bargaining, negotiation, and compromise between the various interests involved where power is, therefore, diffused through a society.

Third, Myrdal’s public choice\(^\text{15}\) perspective whose basic assumption about political society as being composed of organized interests (see also Buchanan 1986). These interests are concerned with obtaining access to public resources. The benefits are frequently referred to as ‘rents’ where a particular group or individual obtains some form of preferment from the state. Both elected and non-elected officials facilitate favored access to public goods, services, and regulations. Elected public officials who are fundamentally concerned with remaining in power are interested in capturing favored status in the distribution of resources in society (Ames 1987; Anderson and Hayami 1986). In order to do so they consciously seek to provide benefits to a range of interests they believe will help them retain office. They systematically favor certain

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\(^{14}\) Pluralism was closely identified with the work of Robert Dahl, who has remained central to its evolution, “where power and resources should be evenly distributed throughout societies”. (For further reference, see Atkinson and Moon 1994).

\(^{15}\) Gunnar Myrdal (1898-1987) has made a substantial contribution to the analysis of the extent of state intervention. He anticipated the public choice theory of political behavior, inclining the role of pressure groups and deadweight losses arising from what came to be known as rent-seeking activities. Myrdal is often regarded as an advocate of central planning and heavy state controls of the economy. The approach favored by Myrdal is one of neither Soviet authority and force exercised for central state planning, nor of capitalist laissez faire, but of a third way. That of combining the use of prices for economic and social purposes, with a direct attack on attitudes and institutions (and on overcoming obstacles and inhibitions) (Streeten 1993).
interests over others; and they maximize their returns from the allocations of public expenditures, goods, services and state regulation as a way of attracting and rewarding supporters (Anderson and Hayami 1986; Bates 1981).

In short, elected public officials seek to use public resources to stay in power where the resources of the state become a “weapon for survival” (Ames 1987). Non-elected officials, also respond to the pushing and hauling of interest groups because they can derive rents from providing favored access to public goods, services and regulations (Colander 1984). Politics, then, is the sum total of individuals seeking special advantage through public policy and individual officials seeking to benefit from public offices through re-election and rents (Grindle and Thomas 1991b).

In short, the public choice theory is based on the view that people are rational, self-interested, opportunistic, maximizers (Larmour 1990). The difference between pluralist and public choice approaches, as Turner and Hulme (1997) point out,

> “is the perception of politics. The former sees wise policy resulting from competing interest groups, while the latter has no illusions about politics, characterizing it negatively as an often cynical and always self-interested struggle for resources.”

As for the state-centered models, it includes three approaches. First, the rational actor that shares with public choice the belief that actors behave as rational choosers between alternative courses of action. But the rational actor model does not assume the actors’ preoccupation with self-interest, which takes such a central role in public choice. Also, the focus of both analysis and action in rational actor models is on the decision-makers and the decision process and not on the societal players. They take supporting roles in this approach.

> “In its pure form the rational actor model involves a sequence in which goals are identified, translated into objectives and prioritized. Alternative course of action for achieving the objectives are evaluated, chosen, and implemented. It is the stuff of a perfect world in which there are no constraints in time, resources, and knowledge. It is an ideal type model which is never achieved although we have regularly encountered planners who aspire to reach some approximation of this scientific approach in their own work” (Turner and Hulme 1997).

Saasa (1985) notes that public policy making cannot be fully covered by the rational actor modes as it does not do full justice to the complexity and turbulence of the environments in which decision makers operate.
Second, the bureaucratic politics model which views the structure of the state as an arena in which public officials engage in political maneuvers to secure desired policy outcomes. They, as Clay and Schaffer (1984) describe, build coalitions, bargain, compromise, co-opt, guard information and devise strategies in order to further their personal or organizational objectives. The objective, as Turner and Hulme (1997) argue, is control over the policy process in areas, which are of particular concern to the actors involved.

Finally, the state interests approach, which moves away from the micro-political processes occurring between public officials and adopts a broader perspective in which ‘the state appears to have some autonomy in defining the nature of public problems and developing solutions to them’ (Grindle and Thomas 1989). The state is seen to have interests. These state interests can refer to any aspect of human activity. Different degrees of autonomy and perhaps different interests vis-a-vis those of societal actors (Turner and Hulme 1997). This approach recognizes that the nature of state-society relations is of great concern, as this will determine the degree of autonomy of policy elites in the state.

Table 2.1 summarizes the models for explaining the paradoxes in the performance and behavior of public policy and their relevance to the tourism public policy in the NWC.

| Society Centered Models | | State Centered Models |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Social Class | Policy is an instrument of domination used by the ruling class | Public institutions utilized policy to get access to land ownership in the NWC. |
| | Pluralism (an ideal model) | No relevance to the Egyptian case. |
| | Public Choice | Upper tier officials controlled policy outcomes |
| | Public Choice | The state defines the societal problems and solves them |
| | Public Choice | No relevance to the Egyptian case |
| | Public Choice | State Interests |
| | Public Choice | State Interests |
The above discussion shows that there are many models that have been applied to the policy process. Some are society centered and focus on the interplay between societal actors. Others are state centered and emphasize the interactions of those involved in the decision making of the policy process. Yet, both perspectives have explanatory validity and that elements of both need to be combined to illuminate the nature of the policy process in any specific country. As for the case of this study, the NWC region of Egypt, much of the public choice mode of analysis explains the policy process in the region as the following chapters illustrate. The findings of the research supports the public choice view, or what Mackintosh (1992) calls the ‘private interest state’ where politicians, voters, civil servants are all assumed to act solely in their own interests. ‘They pursue individual gain not the public good’, as Mackintosh (1992) explains. However, Mackintosh (1992) notes that this is not to assume that politicians and state officials are corrupt:

“On the contrary, the proponents of this view tend to argue that to pursue one’s own interests is an acceptable and indeed morally valuable approach to life. They associate the idea with a much more favorable view of competitive markets” (ibid.)

Therefore, this study acknowledges that human agents construct policy and we need to understand their behavior. For this we need to appreciate that these agents have multiple, often conflicting and sometimes changing political goals (Turner and Hulme 1997) and that they may enter and exit the policy process at different stages, and can be replaced by others who have different values and goals.

When selecting certain tourism policies, decision-makers are also choosing between different sets of values, and these values differ between officials in central and local governments. Therefore, government bodies who delegate the task of regulating and determining the nature of tourism development are involved in the process of value choice. Therefore, for the purposes of this study,

“Values are ends, goals, interests, beliefs, ethics, biases, attitudes, traditions, morals and objectives that change with human perception and with time, and that have a significant influence on power conflicts relating to policy” (Henning 1974).

16 This view of the state faces another view, which is the ‘public interest view of the state’ which has been terminally undermined. Refer to Mackintosh (1992) for further discussion.
Public policies are, therefore, representative of value choices (Hall and Jenkins 1995). For example, to declare an area a wilderness park rather than allow mining to occur may represent the dominance of environmental values over economic values. Therefore, value and value change lie at the heart of the understanding of tourism and public policy. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 1, public policy analysis requires untangling the interaction of values, interests and resources, specify how they are shaped by prevailing organizational arrangements and explore the way politics can intervene to confirm or upset the expected results (Davis et al 1993).

Political expediency, therefore, is manifested when the actors involved in the policy process seek special advantage through public policy and individual officials seek to benefit from public offices through re-election and rents. These issues are necessary to understand the performance of the tourism public policy of the NWC region. Policy analysis needs to be carried out within the framework of power arrangements, values, interests and institutional arrangements, which will be explained next.

2.3.3. Tourism and State Institutions
In order to understand the tourism public policy, it is necessary to have some understanding of, and make reference to, the institutional arrangements where tourism policy is formulated and implemented. Such frameworks, as Hall and Jenkins (1995) argue, vary significantly between countries and between policy sectors within an individual country.

‘These differences affect how political conflict is expressed, what strategies individuals and groups will employ in attempting to influence policy, and the weight that policy makers ascribe to particular social and economic interests’ (Brooks 1993).

Hall and Jenkins (1995) view institutional arrangements as a “filter that mediates and expresses the play of conflicting social and economic forces in society.” In addition, Britton (1993) argues that “policy making is filtered through a complex institutional framework”. The institutional framework mediates conflict by providing a set of rules and procedures that regulates how and where demands on public policy can be made? Who has the authority to take certain decisions and actions? And how decisions and policies are implemented? It also expresses conflict in that institutions and relationships comprising the state system reflect and adapt to the broader pattern of social and economic forces (Brooks 1993). The recognition of institutional
arrangements for public policy, as Pal (1992) points out, highlights the fact that politics and policy making have many distinct characteristics and dynamics that cannot simply be explained away as secondary to economic or other forces.

Dugger (1992) sees power as derived from institutions. Salem (1997) points out that in order to understand power; the relation between individuality and institutional structure should be analyzed. He argues that in each society there exists a dominant cluster of institutions and other clusters of subordinate institutions. Institutional clusters can be religious, military, political, or educational. In this approach, Salem (1997) points out that a society is a network of linked institutions that are clustered around general functions and linked to the dominant cluster. Institutional domination is dynamic and varies according to other circumstances. For example, the military would be the dominant cluster during war. Dugger (1992) calls this a structure of institutional hegemony\(^\text{17}\), and argues that ‘power of individuals is institutionally determined’.

In the case of Egypt, after the 1973 war with Israel, the Ministry of Reconstruction became a dominant institution being the leader of “the great post war upswell of enthusiasm for reconstruction of the war-ravaged areas” (see Welbank 1982) as Chapters 3, 4 and 5 discuss in further detail. In the case of individuals outside the dominant institutional cluster, they can still gain power by creating some informal links of conjoint interests with people inside the dominant institution. Institutional change and reorganization property rights are strongly forced by those powerful individuals inside and outside the dominant institutional cluster. Such reorganization alters the distribution of wealth and political power and will normally be in favor of, as Salem (1997) suggests, the already established power structure. Moreover, in order to ensure a symbiotic relation between the dominant cluster and the apex of power, powerful individuals inside and outside the dominant cluster who are known to be loyal and trustworthy to the apex of power are awarded by being installed in key executive positions of civil administration system like city mayors or governors. This structure conditions many of intergovernmental relations and is particularly obvious.

\(^{17}\) Pellicani (1981) explains that hegemony is nothing more than a conceptualization of the observation that the supremacy of one class over others relies on a tight net of intellectual and moral relations that involve a capacity for determined leadership on the one hand and more or less spontaneous acceptance of this leadership on the other (cited by Hall 1994).
in the Egyptian case. ‘Central government, rather than local voters, choose the municipal political executive’, as Dillinger (1994) points out, while elected councils are often permitted, but function in a purely advisory role. The direct appointment of municipal executives is still the pattern in many cities in countries of the South, including Egypt. Dillinger (1994) refers to such type of local government as ‘over controlled’ where allocation of municipal expenditure, municipal revenues, and sectoral composition and size of local government budget are controlled by the center.

With respect to tourism, Lanfant (1980) points out that the tourism industry with its different branches in the originating and receiving societies “should not be regarded as a system of action that can operate autonomously, independently of established political power”. On one hand there are numerous interactions that exists between them, and “states are led to play an increasingly active part in this connection” (ibid.). However, the extent of the state’s role in tourism varies according to the conditions and circumstances peculiar to each country (politic-economic-constitutional system, socio-economic development, degree of tourism development) (IOUTO 1974). On the other hand, the state can be conceptualized as a set of officials with their own preferences and capacities to affect public policy, or in more structural terms, as a relatively permanent set of political institutions operating in relation to civil society (Nordlinger 1981); where the state itself includes many institutions with several agendas, numerous interests, different goals and political powers. Miliband (1973), for example, points out that the term ‘State’ actually stands for a number of institutions, including government (central, local and other levels of government), government business enterprises, administration, judiciary and police which together form the state apparatus. The concept of the state is broader than that of government, public sector, or bureaucracy\(^\text{18}\), although, as Hall (1994) points out that for many researchers, the government is the state. However, the government elected or unelected, is only one of the central institutions of the state. In addition, the term public sector covers the whole range of public organizations from national government

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\(^{18}\) According to Harold Laski ‘Bureaucracy is the term usually applied to a system of government, the control of which is so completely in the hands of officials, that their power jeopardizes the liberties of the ordinary citizens. The characteristics of such a regime are a passion for routine in administration, the sacrifice of flexibility to rule, delay in the making of decision, and a refusal to embark upon experiment’ (cited in Ayubi 1980).
ministries and departments to government business enterprises and local government tourism departments.

Therefore, as the above discussion indicates, the state has a number of institutional elements all with different political powers and they will all influence the tourism industry and the way tourism is developed. Chapter 5 shows the very many public institutions that were involved in implementing the tourism policy of the NWC region, and how such numerous institutions (with their several agendas, values, interests and power), constrained the implementation of policy. Political expediency in this case is manifested when several institutions (each with its own preferences) struggle to control resources and implement their agendas.

2.4. Sustainable Tourism: A Framework for Analysis

The first chapter examined some theoretical constructs and issues involved in the debate over STD\(^{19}\) offering a resume of the major concepts and arguments that have been evolving in the literature (Section 1.5). This section utilizes the concept of STD as a secondary analytical tool for the analysis of the tourism public policy of the NWC region. Particularly because in the last ten years, the term sustainable development has come to dominate the environmental agenda and sustainability is now an essential item in the vocabulary of modern political discourse. Therefore, any policy for development should be analyzed within the framework of sustainable development to check its adherence to sustainable development principles especially if the policy ‘promised’ to do so.

The STD ‘paradigm’\(^{20}\) (Wall 1993; Wheeller 1993; Godfrey 1996; Hunter 1997) is utilized in this study as an ‘ideal type’ or ‘pure standards’ against which ‘reality’ can be compared. Reality in the case of this study is the development process of the NWC region. The ideal type approach was developed by Weber (1949) and Spradley (1979) and has been used for analyzing qualitative data as well as a device used for

\(^{19}\) The debates concerning conservation versus growth, and weak sustainability versus strong sustainability.

\(^{20}\) There are many definitions of paradigm. In general a scientific paradigm is a whole system of thinking. It includes basic assumptions, the important questions to be answered or puzzles to be solved, the research techniques to be used and examples of what good scientific research looks like.
comparison against actual cases (Neuman 1997), because, as Mills (1959) argues, the comparison of cases could be made against an idealized model.

Although the term STD was not explicitly stated in the plans and reports of the NWC region’s development, because at that time it was not part of the development lexicon, the principles of STD were embraced in the policy as both the methodology and goal for achieving tourism development in the region that is in tune with the social and physical environments (PUD and ORplan 1978; PUD and Pacer 1983) as discussed in Chapter 4.

Hence, this section attempts to define STD, review its principles, and highlight the political dimensions involved in its definition. The section extends to question who should be responsible for applying those principles and who supervises the adherence to the principles.

### 2.4.1. Defining Sustainable Tourism

“The term ‘Sustainable Development’ is an ideological term. It can be used, and is used, by all the mainstream political parties, and those outside the mainstream, to illustrate and describe policies, the implications of which can be shown to be anything but sustainable in a number of ways. And it is widely used in a meaningless and anodyne way” (Mowforth and Munt 1998).

The debate on SD has developed from initial narrow concern with resource use and ecological conservation to an environmental discourse, which recognizes the social, cultural and political processes, as parts of environmental problems (Collins 1996). The major landmarks in the debate reveal how certain definitions of SD have become institutionalized. Ever since the Brundtland Report’s definition, the debate on SD was shifted in three important ways: First, environmental problems were explicitly recognized as social problems which needed to be addressed using a combination of social, political and economic policies. Second, this view was publicized at a global and political level by asserting that

> “Sustainable development seeks to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability to meet those of the future” (WEC 1987).

The report argued for change in a wide range of political, social, economic and industrial systems to foster greater environmental protection. Third, the report made an explicit commitment to the future. Previous definitions of SD argued that growth
could not continue whereas the Brundtland Report asserts that economic production faster than population growth is required to overcome the poverty of the ‘less developed world’. Paradoxically, Pearce (1991) argues, the Brundtland Commission also stipulated that world demand on natural resources and the environment must be reduced. In its attempt to make development sustainable, Brundtland emphasizes the notion of sustainable development, rather than sustainability²¹. The Brundtland’s policy objectives for achieving sustainable development are shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2. The Brundtland Report: Critical Objectives for SD
Source: WCED (1987)

These objectives emphasize the importance of growth and the role of economics in decision-making to secure the social and environmental aims of the World Commission for Environment and Development (WCED), (see Figure 2.7). Severe criticism has been leveled at the Commission by commentators who argue that its support for economic growth to achieve SD merely compounds and extends environmental problems (see Collins 1996). Moreover, the Commission’s objectives do not treat terms such as ‘the quality of growth’ and ‘enhancing the resource base’ as problematic (ibid.).

What are the implications of these terms and how are they to be interpreted in relation to future generations? To what extent can the needs of future generations be known? These and other questions dominated the reaction to Brundtland’s definition.
Different approaches to SD definitions have been identified in the literature. A neoliber
al approach defines SD as a means to sustain economic growth by regarding the
costs of environmental degradation and depletion (Pearce et al 1989). Basic needs
approach defines SD as a means to achieve social well-being but regarding the
existence of ecological conditions necessary to support human life at a specific level
of well-being through future generations (Hardoy et al 1992). In the structuralist
approach SD is defined as a means to equity and social justice in the control over
environmental resources (Redclifft 1992). For some, sustainability is a means of
sustaining much more than just environment. It is about sustainable development and
incorporates indicators such as income, employment, health, housing, human welfare
indicators that are concerned with a more rounded policy goal than economic growth
(Jacobs and Stott 1992 cited by Mowforth and Munt 1998). For others sustainability is
to be reclaimed within a far more radical agenda of political ecology where ecological
issues and questions of social justice are paramount (for example, see Hayward 1994;
Shiva 1988; Lipietz 1995). This reveals increasing concern that SD was being
interpreted to suit particular interests and perhaps more importantly, that certain
definitions, particularly the Brundtland’s definition, were becoming institutionalized.
In addition, political expediency is manifested when a particular interpretation of SD
is adopted to suit the interests and desires of a decision-maker or an organization.
Tourism’s interest in sustainable development is logical given this is one industry that sells the environment as its product. Romeril (1989) for example states that natural assets and attractions, such as sun, sea and sand, have usually been the major reason for destination’s popularity. Similarly, Morrisson and Selman (1991) suggest that tourism tends to develop in areas, which are able to provide natural amenities, together with human assets such as exotic cultures and historic sites. Indeed, there is no tourist activity, which does not rely on environmental resources in some way. More generally, most tourists seek destinations that have a high level of environmental quality (they like to visit places that are attractive, clean and neither polluted nor congested). It is also essential that residents of the tourism areas should not have to suffer from a deteriorated environment and social problems.

The term sustainable tourism development (STD) has come to represent and encompass a set of principles, policy prescriptions, and management methods (Hunter 1997; Eber 1992; WTO 1993b; Tourism Canada 1990; Elkin et al 1991; Theobold 1995; Elliott 1997) which chart a path for tourism development such that a destination area’s environmental resource base (including natural, built and cultural features) is protected for future developments. The Tourism Conference for Business and the Environment in Vancouver, Canada (Tourism Canada, 1990) reports that sustainable tourism development is envisaged as:

‘Leading to the management of all resources in such a way that we can fulfill economic, social, and aesthetic needs while maintaining cultural integrity, essential ecological processes, biological diversity and life support systems’.

Murphy (1994) explains the seven dimensions incorporated within this definition. The first dimension noted is the need for resource management; for in this crowded world with diminishing resources little can be left to chance. The second dimension noted is that such management needs to reaffirm that tourism is an economic activity, which must be capable of making a profit in order to survive and benefit the community. The

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22 As Green and Hunter (1992) point out, it is necessary to take a very broad view of what constitutes the environment. The term may be taken as referring not only to the atmosphere and the natural environment (e.g. mountains, countryside and coast) but also to social relationships, the cultural heritage and the built environment. The environmental aspects of tourism may be categorized under three main headings: physical, biological, and socio-economic. Invariably impacts of one category, as the WTO and UNEP (1983) point out, do not occur in isolation but are interrelated with each other, although it may need to be seen in the perspective of positive impacts in another category and vice versa.
third dimension points out the need to fulfill social obligations. This means more than intergenerational equity; it means respect for other livelihoods and customs. Such variety and heritage is a major resource for tourism in a world that is fast becoming homogenized into a global economy. The fourth dimension points out that a major component of environment and culture is their aesthetic appeal. While the focus has often been on international markers, such as world renowned heritage sites, the aesthetic qualities of regular townscapes and general landscapes should not be overlooked. All of the previous dimensions should be addressed within ecological parameters (the fifth dimension) to sustain the environment. In addition to the very real concerns about the natural environment, conservation of cultural legacies should not be ignored. The ecological process needs to be understood so that tourism intrusions will have the minimal impact, especially in sensitive areas like shorelines, mountains, and wetlands. The sixth dimension noted is that the concern over maintaining our biological diversity is particularly germane to tourism, which thrives on the appeal of different flora and fauna along with a distinctive sense of place. Finally, the seventh dimension points out that the need to sustain our basic life support system is paramount. If these basic needs are not met, then our higher level and discretionary needs like travel will fail to materialize.

In summary, the approach to sustainable tourism development implies that the natural, cultural and other resources of tourism are conserved for continuous use in the future, while still bringing benefits to the present society (WTO, 1994). The World Tourism Organization argues that tourism must be environmentally sustainable-in both the natural and cultural environments-to be economically sustainable (WTO 1993b). Sustainability is essentially about resource (natural, social and cultural) management (Godfrey 1996). In the words of Brookfield (1991) ‘sustainability not only refers to environmental regeneration and the maintenance of bio-diversity but must also be measured by progress along a vector made up of attributes that include improvement in income and its distribution, in health, in education, freedoms, and access to resources’. Despite these definitions, sustainability and its application to tourism should not be considered a once and for all position; a neutral, scientific term to which techniques can be applied and upon which policies and programmes can be implemented and evaluated and blueprints, ideal types and models catalogued and advocated. Rather, it constantly changes as the broader influences and interests
change reflecting a dynamic situation and concept (Mowforth and Munt 1998). Therefore, there to be no absolutely true nature of sustainability and it is not definable except in terms of context, control and position of those who are defining it. It is also not definable by, and is not reducible to, a series of absolute principles. If principles can be applied to the notion, then it can only be in a relative way, relative to each other without contradiction, relative to the varying perceptions of those who use them, and relative to the values, ideological and moral, of those who apply and interpret them. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ are relative terms, as is sustainability (ibid.). These issues highlight the sensitivity and political nature of the STD concept. Political expediency, as mentioned above, may necessitate defining STD according to the interests of those who are defining it. However, what is required in pursuit of the definition of the STD concept and its principles is a change of development paradigm in which the economy is seen as a tool to achieve policy goals rather than a source of those goals, and the environment is seen as a dynamic process of potentials and restrictions. In addition, economic activity is to be valued (and promoted) in so far as it contributes to these politically adopted goals of society, and not as an end in itself.

What are the implications of STD definitions for policy analysis? De Kadt (1992) argues that “sustainability is an organizing concept for policy”. The Brundtland Commission’s report, (WCED 1987), has helped to place the issue of sustainability closer to the center of the political agenda. This has drawn renewed attention to three areas in which the approaches, and reproaches, of ‘Alternative Development’ can help to modify analysis and action without a revolution in social and economic organization: resource use and renewability, the issue of scale, and the equitable distribution of benefits (including to future generations). Making tourism sustainable involves not just encouraging the development of ‘an alternative to’ conventional tourism (though this could be part of it), but above all it forces conventional tourism development to take greater notice of the three areas mentioned above. Similar to the parental sustainable development concept, the concept of sustainable tourism did not escape the conflict of ‘basic needs via growth versus conservation’. For example, De Kadt (1992) questions:

“but what about the need of poor countries which is continuing economic growth? For which they require many of the natural and environmental resources that are under stress” (ibid.).
For developing countries, then, a crucial aspect of sustainability is the maintenance of the productivity of resources. It is clearly essential for the maintenance of the value of the asset to protect its ecological *raison d’être*, and so the industry itself has strong reasons to do so. But often the users will not calculate these costs unless an external authority forces them to do so, usually by means of taxation or other incentives and disincentives. What is clear, however, is that such issues are now being more widely discussed and that the analytical tools for moving in this direction are becoming available. One such analytical tool is the concept of carrying capacity\(^{23}\), which has been available to tourism planners for many years. It links questions of resource use and renewability to the issue of scale.

How could STD be measured and how can tourism development policy be analyzed within STD framework? All too often, the first indicator of non-sustainability is the decline of attractiveness perceived through a decline in visitor numbers\(^{24}\), for example in the case of Lloret, Costa Brava along the Catalan coast in Spain (Strapp 1988), or the damage of the environment of the destination area, for example in Goa, India (Wilson 1997). In many cases such indicators come too late for satisfactory remedial action, even if that had been possible. In many cases the only satisfactory remedy is a reduction in tourist numbers, but this is frequently seen as problematical (Butler 1993), if not unacceptable because of reduced economic benefits, at least in the short term.

In general, the concept of sustainable tourism involves recognition of the negative impacts of tourism development and the need to manage them if sustainability is to be achieved. Carrying capacity often has been cited as a framework within which such negative impacts can be considered (Hunter and Green 1995; Young 1973; Inskeep

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\(^{23}\) For further identification of the different carrying capacity types refer to Cooper *et al* (1993)

\(^{24}\) Woodley (1993) argues that the predominant use of visitor numbers as the critical measure of tourism success (or failure) is insufficient and that one needs clearer objectives, sufficient knowledge, indicators of change, and responsible power to manage the tourist activity if sustainability is to be achieved.
Coccossis and Parpairis (1992) describe how they believe that carrying capacity can be adapted to guiding tourism development. Saleem (1994) tries to establish a framework to determine the tourism carrying capacity of a destination. His objective is to establish a measure that would provide information about the global tourism carrying capacity of the destination. Boullon (1985), also, offers a formula to estimate the tourist carrying capacity of a given area, which consists of dividing the area to be used by tourists by the average individual standard (usually in m²/person) required. This individual standard, however, is not easily arrived at, and must be carefully defined for each particular case, since it involves at least three capacity variables: material, psychological; and ecological. However, there is a need to develop certain measures, standards and idealized models, even if they are hypothetical, which are context specific to ensure the realization of tourism planning objectives within the framework of sustainable tourism.

In the case of environmental pollution or ecological effects, the application of scientific knowledge (physics, chemistry and biology) has proved successful in establishing some measures to determine the carrying capacity. For example, sea pollution level in coastal areas due to effluent discharges can be measured by counting a certain type of bacteria in the beach water, or air pollution due to traffic emissions by the amount of carbon monoxide in the air. Further, it is also possible to monitor and measure the impacts of this pollution on the ecosystem by scientific testing.

With respect to utilizing the carrying capacity concept as an indicator for sustainable tourism, Butler (1993) points out that there are no universally accepted indicators of the sustainability of a tourism product, or of tourism itself in any specific environment. Although there have been several efforts in the literature to develop indicators for sustainable tourism (e.g. Smith 1995), there are no satisfactory indicators of carrying capacity or the ability of the environment to sustain tourism. Lindberg et al. (1997) argue that the concept of carrying capacity is not adequate to address the complexity found in tourism situations. The are limitations of the traditional carrying capacity, as Lindberg et al. (1997) point out, that concern the definitions of carrying capacity which often provide little guidance for practical implementation, because there are no specific criteria by which judgment regarding ‘high levels of visitors’ satisfaction’ for example, can be made negates the value of such definition. There is also the limitation of the visitor satisfaction concept because visitors differ from one another. However, Pizam et al (1978) were able to empirically identify the factors of tourist satisfaction and suggest the means to measure them. Nevertheless, as Wall (1982) points out in his critical appraisal of the concept of carrying capacity, “if its use encourages tourism planners and managers to give greater consideration to environmental matters, to the qualities of the experiences available to both hosts and guests and to specify their goals and objectives, then it will have served a successful purpose.”

Despite its limitations, carrying capacity evaluations, as Romeril (1989) argues, can function as an operational concept for the planning exercise, which is now considered necessary to avoid the negative effects which inevitably follow tourist saturation.
Unfortunately, any measures to determine hostility or aggression levels of residents towards visitors in a tourist destination or social impacts of economic deprivation or social polarization have not been easily developed. Concepts and models from behavioral science and social science are, however, widely used in this area; but the subject matter under investigation, as Saleem (1994) argues, becomes very subjective and the decision making process is essentially judgmental. Romeril (1989), for example, argues that the concept of a threshold level of tourist activity beyond which overcrowding, congestion and deleterious environmental impacts will occur is an attractive one and not difficult to achieve in theory. However, the reality is far more difficult to rationalize and quantify since no single typology of tourism, nor of environment exists.

Figure 2.8 depicts the conceptual framework for the development of indicators for tourism policy analysis. It recognizes that policy is an ongoing process. Policies are formulated in response to particular indicators (problems) in a particular context. Policy and action are continuously monitored and evaluated in terms of their impact and sustainability. Policy decisions and actions are carried out within an institutional context and depend on the pressing problems, the condition of the environment, the policies adopted and whether objectives have been achieved.

Although such framework has some limitations, (for example, the complexity of relations between various aspects of development and direct causal linkages, and the inability to analyze trends over time), it may provide an explanation as to the causes and consequences of government activity with respect to sustainable development. It recognizes that tourism policy and action are responses to four general indicators:

- **The pressure indicator** refers to the pressing economic, physical and social problems in a particular context. These may include the high urban population concentration in some major cities and/or the regional development of backward areas.

- **The state indicator** refers to the condition of the environment in the problem region and its capacity to sustain the required development.

- **The response indicator** refers to the policy adopted (by the government, the private sector, or the community) in addressing the situation.
The performance indicator refers to whether the objectives have been (or failed to be) achieved.

From the above discussion, it can be argued that utilising indicators such as carrying capacity, visitors’ numbers, visitors’ satisfaction are notions with virtually little practical use. Sustainable tourism development depends on whether principles has been adhered to, sustainability objectives are achieved, policy problems are solved, the condition of the environment is not worsened, and whether institutions have been efficient in translating ‘good’ policy to action.

### 2.4.2 Principles of Sustainable Tourism

Some writers criticized the definition of principles for sustainable tourism. Wheeller (1994), for example, has strong reservations about any attempt to provide a code of ethics or principles. Ashcroft, (1993) also questions just how much effort should be put into definition of principles for sustainable tourism when so little effort seems to be put into practical action to achieve them. Bramwell and Lane (1993) point out that it is easy to discuss sustainability, however, implementation is the problem.
Simultaneously, Krippendorf (1993) feels that codes of practice are an essential, functional element in tourism management. The belief seems to be that doing something in terms of furthering the sustainability cause is better than doing nothing. Defining principles and standards is, however, a first step towards achieving goals. ‘Every step, no matter how small, adds to the sum of the overall responsible tourism effect’ (Wood and House, 1991), if it is in the supposedly correct direction. This study fully concurs with the latter opinions.

Before addressing the principles of sustainable tourism, it is necessary to point out the principles and dimensions of its ‘parental’ paradigm, sustainable development. Perhaps the four principles that Elkin et al (1991) address, summarize what exist in the literature and are derived from the Brundtland’s definition of sustainable development (WCED 1987).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Futurity</th>
<th>Concern for the Environment</th>
<th>Equity</th>
<th>Participation</th>
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Table 2.3. Principles of Sustainable Development

Following the popularization of sustainable development as an environmental management concept, a growing proportion of the tourism research literature has focused on the principles and practice of sustainable tourism development. However, Hunter (1997) argues that the concerns for sustainable tourism have become too far removed from those of its ‘parental’ concept, resulting in a gap such that principles and policies of sustainable tourism do not necessarily contribute to those of sustainable development. Although, many observers would be broadly content with the currently dominant tourism-centric paradigm of sustainable tourism, sustainable tourism research would benefit from a closer inspection of the broader sustainable development literature and learn from the ongoing debate which surrounds the interpretation of sustainable development (ibid.). Moreover, sustainable tourism research would also benefit from learning from practical experience that highlights the reasons for some failures to achieve an environmentally sustainable tourism. Most of these failures relate to the way governments intervene or deal with tourism developments. Farrell and Runyan (1991) and Elliott (1997), for example, believe that sustainable tourism development have often been unsuccessful because of five main reasons. First, economic growth and development were given overriding priority by
governments; there was no strong commitment to environmentally sustainable tourism. Political, public and economic opinion brought little pressure, for they also were mainly committed to tourism development. Second, there was either a failure to provide plans and clear environmental objectives, or the plans were not implemented. Much tourism development was left entirely to the industry, with conservation getting little attention from governments. Conversely, some policies were too comprehensive and detailed and unrealistic in practice. Plans were not integrated with other development or regional wide issues. Third, the formal control system has been ineffective at all levels of government and ill prepared not only for mass tourism but also for small developments or backpacker tourism, which can be just as devastating to a fragile ecological system. Fourth, sustainable development has failed at the local level where the impact is most felt. Local governments have often not had resources, skills, or contacts necessary either to understand or implement sustainable development or resist developers, and central authorities have failed to support them. Finally, sustainable development has been unsuccessful because of the operation of informal factors. Hidden agendas have been followed by politicians and managers, which rated economic development high and conservation low. There has been politicisation of the system and development has been encouraged or allowed, to the personal benefit of politicians and administrators. Self-seeking and greed have led to corruption and bribery, the non-enforcement of law and the rejection of public interest and responsibility. The management culture with its own informal interests, closed nature and secrecy and the self-seeking and rivalry of public agencies have not controlled but often even supported unsustainable development (Farrell and Runyan 1991; Elliott 1997).

Therefore, the following definition of principles for sustainable tourism attempts to redefine the concept of sustainable tourism in the light of its parental paradigm and avoid the factors that contributed to the finding of what Farrell and Runyan (1991) call ‘unsustainable tourism development’. It should be clarified here that the discussion does not offer ‘operational’ suggestions as to the concrete types or modes of tourism development that should be advanced. Instead, a set of sustainability ‘specifications’ is outlined. The reason that the principles of sustainable tourism are adopted here is to provide an ‘ideal type’ or ‘pure standards’ against which ‘reality’ can be compared in order to offer some criteria for analyzing the development process.
of the NWC region of Egypt. The principles of sustainable tourism are adapted from the works of Elkin et al 1991; Elliott 1997; WTO 1993b; 1994; Komilis 1994; Theobold 1995; English Tourist Board 1991; and Hunter 1997 and from a discussion paper commissioned from Tourism Concern (Eber 1992)\textsuperscript{27} to address the principles for sustainable tourism:

\textbf{Futurity}

As mentioned above, the debate in the literature of sustainable tourism largely revolves around the compatibility of sustainable tourism development with continued economic growth (Hunter 1997). Butler (1993), for example, defines sustainable tourism as ‘tourism which is in a form which can maintain its viability in an area for an indefinite period of time’. The futurity criterion refers to continuity and adjustment of a region’s tourist development within its wider environment. Sustainable development does not imply that a given process of economic growth, or in this case, certain tourist activities, products, or projects, should be able to continue indefinitely.

\textsuperscript{27} Wheeller (1994) and Ashcroft (1993) are particularly reticent about supporting the document of Eber (1992).
Tastes and lifestyles change, as Komilis (1994) argues, so do vacation motives and holiday patterns, in a perhaps smaller than a generation. Therefore, the essence and appeal of sustainability and of this criterion pertains keeping all choices open for the future while at the same time developing a region’s socio-economic and environmental assets in response to changing demand conditions within a highly competitive environment (ibid.). This cannot be achieved in practice because keeping all choices open include the possibility of no change ever and that is in contrast with the desires for growth and long term economic gain. Therefore, the futurity principle should entail sustaining the long-term economic gain from the tourism industry while maintaining the natural environmental resources to meet the needs of future generations. This may be achieved by, for example, promoting the suitable tourism types, projects, and attractions that are appropriate to every destination’s environment.

**Environmental Considerations**

The environment refers to the physical and socio-cultural resources. As mentioned earlier, the physical environment includes natural and built components, while the socio-cultural environment includes the human resources. The natural resources may be used sustainably through preventing irreversible changes to environmental assets which have no substitute, preventing damage to the essential functions of ecosystems and preventing, for example, loss of the ozone layer and living species (Eber 1992). This can be achieved by adopting environmental policies to regulate, for example, waste disposal, recycling, and water conservation. Also, human resources may be used sustainably by protecting, for example, local cultures, traditions, livelihoods, and the land on which they are based. Moreover, the “over-consumption” of natural and other resources in tourism, such as excessive use of water, wood or food, is not only damaging the local environment, as Eber (1992) argues, but is incompatible with the long term sustainability of the industry.

**Diversity**

Diversity is one of tourism’s major resources. According to Komilis (1994) the inter-regional differentiation and diversity of the regional tourist production is among the basic development criteria which underlie the selection of types of tourism growth and the goals or policies of regional development. Diversity in natural, cultural and social environments is a strength, which provides resilience to externalities, shocks,
and stress. It is also vital in order to avoid over-dependency on one or a few bases of life support of the industry. A rich and varied environment different from the tourists’ own is often an important factor in determining tourists’ choice of destinations. However, most of the rapid and uncontrolled over development of tourism has endangered and ultimately destroyed those very assets on which it depends, affecting benefits for hosts, tourists and the industry alike. The words of Eber (1992) best describe the factors affecting the diversity of the natural, cultural and regional social system:

‘Natural diversity is threatened by the construction of extensive facilities for tourism, especially where development occurs without prior regard to an area’s special features. Moreover, rapid and uncontrolled development of major tourism enterprises can destroy the diversity of local and regional social structure, particularly when they are introduced from outside the region or country and are not controlled, nor understood by local community. The diversity of local or regional social systems and ecosystems is reduced when traditional occupations such as fishing or agriculture, are neglected in favor of jobs in tourism. Local people, particularly the young are often attracted to the glamorous lifestyle and conspicuous consumption associated with tourism. This may be inappropriate to local social or economic conditions and contribute to conflicts and divisions with elders and parents. Cultural diversity forms part of the tourism industry’s primary assets and arguably, is what many tourists travel to find, so it should be fostered and protected’.

Therefore, the tourism industry should ensure a pace, scale, and type of development, which protects rather than destroys diversity, local culture, and communities. Encouraging social and economic diversity can be achieved by integrating tourism within the activities of a local community and with their full participation. Preventing the destruction of natural diversity may be achieved by respecting each area’s carrying capacity.

The Integration of Tourism with Other Regional Economic Sectors
Tourism development, which is integrated into a national and local strategic planning framework, increases the long-term viability of tourism (Eber 1992). Conflicts of interest, over-use of resources, and over-dependency can be avoided or minimized by the integration of any one sector with the other sectors. According to Komilis (1994) maximizing the economic benefits from tourism over an entire region may be achieved by providing the best inter-linkages of tourism to the other sectors of the regional economy, because tourism is, of course, not the only one of major
importance in a region. Eber (1992) argues that tourism which supports a wide range of local economic activities and which takes environmental costs and values into account, both protects those economies and avoids environmental damage. The tourism industry has been less willing to recognize the value of the environment when it comes to those enterprises which are not so obviously dependent on it, for example, second homes, air travel, tour operators and small industries. Here the pursuit appears to be more for rapid, short-term economic returns rather than long term economic development or benefits to the environment and to host communities. This tends to result in overdeveloped tourist sites established without adequate infrastructure, environmental auditing to regard the carrying capacity, leading to environmental degradation and ultimately to their own non-viability.

**Equity and Involvement of Local Communities**

The equity issue is an integral part of the arguments for achieving sustainability; and given the lack of clear definitions and understanding of this concept, as Sinclair and Stabler (1997) noted, the weak commitment to it is understandable. The question of who benefits is increasingly being asked with respect to tourism development policies, particularly in economically peripheral regions which paradoxically, by virtue of their lack of development, may have a range of resources that are most attractive to tourists. While jobs may be created, they are often not taken up by those at which tourism development policies were targeted. It can be argued that unless there is a substantial amount of local entrepreneurial skills and available capital, local communities will be disadvantaged in competition against companies from metropolitan centres. Accordingly, the question of who gains financially and who loses financially often sets the power and control issue in sharper and more immediate focus than all other facets of sustainability (Mowforth and Munt 1998).

Furthermore, the equity criterion involves not only the equal distribution of benefits from development, but also the equal access to resources among present and future populations. Indeed, equity refers also to inter-generational equity, which is a commitment to equitable access to resources between generations. This means that resource exploitation at present should not jeopardise the ability of future generations to benefit and to meet their needs.
When tourism’s growth is related to sustainable development, as Komilis (1994) argues, equity and local involvement conditions should prevail. The full involvement of local communities in the tourism sector not only benefits them and the environment in general, but also improves the quality of the tourism experience as Eber (1992) argues. Projects imposed from outside and motivated by the pursuit of rapid economic growth often override local needs, conditions and resources, and result in unacceptable environmental, social and cultural costs. While when a community is involved in the direction of tourism development, it is more likely to become an active partner and to provide checks and balances since it has a particular stake in the region and commitment to environmental quality. Local involvement means more than employment in the usual low-paid, seasonal menial and service jobs, such as waiters, chambermaids and gardeners. Local involvement, through encouraging the local ownership of craft and cottage industries, guiding services, transportation and accommodation, shops and restaurants, would minimize the leakage of foreign currency and benefit both host community and tourists alike. In successful sustainable tourism, as Elliott (1997) points out, there is acceptance and implementation at the local level, by local governments and communities. Local people are involved in the formulation of national policies and priorities and in their enforcement through both small and large investors. However, the principle of local participation, however, is easier to promote on paper from a distance than it is to put into practice at the local level. A range of difficulties, such as conflicting interests and the existence of local power bases and elites serve to complicate and confound the good intentions of planners.

Consultation between the tourist industry and local communities, organizations and institutions is essential, if they are to work alongside each other and resolve potential conflicts of interests (Eber 1992). Consultation is a process, which aims to reconcile economic development with the broader interests of local people and the potential impact of development on their natural, social and cultural environment. Consultation between government, industry, and local people is essential in order to assess a development project, ways of minimizing its negative impacts and maximizing local people’s positive contribution. Projects which are imposed from outside or above often fail to take account of local and human resources and interests. Lack of
consultation between public and private bodies and local communities may cause hostility and opposition and make it even harder to resolve conflicts of interests.

Public Awareness and Research

Recruitment of local personnel at all levels, along with staff training which integrates sustainable tourism into work practice, improves the quality of the tourism product as Eber (1992) argues. Properly trained staff can encourage a sense of responsibility and environmental awareness in tourists, which in turn will lead to a longer term and more sustainable industry. Sustainable development emphasizes the need for improved education in order to promote social and economic well being. Education and training in environmental awareness and management, essential for integrated and sustainable development, must include social and cultural as well as economic issues. Moreover, on-going research and monitoring by the industry using effective data collection and analysis is essential to help solve problems, to increase awareness and to bring benefits to destinations, the industry and consumers. If the feasibility prior to establishing a project or enterprise may be assessed, the on-going progress and wider impacts of development are rarely monitored. In addition, such research that is carried out appears to be directed towards problem solving rather than problem avoiding.

In any tourism analysis there is a need to examine the questions of who is stating the principles, priorities and policies, who will benefit from related action and who will lose. And as for the principles, the power of those who use the tools of sustainability, is essential feature of an analysis for tourism (Mowforth and Munt 1998). To achieve a national consensus, the formulation process of tourism policy should be, as Elliott (1997) argues, bottom-up as well as top down. The process is not just to formulate a definition and policy but it is also to inform and make the country aware of the importance of sustainable development. The implementation of the above mentioned principles and measures is a task that only governments can ensure and put into effect (Elliott 1997; De Kadt 1992; Saleem 1994; WTO 1985a; Young 1973; Woodley 1993; Wanhill 1994a). Richter (1989) believes there is an essential and enduring role for government in determining who gets what in tourism. Principles, as Elliott (1997) argues, are the justification for the use of power by governments; ‘Principles give legitimacy to the actions of government officials, and the public have expectations that the principles will be followed’ (Elliott 1997).
2.4.3. Sustainable Tourism and the Responsibility of the State

Grindle (1997) noted the dilemma faced in many countries around the world in the mid 1990s. “Too much state” acknowledges that, for many, the development history of the past several decades meant interventionist and often intrusive state led development strategies combined with an emphasis on centralized political control. Too frequently, this history resulted in stagnant and inefficient economies and political regimes that are unresponsive, authoritarian, and corrupt (ibid.). Ironically, “too little state” points to the reality that these large and intrusive public sectors often showed little effective capacity to formulate policy, implement it, and perform routine administrative functions. This condition is frequently added up to a pervasive inability to carry out even the most basic tasks required of modern states. In short, while many governments claimed a central role in leading the process of development, they demonstrated remarkable incapacity to plan and pursue it (ibid.).

The response to problems created by ‘too much state’ occupied the development agenda for much of the 1980s and early 1990s. Many governments committed themselves to market-oriented approaches for generating economic growth at the same time that civil societies organized to press for democratic elections and greater participation in decision making. In both economic and political terms, pressure was exerted to eliminate or strictly limit government control and intervention. Throughout this period also, development specialists joined in an attack on the state for having ‘grown too large, intervened in economic interactions too energetically, and mismanaged policy making and implementation too regularly’ (ibid). An almost universal focus on state minimalism (on cutting down on the size, expense, and responsibilities of public sectors) was a clear response to decades of too much state.

The response to ‘too little state’ took much longer to emerge. For much of the 1980s, intense concern about reducing state involvement in the economy overwhelmed the policy agendas of international financial institutions, which often took the lead in such initiatives, and reformist policy elites. Stabilizing macroeconomic conditions, liberalizing domestic and international trade, deregulating the market, privatizing state-owned industries, and reducing the size and fiscal reformers. Similarly, democratizing initiatives, driven by both domestic and international advocates, focused primarily attention on dismantling the structures of control and corruption that had held discredited regimes together. Initially, economic and political reformers...
alike were convinced that the state must shed functions in order to enhance opportunities for dynamic growth and political freedom.

However, the issue for economic development is not too much state versus too little state, but the presence or absence of a capable state. Therefore, it is the concern of this sub-section to discuss how governments manage and mismanage tourism. It is about politics; that is, the use of power by public organizations in their management of tourism development. It points out that the development of tourism will not be optimal if it is left entirely in the hands of the private sector, for they are primarily motivated by profit making. However, on the other hand, if tourism development is dominated by the public sector, then it is unlikely to be developed at the optimal rate from the economic point of view as competition will be lacking. Therefore, this study advocates that tourism development planning, which aims to achieve sustainable development, requires careful co-operation and co-ordination of both the public and private sectors. Appendix II adapts the framework used by Elliott (1997) to help in identification, analysis, and evaluation of the areas of governments and tourism because they are large and complex areas to study. The framework is based upon four major questions: why, who, how and what: Why do governments intervene in planning for sustainable tourism? Who is involved in the management of tourism development? How do governments intervene in tourism management; and, to what extent should governments be involved?

For tourism to be sustainable means "establishing an industry which involves consideration of the long-term effects of economic activity in particular, in relation to resources and therefore, concern for the needs of future generations" (Curry and Morvaridi, 1992). Sustainable tourism is defined as a model form of economic development that is designed to improve the quality of life of host community, provide a high quality of experience for the visitor and maintain the quality of the environment on which both the host community and the visitor depend (WTO, 1993b). Krippendorf (1987) argues that only an ecologically-minded tourism industry will safeguard its prospects for growth into the next century.

As argued above, sustainable tourism requires some form of state intervention in order to achieve tourism planning goals and environmental protection by putting the principles of sustainable tourism into effect. The rationale for the involvement of
governments in the management of tourism has been based on the welfare economic arguments for the public interest. The private sector, motivated by increasing its financial profits, would disregard the social, cultural and environmental concerns, while governments intervene to achieve the public interest. The importance of tourism worldwide has made it an investment opportunity that few governments can afford to ignore. In most countries, the development of tourism is a partnership between the private and public sectors. Where the line is drawn in this partnership depends on the prevailing economic, political and social policies of the country. Probably the best scenario is the new style of interventionist local state, which is advocated by Hall and Jenkins (1995). Despite the reduced role of national governments in economic intervention, the local government has increased its involvement in economic activity. The reduced role of central government in positive economic development strategies was a major force in the creation of the new economic roles for the local government (ibid.). Eisinger (1988) has described this new style of interventionist local government as the entrepreneurial state. Here the local government, typically in partnership with the private sector, becomes an active player in the market through the adoption of a variety of policy instruments. Indeed, local government has been recognized as being the most important authority in establishing tourism development policies (Madrigal 1995; Bouquet and Winter 1987; Pearce 1989). Paradoxically while often promoting development, local government is also responsible for regulating growth (Madrigal 1995). The traditional economic development strategies of the local government concentrated on such supply side factors as incentives that lowered costs (capital, land and labor), including loans, loan guarantees, tax exemptions and lower tax rates. The new entrepreneurial local state increasingly focuses on demand-side strategies, which aim to discover, develop, expand, and create new markets. Although upper tier governments have almost all the power, financial and legal, that power has to be given to local governments to have authority because they are the legitimate legal representatives of the local people.

Egypt, as many other countries, represents an example where the role of the state has been shaped by a belief in the guardian or nation state ideal (Salem 1997). Richards and Waterbury (1990) argue that politics of de-colonization and development in Egypt caused the creation of the Interventionist State as being responsible for the welfare of
The Interventionist State\textsuperscript{28} is usually perceived as an autonomous\textsuperscript{29} actor-unique and relatively independent in its own sphere of activity. This perception sees the policy outputs of this autonomous state to be better conceptualized because of the state’s fairly unique interests and the fact that its organizational and administrative norms and procedures are generally independent of social forces. In earlier years, this autonomous state, often defined in authoritarian-bureaucratic terms, was perceived as a necessary prerequisite for the process of modernization in Egypt. Thus, the state, usually as embodiment of the military establishment, was seen as the only force with enough power to challenge the traditional obstacles to development. In recent years, many observers are questioning the utility of the highly centralized and usually authoritarian approach to development. It can be argued that states must acquire a certain degree of ‘relative autonomy’ from the dominant class, (see for example Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985) in order to promote economic transformation effectively, and, in particular that a certain autonomy is necessary not only to formulate collective goals but to implement them as well. Yet it is less important to study the extent to which the state is autonomous in developing policies opposed to the best interests of society than to understand the mechanism by which such state

\textsuperscript{28} Considerable variations are found in the literature giving different perspectives regarding the role of the state. On one hand there is the implicit liberal assumption that the state is a neutral and even benevolent arbiter-whose role is to promote the national interest in economic growth, efficiency and social welfare (cited in Sandbrook 1982). On the other hand, there is the opposing view, which conceives of the state as a set of public institutions that reflect in its activities the interest of the dominant social forces rooted in the structure of production (e.g. Zieman et al 1977). Between these two distinct perspectives there are other propositions (for instance, O’Donnell’s (1979) bureaucratic-authoritarian state, and Djilas’s (1957) state capitalism) (cited in Waterbury 1983).

\textsuperscript{29} According to Clark and Dear (1984) autonomy is, of course, relative and refers principally to the extent to which an agency is able to define and carry out its own tasks free from the review of other agencies. If the state is in fact autonomous, if it can create its own legitimacy through clientism and control of the interpretive organs of society, and if it has its own objectives of reproduction and power, how is it different from organized crime such as Mafia? (Clark and Dear 1984). Poulantzas (1969) in Clark and Dear (1984) has commented that the state is not an autonomous entity, but reflects the balance of power among classes at any given time. According to Gold, Lo and Wright (1975) “The state is a mystification, a concrete institution which serves the interests of the dominant class, but which seeks to portray itself as serving the nation as a whole, by obscuring the basic lines of class antagonism” (cited by Clark and Dear 1984).
policies are in fact implemented and made efficacious in the achievement of developmental goals (Mayfield 1996).

Nordlinger (1981) identifies four basic principles of this autonomous interventionist state, or as he calls it the statist perspective (which is useful for understanding much of past policy-making in Egypt). First, is that public officials form their own policy preferences, explained more by the state’s internal variations—such preferences being seen as essentially independent of societal pressures. Second, the state is conceptualized as acting on its preferences, which are quite independent of those of the private interests of society. Third, the state’s administrative activities and institutional processes have much greater impact on society than society has on the state. The forth sees that the state enjoys independent status, with its cohesiveness and differentiation limiting its propensity for change. Therefore, Nordlinger (1981) points out that in the statist perspective public bureaucrats have their own perspective and agenda, quite independent of society:

“In their substance and underpinnings they do not regularly coincide with those of any larger or smaller societal associations, groups, strata, ethnic segments, or regions. What public officials do, whom they interact with, where they sit, and what they see and know, help generate the singular interests, values, and benefits underlying their preferences. Separated from society by virtue of their directive positions, officials prefer policies that help structure and heighten their autonomy” (ibid.)

This view substantiates the hypothesis that the benefits and singular interests of public officials determine, in large, their decisions.

It is true that many still emphasize the need for a strong state bureaucracy (for an example of the emphasis on state-society relation, see Anderson 1986), and even argue that such bureaucracies are able to shape and limit the policy options available in a given situation. However, Mayfield (1996) challenges the efficiency and effectiveness of a bureaucratic system for societal transformation, even if Lenin and Weber were convinced for their utility. It can be argued that what is needed is not the rational bureaucratic processes of centralized decision-making, but rather, as Mayfield (1996) suggests, the more pluralistic interaction of groups and interests in society struggling to find solutions to their individual problems and which have the ability to keep administrative systems both accountable and effective. The researcher strongly accords with this suggestion.
2.5. Concluding Remarks
This study is centrally concerned with analyzing and explaining failure of tourism policy of the NWC of Egypt. Such failure is not peculiar to tourism, nor to policies implemented in Egypt. Public policies, as Quick (1980) points out, often do not get implemented at all, and those which manage to get through the tortuous process of implementation often look very different from what their framers originally intended. It became clear that different policies had different problems in implementation, and it was therefore much more interesting to examine the problems unique to a specific programme rather than those, which were general to a whole range of programmes. Generalizing from one example is always problematic, since it is never possible to separate the general from the idiosyncratic with any degree of confidence. The value of the case studies is that they suggest possibilities for future comparative research, not that they constitute proof of a general hypothesis. The case study of this research attempts to analyze what went wrong with the programme under consideration and seeks to suggest means of avoiding similar outcomes in other contexts.

It is a theme of this chapter that policy cannot be effectively analyzed, much less explained, outside an understanding of the context into which it is born and in which it is expected to operate. The complexities of the numerous agencies involved in the tourism public policy process, the variations in their resource bases and their control powers, and the complexity of the formal and informal negotiations that surround both the preparation and implementation of policies, makes it a difficult task to ‘assess the link between a particular policy and a particular outcome’ (Bracken 1981).

Decision-makers assume central roles in initiating, shaping, and pursuing public policies. They are frequently the most important actors in placing issues on an agenda for government action, assessing alternatives, and superintending implementation. However, in an environment of absence of elections and existence of relationships based on common interests, political expediency may necessitate awarding certain concessions to a powerful clan or kin to gain more political powers, especially because civil servants of governments in the developing countries are normally having low and fixed salaries, poor career prospectus and shoddy working environment (Salem 1997). In addition, elitist political culture and well-defined power structures contribute to a perverse incentive structure to abuse whatever institutional power at
hand. Therefore political expediency can affect the civil servants at different levels. A mayor, for example, can be politically rewarded to offer a powerful investor a preferential treatment, which can pay off in terms of better career prospects or a service for a kin.

Local elites are of particular importance in determining the nature and pattern of regional development in general and tourism development in particular. In a neo-colonial context, it is usually members of the ruling classes who have the power to bargain with foreign industry or government representatives, and to implement policies consistent with these interests (Britton 1982b). For example, the development of international tourism in Fiji, as with many other countries, was based on the interaction of foreign and local elites in pursuit of their own interests and mutual benefits (Britton 1983). In the case of Hawaii many problems emerged because the indigenous community lost control of their land and the political process (Britton 1983). Controlled tourism, therefore, means control by local landowners and discussion at the village level, rather than the implementation of schemes by ‘big men’ who are members of the local elite, overseas corporations, or Western aid agencies and conservation organisations, without due approval by traditional landholders. In this case, hegemony, therefore, is essentially about the power of persuasion. Sustainability and tourism are examples of hegemony in practice. Tourism is replete with examples of hegemonic strategies ranging from tourism codes of conduct to the advocacy of more sustainable forms of tourism.

The identification of principles for STD represented a prescriptive rational approach (which demonstrates how tourism policy and decision making should occur relative to pre-established standards). Such an approach assumes that a dichotomy exists between the policy-making process and administration and the economic objectives (Mitchel 1979), whereby individuals can identify and rank goals, values and objectives, and can choose consistently among them according to their norms and values. This scientific or rational approach to policy analysis, management, and administration is centered on two objects,

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30 Hegemony was a concept developed by the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, to emphasize the ability of dominant classes to convince the majority of subordinate classes to adopt certain political, cultural or moral values; a more efficient strategy than coercing subordinate social groups into conformity (Jackson 1992, cited by Mowforth and Munt 1998).
Prescriptive models serve as a guide towards specific ideals. However, such ideals cannot be reached without an understanding of what actually does happen in the formulation and implementation of tourism policy. Descriptive models of policy making, through their emphasis on the policy making process, represent a refutation of the rational, policy/administration dichotomy that characterizes perspective approaches to policy analysis. This is, therefore, an attempt of this research.

At times getting inside government may appear to be an insuperable obstacle, particularly in developing countries where policy making is often closed to public scrutiny or widespread participation by interested citizens. A study that deals centrally with the strategic political motivations of policy makers, for example, simply asserts that these motivations center on the imperative to retain office. Getting inside the state is abandoned as unfeasible. Given that the regime in Egypt is centralized, it is difficult to determine the preferences of its leaders by direct observation of decision making, by analysis of documents or by interviews with participants. Preferences can be inferred from policy outputs. Thus, the fundamental question of this study is inductive: Given the policy evidence, what strategies might that regime have been pursuing? This study has tried to overcome this problem by basing its accounts on materials primarily presented by participants in the policy process of the NWC region of Egypt.

In Chapter 3, the commonalties of historical, economic and political conditions are developed in order to describe the general context of government decision making and implementation in Egypt. The chapter will review the historical and institutional context within which the tourism public policy of the NWC region of Egypt took place. It will extend the discussion of explaining the relationships between power, values, and interests, institutional arrangements and political expediency in the Egyptian context, and it will then review the national and regional policies’ objectives to provide the means for the analysis of the policy process of the case study.

Chapters 4 and 5 will utilize the in-depth semi-structured discussions undertaken during the fieldwork and will refer to documents, reports, published and un-published
materials in order to obtain insight into the reasons for variation between the national and regional development objectives and the outcomes of the development process.
Chapter 3

THE EGYPTIAN NATIONAL AND REGIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES: POLICY AND PRACTICE DIFFERENTIATION
3.1 Introduction

As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study aims to contribute to the understanding of how development planning is carried out by propounding an analysis of the tourism public policy of the NWC region of Egypt. It aims to do so by describing not only the causes and consequences of the policy, but by explaining how and why the policy decisions are made, who make those decisions, and what influences the making and implementation of policy. Therefore, the previous chapters highlighted key concepts and theories that explain the tourism policy process, its political dimensions, models of analysis, and the factors affecting policy formulation and implementation. While focusing on political expediency, Chapter 2 has reviewed the literature that discuss the significance of institutional arrangements, values and interests, power arrangements and control of individuals and organizations in affecting policy and action. It adapted the framework developed by Hall (1994) that offers a descriptive approach for tourism policy analysis, which sees institutional arrangements, power arrangements, and the values and interests of the actors involved as the basic variables that explain the action environment. It noted that policy behavior is best understood when analyzed within such framework. It also presented the principles of sustainable tourism development (STD) as an analytical tool and discussed the nature and extent of governments’ intervention for achieving STD.

Chapter 2 highlighted that for public policy analysis it is necessary to relate it to the political system and the power structure of society as a whole. This chapter, therefore, brings the discussion to the Egyptian context. It is divided into three sections that together present an overview of the political and socio-economic factors affecting the tourism policy formulation and implementation in the NWC region of Egypt. Section 3.2 presents the historical and institutional contexts within which the features and attributes of policies formulated in the 1970s can be understood. It aims to explain the
reasons and consequences of the behavior of the actors and institutions involved in the policy making and policy implementation processes in Egypt especially during the study period (1974 - 1994). This is a pre-requisite to interpret different dynamics and issues embodied in the case study that are addressed in the subsequent chapters.

Section 3.3 identifies the Egyptian development challenges and the policies addressed to help in the resolution of the country’s economic and human settlement problems. The section also links the development of the NWC region with the national policy for development. Section 3.4 puts tourism in the perspective of the Egyptian development strategy and reviews the national tourism policies and goals. It also allocates the NWC region within the Egyptian tourist map and illustrates the intended prospects for developing tourism in the NWC region.

3.2 Historical and Institutional Contexts

The institutional approach adopted in this section traces the historical, political and cultural environments of institutions and government officials which leads the discussion to exploring the way policies were formulated and implemented in Egypt during the study period. Accordingly, this section starts by providing a socio-economic overview of Egypt to appreciate its institutional legacy. It is maintained that this legacy influences the overall political and administrative culture that affects the processes of decision making, policy formulation, and implementation. This section tends to focus on institutions and not just the abstract notion of the state, and seeks to make history an important variable in the study of political institutions.

3.2.1 The Egyptian State

In order to understand how the policies of the 1970s were made and implemented, it is essential that the state be examined. The state is defined to include the President, the cabinet, the government, and all public sector administration. It dominated Egypt’s economic life in the 1970s, as it had in the 1960s (Rivlin 1985). In 1970/71 it employed 1.25 million civil servants. From 1977 to 1980 employment in the bureaucratic machine increased from around 1.9 millions to 2.5 millions (i.e. by 30 percent or some 10 percent per year) (Ayubi 1991). This is about four times the population growth rate during that period (2.6 percent) and actually surpasses the rate of bureaucratic growth even at the highest stage of socialist transformation in the 1960s. Despite the ‘rhetoric about decentralization and local government’ (Ayubi
1991), employment in the central bureaucracy increased during the same period (1977 to 1980) by 60.4 percent whereas it increased only by 28.7 percent in local government (*ibid.*). Through this huge bureaucracy, the state directly and indirectly controlled much of the economy.

As noted in Chapter 2, Egypt represents an example where the role of the state has been shaped by a belief in the guardian or nation state ideal. Until present, Egyptians regard the state as the source of power and services provision. This is an unwritten or spoken contract, but the state has shaped it and made it a settled habit of thought in Egyptian people’s minds since 1952\(^1\) until mid 1980s and early 1990s. This is reflected in the Egyptian Five-Year Plan of 1978-82, which summarized the government’s duties towards the people as being:

i) to guarantee unconditional employment and earning to all; ii) to provide social welfare through housing, health, education and other services, iii) protect the consumer from the increase in the cost of living, iv) to administer all public utilities and most units of national production, and, v) to make available to the public both necessary and luxury foodstuffs at prices much lower than their actual cost to the government (cited by Salem 1997).

Egypt might have deserted its socialist ideals in the early 1970s, and the role of the state in Egypt may be declining in some economic and social fields, but the control functions of the bureaucracy has not been noticeably reduced, as Ayubi (1991) argues. The state organizations seem to be immediately present and noticeably active when it comes to things like checks and controls, but their presence and activity diminish considerably when it comes to providing infrastructure facilities or useful information systems and feasibility studies. For example, financing most of the regional infrastructure facilities in the NWC region, as the region’s planning consultant\(^2\) points out, was carried out by private sector money, although it is, as he argues, the state’s responsibility.

It seems difficult to deny that in the history of modern societies state institutions have enjoyed, (and enjoy even more in today’s welfare society), a particularly privileged position in the making and implementing of political decisions. This is especially true

\(^1\) In 1952, the revolutionary government headed by military officers overthrew the monarchy and ruled the country.

\(^2\) In a discussion with the regional planning consultant of the NWC region, Cairo, August 1997.
in the Egyptian experience of the past forty years, especially during the Nasser\textsuperscript{3} years, when military officers and key administrators developed a new stratification of social influence designed to maximize power for the state. However the state in most developing countries is not the strong, autonomous entity implied in much of the state-society literature. From this perspective, the state is often weakened, for example, by the rural local elite and power brokers who maintain alternative organizational structures, have localized systems of communication, and establish incentive processes that dilute central power even among the central government officials assigned to these rural areas. To support this view, Ansari (1986) develops an argument that in spite of Nasser’s reforms of the late 1950s and early 1960s very little changed in the socio-economic structures or in the influence patterns of the local elite in the rural areas of Egypt. While one might reject Ansari’s implication that the local elites were the key causal factor in explaining Egypt’s inability to foster meaningful reform, his research does document the many ways that the local rural elites were able to resist and frustrate central government policy initiatives. However, these arguments support the researcher’s view that both, the state and powerful groups in society determine the way political decisions are made and implemented in Egypt, where these decisions are rather independent from the social and economic needs of the nation. In this case, political expediency would influence the decision making and implementation processes rather than the social and economic requisites of the nation.

\textbf{3.2.2 The Political System}

The traditional assessment of the Egyptian political system is that central government forces have dominated. Most historical summaries of Egypt’s approach to politics emphasize the highly centralized system existing from the days of the Pharaohs, through the Khedives, and then on to the regimes of Nasser and Sadat. Mayfield (1996) points out that even contemporary analysts define the political system of modern Egypt as a highly bureaucratized system that dominates the whole of the countryside economically, socially and politically.

The President as a person and the presidency as an institution lie at the heart of Egypt’s political system. At the top of the political system is the President who is nominated by the parliament and voted upon, uncontested, by the people in a

\textsuperscript{3} President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, 1956-1970
referendum. He is elected for a six-year period, which is renewable. Generally, the President, “with extensive power over all matters” (Rivlin 1985), has always enjoyed sweeping powers and his activities have overshadowed all other organs of the state. He has no effective department of his own and uses the cabinet, plus personal advisors, to deal with all issues (Aliboni et al. 1984). Ministers and senior officials form a second level after the President. They provide the technical (and sometimes political) skills for the implementation of policy at the detailed level. However, “their tenure was limited by the need for scapegoats to blame for policy failures” (Rivlin 1985). The huge number of civil servants (as pointed out above) has been directly responsible for controlling the large public sector and for influencing the economy toward the government’s objectives. Government administration is accountable to the President and to a small extent to Parliament. It had been, especially in the 1970s, mainly a closed system (ibid.), and was not, therefore, fully open to public scrutiny and criticism.

Figure 3.1. The Egyptian Political System

Egypt has a republican form of government with executive powers concentrated in the presidency as shown in Figure 3.1. According to the Constitution, the President formulates and supervises the implementation of general state policy. In addition, centralized power from Cairo has dominated Egyptian patterns of leadership: from the

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4 The Constitution was adopted in 1971 and amended in 1980. It outlines Egypt’s political system and defines public authorities.
village, to the mayor of the principal city of the district, to the Governor of the province, to the cabinet minister(s) in Cairo responsible for local government functions, to the directors of the national universities who hold ministerial rank, etc. Indeed the legislature itself is dominated by the presidency (Middle East Research Institute 1985).

Present-day politics in Egypt is better understood when approached in its historical context. One can distinguish between three main phases in the evolution of Egypt as Aliboni et al (1984) point out: the liberal constitutional phase 1923-52, the one party phase 1952-74 and the controlled or limited political pluralism 1975-82.

The first phase was characterized by the existence of political parties and the free enterprise system. The absence of political competitiveness, the existence of a single political organization, controlled political participation, centralization of power, and supremacy of political dissent characterized the Nasserist (second) phase. There was an obvious imbalance between politics and administration.

In the 1970s, Sadat introduced a number of major changes into the body politic of Egypt (third phase). It was transformed from national planning and socialism to more reliance on market forces and private enterprises, from one party system to controlled political pluralism, and from a pro-soviet foreign policy orientation to an essentially pro-American one.

Notwithstanding the many differences in economic and social policies between Nasser and Sadat, Egypt’s political system has displayed a noticeable element of continuity, that is, the obvious lack of political institutionalization. Despite an extensive, rather cumbersome bureaucracy (or perhaps because of it), Nasser always had the final say in vital decision making. The same was true for Sadat whose power was just as extensive, as Aliboni et al. (1984) point out. Sadat, like Nasser before him, completely decided the course the government was to take. This was particularly reflected when the October Working Paper was initiated in 1974, the issues and suggestions of the paper became policies that had to be implemented without proper analysis or appraisal. El-Salmi (1980) points out

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“when infitah (open door) policy came into operation in 1974, public sector management seemed to accept it as a fact of life and started a process of adjustment to the new situation.”

Egypt had one political party between 1957 and 1976. The National Democratic Party continued to dominate the Egyptian political environment even after allowing more than one party, including opposition. Although there were many decentralization laws in the 1960s and 1970s, the political commitment to devolute power towards local governments is yet to materialize (Salem 1997).

3.2.3 The Central and Local Governments

Egypt has had a largely government-controlled economy since the nationalization of 1961. Moreover, control over the public sector’s fiscal actions, for example, has been highly centralized, as Ikram (1980) points out, with almost no autonomy permitted to local administrations, and with most of the important decisions affecting public sector enterprises being made by the central government. Moreover, the Egyptian public sector suffers the same problems as public sectors in many countries the world over. There is a high level of bureaucratic control and little space is left for decentralized initiative. Managers are badly paid and lack motivation, and are subjected to continuous political interference, particularly with respect to decisions on hiring and firing (Aliboni et al. 1984).

“There is a painful shortage of skilled professionals at the top. Egypt’s hierarchical traditions mean that promotion is by seniority rather than merit; sycophancy towards senior colleagues is deeply entrenched; most government clerks, rottenly paid, still do as little as they can for the few hours they spend at work, then try and make a bit of money in the rest of their time” (The Economist 1999).

Central Government

The central government consists of a central administration (the ministries\(^6\) and the legislature) and agencies referred to as Public Authorities. The agencies are divided into Public Authorities (services), which are responsible for general functions of the government, such as universities, research institutions, and the television agency; and Public Authorities (economic), which are basically non-financial public enterprises, such as the Suez Canal National Authority and the railways (see Ikram 1980). Public sector companies consist of government enterprises that are not included under the

\(^6\) In 1993 there were 32 ministries, in addition to 200 agencies that report to these ministries (El-Sherbini 1993, cited in Salem 1997)
Public Authority (economic). These enterprises are widely dispersed throughout virtually every field of economic activity and generally dominate the activities of their respective sectors. They form the chief vehicle for the government’s measure to exercise economic control, particularly over prices, wages, and investment.

The central government ministries according to their line of activity supervise public enterprises, for example, the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction of Egypt (MOR) supervises all building materials and construction enterprises. A public enterprise, as described by El-Salmi (1980), is being caught in a web of conflicting, and even contradictory organizational relationships, flows of information, directives, orders, and laws. According to El-Salmi (1980) central government bureaucracy in Egypt used to represent the most important constraint affecting public sector management. According to Law 111 of 1975: ‘the minister in charge chairs the general assembly of a public enterprise.’ In this capacity, the minister, as a representative of the central government, can exert influence and pressure on enterprise management to make the types of decisions required by the Government. The minister concerned has the authority to dismiss the chairman of the board and/or the board of directors, which can be considered as a very serious threat to enterprise management. The top management is appointed by the decision of either the Prime Minister or the Minister in charge.

Hence management loyalty naturally rests with top government decision makers, which acts as a psychological constraint that has an unconscious impact on enterprise management decision making. Therefore, public enterprise’s financial affairs are highly influenced or controlled by government regulations and interventions. This can be emphasized in four points. First, financing of current operations is subject to the general directives issued annually by the Ministry of Finance as part of the budget law. Second, bank credits are set at a certain ceiling that a public enterprise cannot escape. The Central Bank and the Ministries of Finance and Economy determine such a ceiling. Third, profit distribution is controlled by the decision of the Prime Minister who prescribes by law the percentages of profit to be distributed. Forth, price, and wage settings are controlled by government regulations that public enterprises have to abide by. Moreover, the choice of top managers is highly influenced by their social

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7 This is in conflict with the nature of tourism projects.
affiliation and political loyalty. The controversy over the relative merits of experts versus loyal public servants was current in the 1960s and 1970s. Even at the time of this study, it still has an influence on the selection of top management personnel in the public sector. Therefore, product mix decisions in most public enterprises are greatly influenced by social and political considerations. In general, Egyptian public management can be regarded as socio-politically oriented where social and political considerations have a superior impact on decision making, even if proper economic criteria are to be sacrificed. El-Salmi (1980) classifies the basic decision criteria applied by public sector management when making their own decisions (i.e. without government pressure or intervention) to be as follows, in order of importance: profit and financial; productivity and technical; employment and labor relations; and social and political. However, when management decision making is subjected to government pressure, it generally yields to socio-political considerations and sacrifices economic and profit considerations. However, and as this study highlights, the government itself has been seeking profit even when it had to compromise on social, technical, employment and environmental consideration.

In addition, the performance of the Egyptian bureaucracy is characterized by the frequency of changes in laws, structures, and leadership. This makes ‘organizational instability’ a real problem. For example, in the 1970s the average period of position tenure for an Egyptian minister is a year and a half, \(^8\) barely sufficient to enable him to familiarize himself with the tasks of his post, and also he lacked incentives to make difficult decisions. The Egyptian administrative structure is notorious for its fragmentation and lack of coordination. Excessive compartmentalism is also obvious (Ayubi 1991). Duplication, overlap, and vague mandates cause waste of resources and intensify rivalries among governmental bodies (Salem 1997). The words of Handoussa describe the Egyptian bureaucracy:

> “The ‘archaic’ bureaucracy inherited from colonial times continued to accumulate power and discretion with the help of party politics, overlapping jurisdictions between national and local government or amongst ministries, and /or confusing regulatory environment. Then there is the impact, at all levels of the bureaucracy, of the idolization of papers and documents, signatures and seals, and the complexity, repetition, and overlapping of a large number of

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\(^8\) Between October 1970 and May 1980, there were 16 government reshuffles in those nine and one half years: each administration, therefore, lasted an average of seven and one half months (see Rivlin 1985).
formalities and procedures that lead inevitably to bottlenecks and
delays”.

Local Government

In Egypt, local government consists of the twenty-six Governorates and the various municipal authorities. Their powers to tax and to borrow are minimal and rigidly controlled by the central government; local expenditures must be met almost entirely through transfers from the central budget (Ikram 1980). The local government system in Egypt is an illustration of centralization. It is made of three main parties. First, the Governors: who are appointed by the President. Second, the executive councils appointed by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Local Administration; and third, the elected popular/municipal councils. The first two bodies are responsible for planning, budgeting, and negotiation with the central government to secure financial transfers and implementation. The elected councils are expected to work as watchdogs on the other two, and vehicles to convey aspirations and views of local people to policy and decision-makers (Salem 1997).

The system, however, suffers endemic agency, information problems, and other problems. Governors are accountable to the President (as opposed to local people) and are subject to replacement at any time. The elected municipal councils were found by Nerr et al (1982) and Cook and El-Missiri (1995) to be unrepresentative of local people and largely ineffective.

“Egyptians still have no say at all in the way they are governed. Elections remain a disgrace. Ministers, provincial governors, and other senior officials are appointed by the president. Power is centralized, with little authority devolved to local level. A handful of political dinosaurs still run their departments like closed empires, largely impervious to the ambitions of their more modern-minded colleagues” (The Economist 1999).

The difference between local and central government as far as the local people are concerned is blurred, as Salem (1997) argues. Cook and El-Missiri (1995) infer that ‘decision making in the Governorates can take diverse routes depending upon personal relationships and cultural forces and sometimes even bypasses the normal governorate channels and jumps to the central ministry level to gain resolution’. This only indicates that central controls over local bureaucrats are not as predictable as might be assumed (Adams 1986).
In evaluating Egyptian local administration, it is important to distinguish between function and administrative discretion. Local administrators exhibit absolutely no or very little discretion; then, outlining a long list of local administrative functions may have nothing to do with the extent to which formal authority is decentralized.

Local government is necessary to enable local people to appoint representatives and managers to administer the local area on behalf of the residents.

“Local areas belong to the local people and they pay local taxes for which they are entitled to the services of the local politicians, and managers. Local government may have to protect the rights of local people against upper tier governments and private interests” (Elliott 1997).

However, the case of local administration in Egypt involves the appointment of a generalist representative of the President himself. The Governor is the senior government officer in the Governorate. What makes the Egyptian system less than a purely unitary functional system (which requires independent central ministry officials structured hierarchically but beholden to no one but their superiors in the capital) is the fact that the Governor is the superior official in the Governorate to whom all functional officials are subordinate. The Governor represents the national interest, the state, and the government. He, although not clearly stated in the law, embodies the authority of all central ministries. In relation to other levels in the system (district, town, and village) the Governor is the senior executive officer of the whole Governorate and exercises control over all lower tier authorities (both executive and popular). He is also responsible for coordinating a fairly complicated system involving planning, supervision, and coordination (all clearly accepted in Egypt as the essential elements of any local administrative systems). However, the Governor’s personality and managerial skills may be more crucial in determining the degree of decentralization of authority than the laws or rules and regulations presently established (Mayfield 1996). The Ex-Governor of Matrouh Governorate assured that “the Governorate is a local administration and not a local authority” and thus has no authority to decide, for example, the number of housing units to be implemented in his
Governorate. “This is the job of the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction,” he adds.¹⁹

Too often, the central government’s preoccupation with issues of trade and diplomatic relations, rates of inflation and foreign currency exchange rates, and national policy-making makes the activities of village and district councils or governorate administrative units seem of little consequence. However, Mayfield (1996) challenges this mistaken, almost parochial, view. He argues that local government/administrative systems have potentially extremely important roles to play.¹⁰ Roles that directly affect national political stability by providing desperately needed services in food supply, health, education, and welfare, implementing structural adjustment policy reform requirements, and stimulating and reinforcing economic development both through private and public sector expertise. Mayfield (1996) also argues that certain local level systems (local government/administrative units, local popularly elected provincial, district, and village councils, and various local private associations, cooperatives, and interest groups) play an important role in determining the effectiveness of state activities in reaching three important goals: sustainable economic development, equitable structural adjustments, and greater democratization within the political processes of the state. However, many officials in Egypt do not appreciate the significant contribution that local government/administrative institutions can make in achieving national development goals. Many of the political and administrative activities found in the local councils and administrative units of Egypt are too often considered extraneous and of no consequence to the broader issues and concerns at the central level. Meikle (1982), for example, concluded from her work in Egypt that with the support of the local level much could be achieved.

“The centralized nature of the administration meant that the local client had not been involved in the identification of the need being addressed by the consultant and therefore gave it a low priority for action” (ibid.).

¹⁹ In a discussion with the researcher in June 1997. This was a response to the researcher’s inquiry about the extent of the governorate’s authority over the development of Marina Al Alamein Tourists Center in Matrouh, the NWC region of Egypt.

¹⁰ Mayfield (1996) points out that many of the failures of World bank and IMF policy reform activities and national development programs can be directly attributed to the fact that they completely ignore local institutional and administrative prerequisites for effective implementation.
The above discussion highlights the characteristics of the central and local governments in Egypt. It emphasizes the centralized nature of the state and the weakness of local governments. Policy decisions always came from above where lack of coordination, fragmentation, and organizational instability existed. The frequency of changes in laws, structure, and leadership challenge the effectiveness of policy implementation. In addition, policy is managed by government officials whose decisions and actions are questionable, as the following sub-section illustrates.

3.2.4 Corruption in the Public Sector

Zaalouk (1989) points out that although government planning and supervision in Egypt decreased during the 1970s, corruption and parasitic activity had been gnawing at the economy and society as a whole. The amount and scope of illegal financial activity was alarming. It ranged from drug peddling, to tax evasion, illegal currency transfers, embezzlement, and bribery. It had been estimated that the proceeds of this black economy made up between 15 and 30 per cent of the gross national product in the 1970s and 1980s (ibid.).

According to Ayubi (1991) corruption is a problem that has grown considerably under the Open Door Policy (infitah) in the 1970s. Of course, corruption (broadly defined here as the ‘illegitimate utilization of public office for unjustified private gain’) is not confined just to Egypt, and indeed Egypt may not be among the very worst cases in this respect. However, in the words of Ayubi (1991),

[in Egypt] “corruption has become both petty and grand. It has come to permeate all echelons of the bureaucracy, and to involve all the known varieties: bribery, nepotism, favoritism, forgery, embezzlement, smuggling, illegal exchange of favors, the devious allocation of permits and licenses, and so on.”

The scale of corruption in the financial and economic fields, (which have the most immediate impact on development), increased greatly from the beginning of the 1970s, especially in the areas of customs, taxes, import and export, real estate, credit and supplies. In the late 1970s, the under-secretary of the Ministry of Finance admitted that the country was witnessing an unprecedented large number of embezzlements. Other agencies such as the State Security Investigations, the Public Socialist Prosecutor, the Central Auditing Agency and most particularly the Administrative Control Authority (which, ironically, was dismantled in June 1980)
also began to reveal countless cases of fraud and misconduct among public officials that reached serious criminal levels. Under Sadat the level of corruption became quite high, and involved such top public personalities as the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of the Economy, the Minister of Civil Aviation, the Minister of Electricity, the Chairman of Egypt-air, the Chairman of the Water Board, and many other highly placed officials.\footnote{See among many others the cases documented in Al Ahram Newspaper: March 21\textsuperscript{st} 1978, Al Akhbar Newspaper: December 1\textsuperscript{st} 1978 and December 11\textsuperscript{th} 1978.}

The reasons for corruption in Egypt are multiple and many of them have nothing to do with \textit{infitah} (Open Door Policy) as Ayubi (1991) points out. They include the weakness of the civil structure, the long history of poverty, excessive routine, loopholes in legislation, overlapping jurisdictions, disparity between authority and responsibility, and inefficient control devices. However, there is no doubt that corruption has grown in scope and magnitude since the adoption of the \textit{infitah}. As people see more ‘big money’ circulating and as the salaried people in particular find it increasingly difficult to make ends meet, the temptation of corruption becomes more powerful. Corruption is more clearly motivated by a sense of relative deprivation and a sense of loose conduct in the society at large, and both of these have grown greater since \textit{infitah}. People are increasingly accepting it as a normal practice. Indeed, the government itself has seemed indirectly to overlook corruption. A Prime Minister declared officially in March 1975 that ‘commissions were all right provided that a portion of them was handed over to the government’ (cited by Ayubi 1991).

This was the political and administrative plight in Egypt during the seventies, the decade which witnessed the formulation of the policies and strategies to resolve the country’s economic and human settlement problems, namely the Open Door Policy, the New Map Policy, the tourism policy of the NWC region, and many others. They are taken up in the following section.

\textbf{3.3 The Political Economy of National Development in Egypt}

The previous section has identified and analyzed salient attributes of the institutional arrangements of Egypt during the 1970s and 1980s. It also highlighted the political and administrative culture that shaped institutional and individual norms of behavior.
of the decision-makers and implementers of policies that were addressed to help in the resolution of economic and human settlement problems. The discussion examined and analyzed the predicaments in Egypt as well as the deficiencies in the political system and the public sector and marshaled documentary evidence to buttress the arguments.

Having ranged over the main features of institutional and political arrangements in Egypt, the discussion turns to look at different aspects of the Egyptian political and economic contexts. This section discusses the basic problems that have been facing Egypt and the policies that addressed them. It aims to present the political, social and economic circumstances, which contributed to innovative policies developed immediately prior to, and during, the study period, 1974-94. Policies which aimed to resolve or contribute to the resolution of Egypt’s major problems (how to employ, feed and house a rapidly growing population on a very limited supply of land with severely constrained economic resources and opportunities).

This section describes this context. It starts by briefly explaining the scale and inherent difficulties of the major problems. It then continues by describing the contexts and objectives of two innovative policies, summarized as the ‘Open Door Policy’ and the ‘New Map Policy’ which were included in the October Working Paper of 1974. It concludes by briefly discussing the inherent difficulties associated with the solution and the speed it was presented. Details of which have been revealed by this study and are discussed more fully in the review of the findings of this research, which are presented in the subsequent chapters.

### 3.3.1 Development Challenges in Egypt

In the last few decades, Egypt, as many Southern countries, has been exposed to various challenges, among which, there are two main problems. Perhaps the first and most daunting is the human settlement problem, where the rapid rise in population and the heavy concentration in the urban areas have been hindering the efforts of development and absorbing any production, and particularly causing urban expansion over the agricultural land.

The second challenge is an economic one. In addition to the problems of unemployment, poverty, industrial and agricultural performance, inflation, low per capita income, etc., the country’s scarce resources were being diverted to defense.
Adding to these challenges the institutional and public sector’s predicaments that were discussed in the previous section, thus the country has been put in an acute position.

The Human Settlements Challenge
The population problem in Egypt can be examined from three angles, together they present the human settlement challenge.

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12 El-Hinnawy (1982) points out that the population problem is not just one of quantity or size of the population but it has a qualitative aspect. In this sense, population quality in terms of skill, education, health and women’s participation in the labor force among other terms, may be the main problem. If people were made more productive, as he argues, there would be no problem at all.
The first concerns the rising average increase in population, which can be more understandable when traced historically. The total population in Egypt in 1907 was around 11 million people. Such amount has doubled four times until it reached 44 millions in 1981, that is, in the course of 75 years. Then the population reached 53 millions in 1988, and 62 millions in 1996. It is expected to reach 70 million by the year 2000. The rate of population growth had risen from an average of 1.2 per cent per year before 1940 to 2.5 percent in the 1970s. That is a net increase of more than 1 million people every 10 months as a result of a sharp fall in death rates not compensated by a similar decline in birth rates (Meikle 1987). The proportion of residents in urban areas\textsuperscript{13} to the total amount of population reached around 48% (CAPMAS 1997), while it was not more than 17% in 1907, and it is estimated that it will be 52 percent by the year 2000. These tremendous and continuing increases in population, in addition to the urbanization phenomenon, have created a fundamental conflict between the use of land for agriculture versus urban development. Settlements have been extended onto the fertile area, thus reducing Egypt’s primary resource (Figure 3.2).

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{example.png}
\caption{The Uneven Distribution of Population in Egypt. Source: Hassan (1994)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{13} As a result of rural to urban migration, national increases and low death rates in urban areas.
Second, the increasing population density in both the Nile valley and Delta. This, as mentioned in Chapter 1, has resulted in overcrowding, shortage of housing and breakdown in the urban services. Although the country contains about 1 million square km (386,000 square miles), that is about the size of Spain and France together, only a narrow strip in the Nile Valley and the Delta is usable. This area of 40,000 square km (15,000 square miles), less than 5% of the land, is but an elongated oasis in the midst of desert as noted in Chapter 1. Crammed into this habitable area is 98% of the population (see Chapter 1). Since there are now more than 58 millions living in the Valley and Delta, the population density amounts to 1250 person/square km. It is considered one of the highest densities in the world, while the density in the rest of the country is about 2-persons/square km (Kharoufi 1994). The analysis of internal migration of population has demonstrated that both Cairo and Alexandria cities still prove attractive to the majority of migrants, because of the centralization of administration, production and services in the major cities, where the population density in Cairo amounts to 29,000 person/km$^2$.

Finally, the decrease in agricultural land is the third angle of the population problem in Egypt where the decrease of around 60 thousand acres (25,200 hectares) a year for the favor of urbanization, risks the country's food supply (Kharoufi 1994). This has been a result of random and informal spread of urbanization over the agricultural land.

As a consequence of the above, the needs to re-distribute the population and house the new population have been the concern of the national development policy. The national policy objectives have been to ensure the optimum means for exploitation of natural resources, the opening up of vistas of socio-economic development and the bringing about of better living standards for the people (President Sadat 1974). The relatively fixed amount of the usable land and the rapid growth of the population-will be seen as leitmotif in the discussion of Egypt’s economic problems.

The Economic Challenges

The difficulties associated with the human settlement problem and the weakness of the public sector (that was discussed in the previous section) have been compounded
by a number of complicating economic factors. These include unemployment, very low per capita income, weak Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, unsatisfactory performance of agriculture and industry, and particularly, the general state of the Egyptian economy that has accumulated throughout the years.

The history of the performance of the Egyptian economy shows that it has been uneven since the 1952 revolution. In the early 1950s the economy was suffering from the inevitable uncertainties of a major change in the political regime and from the effects of the worldwide downturn in the business cycle after the Korean War (Ikram 1980). Recovery followed with a stretch of ten years of significant economic growth (until 1965), after which there was a steady decline. At the same time, the transition from a free, private enterprise system to an economy characterized by state planning, public ownership of modern means of production, and wide-ranging administrative control and policy interference. Richards and Waterbury (1990) regard the recovery to Egypt’s first national development five-year plan (1960-65) which was geared towards import substitution and liberalization, and experienced the second wave of nationalization of private sector establishments, including utilities.

The first five-year plan (1960-65) created one million jobs and achieved 6 percent annual growth (ibid.). However, it laid the foundation of a bottom heavy, highly centralized and overly politicized institutional structure. Army officers largely dominated the civil management system. Exclusionary decision-making, control and discretion were the norms. Negative attitudes towards private and foreign investments,

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14 Unemployment is one of Egypt’s greatest socio-economic problems, hovering between 17 and 20 percent. Unemployment in Egypt is due to a variety of reasons. Chief among them are the lack of investments in projects to create new job opportunities, and the raising costs of job creation due to inflation-for example-, the cost of creating a single job opportunity increased from L.E. 44,000 to L.E 66,000 between 1988 and 1993 (Giugale and Mobarak 1996).

15 Between 1960 and 1976 the per capita income improved only from 65 to 100 Egyptian Pounds over the sixteen year period, that is, at about 2.7 percent a year. However, if compared with the rate of population growth, inflation and market prices of the Egyptian Pound it can be seen how low it had been.

16 The GDP growth rate that had averaged around 4 percent annually between 1967 and 1974 (a decrease from 6.7 Percent in 1965), then increased to an annual average over 13 percent between 1975 and 1978. By 1978 there were signs that the economy’s growth was, once again, slowing. Official estimates place growth of the GDP in 1978 at about 8.0 percent, 9.7 percent in 1979 and 9.2 in 1980 (Middle East Research Institute 1985). Then it dropped sharply in the 1980s till it reached around 3.6 percent. However, it started to pick up again after the country adopted the structural adjustment policies. The GDP growth rate for 1995/96 is estimated at around 5 percent (World Bank 1997), and increasing.
and profits were promoted (Handoussa 1995). In the decade after 1965, the economy could no longer sustain the pace of high economic performance, largely because resources were being diverted to defense, and aid flows from the West were interrupted (Middle East Research Institute 1985).

The 1967 defeat and the Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula meant loss of oil fields, closure of the Suez Canal, and the near death of tourism. The country entered an acute recession (Richard and Waterbury 1990). Growth rate fell to 3 percent per year (until 1973) (Institute of National Planning 1994). The legitimacy of the state however remained largely unshaken due to its subsidies of basic commodities and services (Abdel-Fadil 1996). Then in 1973 the oil price revolution opened up new opportunities for investment and development in Egypt, but it also triggered off a phase of recession combined with inflation in the world economy, which had adverse repercussions on all developing countries, Egypt included (Ikram 1980).

The October War of 1973 created a maneuvering space for Egypt to start a move towards a partly liberalized economy (Salem 1997). New legislation was then enacted to attract private investments and to open the economy to foreign trade (Fahmy 1988). The broad framework of a fundamental change toward a more open and market-oriented economy was enunciated in April 1974 by President Sadat in his October Working Paper.

3.3.2 The Policies of the October Working Paper

Up to 1956 the Revolutionary Government, as El-Salmi (1980) points out, had no clear economic strategy; consequently, no profound interest in or understanding of the role and importance of the public sector existed at that time. The major economic problem as perceived by the Revolutionary Government was that of unjust income distribution rather than a shortage or deficiency of national product. In addition, the private sector was dominant in all economic activities, with heavy foreign interests, with the result that virtually no thought was given to the notion of public enterprise.

From 1956, several factors helped to bring the public sector concept to the forefront. The Egyptianization of all French, British, Israeli, and Belgian interests in Egypt where a semi government body, the Economic Organization was established to supervise and control such companies. Moreover, the manufacturing industry was
gaining acceptance as the proper way to economic growth and development, therefore the first Ministry of Industry was established in 1956 and a General Organization of Industrialization was also established to prepare and implement a five year industrialization plan. After the end of the first five-year plan (1960-65), the adoption of a second plan was not possible, due to the decline in domestic and foreign financial resources, and then more dramatically, to the aftermath of the June 1967 war with Israel (Ayubi 1991). In general, the years 1961-1974 witnessed an overall collapse of management efficiency in the public sector, with government bureaucracy gradually controlling and restraining enterprise management.

Therefore, President Sadat’s inheritance in 1970 was an authoritarian, centrally controlled and closed state with severely strained economy. Foreign policy was effectively frozen by the growing détente between the super powers and the superior position of Israel (Meikle 1984). After Sadat had established himself as President, the overall investment climate began to undergo major changes. Egypt opened itself to the West and Arab investment and became a mixed rather than a centralized economy. However, by 1973 Egypt’s economy was under an almost intolerable strain mainly because the country was preparing for war and defense was absorbing most resources. On October 6th 1973, Egypt crossed the Suez Canal and broke the Israeli Bar-Lev defense line, days later the war was effectively over. Egypt’s victory evoked a surge of Arab unity and renewed Egypt’s confidence and international standing.

Egypt’s new confidence encouraged Sadat in stating his policies, which were intended to attract massive foreign investment for the development of Egypt. In the words of President Sadat (1974),

“with the victory of October 1973, Egypt armed with confidence and faith, opened up the entire world with both a new economic policy and a new political front.”

Sadat’s new economic policy was addressed in the October Working Paper, which was to bring victory on the home front in the shape of prosperity for all and thereby resolve Egypt’s major problem of a rapidly growing population dependent on a weak economic base.
Therefore, in the spring of 1974 President Sadat circulated the October Working Paper. This document was presented to the People’s Assembly (the Parliament) in April 1974 and approved by a national referendum in May. In the October Working Paper, President Sadat (1974) set Egypt’s task as

“drawing up a comprehensive civilisational strategy for the movement of [our] society... to build up the new state and the modern society covering every aspect of [our] life.”

This document was raised to the level of a ‘document of revolution’ as Cooper (1982) describes it. Hence, it laid out a comprehensive outline for a major redirection of both political and economic policies.

In substance, the Paper deals exclusively with economics. It was recognized that in order to accelerate economic growth, changes were required in the roles of the different sectors, public vis-a-vis private, and domestic vis-a-vis foreign (Ikram 1980). The continuing importance of the public sector was stressed, but it was also acknowledged that the public sector had annexed certain activities that should have remained in the private sector. Hence, new emphasis was given to the desirability of increasing the inflow of foreign investment and technology through an ‘outward looking’ foreign policy (see also the Middle East Research Institute, 1985). The October Working Paper also included a human settlement policy (New Map) that was concerned with the redistribution of the population to protect agricultural lands, absorb the new population and ease the concentration of people in the major cities. These new policies are taken up next and throughout this section.

**The Open Door Policy (Infitah)**

Since the war of October 1973, Egypt has had three main policy objectives, as Ikram (1980) points out, defense preparedness, reconstruction, and economic development, and the preservation of the social welfare framework. In order to achieve those objectives the October Working Paper has stipulated a new ‘open door’ economic policy symbolized in the equation: Arab capital + Western technology + abundant Egyptian resources = development and progress. This new policy, which carried the liberalization of the economy “farther than anything since the movement into etatist economics in the late 1950s”, as Cooper (1982) argues, became known as *al-infitah al-iqtisadi* (literally, the economic opening). In *infitah*, the Egyptian economy is
represented in the process of opening itself, not only to the West or to foreign investment, but also to profit (Wahba 1994). Infitah proved to be one of the most hotly debated and explosive issues of the entire post 1967\textsuperscript{17} period.

The infitah\textsuperscript{18} (open door) policy called for the revitalization of the private sector, decreasing the state’s involvement in many economic activities like, for example, industry, agriculture, construction, etc., opening the country’s doors to the flow of foreign and Arab capital and the partial dismantling of the public sector\textsuperscript{19}. The sum of these policies, which are still operative at the present time, constituted a reversal of Egypt’s socialist transformation experienced under Nasser (1954-70). The infitah policy, as Daef (1986) points out, tilted progressively towards capitalist “laissez-faire, laissez passer.”

For purposes of the discussion, the policy is divided into two parts: basic principles and specific economic activities (see Cooper 1982). The basic principles are of economic liberalization, which include the need to import the technology from the West and attract foreign and Arab capital to sustain economic development. In order to attract capital, the government believed that it was necessary to provide a number of financial incentives to foreign investors by, for example, encouraging banks to engage in a full range of activities, offering tax exemptions, establishing incentive rates for the conversion of currency, ensuring freedom and security for financial transactions, etc.

On the other hand, in the sphere of economic activity the government took an ‘open’ approach. It considered just about every field open to foreigners and permitted foreigners to have total ownership of specific projects (this was not allowed before infitah).

\textsuperscript{17} The six days war with Israel in June 1967.

\textsuperscript{18} According to Article 3 of Law 43 of 1974, the main objective of the infitah policy is “for the purpose of realizing the objectives of economic and social development within the framework of the State’s general policy and national plan” (cited by Zohny 1988).

\textsuperscript{19} Up to the declaration of the open door policy in 1974, the public sector was responsible for 77% of all industrial production in the country, 78% of construction works, 100% of electricity production, 76.8 of transportation and communication, 78.8 % of services. It undertook 90 percent of all national investments. The economic public sector was being run by 34,000 managers distributed among the various public authorities, organizations and companies, many of whom learned of the availability of their posts through personal contacts (43%) (Ayubi 1991).
In recognition of the fact that competition would soon be coming from foreigners and private sector Egyptians and that the public sector was in no condition to meet the challenge, the government produced a public sector reform strategy, which included three main decisions. First, the Public Organizations were to be dismantled (they were overarching bodies that ran entire industries and it was argued that their elimination would create greater flexibility). Second, the hand of the minister should be taken off the public sector companies. Third, the public sector companies were decided to have independent budgets appended to the national budget because they were guided by methods that differ in their nature and structure from the administration of the government apparatus. Other economic activities that were considered in the *infitah* policy include an agrarian policy, an import policy, and a housing and reconstruction policy. The latter will be discussed in the following sub-section.

The Egyptian economic policy (*infitah*) was successful in one respect. It increased the total resources available to the economy dramatically (Rivlin 1985). The tolls from the Suez Canal, the oil exports, tourism and the remittances from Egyptians working abroad all contributed to diversifying the national income. According to the World Bank, ‘Egypt achieved unprecedented growth following the adoption of *infitah* policies, boosted by sizable increases in foreign assistance, Egyptian worker’s remittances, and foreign direct investment’ (World Bank 1997).

Although this study is not concerned with assessing the *Infitah* policy it is worth mentioning that many observers feel that it had a negative effect on the economy and underline the fact that it had neither succeeded in attracting the expected investments, nor decreasing the size and roles of the public sector (e.g. Aliboni *et al* 1984, El-Salmi 1980, Daef 1986; Ikram 1980). According to Cooper (1982),

“The economic liberalization was an ‘utter disaster’. It produced none of the benefits that the government had projected and almost every one of the negative impacts that the left had predicted.”

As mentioned above, the essence of *infitah* was to free and to normalize the Egyptian economy after so many years of applying artificial and unrealistic economic measures to provide the new impetus for increased production and accelerated economic growth. However Law 111 of 1975, while abolishing the Public Organizations (that were responsible for constraining the performance of public enterprises in the 1960s),
creating the so called Higher Sector Councils (each headed by the minister concerned) to co-ordinate the operation of certain economic sectors’ enterprises.

However, as El-Salmi (1980) argues, this development, while freeing public enterprises from the domination of the Public Organizations, still did not provide Egyptian public enterprises with equal opportunities to compete freely with the private and joint sectors so as to achieve fully the objectives of *infitah*. Especially because freeing the public sector meant more than independent budgets, although that was a major step. It meant distributing voting rights according to ownership, permitting the General Assembly of each company to set the wage schedule, control credit, capitalize the company, merge with other units, and so on (Cooper 1992).

Much of the public sector reform, however, embodied simply a shuffling of personnel with little change in the real distribution of powers and the Higher Sector Council became a picture of the Public Organizations. As a consequence, the overall impact of the *infitah* on public enterprises is negative. In addition, public enterprises became faced with severe competition from superior competitors receiving government support and differential advantages, and in the meantime suffer from administrative, financial and legal constraints. In short, the public sector was so inefficient that it could not withstand any foreign or private competition under the open door policy and its decline was inevitable (Cerny and Jensen 1989; Ayubi 1991).

Although the policy of *infitah* “was introduced explicitly for the purpose of encouraging foreign and specifically Arab investment in Egypt” as Wahba (1994) argues, political expediency necessitated the abolition of this prime objective. Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and signing the Camp David peace agreement with Israel brought the Arab-Egyptian political and economic relation to a halt. For example, by 1975 Arab aid to Egypt had more than trebled after the declaration of the *infitah* policy in 1973 (though grants as a proportion of total Arab aid had fallen by half). After 1975 Arab aid slowed down considerably with grants plummeting to the pre 1973-war level. Total aid also fell sharply from nearly US$2.8 billions in 1975 to just over US$1 billion in 1976. After Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, Arab aid almost petered out.

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20 In the words of President Sadat (1974), “we provide the Arab investors with all legislative guarantees and more important, we offer them the absorbent power of the Egyptian economy under a state of political and social stability.”
out (Wahba 1994). However erratic, Arab aid was of crucial importance to Egypt’s welfare and indeed to its economy. Sadat knew the consequences of his visit to Israel beforehand, but he was willing to jeopardize the aid for the ‘potential’ American and European aid.

With respect to decreasing the role of the state in development in favor of the private sector, infitah had basically meant a separation of the welfare function of the state from its industrialization function. However, the interventionist role of the state continued in the areas of subsidies, the provision of employment and basic services. Whereas in the area of industrialization, for example, the state became merely a large investor among other investors, striving like the others for profit, and cooperating with international capital if this is perceived as the best way to realize profit. This was also evident in the areas of agriculture, construction, and tourism. In the words of Ayubi (1991),

“in spite of some confusing signals at the beginning, it is now our view that the adoption of the open door policy was in the main an attempt by the state bourgeoisie to adjust its etatist (interventionist) policies to the changing domestic, regional and international conditions, with a view to preserving etatism and not jettisoning it.”

The development of the infitah policy represents, therefore, in reality an improvisation on the theme of the Interventionist State, as Wahba (1986) explains, not a victory for the domestic private sector over the state. In short, the state’s role in the economy had thus shifted from an overall developmental role to a producer’s role. That is, from a role where industrialization forms a major pillar in a general policy of comprehensive national development to one where the state is one among several industrial investors seeking profit, even though it remains the largest among these investors.

“The search for profit has become the name of the game even for the public sector” (Ayubi 1991).

Several industrial public companies have had to resort to some trading activities to remain financially afloat and to escape the fate of abolition. The state’s new role as a capitalist investor interested in profit rather socio-economic development is illustrated by the fact that 44 percent of the capital of infitah banks were owned by the state (for there are the very best banks that invest most of their foreign currencies abroad rather
than use them for the financing of industrial development, for example, within Egypt). The state bureaucracy in general was also following a commercial attitude towards the citizens in offering commodities and services. Thus, for example, there had been special speedy deliveries of state houses for whoever pays in foreign currency. Even in food there had been ordinary, improved and deluxe types of bread, and ordinary, improved and touristic grades of rice; and in public transport, there had been ordinary, special and deluxe categories, etc. There were also special prices for faster governmental services so that one pays higher fees for obtaining a fast telephone, or a fast passport, as distinct from waiting in the usual queues and paying the normal rates. The commercial attitude of the bureaucracy had been (and still is) the main detriment of the behavior of the government in implementing the tourism policy of the NWC region as seen in the subsequent chapters.

Moreover, the call of *infitah* to encouraging the private sector and ease the bureaucratic restriction to its operation provided a useful mask of legitimacy and a room to claim that a corrupt deal between some government officials and a powerful investor, for example, is in line with national development policy. There are many examples of deals between civil servants and investors who were offered some preferential treatment, which paid off in terms of a service for a kin, for example, and indeed it even involved changing the course of implementing policies. Such evidences of political expediency (that paralleled the formulation and implementation of the *infitah* national policy) will be discussed in further detail in the context of the NWC region in Chapters 4 and 5.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the essence of this research concerns the implementation of national and regional policy objectives and its relationship with political expediency. Therefore, in the light of the previous discussion, and in regard to the *infitah* policy, it can be safely argued that most ‘promises’ of the *infitah* policy did not see light! For example, the state bureaucracy\(^\text{21}\) not only continued to grow in size with a rate of 19 percent annually between 1975 and 1982 (Richards and Waterbury 1990), but the deterioration in its performance had (by most accounts) accelerated (Ayubi 1991).

\(^{21}\text{From 1977 to 1980, employment in the bureaucratic machine increased from 2 to 2.5 millions (Ayubi 1991).}\)
“The government still employs, in one way or another, nearly one third of the work force of 22 million; another third work on the land. The civil service is a black abyss of underpaid, underemployed, unsackable people” (The Economist 1999).

The bureaucracy had been colonized, like other sectors of the state, by private interests, private pressure groups (Daef 1986) where corruption and parasitical activities had been gnawing at the economy and society as a whole during the seventies (Zaalouk 1984). Foreign debts moved from US$3 billion in 1974 to US$ 24 billions in 1985, while the debt services were equivalent to one third of Egypt’s exports (ibid.). In 1986, 1.4 million Egyptians were unemployed (which represented 10.7% of the labor force), which is an increase of 75 percent from that of 1976 (96 percent of them held intermediate to higher educational degrees) (Institute of National Planning 1994). Real government wages in 1987 amounted to less than half of the 1973-74 levels, mainly as a result of high inflation (up to 20-30 percent) (Moser et al 1993). According to Daef (1986), Sadat’s regime not only failed to reform the state but also allowed it to deteriorate further. “It was colonized by private interests; and corruption became the rule not the exception” (Ayubi 1980). There are also evidences to indicate that infitah had a high social cost (Handoussa 1995). In short, it can be said that both economic reform (envisaged wrongly by the open door policy), and social equity became, to a great extent, victims of the policy goals and administrative capabilities of the state. Daef (1986) argues that infitah “only worsened matters” and that decision making was fragmented among different agencies and committees, while implementation was retarded by the lack of coordination in addition to its being class based.
The New Map Policy

Figure 3.3. The Proposed New Map of Egypt.
The October Working Paper included another policy which is of particular interest to this study, that is the New Map Policy. It was an embryonic human settlement policy that was concerned with setting the framework for a systematic, balanced economic, physical and administrative development (Meikle 1984). The map, which is required by this policy, is not only a geographical and a demographic one; it is also basically an economic one. In the words of President Sadat (1974):

“… A steady life can only be extended to areas where there would be opportunities for work and livelihood... furthermore, this should serve as a gateway to an administrative revolution which has become a necessity.”

The New Map policy acknowledged the pull of the capital city (Cairo), the problems this generates in terms of equal development and progress in different parts of the country, and of scarce agricultural land being consumed by urban development.

“...There is also the problem of the tremendous concentration in the capital, whose population has reached one fifth of the population of the entire country. Judged by any international scale, it is a very high ratio... The gap gets wider between Cairo and all the other parts of the country, thus impeding equal development and progress in the different parts of the country” (President Sadat 1974).

The policy, therefore, acknowledged the need for a new national framework for settlement and economic development, which moved away from the traditional location of the Nile Valley and Delta. It aimed to achieve this by developing new towns in the desert:

“the life of the Egyptian people cannot remain confined to the Delta and the narrow valley of the Nile. Moreover, they cannot continue to occupy with their population and constructions no more than nearly 3 percent of the total of their country” (ibid.).

It was intended that the new towns, together with the expansion of existing towns, would relieve the concentration in Cairo and the other major cities.

“Our policy is exploiting the available natural wealth, the opening up of new scopes for economic and social development, and finding new patterns for a better and wider life for the citizens in new and more diversified environments (ibid.).

Therefore, development was proposed along the Mediterranean coast (i.e. the NWC region), eastward along the Red Sea Coast, and southward around Lake Nasser in Aswan (see Figure 3.3).
"Taking the circumstances of each area into consideration, reconstruction areas should be extended westward along the Mediterranean coast, eastward along the Red Sea coast, and southward around Lake Nasser" where "...the possibilities for mining, industries, fisheries and tourism are largely available in these areas (ibid.).

The Suez Canal zone was identified as the location that made immediate practical, economic and political sense, as Meikle (1984) points out. Practical sense because of extensive war damage and because reconstruction of the canal cities would enable those families which had been evacuated to Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt to return home and thus relieve some of the pressure on over stretched housing and infrastructure. Economic sense because it provided an opportunity to reconstruct and develop existing infrastructure and housing and revitalize and reopen the Suez Canal which would provide a valuable source of income to the country; but most of all it made political sense. Investment in reconstruction and development of the Suez Canal and the Canal cities of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez all adjacent to Sinai and close to Israeli territory was intended to demonstrate Egypt’s future peaceful intentions to the international community and thus encourage international investment in Egypt (ibid.).

The Ministry of the Canal Cities and Sinai under Osman A. Osman was rapidly established (in November 1973) to execute the programme of reconstruction. It was charged with planning for reconstruction and development of the Suez Canal Zone as well as other areas, within a massive reconstruction and development programme to accommodate the long-range growth need of Egypt till the end of the century. In January 1974 the Ministry was named the Ministry of Reconstruction, and in October 1974 it joined the Ministry of housing to become one ministry under the name of the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction. Later, another activity was added to the ministry to become the Ministry of Housing, Reconstruction and New Communities in 1978 (Meikle 1984). At present it is named the Ministry of Housing, Development, and Urban Communities, however, for ease of reference in this study, is called the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR). Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of MOR under different names and Ministers during the study period (1974-1994).
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Figure 3.4. The Ministry of Reconstruction, Housing and Urban Communities (MOR)
Source: Modified from Meikle (1987)
MOR had an unusual and particularly advantageous position in terms of its scope, its responsibilities, budget, ability to bypass normal administrative procedures and the support it received from the President for its role in reconstruction and development. In the words of Welbank (1982), MOR:

“became the leader of the post war upswell of enthusiasm for reconstruction of the war-ravaged areas. A ministry of idealism, hope and determination. This visionary and very wonderful attitude led to the aim of restructuring Port Said in a Utopian image.”

In praising the work of MOR in the reconstruction of the canal cities, Welbank (1982) describes the achievement as:

“remarkable... led by remarkable men. There was a spirit of elitism and determination, which established the Ministry as a sort of super-power in government, a kin to the role of the Ministry of Defense in war. It achieved things, it did not expect to be questioned, it overrode—or sought to do so at any rate—other departments and agencies of government, including Governorate.”

Initially, MOR was under the control of Osman A Osman22 (until 1976), and later under his indirect influence and support (Meikle 1984). Osman had been life president of the Arab Contractors Company, the largest Construction Company in Egypt and one of the most significant in the Middle East. At the same time his son was married to Sadat’s daughter and that gave him more power and advantage and consequently, the ministry had a more advantageous position in the government. This had laid him open to criticism relating to a possible conflict of interest among his various responsibilities. His ministerial position along with his relationship with Sadat, indeed it had been suggested by some, did allow him opportunities for the further development of his business interest (Meikle 1984). In the words of Daef (1986),

“MOR was virtually a colony of Osman’s construction industry at the time.”

22 Osman Ahmed Osman, President, and half owner of Arab Contractors Company, with 50,000 employees and annual business worth about 200 million Egyptian Pounds (in 1980). He had been appointed by Sadat as Minister of Housing and Reconstruction in 1974 until 1976. He reigned supreme over the entire reconstruction budget, including hundreds of millions of dollars flowing in from Arab countries. A special Law (62 of 1974) gave him the right to ignore general procurement and import regulations for all materials and equipment that were required for reconstruction. He was responsible for importing large amounts of Spanish construction steel at what many members of Parliament though were suspiciously high prices. A special committee in 1976 drew a list of twenty-six accusations that ranged from nepotism and conflict of interest, to bribery and receiving foreign kickbacks. He dismissed the charge of conflict of interest and continued as a Minister (Waterbury 1983, cited in Daef 1986).
As a consequence, Osman’s approach was not universally popular and was especially unpopular with other ministers, governors and with civil servants who saw their positions threatened. These opinions remained (against the MOR) even after Osman left the ministry, and had direct effects on coordination and implementation of MOR projects especially in the NWC region as will be discussed in further detail in the next section and in subsequent chapters.

As work progressed in the reconstruction of the three canal cities, and life in them began to return to its normal pattern of the pre 1967 war, emphasis began to shift toward the problem of over crowding in Cairo and in the rest of the Nile Valley. The aim was to realize the October Working Paper’s objective of establishing several new towns in the desert to accommodate 18 million Egyptian by the year 2000 (Towlan 1979). This was illustrated in the words of President Sadat (1974):

“Not a single new city has been established in Egypt since the opening of the Suez Canal and the construction of its three cites, that is more than one hundred years ago. It has become necessary that Egypt should have its project for setting up new towns and building a number of new ports with their annexing towns along our extended coasts” (President Sadat 1974).

Therefore, two new towns, Tenth of Ramadan City and Sadat City were initiated in 1975 and 1976 respectively, as a first step in the direction of moving urban development toward the desert. In 1978 two more towns were planned, New Ameriyah City (located in the NWC region) and Fifteenth of May City. The four new towns, shown in Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1, were planned to accommodate a total population of 1.65 million people by the year 2000 (Towlan 1979). Later, many other towns were planned and implemented, for example, Sixth of October city, Obour city, Badr city, and others.

With respect to the New Map policy, the urbanization continues to follow the continued centralization and focus on the Nile corridor. The projected population scenarios put forward in 1973 have achieved approximately 20 percent of projected capacities in terms of population (Trans-Space Architects and Censol Inc. 1996). Table 3.1 shows the population distribution and population densities in both, the Nile

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23 At present there are 19 new towns in Egypt. The government to implement the new towns between 1974 and 1985 spent more than 600 million pounds.
Valley, and the desert regions. It highlights that the population distribution remained the same in the Nile Valley and Delta, while the population densities had even increased in the twenty years that followed the adoption of the new map policies:

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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nile Valley and Delta</td>
<td>36,186,488 (98.8%)</td>
<td>47,639,660 (98.8%)</td>
<td>59,513,000 (98.8%)</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>1691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36,626,000 (100%)</td>
<td>48,205,049 (100%)</td>
<td>60,226,000 (100%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Several studies have analyzed the Egyptian New Town experience. These studies included academic dissertations (e.g. Ibrahim 1993; Demerdash 1990, Hamdi 1987), seminars (e.g. Amin 1986, Gamaluddin 1988), conferences (e.g. El Kateab 1990), and reports (e.g. Fahmy 1990, IRUP 1986; 1987, MOR 1989) to highlight but a few. If all those studies have agreed on one particular thing, it was the major disparity between what was intended in the new map policy and what was achieved in practice.

To take the Tenth of Ramadan City as an example, because it was the first experience of the New Town Strategy, the differences between planning and outcomes are very obvious. The city was planned to accommodate 500,000 people by the year 2002. The completion of the first of its five execution phases was projected to be in 1987. Table 3.2 and Figures 3.6 and 3.7 compare between what was planned for the first stage and the status of the town in 1989:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>As Planned for the First Stage (1977-87)</th>
<th>Status in 1989</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Establishing four residential districts</td>
<td>Building of:-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Establishing 34 residential neighborhoods subdivided upon the four districts

Establishing 4 service centers in the district

Establishing 34 service centers in the neighborhoods

Resettling 150,000 people

75% of the first district, 50% of the second district, and 25% of the fourth district

Work began in establishing

6 neighborhoods in the first district

4 neighborhoods in the second district

3 neighborhoods in the forth district

Work began in the first district service center

Work began in 9 service centers

9000 have been resettled

Table 3.2. Tenth of Ramadan City, Comparison between Planning and Implementation
Source: Ibrahim (1993)

Table 3.2 shows that the planning intended to attract 150,000 people in the first 10 years; however, only 9000 have resettled (97.7 percent are males). In 1987, 18,000 workers were employed in industrial activities. However, 60 percent of the workers commute to the city on daily basis, thus hindering the primary objective of the new towns strategy (that is providing work opportunities to encourage people to settle in the new town and not to commute daily). Moreover, 54.4 percent of the housing units that were allocated to settlers are closed all year round, while 12 percent of the total housing units that were built in the city were not sold up till 1990 (Ibrahim 1993).

Figure 3.6 shows the differences between the anticipated and the actual population growth in the Tenth of Ramadan City.
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![Graph showing population growth](image)

**Figure 3.6. Tenth of Ramadan: Actual and Projected Population after the 1st Execution stage.**
Source: Ibrahim (1993); Ministry of Reconstruction (1998)

Photographs from NAC showing that most housing are closed all year round

**Figure 3.7 compares between the anticipated development at the end of the first stage (1987) and actual implementation. The development had very little modification ever since.**
The case of most other new towns is similar to that of the Tenth of Ramadan City, if not worse. Law 59 of 1979 specified that new towns must be established outside existing agricultural lands or in desert areas to depopulate the Nile Valley and the Delta region through urban redeployment into desert spaces, and to funnel the densities. About 60% of absorption capacity of the new towns was aimed at Cairo, 19% at the Delta and 2% at the Canal Zone (Kharoufi 1994). However, these have so far attracted very few potential settlers. The failure is exemplified by Sadat City, an agglomeration built to accommodate 500,000 inhabitants along Cairo - Alexandria road, but whose only occupants today are the migrants who come to work every day and return to their villages in the evening (Aliboni et al. 1984).

24 Only 6330 jobs are fulfilled until 1995 in Sadat City compared to the anticipated 165,000 jobs (Ministry of State for New Urban Communities 1995). There are 12774 housing units in Sadat city (the majority are empty) which are supposed to accommodate the anticipated population of 500,000 people by the year 2003.
Ibrahim (1993) explains that the primary reason for the disparity between planning and implementation in the new towns relates to the nature of the implementing agency. Taking the Tenth of Ramadan as an example, he points out that the Authority for New Urban Communities (ANUC), which has been the implementing and management agency for the new towns in Egypt, failed to implement the plans for the Tenth of Ramadan. That is because it has been operating as an executive agency rather than a management authority responsible for managing the development of the new settlement. This is a result of being subject to, and under the authority of, the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR).

“ANUC has been dealing with the elements of urban development as engineering projects and not as a process of resettling people, allocating services and industries in an integrated manner” (Ibrahim 1993).

According to Hanna (1998) MOR was supposed to desist after it finished its job reconstructing the canal cities. As it was the case with the Ministry of the High Dam that ceased after the dam was established in the 1960s and the Ministry of Population that was cancelled after the Population Conference was completed in the 1990s.

“These were ministries that had particular, timed and limited tasks; otherwise the number of Ministries would increase indefinitely” (ibid.).

Hanna (1998) argues that the continuity of the MOR is among the primary reasons of deterioration in the performance of the construction industry and urban development in general in Egypt. The overall objective of MOR has been to build, construct, and urbanize Egypt. Perhaps this is a normal attitude for a ministry whose all of its technical staff are engineers as well as its top management personnel and even the ministers who have been in charge of the ministry were also, in the main, engineers. They narrowly view urban development as a process of constructing buildings and infrastructure. Urban development in general, and managing human settlements in particular should include a much broader approach than just constructing buildings and infrastructure.

The above discussion highlighted that the New Map Policy also failed to achieve many of its objectives. As pointed out above, some scholars and experts (e.g. Hanna

25 Dr. Milad Hanna, the Ex-Minister of Housing.
(1998); Ibrahim (1993); the former head of ANUC and others) relate such failure to the nature and performance of the actors involved, primarily MOR and its affiliated organizations. The evaluation of the performance of MOR in implementing the new map policy, in the context of the NWC region, will be discussed in further detail next and in Chapters 4 and 5.

The Development of the NWC as part of the New Map Policy

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the development of the NWC region is part of the national strategy for population redistribution that comprises an eastern and a western crescent of development pivoting on Cairo. It is the culmination of the western crescent and links it to the developed possibilities of the western desert coast extending westwards to the Libyan boarders (see Figure 3.8). Therefore, in 1975, the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) commissioned a Dutch consulting firm, in collaboration with an Egyptian consulting office, to plan for the development of the NWC region (Ilaco and Pacer 1976) and to study the possibilities of attracting the population to this ‘virgin’ part of the country. The regional planning will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. However, it is necessary at this stage to relate it to the new map policy.

Figure 3.8. The NWC Region and the Crescent of New Communities Pivoting on Cairo

The overall goal for intervention in the NWC region was to contribute to solving Egypt’s human settlement problem as illustrated in the following quote:

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26 In a discussion with the researcher in August 1997.

27 One of the main objectives of the New Map policy is to “realize a real and integrated Egyptian existence in all parts of the country” (President Sadat 1974).
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“The primary goal of the regional development planning is to contribute to the government’s goal to conquer the desert, to stimulate income and employment growth, to boost agricultural production and to enforce social stability in the region” (Ilaco and Pacer 1976).

The regional planning contained proposals to increase Egypt’s livable space by at least 6,000 km$^2$ or 15 percent of the total Egyptian inhabited area at the time (40,000 km$^2$). According to the regional planning:

“some 750,000 people can be accommodated in the area before the year 2000, a sufficient amount of work can be created for them and they can earn income and can be supplied with a level of services that will be at least the same as that in the rest of Egypt” (Ilaco and Pacer 1976)

Tourism was proposed as the region’s main economic mainstay to provide the necessary work opportunities to attract the population. This was based on an estimated 850,000 tourists in 1990 and 1.5 million tourists in the year 2000, both international and domestic (ibid.). It was also suggested that there would be many other economic activities including agriculture, agro-processing, fisheries, quarrying, sheep herding, construction, and other services.

According to the statistics of the regional planning (Ilaco and Pacer 1976), the region’s population was only 130,000 people mainly Bedouins without adequate supply of drinking water, electricity, education, and medical care and without diversified employment. Apart from the 750,000 people who could be accommodated, the regional planning highlighted that the region provides enough livable space to absorb another 2 to 3 million people, and the anticipated development to accommodate the 750,000 was based only on the region’s own resources to fulfill the economic goal stated in the Terms of Reference, of enhancing the economic self sufficiency of regions. Thus, the regional plan highlighted that there is a need for other growth centers if the government wants to accommodate more people in the region.

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28 The National Urban Development Strategy of Egypt (NUPS 1982) concluded that the best strategy would be to place primary emphasis on seeking national economic growth and gains in inter-personal equity, and less emphasis on attempting to achieve convergence of regional incomes across all regions of the country during the (next) two decades (cited in Watts 1991).
In the light of the recommendations of the regional planning, in 1977 MOR commissioned the same planning consortium (Ilaco and Pacer 1978) to prepare the Master Plan of a new town to be allocated in the region, that is New Ameriyah City (NAC)\textsuperscript{29} which was later renamed New Borg El-Arab city. The target population of NAC was estimated to reach 500,000 by the year 2003 (in addition to the estimated 750,000 people of the coastal zone of the NWC region) (Ministry of State for New Urban Communities 1995). It is located in the east part of the NWC region, 60 km south-west of Alexandria and 7 km to the south of the Mediterranean as shown in Figure 3.9. The main objective of allocating NAC in this location was to

“direct the urban development to the north-west of the Delta and to overcome the encroachment on the agricultural lands in the overpopulated areas in both Alexandria and Behira Governorates, and to provide new job opportunities for the people of Alexandria and Behira” (\textit{ibid.}).

\textsuperscript{29} It was the third city, after the Tenth of Ramadan and Sadat cities, to be development within the New Towns development strategy.
According to the Master Plan, the city could provide 151,000 job opportunities, 109,000 housing units, and a large industrial area (allocated on 6.7 km²) within its total area of 220 km² by the year 2003 (Ilaco and Pacer 1978). However, up until 1997, only 6313 housing units were completed representing around 6% of the total anticipated housing units, while only 13,445 workers had been offered jobs in the industrial area out of 60,000 anticipated jobs in industries. The current population of NAC does not exceed 21,000 inhabitants. With such very low rates of development, the fulfillment of the planning objectives set for the year 2003 is seen as unattainable.

Having ranged over the economic and human settlement problems and features of policy and politics in Egypt, the discussion turns to look at different aspects of the Egyptian context. The following section will discuss the dynamics and underpinnings of tourism development in Egypt.

### 3.4 Tourism Development in Egypt

Tourism development has been seen and understood as a solution to many of Egypt’s problems particularly the ones mentioned in the previous section. In addition to tourism’s potential to generate employment for skilled and unskilled labor, its capability to bring about foreign currencies, and its contribution to the balance of payments, it had been adopted particularly because of its ability to shift development away from the densely populated areas towards less developed regions (Attia 1994). Peter (1969) argues that tourism by its nature, tends to distribute development away from the industrial centers towards those regions in a country that have not been developed (cited in Shaw and Williams 1991). In the words of Lanfant (1995) ‘in geographical areas where no other economic option seems possible, tourism is often presented as the last chance’. These views have been supported by the fact that investments for tourism development benefit other development sectors (McIntosh and Goeldner 1990, Giugale and Mobarak 1996), (for example, the investment in extending infrastructure to remote areas amplifies the development of other sectors).

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30 The planning objective was to offer 60,000 work opportunity in industry, 78,000 in services and 13,000 jobs in construction by the year 2003 (Ilaco and Pacer 1978).

31 The planning anticipated that by 1983 there will be housing supply for 8,800 households, by 1987 around 33,400 housing units, by 1992 around 59,400 housing units, and by 1997 a supply of 83,400 households will be available for residence (Ilaco and Pacer 1978).
According to Gearing et al. (1976) “tourism can speed up the development process because the gestation period of most tourist investment projects is relatively short”.

In short, tourism had been used as a catalyst for development in those desert regions in Egypt that has susceptible natural attractions for exploitation for tourism purposes. Moreover, tourism had been adopted as an economic activity in a view that it could rationalize economic policy, especially through balanced growth brought about by new or additional business production cycles promoted by tourism expansion (Abdel-Wahab 1997).

This section, therefore, attempts to investigate the contribution of tourism to the resolution of the Egyptian human settlement and economic problems. It demonstrates the importance of tourism to the national economy and the regional development of Egypt. It discusses the objectives of tourism plans and strategies and how they have been contributing to the enhancement of the Egyptian economy and resolving the human settlement problems. It briefly highlights the extent of the realization of objectives of the national tourism plans and the factors that affected such extent.

### 3.4.1 Growth of Tourism in Egypt

Egypt is an example of a country that already has substantial tourist attractions. It is one of the oldest civilizations in the world. Being endowed with historical monuments, archaeological sites and landmarks covering millennia of civilization, as well as extensive beautiful beaches, it has considerable potential for developing its tourism sector (Abdel-Wahab 1997).

As a tourist destination, Egypt offers the unique package of culture; leisure and business related tourism. The potential attracting capacity of the country is believed to be substantially greater than the realized demand. To many investors the tourist industry in Egypt seems to be one of the rare examples where supply creates its own demand. This belief can be supported by the recent rates of growth in both tourists’ arrivals and tourists’ accommodation in the newly developed areas, particularly in the Red Sea region as Figure 3.10 illustrates. The expanding presence of international hotel management chains in the country is another evidence of such potential. Not only that such chains are heavily represented but also they are acquiring more
locations. On the regional level Egypt attracted 46 percent of up market internationally affiliated hotels in the Middle East (Trans-Space Architects and Censol Inc. 1996).

Figure 3.10. The Growth of Tourism in Egypt (Tourists Arrivals and Nights Spent)
Source: Ministry of Tourism (1997).

Throughout history, the Egyptian tourism sector had received considerable attention from both the state and the private sector as Abdel-Wahab (1997) points out. However, this support softened as the development emphasis shifted to the industrial sector in the 1950s. Deterioration of the tourism industry was further aggravated by the war of 1967 with Israel and the continued hostilities for about ten years until the Peace agreement. During this period, the influx of tourists to Egypt was substantially impaired. A change in economic philosophy (infitah), coupled with the signing of the Peace Agreement in the late 1970s, brought with it increased emphasis on tourism. The number of hotels increased, facilities for servicing the tourism sector improved, and as a result the number of tourists’ arrivals increased substantially. This was assisted by the diversification of the Egyptian tourist product from a solely cultural destination to a combined leisure and cultural attraction.

The diversification of the tourist product has been the prime objective of the Egyptian government in compliance with the recommendations of the October Working Paper (President Sadat 1974). This was coupled by the government’s policies to introduce financial and development measures to facilitate and encourage the restructuring of tourism in Egypt from being based mainly on historical tourism to leisure and recreational tourism (WTO 1988). This is because the latter represents a much higher percentage of international tourism and the traditional cultural visits, however, do not bring about much repeat tourism (Abdel-Wahab 1997).
Egypt has the potential for developing recreational tourism. It has long and extended coasts on the Red Sea and the Mediterranean that reach 2400 km (40 percent of which are on the Mediterranean). The warm and sunny climate throughout the year in addition to the good sandy beaches give the country a better advantage over other Mediterranean countries that attract tourists only in summer. Moreover, the Roman city of Alexandria, the Pharaonic city of Thebes (Luxor) and the Islamic city of Cairo etc., add to the country’s natural, cultural and historical heritage (Attia 1994). Figure 3.11 shows Egypt’s major tourism areas.

Figure 3.11. Egypt’s Major Tourism Areas
Source: TDA (1997)

3.4.2 Tourism in the Economy
It is futile to attempt to generalize about the role and functions of tourism in economic development strategy, not only because of the differences between countries as regards to tourism (generating, receiving, developed, developing, etc.) but also because countries are socio-economically heterogeneous. Differences in the degree of development and in the economic system also influence the role tourism will play in the economy. However, the growing importance of tourism in Egypt is reflected in the structure of the economy. It is one of the four primary sources of the national income together with the Suez Canal, oil and gas exports, and the remittances of Egyptians living abroad (Abdel-Wahab 1997), as shown in Figure 3.12.
Although tourism still contributes less than 3 percent of GDP, it has been since 1987, the fastest growing sector of the economy. For example, between 1985 and 1989, tourism in Egypt, as measured by the number of international arrivals, has grown from 72,000 in 1952 to 680,000 in 1974 (Ministry of Information 1976) to 1.4 million in 1982 to 4.1 million tourists in 1996 (see Figure 3.10 above). Between 1982 to 1992 the average growth rate of tourists’ arrivals was estimated at 13.6 percent, much higher than the rate of growth of worldwide tourism, which grew at an average rate of about 5.9 percent in the same period (Abdel-Wahab 1997).

From being a modest contributor to foreign exchange earnings of about 700 million US$ in 1986, tourism receipts reached 2.8 billion US$ in 1995, as shown in Figure 3.12, putting the industry in second place after workers’ remittances, but ahead of Suez Canal revenues and revenues from oil exports.32

Apart from being an important foreign exchange earner to Egypt, tourism development had also a substantial impact on employment generation in hotels, restaurants, tourist agencies, etc. In addition to the indirect employment in construction, transport, food industry, textiles, the air-conditioning industry, the furniture industry, souvenirs, informal small scale industries, services, etc. Indeed, one in seven Egyptians is said to depend in one way or another on the tourist industry (The Economist 1999).

32 According to the Economist (1999), tourism remains a vital source of foreign currency bringing in US$ 4 billion a year. Apart from that, Egypt has three other substantial sources of foreign exchange, each bringing in $2 billion-$3 billion a year: remittances from expatriate Egyptians; dues from ships passing through the Suez Canal; and oil exports. It also gets $3 billion-worth in aid a year, more than two thirds of it from the United States.
The growth of tourist arrivals was paralleled by an incredible growth in the construction of hotels. In 1982 there were less than 18,000 rooms in the official hotels in the country. However, by 1996 the number escalated to reach 68,000 rooms (150,000 beds in about 760 hotels) and there are more than 23,000 rooms under construction (Ministry of Tourism 1997). Egypt’s accommodation capacity is expected to rise to 130,000 rooms (250,000 beds) by the end of 1999 (Abdel-Wahab 1997). Accordingly, some 200,000 people are employed in tourism services and activities with an additional 1.5 millions are considered to depend (indirectly) on tourism (ibid.).

Despite the above-mentioned ‘shining marks’ of tourism’s major contribution to the Egyptian economy in recent years, the contribution of tourism to the resolution of the human settlement problem is less pleasing. In order to emphasize the extent of tourism’s contribution to the resolution of the human settlement problem, the following sub-sections will trace the historical development of the philosophies, plans and policies discussing the inherent difficulties associated with the solutions.

3.4.3 The Egyptian Tourist Map

As mentioned before, the government’s policy has been focusing on changing the structural skeleton of tourism in Egypt by giving special attention to promote tourism in different new areas that are famous for their natural attractions. That is to suit the new international trend towards recreational tourism which represents about 50 to 60 percent of the international tourism movement, instead of focusing only on cultural tourism that represents only 10 percent of international tourism movement.

Despite the fact that Egypt has not yet formulated a binding national tourism policy, the government has been issuing several tourism strategies and Five-Year Tourism Plans. In 1973, Law number 2 was issued to allot the Ministry of Tourism (MOR) the responsibility of planning, supervising, regulating and exploiting the country’s tourism regions, particularly the coastal regions. Therefore, in 1974, the MOT issued a

33 Under Law 2 of 1973, the Ministry of Tourism can reserve areas for tourism development. In addition to supervising these areas and planning for their development, the Ministry of Tourism coordinates with other government agencies to provide infrastructure for them. Since “no person or corporate body may exploit any tourist area without authorization from the Ministry of Tourism”, this law has been a powerful tool to make private developers comply with the ministry’s regulations and building codes and to check land speculation.
national tourism strategy that determined the six lead tourism regions (priority regions) in Egypt as shown in Figure 3.13.
Each region includes natural attractions and tourism potential that vary in importance and significance, and also vary according to the state of their tourism infrastructure and living conditions. Accordingly, the six regions were classified into three categories.

The **first** includes the most important regions that need immediate improvements in infrastructure and living conditions, where they already have a reputation for their attractions and tourist image, the most important region in this category is the NWC region. The **second** category includes regions that can be promoted for tourism
activities but lack some essential infrastructure and investment projects, for example, Sinai. The third category includes reserved regions that can be developed in later plans, for example, the Nile Valley, and the Oases.

According to Law number 2 for 1973, the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) was to be responsible for the preparation of comprehensive plans to develop and manage the lead tourism regions, particularly the coastal ones, according to the above mentioned categories within the framework of the October Working Paper (President Sadat 1974). At that time, the NWC region seemed the most appropriate for several reasons, five of which can be of relevance. First, it included some settlements, services, and infrastructure (although in a below average condition) that could be modified for tourism purposes while most other tourism regions lacked such potentiality. Second, it was allocated between two major tourism cities (Alexandria and Matrouh) which would help in the marketing and promotion of the region. Third, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Suez Canal regions were still under military threat from Israel, which would decrease their attractiveness as tourist destinations. Forth, its location along the Mediterranean gave it a competitive edge and a worldwide reputation for its sun, climate, and sandy beaches. Fifth, a comprehensive survey was prepared for the NWC region by a private consultant in 1970 that was sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 1970) and that meant that the regional data and surveys are ready for planning. Accordingly, the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) was preparing itself to exploit the NWC region.

However, a major conflict had arisen between MOT and the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) concerning who had the right over the development of the region? MOT was supported by Law number 2 for 1973, while MOR was supported by the ministry’s hegemony and the minister’s power and kinship to the President (as discussed in Section 3.3). The outcome was for MOR’s benefit. It had, therefore, declared the NWC region a ‘new community’, and commissioned consultants (Ilaco and Pacer 1976) to prepare the regional planning as noted in the previous section. However, the ‘Regional Plan for the Coastal Zone of the Western Desert’ highlighted the region’s potential and competitive advantage for developing tourism. As a consequence, MOR commissioned the preparation of the tourism planning for the
NWC region (PUD and ORplan 1978). These will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.

The objective of government intervention in the regional developments, however, was to make two main contributions. The first is the correction of the principal regional imbalances within the country by participating in the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind. The second, is the rectification of declining industrial regions and/or promoting other (additional) economic activities (cited by El-Roubi 1987). Accordingly, the government had taken some definitive steps towards the realization of those objectives. The following subsection discusses the nature, features and objectives of tourism plans and policies during the study period (1974-94) so as to properly allocate the arguments for tourism’s contribution to the resolution of the Egyptian economic and human settlement problems within their historical and institutional contexts.

3.4.4 National Tourism Policies

The Ministry of Tourism (MOT) has been the main authority dealing with tourism in Egypt. The Ministry is organized into four major functional parts dealing with planning and development, regulation of tourists’ services, administration, and financial and legal affairs. Like most other ministries, MOT suffers from overstaffing and inadequate technical capability as Abdel-Wahab (1991) argues. The Ministry has been streamlined to strengthen its technical expertise in support of a private sector-led tourism development strategy, to be competitive with neighboring countries and to protect the country’s unique cultural and natural resources. The first step (that was as late as 1991) was the creation of the Tourism Development Authority (TDA), which draws principally on private sector expertise to assist MOT in guiding and promoting increased private sector investments in the sector. These changes were expected to provide the tourism sector with a stronger institutional framework for coherent, private sector-oriented and environmentally sound tourism development (Abdel-Wahab 1997).

In 1975, the government created the High Council for Tourism, chaired by the premier. It comprises all ministers who have something to do with tourism. Ministers of interior, tourism, maritime transport, economy, housing and reconstruction, finance,
defense, civil aviation, the chairman of Egypt-air, the antiquities department, the union of tourism chamber and the Arab union for tourism, and regional secretary of the international tourism association. The High Council defines major policy lines, proposes legislation for the development of the sector, and coordinates tourism related activities, but because of the multiple responsibilities of its members, the council has been relatively inactive. Therefore a more active body was created in early 1976, the High Council of Tourism and Civil Aviation. The minister of tourism chaired it. Its role was similar to that of the High Council for Tourism, but its approach was not as broad (Ikram 1980).

The tourism sector has been depending on budgetary allocation for its investments. A small share of its investment programme has been financed from internally generated revenues and the rest has been allocated under the Five-Year budgetary process. These allocations had usually been either insufficient to maintain the growth of complementary infrastructure in the sector, or were provided in an untimely fashion which resulted in serious delays in the completion of major projects. Despite the fact that Egypt has not yet formulated its tourism national policy, a long term and futuristic plan for tourism development in Egypt was drawn up. Within this long-term plan, the Five-Year Tourism Plans could periodically be fitted mainly to be able to allocate budgets for the investments in the tourism sector. The historical review of the national tourism policies and plans is necessary for understanding the context within which the tourism public policy for the NWC region was formulated and implemented. In addition, the extent of realization of the objectives of the national tourism policies and plans needs to be highlighted in order to advance the arguments for appraising the effectiveness of the Egyptian government in translating policy into action.

The history of tourism plans in Egypt before and during the study period (1974-94) can be classified into four phases. The first phase represents the strategies and plans for tourism development before the adoption of the infitah (open door) policy in 1974. The second phase is from 1974 till 1982 where tourism started to benefit from the policy of openness and thus, gain the government’s attention and was, therefore, allocated some investment. The third phase is from 1982 till 1987, which included the first Five-Year Tourism Development Plan (FYTP 1982-87). The forth phase is from 1987 till 1994 which included the second Five-Year Tourism Development Plan.
The Egyptian National and Regional Objectives: Policy and Practice Differentiation (FYTDP 1987-92). The latter phase witnessed the emergence of tourism as a major contributor to the national income of Egypt.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Policy before Infitah</td>
<td>Formulation of the NWC Tourism Policy</td>
<td>First FYTDP 1982-87</td>
<td>Second FYTDP 1987-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table 3.3. Phases of Tourism Policies Before and During the Study Period (1974-94)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Phase 1**

The first Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1960-1965) allocated some investments to the tourism sector that did not correspond with its importance. However, the first half of the 1960s witnessed some government intervention to promote tourism by building few hotels along the Red Sea in Hurghada and Ain Al-Sokhna and along the Mediterranean in Al-Alamein (Sidi Abdel-Rahman Hotel). In spite of this limited approach, these projects acted as a starting point towards the development of uninhibited beaches along the Egyptian coasts. The dependence on local private firms in designing and implementing the hotels and public firms in operating and managing these projects created the basis for an experienced Egyptian workforce needed for the construction and operation for such types of projects that was new to the Egyptian market (El-Roubi 1987). However, the 1967 War between Egypt and Israel constrained the development in the tourism sector and decreased the tourist arrivals and revenues. Consequently, the construction of new hotels and tourism projects stopped. The period between 1967 and 1973 witnessed the preparation of the legal framework that allowed the Tourism Board to decide on the tourism areas in the country and allocate the investments towards them so as to stimulate and encourage the private sector to start few tourism projects. Hence, Law number 1 and Law number 2 were issued in 1973 and stated that:

> “the Tourism Board is responsible for developing the areas suitable for tourism development; and the enabling, facilitation and encouragement of the private sector to invest and develop tourism attractions and facilities” (cited by El-Roubi 1987).
Phase 2

After the 1973 war, Egypt adopted the open door policy (infitah) where several Laws were issued to encourage Arab and Foreign investments in order to increase foreign exchange, reduce deficits and expose (open) the country to international technology and experiences. The tourism sector benefited from tax and customs deductions and other economic incentives that were stated in the Law. This period had witnessed an increasing concern for planning for the development of the coastal zones along the Mediterranean and the Red Sea where the inefficiency and insufficiency of existed infrastructure was recognized as an obstacle to the private sector’s investments in those areas. The Tourism Board recognized the importance of diversifying the tourism product by changing the structural skeleton of tourism in Egypt. This was initiated by giving special attention to different new areas that are famous for their natural attractions. That is to suit the new international trend towards recreational tourism instead of focusing only on cultural tourism. The decision was to implement a variety of tourism projects and facilities to encourage the private sector’s initiative as well as developing the criteria and carrying capacity standards necessary for implementing new projects and at the same time ease the bureaucratic procedures for the private sector’s investment. Therefore, in order to achieve the objective of diversifying the tourist product, the government decided to prepare comprehensive development plans for the coastal regions of Egypt. The first was the regional planning NWC region as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

At the same time, the second half of the 1970s witnessed the formulation of a Five-Year tourism plan that aimed at achieving 1,700,000 international tourists’ arrivals by 1980. It forecasted that the tourists’ period of stay would reach 17 million tourist nights and revenues to reach 1.2 billion Egyptian Pounds by 1980. However, the plan did not propose any clear objectives, strategies, or recommendations. It was only a forecast for tourism variables, and thus, cannot be considered as one of the tourism’s Five-Year Development Plans (FYTDP). Consequently, the plan achieved only 74% of the targeted tourist arrivals, 48% from tourists’ nights and 70% from the targeted receipts from tourism as the following table illustrates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Achieved</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
Phase 3

The prime objective of the first Five-Year Tourism Development Plan (FYTDP 1982-87) was to achieve a growth rate for tourism arrivals of 6% annually. The plan saw that the tourism sector could contribute to the GDP with 8 to 10% and not only 6% that was achieved in 1980 if the policies for lifting the constraints on the sector are adopted. In its general terms, the main objectives of the first FYTDP 1982-87 can be classified according to five spheres of activity: marketing, economical, production, employment, and developmental objectives. The marketing objective aimed that the tourism arrivals reach 2.5 millions by the end of the plan, spending 17.5 million nights. The economical objective aimed that the tourism revenues reach 2.5 billion US Dollars by 1987, and to contribute to better living standards for the locals. The production objective was to increase the number of rooms to reach 29,000 room. The employment objective aimed that the tourism sector would provide 50,000 new jobs in addition to the indirect employment. The development objective aimed to achieve equilibrium among different regions in the country, and to diversify the tourism types to include cultural, recreational, religious and conference tourism. In order to achieve those objectives, the plan recommended some reforms and guidelines. Appendix V presents an outline for the strategies adopted to fulfill the objectives of the first FYTDP 1982-1987.

The following tables compare between the Five-Year Plan’s targets for the international tourists’ arrivals, tourists’ nights spent and revenues, and the achieved figures at the end of the plan’s period.

---

### Table 3.4. The Forecasted and Achieved Tourists Arrivals (1976-1980).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Achieved</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Rate of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>1,253,000</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17,000,000</td>
<td>8,084,000</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,200 millions</td>
<td>842 millions</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: El-Roubi (1987)

---

34 The first FYTDP1982-1987 identified the following constraints:
- The political and military conditions present in the Middle East
- Lack of infrastructure in major cities and tourism regions and lack of proper environmental conditions
- Lack of tourism awareness among the population and the inefficiency of the employees working at the authorities that deal with tourists (immigration, customs, banks, ports.. etc)
- Lack of coordination among the multi-form authorities that deal with the tourism sector and decide for its development (archaeology department, MOR, local authorities, investment board etc.)
- High priced tourism facilities, which discourage international tourists’ arrivals and also lead Egyptians to look for other less expensive tourism markets in other countries.
- Lack of adequate tourism marketing and promotions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Achieved</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Rate of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,800,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>11,000,000</td>
<td>9,301,390</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
<td>8,856,749</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
<td>8,572,201</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>9,007,053</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>+5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>17,500,000</td>
<td>7,800,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-13.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6. Planned and Achieved Tourist Nights first FYTDP 1982-87

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Planned in million US$</th>
<th>Achieved in million US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>2,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>2,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td>2,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>3,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2,533</td>
<td>3,115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7. Planned and Achieved Tourism Revenues in the first FYTDP 1982-87

The tables show that the planned figures for tourist arrivals and tourist nights were not achieved at the end of the first FYTDP (1982-87). As shown in table 3.5, the actual arrivals represented only 52 percent of the planned at the last year of the plan. This can be because that the international tourism worldwide was slow during this period. However, this cannot be an exclusive excuse for the large deficit in the number of arrivals where the average annual growth of arrivals was -0.7%. This was also obvious in the number of nights spent by tourists where the actual represented 45% of the planned in the last year of the plan. Even though the international rates were slow in most other countries, this is not an excuse for the extremely low numbers of nights spent in Egypt. In addition, two main failures can be identified. First, the plan was unable to achieve the share of international tourists that corresponds to the country’s resources. Second, it was unable to offer what may attract tourists to spend more time in the country. However, the plan achieved some success in three areas. First it achieved the development of non-traditional areas especially in Southern Sinai and the Red Sea, and in a lesser category, Northern Sinai and the NWC region. Second, more care was given to domestic tourism. Third, the country witnessed some improvements in the transportation systems and networks including internal road networks, airports’ conditions, and transport facilities.
Phase 4

The second Five-Year Tourism Development Plan (FYTDP 1987-92) aimed to achieve economic, sectoral and social objectives. The economic objective included maximizing the returns from investment in the tourism sector mainly by improving occupancy rates in hotels. The sectoral objective included achieving a competitive image of the country by overcoming the two main problems of the low number of tourists and low number of nights spent in the country. The social objectives identified three areas of concern. First, to raise the living standards of the Egyptians (by, for example, recognizing that domestic tourism could be a tool to uplift the moralities of the population, increase their sense of belonging to the country and decrease their travel for leisure to other countries (so as to preserve the foreign currencies within the country). Second, viewing international tourism as means to attract international sympathy to the country’s problems and promote social development as a consequence of the exposure of locals to visitors. Third, tourism can also protect the environment (its resource base) and leads to improvements in living standards.

The plan aimed to attract 2.5 million tourists at the end of the five-year plan with a rate of growth of 6 to 7 percent; as well as reaching 17.5 million nights by 1992 (average of 7 nights per tourist). The plan forecasted that tourism revenues at the end of the plan (in 1992) would reach 1.75 billion US$. The plan also aimed to achieve 36,000 new job opportunities, 9000 of which is direct employment in the tourism sector. Accordingly, the budgetary allocation for the investment in the tourism sector to achieve the targets of the second FYTDP (1987-92) was about 820 million Egyptian Pounds. About 400 million of which would be from the public sector, while about 420 million were assigned to the private sector. However, actual investments totaled more than four times the planned investments during the five years, by the private sector. Such an increase boosted the industry and achieved unprecedented rates of growth that even survived the Gulf Crises and the terrorist attacks to Egypt, which affected the tourists’ inflow to a great extent. This is illustrated in the following table and in Figure 3.14.

35 Since 1992 more than L.E.3 billion have been invested in tourist projects by private investors (Abdel-Wahab 1997).
Source: Abdel-Wahab (1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tourists Arrivals</th>
<th>Planned in 1987</th>
<th>Achieved in 1992</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>150%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourists Nights</td>
<td>17,500,000</td>
<td>21,835,000</td>
<td>150%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Receipts</td>
<td>1,750 million US$</td>
<td>2,400 million US$</td>
<td>140%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.14. The Actual Tourists’ Arrivals and Tourists Nights Spent in Egypt Between 1987-94
Source: Ministry of Tourism (1997).

Having reviewed the tourism plans during the study period (1974-94), it is necessary to highlight few important points. Most of the plans did not achieve their desired outcomes except for the second FYTDP (1987-92). The private sector’s contribution in tourism investment (especially in hotels, tourist services, transport, utilities, etc.,) was the main detriment in the plan’s success. Tourism had even survived the Gulf Crises, which although disrupted the inflow of tourists in 1991 (as Figure 3.14 illustrates), tourism picked-up again. In 1992 tourism in Egypt received an unprecedented tourists’ inflow. That was a consequence of a major worldwide campaign and a comprehensive tourism-marketing plan. This was accompanied by an expansion in hotels, tourists’ facilities, services, and the disposition of infrastructure, airports, and utilities particularly in Sinai and along the Red Sea coasts.

However, tourist facilities along the Red Sea coast have evolved in response to demands and in the absence of long-term physical plans. Today, Hurghada, stands as an example of unguided development, inadequate infrastructure and virtually absent environmental management (Abdel-Wahab 1997). Although the diversification of the tourist product, by promoting beach-oriented tourism in Sinai and along the Red Sea coast, has finally achieved the government’s intendment in terms of tourists’ inflow and tourist nights, the neglect of sustainable tourism principles has been endangering the protraction of the benefits. In addition, Egypt would have achieved much more if
the tourism policy of the NWC region has been consummated to what was conceived for it, as the next chapters argue.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter previewed the Egyptian political, economic and social environments that paralleled the innovative policies of the 1970s. It attempted to relate the tourism public policy of the NWC region to the political system and the power structure of the Egyptian society as a whole. It presented an overview of the political and socio-economic factors affecting policy formulation and implementation in Egypt.

The review of the historical and institutional contexts explained some reasons and consequences of the behavior of the actors and institutions involved in the policy making and policy implementation processes. The chapter highlighted the Egyptian development challenges and the policies addressed to help in the resolution of the country’s economic and human settlement problems. It pointed out, through illustrative examples, that many policy objectives were not realized. The open door policy (infitah) was constrained by the resistance of the bureaucracy to reform initiatives, by corruption and by the centralization of decisions and implementation. The new map policy also failed to achieve its desired outcomes due to power struggles between ministries as well as between departments within the same ministry. Moreover, the tourist industry was largely affected by political factors including military disputes with neighboring countries; terrorist attacks against tourists as well as power struggles between government bodies.

The principal weakness of the government structure in the tourism sector had been the lack of proper coordination between the unit in charge of the design and implementation of infrastructure (MOR) and the units in charge of super-structure (MOT). Even if the High Council of Tourism was functioning normally, adequate coordination could not be achieved without continuous rapport at the working level, and this is not easy to secure for two different ministries. As long as most tourism projects consisted of city hotels, this shortcoming might not be too serious, but if new tourism resorts were opened and the basic infrastructure became an important component of the projects, it would probably be a grave limitation on the efficient use of resources (Ikram 1980). This was obvious in the case of the NWC as will be
discussed in the next chapter. A possible solution, and one that had been rather successful in other countries, is the creation of a Tourism Development Corporation, which would coordinate and supervise all tourism projects and either undertake infrastructure and superstructure works itself or entrust this authority to other government agencies (see Appendix II). Given the traditional weakness of the Ministry of Planning (Auybi 1991) and the current resistance to its influence by certain powerful ministries that have access to external funding, it is reasonable to assume that development policies and projects are currently not being thoroughly coordinated within the bureaucratic machine.

Although effective policy implementation depends on bureaucracy (Daef 1986), in Egypt the bureaucracy was incapable of achieving many policy objectives as this chapter has demonstrated. Section 3.2 emphasized the absence of local government from the decision making cycle in the Egyptian political environment during the study period (1974-1994). Perhaps the absence of the local authorities in implementing the plans and policies had been a major detriment in the failure of policies to achieve their objectives. Watts (1991) points out that there is a growing body of opinion arguing that it is far more effective and efficient to enable local authorities themselves to plan and implement projects. “With the support of the local level much could be achieved,” as Meikle (1984) contends from her work experience in implementing Egypt’s new map policies.

“The centralized nature of the Egyptian administration meant that the local ‘client’ had not been involved in the identification of the need being addressed by the planners and policy makers and, therefore, gave it a low priority for action” (ibid.).

The role of local authorities in reflecting people’s ambitions and needs at the township level is crucial to ensure the implementation of the practical measures necessary to achieve success. In the words of Watts (1991),

“it must never be assumed that national studies can take the place of detailed local knowledge, which only a properly organized local authority can have”.

Indeed, in their study on urban economics and national development, Peterson et al. (1991) lay much more stress on the need for local authorities themselves to take initiatives in developing local potentials. Peterson et al. (1991) consider that local
government will do better to think of themselves as long-term investors in regional development. They can identify the region’s potential competitive advantages, then build on the strengths through public and private investment, flexible business regulations, and efforts to control the local cost structure. However as they admit, urban areas are part of a national and international economy, and even the best designed local strategy cannot overcome market, and other disadvantages. It is in this respect that national strategies can play a role; and the need is stressed for mediating mechanisms to be established so that local enterprise can be recognized and supported from the center.
Chapter 4

IMPLEMENTING TOURISM PUBLIC POLICY: FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDY
4.1 Introduction

This study aimed, as explained in Chapter 1, to explain and analyze what happened in Egypt when the government adopted a policy for promoting tourism development to assist with the resolution of the country’s human settlement and economic problems. Specifically, it aimed to reach a greater understanding for the development process in the NWC region and how political expediency affected tourism public policy decisions and outcomes.

This and the following chapter bring the discussion to the North West Coast (NWC) region’s context. They present the detailed findings of this research. They show, by reference to the NWC region of Egypt, how institutional arrangements, power arrangements, values, interests, and control of the actors had influenced the policy behavior. Both chapters attempt to analyze the public policy process of the region. The examination of what happened is the locus of this chapter, while the question why had it happen is discussed in Chapter 5.

This chapter explains the causes and consequences of policy. It is mainly descriptive and recounts the history of the different studies undertaken for the region’s development so as to trace the history and evolution of the NWC public policy. The first section looks at the region’s development since the early 1970s, and provides the background to the rest of the chapter and to the following chapters. The second section defines the policy’s objectives and argues that the policy failed to achieve the goals of Sustainable Tourism Development (STD). The third section examines the performance of the public pilot projects (Marakia, Marabella and Marina Al Alamein) that were implemented to act as examples for projects in the region and to stimulate private sector initiative. The chapter concludes by analyzing the outcomes of the policy and the inherent difficulties associated with its implementation.
4.2 The Organization of Studies for the Region

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the first study to the NWC region was the comprehensive survey, prepared by a private consultant, and sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 1970). The survey entitled “Pre-Investment Survey of the Northwestern Coastal Region: Physical Conditions and Water Resources” aimed to study the suitability of promoting agricultural activities in the region. Such survey took place to increase the effectiveness of the governmental rural management policy that was implemented in the 1960s in Burg El Arab area. According to Richards (1986) the implementation of the rural policy had caused great changes in the region’s agricultural practice and sociological structure, and specifically in the mobilization of the labor force (e.g. large numbers of peasants moved from the Nile Valley to the NWC).

The second study was a tourism development strategy prepared by the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) in 1973, which proposed some guidelines and building regulations for tourism development in the whole region from Alexandria in the East to Salum in the West. Appendix VII reviews the regulations of MOT that were to be applied in the NWC region. According to the tourism development scheme, several investors had shown interest in the planned developments for Ras El Hekma and for some parts along the Mediterranean coast immediately west of Alexandria.

The third study was the ‘Regional Plan for the Coastal Zone of the Western Desert’ (Ilaco and Pacer 1976) which, as mentioned in Chapter 1, divided the region into four sub-regions for tourism planning purposes. The government decided that Alex-Imayid sub-region (the study area) was the first to be developed and identified the following particulars to support its choice (cited by PUD and ORplan 1978):

- **The availability of resources**: In this area, some of the most significant investments and resource exploitation had already taken place at that time. Some of these resources were naturally available raw material such as limestone and gypsum, which led to the proposition of establishing heavy industrial activities (cement and gypsum industries). Water resources had been also available in this region in addition to reclaimed land and some services and infrastructure, which led to the proposition of agricultural activities, which would, in turn, facilitate the establishment of permanent jobs and consequently human settlements.
• **Existing Settlements:** The study area contained most of the existing settlements of the NWC region (Al Hammam, Burg El Arab, Al Alamein, etc.) which would facilitate the supply of labor needed for the region’s development, as well as playing a vital part in the region’s future development strategies.

• **Land Tenure:** Most of the coastal lands in the sub-region were owned by cooperative societies (who will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5). These cooperatives aimed at building tourist centers and settlements on their lands straightaway to ensure fast returns on investment. Since such proposals would affect the development of the whole area, it was deemed necessary to establish a master plan, which would include the necessary building and zoning regulations and guidelines under which such private settlements could be developed.

• **The Location of the Sub-Region in Relation to the Existing Urban Centers:** The study area lies close to the densely populated cities in and around the Nile Valley and Delta. Therefore, from the demographic point of view, the development would be affected\(^1\) by, for example, Alexandria City (the second largest city in Egypt) and by the cities in the Nile Valley and Delta as well as by urban centers in Behira Governorate (to the east of the study area). Some population influx from Alexandria was to be expected to work in the region’s new development. Should this not take place, some existing population from the region would have to move for other work opportunities elsewhere particularly in the already densely populated cities.

• **The Location of the Sub-Region in Relation to Newly Developed Towns:** There had been some proposed developments outside the study area, which would have had some effects on the development programme. For example, New Ameriyah City (NAC) which would not only function as an industrial center but would provide services to the wider region. The major settlements in the region (El-Hammam and Burg El-Arab towns) would not grow into their full capacity unless substantial investment was made in NAC creating “spin off” effects.

\(^1\) It was recognized that urban growth would be successful, cheaper, and faster if emerged from existing urban centers and then directed towards uninhabited areas rather than initiating new growth centers in the middle of the desert.
Hence, the government commissioned for the preparation of a physical plan and development programme for Alex-Imayid sub-region. The ‘NW Coastal Zone: Physical Planning and Development Programme’ (PUD and ORplan 1978) was envisaged as the tourism development planning of the study area. Later, the government commissioned for the preparation of the ‘Structure Planning of the North West Coast Between the 34th and 100th km from Alexandria’ (PUD and Pacer 1983a).

The structure planning included detailed analysis of the natural, economic and social constraints as well as alternative solutions and policies in accordance with those constraints. Both plans were approved, authorized and adopted statutorily by the government and thus, (together with the regional planning), constituted a politically determined public policy for the NWC region’s development.

This section, therefore, attempts to review those plans and will refer to the other relevant plans that swayed the development approaches in, and around, the study area. The other plans include the ‘Master Plan for New Ameriyah City’ (Ilaco and Pacer 1978), the ‘Conceptual Plan for the Area between El-Max and the 36th km West of Alexandria’ (PUD and Pacer 1983b), the ‘Master Plan for the Comprehensive Development of the NWC between the 100th km to 268th km from Alexandria’ (Pacer and Egyptem 1985); ‘The Holistic Planning for Marsa Matrouh City’ (GOPP 1993), and the Regional Planning for the North West Coast Region (GOPP 1998).

4.2.1 The Regional Planning
The ‘Regional Plan for the Coastal Zone of the Western Desert’ was submitted to the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) in 1976. It was produced in the form of a five-volume report and maps. The regional planning covered the area between the 34th km west of Alexandria to the Egyptian western boarders with Libya and from the Mediterranean coast in the north, to contour line +200 meters to the south. That covers an area of around 450-500 km from east to west, and between 30-50 km from north to south as shown in Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of land uses and tourism activities in the regional planning.
Figure 4.1: The Regional Planning for the NWL Region
Source: Nieuwoudt and Pever (1976)
According to its Terms of Reference (TOR), the regional planning identified two main objectives: a regional objective and a national one: The **regional** objective was to increase the welfare and wellbeing of the indigenous population, the Bedouins. The **national** objective was for the NWC region to contribute to the resolution of Egypt’s human settlement and economic problems.

The **regional objective** can be more understood from the following quote:

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“...the isolated position of the region within the country and its low service level compared to that in the rest of Egypt makes the Bedouins feel that they are treated as a neglected minority group. Their society [has] not been integrated into that of the country as a whole. The main purpose of the regional development plan [is] to overcome this situation of a dual society, in order to dissolve economic stagnation and social frustration” (Ilaco and Pacer 1976).
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Therefore, tourism was chosen as the main economic mainstay for the region because it was seen as the most suitable activity that would achieve both the national and the regional objectives in the NWC. It would provide job opportunities to attract the population from other parts of the country. In addition, it would speed up the development of infrastructure, services, and utilities. Furthermore, it would bring new inhabitants and tourists to the NWC region and thus end the social isolation of the region’s population (*ibid.*).

The Bedouins were the only people who ‘felt at home’ in the Western Desert at that time. They were also the only ones who had fully adjusted themselves to the natural conditions as prevalent in the region. Most of the land and its resources was customarily owned by Bedouins living in scattered rural communities. The other inhabitants mostly originated from the Delta region but they did not always enjoy their stay in the NWC.

Beside the Bedouins, the Egyptian holidaymakers traveled to the region between June and September to enjoy the beaches and visit the historical places and war monuments in Al-Alamein. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the level of services (public utilities, health, education, etc.) was below average, illiteracy was common, there were no manufacturing industries, and agriculture was mostly practiced according to very old

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3 Immigrant population were mainly employed in government services and in the construction industry (75 percent had not taken their families along).

4 Al-Alamein became famous worldwide when during World War II it witnessed the fierce battles between the Allies and the Germans.
Accordingly, the regional objective aimed at achieving two general targets, a social, and an economic one. The social aimed at ‘social stability and the exploitation of the national heritage of the country for the enjoyment of the people’. The economic included ‘the enhancement of the economic self-sufficiency and the increase of national and regional income’\(^5\) (Ilaco and Pacer 1976). As far as tourism development is concerned this implies the use of the region for the social and economic benefits of the population and as a foreign currency earner.

In order to achieve the national objective, the plan intended to raise the population of the region from 130,000 people\(^6\) (Bedouins represented around 87 percent) to around 750,000 people (200,000 of who are Bedouins). As mentioned in Chapter 3, the planning contained proposals, which, if realized, would have increased Egypt’s livable space by at least 6,000 km\(^2\), or 15 percent\(^7\). In the elongated area along the Mediterranean (about 500 km) and about 20 km in-land, a number of towns were identified which, on the basis of the resources available in the region, could be developed into growth centers each with its particular economic activities. Beside the growth centers there have been, throughout the region, the hinterlands, which included some dispersed Bedouin settlements and have been suitable for sheep and goat herding. These growth centers are identified as follows (from east to west):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growth Centers</th>
<th>Economic Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Hammam-Sidi Kreir</td>
<td>Chemical industries, agriculture and domestic tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Daabaa-Fuka</td>
<td>Agriculture and agro-industries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\) ‘The provinces which are still the main source of our national wealth and also the source of man-power, should not be left to suffer from the effects of what they constantly lose to the capital, for the simple reasons that capitals have by nature a stronger voice and are near to the eyes and ears of the rulers’ (President Sadat 1974).

\(^6\) From a total workforce of 36,700 people (28 percent of the population) in 1975, 63 percent worked in agriculture and sheep herding, 2 percent in quarrying, 1 percent in manufacturing, 8 percent in construction, 10 percent in government, 9 percent in commercial activities, while 7 percent worked in other activities.

\(^7\) The total urbanized area of Egypt was about 40,000 km\(^2\) in 1975 (4% of the total area of Egypt).
The regional planning recognized that the accommodation of the 750,000 people would not solve Egypt’s human settlement problem. This number was equal to the population growth in 9 months only (at that time). Therefore, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the planning highlighted that the NWC region included enough livable space to absorb 2 to 3 million extra people, provided there are more growth centers and supplementary economic activities as well as an increase in government action and investments. The regional planning identified the existing and potential economic activities that would promote economic development and urbanization growth in the NWC region. The main activities included agriculture, tourism, and manufacturing industry.

**Agriculture**

With respect to agriculture, the plan highlighted that some 10 percent of the total area of the region had been identified as, more or less, suitable for cultivation. Less than half of this area was already cultivated before 1976. The total area of land suitable for irrigation had been estimated at approximately 70,000 ha. Agriculture was the dominating sector in the economy of the coastal zone accounting for about 70 percent of the total employment. The most important agricultural products were olives, figs, and barley fields (Richards 1986). They accounted for approximately 90 percent of all agricultural activities. However, as the plan pointed out,

“…These were facing serious difficulties even to such extent that there is a fair chance of some features of traditional agriculture being completely wiped out in the future. Large parts of the population would then become uprooted socio-economically and become involuntarily compelled either to look for a living in other sectors of the economy in the region or to become unemployed. The Bedouin society is then likely to lose its stability, food production is bound to decline, and a loss of employment and a reduction in income are to be expected” (Ilaco and Pacer 1976).

Those fears that the planning highlighted became a reality. The construction boom for second homes developments, that has been occurring throughout the NWC region since the early 1980s, attracted most of the indigenous population of the region.
Houses and buildings had replaced agriculture lands along the coastal strip. The Bedouin communities became experts in construction activities, which had a positive effect on their livelihood. However, this was only for a short time. When the construction boom slowed down, large segments of the population became unemployed. In addition, they had already sold most of their agricultural lands to private developers and those lands have been transformed into “a concrete jungle” (Business Today 1998).

**Tourism**

The regional planning also highlighted the region’s potential for developing tourism. That is to enhance the regional economy from the benefits associated with tourism, for example, foreign exchange, employment, and rapid development growth. In addition, it was identified that the region could contribute to the accommodation of the 4 million holidaymakers\(^8\) of the country during summer. These ideas were based on the fact that the region enjoys a combination of pure white sandy beaches and dunes, a deep blue sea, clean air, and in comparison with some competitive Mediterranean destinations, a favorable climate. Indeed, FAO (1970) described the climate of the NWC region as being one of the mildest in the Mediterranean vicinity. In addition, historical and archaeological assets are found scattered over the region, while the regional cultural heritage has a particular value. All these potentialities add to the region’s attractiveness as a major tourist attraction. Therefore, for tourism planning purposes, the planning subdivided the coastal strip into four zones as pointed out in Chapter 1 and shown in Figure 1.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-regional beach capacity*</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria to Imayid zone. Includes 300 ha of sandy beaches in along a 90 km coastal strip</td>
<td>An uninterrupted fairly straight sandy beach with dunes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Alamein to Ras El Hekma zone. Includes 72 ha</td>
<td>With more or less isolated dunes and scattered,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^8\) About 10 percent of the population of Egypt take their annual holiday within the country, the majority coming from Cairo with a significant contribution from Alexandria. 90 percent of holiday trips are done by cars and buses. Their destinations are predominantly the holiday resorts on the Mediterranean, 70 percent of the travel stream absorbed by Alexandria alone (PUD and ORplan 1978).

\(^7\) Disregarding smaller bays and beaches, for which the provision of access roads and development would be too costly.
of sandy beaches along a 130 km coastal strip

**Marsa Matrouh zone.** Includes 44 ha of beaches along a 120 km coastal strip

**Neguila to Salum zone.** Includes 34 ha of beaches along a 120 km coastal strip

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2. The Division of the NWC to Four Tourism Sub-Regions. Source: Ilaco and Pacer (1976)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Holiday-makers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Arab Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Tourists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Trippers (5 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Trippers (5 percent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the regional planning identified around 450 ha of sandy beaches along the Mediterranean, 300 ha of which are in the first sub-region (Alex-Imayid). The regional planning included a tourism market survey that projected the total demand for beach holidays in the region as follows:

The regional planning stressed the importance of day-trippers originating from the surrounding urban centers:

“They cannot afford high travel expenses and, hence, are less mobile... They should be given priority in the allocation of beach areas” (Ilaco and Pacer 1976).

Therefore, the planning recommended the allocation of public beach facilities throughout the region and particularly in Alex-Imayid sub-region as shown in Figure 4.1 above. Moreover, a number of housing cooperatives owned land plots along the coast particularly in Alex-Imayid sub-region with the intention of developing accommodation and resorts along the coast. Therefore, the regional planning suggested the preparation of a tourism plan (Section 4.2.2), as a first step, for Alex-Imayid sub-region to reallocate the housing cooperatives so as not to occupy the whole coastal strip and prevent day-trippers from their right for leisure and tourism in public beaches. The planning also placed great emphasis on international tourism and recognized the need for good infrastructure, including adequate water and electricity supply systems, roads, communications, and airports allowing charter planes to land.
“The developments should start by upgrading the airport of Marsa Matrouh and the airport of Alexandria for the reception of international tourists” (ibid.).

The planning anticipated that within a period of about five years, mass tourists would be attracted to the region provided there is a promotional policy that emphasizes the region’s authentic-original tourism product. Such policy was expected to attract in the beginning a very selective market of European sun-seekers (the pioneer tourist market) on the short term.

“When these pioneers have discovered the beaches of the NWC, they will be followed by mass tourists” (ibid.).

Hence, the regional planning proposed some strategies for the tourism development of the NWC region. Table 4.4 compares between planned and implemented development strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned in 1976</th>
<th>Actual in 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of water and power supply systems and the road network</td>
<td>Established, but insufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment of the Marsa Matrouh airport for landing of wide-body air-crafts</td>
<td>Established, but without a terminal for passengers. It is a military airport with no facilities or reception for passengers and works only in summer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building of an international hotel in Marsa Matrouh</td>
<td>Not established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of a design for development of Bagush as a resort for international tourism, possibly also for the supporting resorts like Sidi Abd El-Rahman and Ras El Hekma</td>
<td>Not established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a resort for regional tourists near Alexandria</td>
<td>Established (Marakia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a hotel and tourism school providing training at all levels in the Marsa Matrouh area, preferably to be attached to a hotel</td>
<td>Not established</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4. Strategies for Tourism Development: Policy and Practice Differentiation
Source: Modified from Ilaco and Pacer (1976)

Accordingly, the regional planning anticipated that the implementation of such strategies would attract more than one million tourists by the year 2000 (around 62 percent are from European and Arab countries). It was anticipated that the number of beds (in hotels, apartment hotels, bungalow villages, and camping sites) that would be available in the region by the year 2000 would reach 112,200 beds (34,800 in hotels, 35,400 in apartments, 15,250 in camping sites, 26,750 in bungalows). However, by 1998 the region did not attract any international tourists (except for very few from Arab countries) and the number of tourists’ beds that were available by 1998 were
25,131 beds (only 4220 were in hotels, while the others were in furnished flats mostly in Marsa Matrouh city) (Matrouh Governorate 1998). Indeed, the NWC did not become a tourism region as it was conceived for it. According to the Economist (1999):

“The once empty, and beautiful, Mediterranean shoreline has become a solid block of wall-to-wall holiday homes with their private beaches and marinas, for middle-class Egyptians”.

Accordingly, the anticipated employment in the tourist industry was not generated and as a consequence the region failed to attract the population from other parts of the country.

Manufacturing Industry
In addition to agriculture and tourism the regional planning recognized the potential for manufacturing activities in the region. In addition to agro-processing and cottage industry, the planning recommended the establishment of a large oil refinery to be allocated in Sidi Kreir (about 35 km west of Alexandria). Moreover, the plan recommended the exploitation of the region’s raw materials and resources by establishing some necessary industries such as a cement factory, a gypsum plant, and a salt crystallization plant.

“Most of these factories could act as a nucleus attracting other industries (supporting as well as downstream operations)” (Ilaco and Pacer 1976).

The regional planning had allocated those industries in Alex-Imayid sub-region because, as the planning highlighted, the remaining parts of the region had hardly any raw material base.

The anticipated employment opportunities in the resource-based industries were estimated to reach 16,300 jobs by the year 2000. These were based on employment in resource based (chemical and non-metallic mineral) industries only. While employment in other industries like clothing, footwear, packaging, cleaning materials, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, pesticides, plastic products and other services industries would amount to an additional 31,600 jobs. Therefore, the anticipated total employment in industrial activities in the region by the year 2000 amounted to around 47,900 jobs that would represent 20 percent of the total regional employment (rising from 4.5 percent in 1975). In general, Table 4.5 presents the anticipated employment
opportunities per economic sector. It shows that the situation in 1998 differed from the projected employment for year 2000. Although the total employment generated amounted to 250,000, around 60 percent were in construction alone. Employment in construction is, however, temporary. Workers either commute daily from Alexandria and Behira or reside in the construction sites without their families (Mahmoud Mostafa Hussein, 1988). When the construction boom ends, workers would have to look for employment elsewhere in the country. On the other hand, employment in the service sector (including tourism) amounted to only 42,000 jobs which is much less than the anticipated 118,000 jobs. As a consequence, very little employment was offered to attract the population to the NWC.

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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services (including tourism)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Labor Force</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5. Projected Labor Force per economic sector (in 1,000)
Source: Ilaco and Pacer (1976); State Information Center (1999)

With respect to public utilities, the planning studied the region’s requirements for telecommunication, water supply, and desalination plants and for solid waste disposal and treatment plants. The planning proposed an extension for the existed electric power systems, and recommended the implementation of a 600 MW nuclear power plant that was projected near Burg El Arab town, which was estimated to be ready for

Box 4.1. The Reserved Area for Al Dabaa Power Plant
Source: Egypt Today (1998); Fieldwork Survey.
The reserved area is surrounded by a concrete fence and encloses one of the most beautiful areas along the NWC region. Within this reserved area there exists more than 4000 people mostly Bedouins. The Bedouins have traditionally cultivated large parts of this area and depended, together with the rest of Al Dabaa community (around 40,000 people), on the beaches of the restricted area for recreation. The concrete fence and the security guards of the proposed nuclear plant have constrained the mobility of the people from Al Dabba (in the hinterland) to the agricultural areas and beaches. Moreover, the officials of the Public Agency for Nuclear Energy have constructed some holiday homes in the restricted area for their families after the dispossession of the land from its original owners, the Bedouins. Furthermore, the Bedouins, who refused to leave their lands in the restricted area, were prevented from increasing their cultivated lands, expanding or upgrading their homes, and have even been denied access to water supply and electricity. According to the Ministry of Electricity (the institution to which the Public Agency for Nuclear Energy is affiliated), the nuclear plant project is cancelled and the land will remain under the ministry’s ownership.
commissioning in the early 1980s. The nuclear power plant was later reallocated to Al Dabaa. However, until the time of this study, it has not been established. Instead, a 15 km stretch of the coast and 5-8 km inland has been reserved for the nuclear plant in Al Dabaa since 1981 (see Box 4.2).

Finally, the regional planning stressed that only government is able to initiate and further a ‘harmonious development’ of both the economic as well as the social structure of the region. In other words, the government should take the lead in starting the development programmes in agriculture, tourism, and manufacturing industries.

The planners recognized that this regional planning is only indicative and unsuitable for immediate implementation because it was based on preliminary technical and economic studies. Accordingly, the regional planning recommended other ‘sector studies’ for every economic sector and public utility as well as a physical plan for each of the four sub-regions and for each existing town. Moreover, it stressed that the government should contribute to the development by implementing projects, by giving institutional support and by undertaking national and international promotion campaigns. Furthermore, the regional planning highlighted that implementation by the government ‘is compulsory’ in projects, which the private sector could not take the lead because of the scale of operation (e.g. tourism, agriculture, and agro-industries). These projects, as the planning stressed, ‘have not only to be implemented but also to be managed by the government’. Accordingly, in 1977, the government commissioned for the preparation of the physical plan and development programme for the Alex-Imayid sub-region.

4.2.2 The Tourism Planning

The study area comprises part of the NWC region of Egypt. It extends between the 34th and the 100th km from Alexandria, and is bounded by the Mediterranean coastline in the north and the Alexandria-Matrouh railway line in the south (around 7 km from north to south). It includes districts from Alexandria, Matrouh, and Behira governorates as shown in Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1.

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9 This recommendation was in accordance with the recommendations of National Plan for Tourism in Egypt (1978) which stated that “it is unreasonable to expect private enterprises to attempt any serious tourism development in the NWC region without assistance from the government, or at least under the provision of financial incentives… these would include, public financing of regional infrastructure” (cited by PUD and ORplan 1978).
Institutional Setting

The coastal strip that lies between the Mediterranean Sea and the Alexandria - Matrouh road was owned by two public agencies. The coastal strip between the 20th and the 47th km. from Alexandria was owned by Al-Awkaf (The Religious Affairs Agency), while the Reconstruction and Land Reclamation Agency (RLRA)\(^\text{10}\) (an affiliate to the Ministry of State for Land Reclamation) owned the area between the 47th and the 100th km. These two agencies were assigned and authorized (by Act 100 in 1965) to develop the coastal area by selling, conveying or leasing land to any authority, public body, private body, governmental agency or individuals. According to the issuing decree of RLRA, the agency was committed to sell lands with a minimum yearly value of 1 million Egyptian Pounds (1960s and early 1970s prices\(^\text{11}\)). Accordingly, some cooperatives and individuals submitted applications to purchase land for residential and recreational purposes.

The two agencies divided their lands into parcels. The areas of the parcels under Al-Awkaf tenure varied from 5 to 85 ha (the water front of each parcel varied between 300-500 meters), while those under RLRA’s tenure varied from 1 to 80 ha (the water front of each parcel varied between 250-3000 meters) where the majority of the parcels had a 250m beachfront. Accordingly the two agencies sold the majority of land to companies and individuals and to the housing cooperative societies, that formed strong interest groups in the region as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.

By 1976, 91 housing cooperatives had acquired land parcels. Neither of the agencies had established regulations to control the development of the coastal strip. Their only condition was to reserve the beachfront with depth of 120 meters for beach use (according to the regulations established by the Ministry of Tourism). Despite the restriction of the ministry of reconstruction on land acquisition, the purchase of lands continued till early 1980s, and the housing cooperatives had acquired, by then, around 115 parcels. In this case, political expediency was manifested when RLRA and Al Awkaf agency struggled to control land and implement their agendas as discussed in

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\(^{10}\) RLRA was responsible for (all state owned) desert areas of Egypt outside the cordons of cities and villages. According to law no 43 in 1981, this agency is responsible for the management of desert areas that the minister of land reclamation decided they are appropriate for agricultural purposes and it may exploit or reclaim those lands after the ministry of defense approves.

\(^{11}\) 1 Egyptian Pound was equal to around 2.5 US$ in the late 1960s.
The cooperative societies aimed at dividing the parcels into smaller lots and sell them to their members\textsuperscript{12}. The problem was that there would be no public access to the beach. “No person, except for the members of the societies, may use the coast for recreational purposes” as PUD and ORplan (1978) point out. Consequently, the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) decided to prepare a physical plan and development programme for regulating the development along the coastal strip. The aim had been:

“to design the physical environment as a setting for human activities, to make it more functional, beautiful, decent and healthy, and to promote the public interest, i.e. the interest of the Egyptian community at large rather than the interests of individuals or special groups” (\textit{ibid.}).

Hence, the government initiated a competition among planning consulting firms (national and international) to propose the physical planning for the narrow coastal strip in Alex-Imayid sub-region (the area between the 34\textsuperscript{th} and the 100\textsuperscript{th} km from Alexandria). The Terms of Reference (TOR) stated that the physical plan for Alex-Imayid sub-region aims primarily:

“to allocate the housing cooperatives and regulate their developments as well as supplying the land parcels with the necessary infrastructure including water supply, sewerage, access roads and energy resources” (\textit{ibid.}).

The technical proposals were submitted to the Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR) (an affiliate to MOR) which selected (with the assistance of the in-house consultant- TAMS) the most appropriate proposal. The NW Coastal Zone: Physical Planning and Development Programme (PUD and ORplan 1978) was selected because it proposed a development scheme for the whole Alex-Imayid sub-region and extended to Al Alamein (till the 100\textsuperscript{th} km from Alexandria). In other words, the approved proposal modified the requirements of the TOR into a development programme that aimed at a comprehensive development for the whole region and wasn’t confined to the limited objective of solving the housing cooperatives’ problem and providing infrastructure to the area.

\textsuperscript{12} According to the National Plan for Tourism in Egypt (1978), “uncontrolled settlement in the NWC region, with small projects are to be avoided by all means. Such small projects would ruin the area” cited in PUD and ORplan 1978).
The NW Coastal Zone: Physical Planning and Development Programme recognized that the scope and requirements in the TOR do not lead to a comprehensive planning for the holistic development of the region, which has been a primary national objective. Therefore, the planning included proposals for the distribution of land uses for both the coastal zone and the hinterlands. It studied the existing activities and proposed new economic activities in the study area in the light of the regional planning of 1976. The economic activities included agriculture in the hinterlands, manufacturing industries, mining, quarrying, and tourism. The planning also proposed master plans for the existing urban communities such as Al Hammam, Burg El Arab, Bahig and Ruwaissat in addition to the dispersed Bedouin settlements throughout the study area.

“The NW Coastal Zone: Physical Planning and Development Programme” identified four main goals for the sub-regional development. The first concerned the contribution of the sub-region to the resolution of the country’s human settlement problem. The planning demonstrated that a population capacity of 650,000 inhabitants could be reached by year 2000. Some 250,000 of the total population would be tourists and the remainder would be dispersed over the proposed and existing settlements. The second was to ease the pressures on the country’s traditional holiday area (Alexandria) that was overcrowded with tourists particularly during summer. The third goal was to establish a tourist industry in the sub-region to fulfill the need for vacation and recreation facilities for both international and domestic tourists. Forth, to create new economic activities for employment generation. The planning anticipated that:

“a labor intensive industry as tourism would generate considerable employment in the area, in long term service as well as the short term construction trades” (PUD and ORplan 1978).

In addition, it was acknowledged that the population increase and the continuing extensive urbanization throughout the country resulted in less amenable urban environments. This was accompanied by a rise in living standards of growing segments of Egyptians. These combined to foster a rising domestic tourist demand that exceeded even population growth (ibid.). Hence, the planning established the specifications and carrying capacity standards for tourism development as well as the strategies for tourism marketing and promotion. Therefore, for ease of reference in
this study, the “NW Coastal Zone: Physical Planning and Development Programme”, is called the tourism planning.

The Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) welcomed the idea of implementing a tourism plan in the region. An unwritten agreement between MOR and the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) stated that MOR would plan and implement the tourism projects in the NWC region while MOT would be responsible for management and operation after the projects were established. The agreement also included that MOR would be responsible for tourism development along the Red Sea coast and in Sinai. MOR agreed because development in these areas seemed to be quite a ‘far away’ idea because most Sinai was still under the Israeli occupation, while the Red Sea region needed major financial investments, which the country could not have afforded. However, the Ministry of Tourism never had an influence on planning, management, nor operation of the projects in the NWC region. This increased the conflict between the two ministries and resulted in constraining the tourism development of the NWC region. MOR had no experience, trained staff, nor skill for carrying out tourism promotion and marketing campaigns abroad. In addition, MOR received very little or no help from MOT to implement hotels or resorts. Although the tourism planning recommended the implementation of several 3-5-stars hotels in the NWC, MOR implemented only one (in Marakia). MOR was unable to sell it off or find an operating company to manage it until 1997 when Misr Company for Tourist Villages\(^\text{13}\) (an affiliate to MOT) finally decided to buy and upgrade the hotel to be operated by Hilton Hotels Management Company. MOT had even constrained the implementation of the planned international airport in the region (since the Civil Aviation Agency had been under the MOT authority), as well as constraining the operation of a large marina that was implemented in Al Alamein. This political expediency was a main factor that transformed the NWC region from a promising destination for international tourism into second-home developments for upper and middle-class Egyptians as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.

**Physical Development Approaches**

It is necessary to review the development approaches that the tourism planning had proposed in order to understand the development and growth patterns that took place.

\(^{13}\) Now called Rowad Misr for Tourism Investment.
The tourism plan considered three design concepts for physical development and growth: the linear mode of development, the net development grid, and the poly-nuclear development pattern as shown in Figure 4.2.

**The first alternative: the linear development concept.** It was in accordance with the existing land ownership pattern. It formed a straight line parallel to the shoreline and the coastal road, leaving a wide strip of land open for future recreational activities south of the existing road. The linear development concept conformed to the existing land ownership pattern and thus would limit the potential opposition from the cooperatives and landowners along the coastal strip. However, the tourism planning identified that this alternative would lead the development of the coastal strip to prosper in isolation from the hinterland settlements. This would have several consequences. It would result in poor accessibility of community and commercial centers from residential areas, higher costs of infrastructure, excessive dependence on private modes of transport leading to congestion and pollution as well as higher public transport costs. In addition, the principal natural resources would benefit only a relatively small community while large sectors of population would be barred from accessing the beach. Furthermore, the physical pattern of development would be inflexible to adjust to future demands for residential and commercial areas. All these disadvantages would have an adverse effect on the acceleration of real (productive) growth in the region.

**The Second Alternative: the ‘net’ development concept.** This alternative was characterized by a network of urbanized areas linking the coastal strip to the existing matrix of settlements. The urbanized areas would thus extend inland and connect the coastline with the hinterland. Considerable open spaces would be preserved on the beach. The web of tourist clusters and the supporting commercial and community facilities would follow the layout of the predetermined principal infrastructure network leading inwards towards the hinterland. Beach access would thus be ensured for day-trippers and the development would be relatively flexible and adaptable to future changes in demand.

However, the tourism plan found that this approach would receive some opposition from landowners due to the need for property realignment and the designation of some areas to particular types of land uses. Land use and resource allocation problems
would then become largely subjective and open to power politics and pressure from various political and interest groups. Therefore, long term as well as short term problems in implementation would to be expected.

*The third alternative was the “poly nuclear” development concept.* It was based on a series of dispersed concentrations of population and economic activities. The planners saw that different types of facilities, activities and utilities located and serving population concentrations would ensure considerable identity and savings in the cost of infrastructure and cause less damage to the natural resources in general and the beaches in particular. Together with the hinterland settlements, it was thought that these concentrations would give rise to an optimum space economy that preserves the balance between self-sufficiency and dynamic economic interaction. In addition to these advantages, the administrative problems would be avoided since the physical development would be distributed among discrete sets of settlements.

This approach was expected to receive opposition for the same reasons as the second alternative (opposition from the majority of interest groups and landowners since a considerable alteration in the land-ownership pattern and associated development rights was proposed). Moreover, this approach required strong legislative and administrative steps for the approval and implementation of the physical planning.

Given the advantages and disadvantages of each concept, it was clear that no single pattern could achieve the required development. The linear alternative would constrain the development in the hinterland, the net concept would require high infrastructure costs and would receive, together with the poly-nuclear concept, strong opposition from the landowners. Therefore, it was considered that the best approach to achieve the required development would be one based on a combination of the three alternatives as shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.2. The Tourism Planning: Alternatives for Development Growth
Source: PUD and ORplan (1978)
Figure 4.3. The Tourism Planning: Land Use and Urban Design
As shown in Figure 4.3, the tourism planning divided the study area into four zones. It proposed that between the 34th and the 47th km from Alexandria (Zone A) the linear concept would be employed because a stretch of hills and sand dunes lie parallel to the coastline and would, therefore, constrain the linking of the coastal area with the hinterland.

The coastal zone between the 47th and the 52nd km (Zone B), would be reserved for day-trippers particularly those coming from New Ameriyah City. Here the net concept would be appropriate to link the coastal strip with New Ameriyah City.

Between the 52nd and the 63rd km (Zone C) the net development pattern would connect Al-Hammam town spatially and functionally with the coastal area. Al-Hammam town would be transformed into the hinterland’s touristic and regional service center to act as an ‘urban growth pole’ for the hinterland development and thus become the administrative, service and commercial center for the hinterland population.

Between the 64th and the 100th km (Zone D), the poly-nuclear concept would establish growth poles to initiate urban growth and attract tourists and settlers based on particular activities and attractions to stimulate development. For example, the area between the 64th and the 80th km would contain country houses in the hinterlands that have beaching facilities on the coast. In addition, the area between the 81st and the 88th km would include a maritime center with its services and facilities to attract international tourists, which consequently would acquire the necessary service population. Appendix IX discusses the four zones in further detail.

**Contribution to Egypt’s Human Settlement Objective**

Accordingly, the tourism planning anticipated that some 400,000 people would reside in the study area by the end of the planning period (25 years) where the majority of the population would be employed in the tourist industry. It anticipated that the population size was not expected to fluctuate in accordance with the seasonality that coexists with tourism in the NWC region. This anticipation was based on the planning recommendation of promoting diversified recreational activities as well as the encouragement of permanent or semi-permanent residence by domestic

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14 The tourism plan estimated that the size of the population in the study area was 23,000 people in 1978.
and foreign retirees.

Moreover, the study area was anticipated to sustain some 180,000-285,000 tourists at the completion of the plan. According to the tourism planning, the study area:

“is almost exclusively designated for domestic and regional (Arab) tourism and for day trippers from Alexandria and New Ameriyah City while foreign tourism was expected to account for only 15 percent. However, the day tripper activity was projected to be overwhelmingly dominant” (PUD and ORplan 1978).

The planning aimed that the study area would contribute to accommodating some of the 4 million domestic tourists of the country. Around 1.5 million domestic tourists proceeded to Alexandria at that time and as a result, the city was extremely congested during summer (Abo-Gad 1997). The following table presents the anticipated tourism figures for 1990 in the study area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tourism Data</th>
<th>Anticipated for 1990</th>
<th>Situation in 1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total No. of Tourists</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>366,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of beds for domestic tourists</td>
<td>200,000 beds</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. International tourists</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available beds for international tourists</td>
<td>30,000 beds</td>
<td>2000 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Season</td>
<td>200 days</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate occupancy of foreign tourists</td>
<td>140 days</td>
<td>10 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6. The Anticipated Tourism Figures for 1990.
Source: PUD and ORplan (1976); Matrouh Governorate (1996)

However, during implementation the growth pattern was restricted to the first alternative: the linear development concept. As a consequence, and since early 1980’s, the formal and informal tourist accommodation (tourist villages, holiday homes, condominiums, etc.,) transformed the traditional coastal town to a form of sub-regional development ribbon and old towns became “blighted and deteriorated slums” (Nematalla, 1996). In addition, the transformation resulted in a polluted environment, lack of public beaches, services and facilities, and the socio-economic problems of uni-functional (seasonal-tourism based) regional development (Trans Space Architects and Censol Inc 1996).

Moreover, a concentration of attention to the domestic second home markets had led to a pattern of development which places great stress on natural environmental resources, while also neglecting other important markets, for example, ecotourism.

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15 The traditional coastal town along the Mediterranean had a small-scale sub-urban area: limited services and facilities; a public beach; a clean environment and a local tourist image.

16 Although the planning had proposed environmental aware tourism attractions, ecotourism was not
which is both economically attractive and environmentally friendly.

As a consequence, the region attracted only the owners of the second homes, while no international tourists were attracted mainly due to shortage of hotels, airports, or beach facilities. Accordingly, the tourist industry did not generate the anticipated employment in the study area. Therefore, the permanent population of the sub-region was less than 70,000 people in 1996.

Hence, the contribution of the study area to Egypt’s human settlement objective, that is to accommodate 400,000 people in Alex-Imayid sub-region, failed. In addition, the day-tripping activity had been minimal due to the lack of facilities, public beaches, and camping areas. This had had several consequences on the attractiveness of New Ameriyah City, as pointed out in the previous chapter, where it received very few settlers in comparison to what was anticipated for it (see Figure 4.4).

![Figure 4.4. NAC in Relation to the Tourism Coastal Zone](image)

*Source: Ilaco and Pacer (1978)*

After the government approved and authorized the tourism planning, MOR commissioned the same consultants to prepare a project that would guide and facilitate the housing cooperatives’ ambitions to exploit their lands in the light of the building and planning regulations of the tourism planning (PUD 1979). That is to prepare a development programme for every site (or a combination of sites) that includes activities like hotels, leisure activities, sports activities, commercial activities, health services etc., in order to promote tourism and encourage the tourist among its proposals.
industry in the region. The planners led the discussions and negotiations between the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) and the representatives of the cooperatives. The ministry approved these programmes where a governmental decree was issued in 1981 to support the tenure of the housing cooperatives and to set the regulation for their activities. Appendix VIII highlights the key points of the governmental decree.

It is important to note that the preparation of the tourism planning (for Alex-Imayid sub-region) paralleled the preparation of the master plan of New Ameriyah City (NAC) (Ilaco and Pacer 1978) which is located to the south of the study area. The coordination between the two plans was emphasized in assigning a coastal zone (8 km long) for NAC settlers adjacent to the housing cooperatives’ parcels as shown in Figure 4.4. This coastal zone was intended to serve, also, day-trippers from Alexandria. In addition, the water supply for both NAC and the study area was coordinated to benefit from one water station to cut down costs. Moreover, a regional highway, parallel to the railway line, was planned to serve both NAC and the study area so that the coastal road between Matrouh and Alexandria could act only as a service road to serve the tourism projects. However, this coordination occurred only on paper. The implementation of both the tourism plan and NAC’s master plan were in opposite directions.

4.2.3 The Structure Planning

The government, represented in MOR issued the decree number 19 for 1980 that approved and authorized the recommendations and guidelines of the tourism planning. Its first clause reads:

“The planning for the NWC region between the 34th and the 100th km [is] approved and authorized according to the attached map (Figure 4.3) that divided the area into zones A, B, C and D, and according to the prescribed planning regulations, carrying capacities and standards” (The Ministry of Reconstruction, Housing, Land Reclamation and Urban Communities).
Accordingly, the policy proposal prepared by the consultants for the tourism development in the NWC was adopted statutorily by government. As a following step to the authorized tourism planning and the project for settling the housing cooperatives, MOR invited around twenty-five national and international consulting firms to compete for the preparation of the Structure Planning for the study area (Alex-Imayid sub-region). The firms submitted their technical and financial proposals and the ministry represented in the Advisory Committee of Reconstruction (ACR) and the in-house consultant (TAMS) selected the joint proposal of PUD and Pacer who signed a contract with the ministry in 1981 to prepare the Structure Planning.

Because it was considered essential that tourism should be carefully developed to bring some economic benefits without requiring high investment costs or generating any local socio-cultural or environmental problems, the objectives of the structure planning were formulated to be quite specific. They were directed to achieve the following:

- Developing tourism attractions that residents as well as domestic and international tourists can use;

- Improving the general income level and economic and social welfare of people in the region, and encouraging the distribution of economic benefits of tourism as widely as possible throughout the society, including development of activities related to tourism such as agriculture and manufacturing;

- Encouraging domestic tourism in order to help redistribute income within Egypt, and encouraging foreign tourism in order to increase the country's foreign exchange, improve regional economic development, and expand international understanding of Egypt and the North West Coast;

- The development of the backward area to attract the population from densely populated cities and regions;

- Utilizing existing infrastructure for tourism to the extent possible and developing new infrastructure that is multi-purpose for both general and tourism use; and

- Promoting conservation of the natural environment and minimizing negative environmental impacts.
The Planned Development

In 1983, the structure planning of the area between the 34th and the 100th km. from
Alexandria was approved and authorized by the government (PUD and Pacer 1983). The plan proposed a framework for the development for the study area (around 360 km²). The framework was a detailed translation of the tourism planning taking into consideration the constraints that evolved during the negotiations with the various interest groups including members of housing cooperatives. The framework included development programmes for the productive sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, mining, livestock, construction, tourism, and others), services sectors, infrastructure, housing and labor-force. The structure planning proposed the sources of financing the development and the phasing of development. It suggested an outline for the integrated approach to the holistic development of the region.

As shown in Figure 4.5, the structure planning was based on a combination of the three development concepts (of the tourism planning) that were discussed in the previous sub-section. It was directed at

“creating a unified pattern of diversified environment that does minimal ecological damage and produces the maximum possible effect on the acceleration of the growth of the hinterland settlements” (PUD and Pacer 1983).

The structure planning followed its predecessor (the tourism planning) which divided the study area into four major zones (A, B, C and D) on the bases of topography, geology, existing land uses, the existing hinterland settlements and the appropriateness of each zone for the proposed development pattern. Three types of settlements were considered in every zone. Proposing those new settlements in the structure planning was to “encourage the growth of urbanization towards the hinterlands” (ibid.). The first type included settlements for tourists on the coastal strip located between the sea and the existing coastal road followed by eight settlements (the second type), four of which accommodate a mixture of tourists (seasonal residents) and permanent residents. This type of settlements would be dependent on services and industrial activities. With respect to settlements along the coastal strip, detailed proposals were formulated to alleviate any property development problems, which would arise. In this manner, the proposed new settlements on the coastal strip were in the form of ‘poly-nuclear’ patterns of development. The third type is the

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17 Several cooperatives have been opposing the tourism plan’s reallocation proposals where the powerful cooperatives (according to their state position or kinship to powerful officials) had refused to allocate and succeeded in retaining their properties.
upgrading of the existing settlements in the hinterland located near the railway line in order to accommodate the permanent settlers. The redevelopment and expansion of the existing hinterland settlements was recommended where they would be thoroughly connected by an effective transport network. According to the structure planning, urban growth of the proposed nodes (growth poles) as well as the extension of the linear development on the coastal strip would be facilitated and connected to the hinterland settlements through a flexible network of recreational activities and infrastructure development. The nature of the four zones and the concept underlying the structure planning are explained in Appendix IX.

In general, the structure planning included a conceptual land use plan and pre-feasibility analysis of the region to make sure that the development would be environmentally and economically feasible. It proposed that the coastal strip located between the beach and the Alexandria - Matrouh road would be dedicated for the development of tourist accommodation, services, and leisure activities. While settlements for permanent and semi-permanent residences would be located to the south of the road. Finally, the existing settlements in the hinterland were to be re-planned and upgraded. These new settlements were prescribed in terms of size of population, function, location, and building and urban design regulations. Appendix X reviews the types, densities, and urban design regulations for the settlements according to the planning recommendations.

The structure planning proposed constructing a regional highway that lies in the north of the existing hinterland settlements, and routed about 6 km. to the south of the sea and parallel to it. The construction of the highway was thought to stimulate the growth of tourism development in both parallel and perpendicular directions to the coast; and would allow the existing hinterland settlements to reach their planned growth capacity. In addition, the highway was planned to relieve the traffic congestion from the existing coastal road and particularly to accommodate trucks and construction transport facilities. It was planned that the coastal road would be restricted to serve the tourists and day-trippers.
With respect to the coastal area, the structure planning suggested that 115 sites were to be assigned to the cooperatives, for the purpose of developing tourism projects as well as sites to be developed by the government as pilot projects. Accordingly, there are several “touristic villages” along the 100 km stretch of developed coast cluttering up the skyline between Sidi Qreir and Al-Alamein, many of which are still under construction. Figure 4.6 shows the present condition of land-use distribution and locations of touristic villages.

The Implemented Development

Figure 4.6 illustrates the disparity between planning and implementation. The structure planning proposed 8-service settlements in the south of the coastal road and another 2 settlements in each of the 4 zones (see Appendix IX). However, only one\(^\text{18}\) of the proposed new settlements was established and accordingly the growth of urbanization towards the hinterland was negligible. Moreover, the growth of the existing hinterland settlements had been in absence of planning and growth control.

\(^{18}\) The settlement, named South Marakia Village, lies to the south of Marakia tourist village and contains the headquarters of the North West Coast Development Agency, employees housing, and a car-service station. It also includes vacation apartments of lesser prices than the ones at the coastal strip.
This had several consequences: the settlements have been a plight to existing settlers due to overcrowding, breakdown in services and infrastructure problems; and have been unattractive to other settlers whom were supposed to reside in them. In addition, although the proposed regional highway had recently been established, the coastal road had been suffering from congestion and there were no preventative measures for avoiding transport facilities serving the activities of construction, quarrying and manufacturing industries which, in turn, resulted in an extremely bad road condition. Furthermore, the coastal area had been subdivided into smaller land parcels and the reserved areas for public beaches were replaced with holiday home developments. The proposed new settlements in the coastal strip that were supposed to follow the poly-nuclear pattern were replaced by land parcels and sold to developers. The number of land parcels amounted to more than 150 sites (rather than the planned 115 parcels) for establishing the so-called touristic villages. MOR divided many sites into smaller lots with less than 100 meters beachfront violating the planning recommendation of establishing plots with multiples of 250 meters. Although MOR abided by the planning recommendation of implementing pilot projects to act as an example for other projects and to stimulate the private sector, the pilot projects were examples of violating the planning regulations as will be discussed in the next section. The touristic villages of both the public and private sectors have occupied the beachfront and there is hardly any vacant area at present that could be used as public beaches or for future projects.

It is necessary to highlight that the touristic villages are neither touristic nor villages, but are referred to as such for lack of a better name. They are not touristic in the sense that they have neither hotels nor any other facilities to attract either domestic or international tourists who do not own property there, nor are they villages, since they do not house a self-sustaining population of any sort. These places are merely blocks of summer housing for Egyptian families who flock to the region for the summer where the average Egyptian family spends no more than three weeks per year vacationing in the area, leaving the villages completely vacant for 10 months of the year. However, during the peak months, the NWC suffers from problems of overcrowding, noise pollution, lack of medical facilities, traffic congestion, etc. What used to be virgin coastline scattered with fig and olive trees has turned into a “concrete jungle” (Business Today 1998; the Economist 1999). In addition, the
scarcity of hotels in the NWC has been the main criticism of the area.

“The white sandy beaches and trademark azure blue waters of the Mediterranean could have made the NWC a major tourist destination to rival, for example, the French Riviera, Spain’s Costa Del Sol, and the Turkish Antalia. Instead, most of the NWC has been, in most areas, transformed into a barren monument to bad taste and bad design” (Business Today 1998).

Photographic Images Showing the Touristic Villages along the NWC

In terms of the other proposed economic activities, the regional planning (Ilaco and Pacer 1976) revealed the availability of natural resources in the NWC region such as limestone, gypsum, clay, and sand. These materials led to the establishment of some industrial projects, which had to be incorporated in the structure planning as determinants. The cement plant was designed to produce 2,000,000 tons per year and located to the north west of Al-Hammam settlement. The gypsum factory was designed to produce 300,000 tons per year and is located adjacent to the existing railway at about 300m west of Al-Garbaniat village. The factories have been a major source of pollution to the region, which is in conflict with tourism development.
The planning recommended the expansion and exploitation of Maryut Lake for salt extractions, fish raising and for tourism purposes. Indeed, the planning recommended the implementation of a tourist center by the lake (where fishing and water-sports activities could be practiced) and the establishment of a settlement for workers where jobs could be created in the tourist industry, fisheries and the salt crystallization plant. The planning also recommended the implementation of a canal to link the Maryut Lake to the Mediterranean to decrease its salinity and enhance water circulation. Also, the lake was to provide recreation and beach areas for the existing hinterland settlements (Al Hammam, Burg Al Arab and Gharbaniat) as shown in Figure 4.5.

However, neither the tourism center nor the settlement were implemented. The lake was not linked to the Mediterranean. Existing towns’ settlers could not use the lake for leisure and recreational purposes. Al-Ahram newspaper in 1999 reported that the Maryut Lake decreased from 50,000 feddans to only 17,000 feddans in the last two decades due to reclamation of the lake for implementing industrial activities, Mubarak Scientific City, the regional highway, and the International Garden. According to the same article, the lake became a reservoir for solid and industrial waste disposal. Accordingly, the fish production decreased from 8800 ton in 1986 to 1900 ton in 1990, which has been affecting the lives of more than 7500 families depending on the

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19 Al Ahram daily newspaper, (1999),”Maryut Lake is Facing Death”, Friday May 7th.
lake’s fish production (ibid.). According to the article, the governmental authorities have been behind such deterioration as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.

Moreover, the area between the 34th km. and the 100th km. is rich with stone quarries along a continuous ridge parallel to the coast and extends at parts to about 30 km. Most of the quarries were found along Abu Sir Plateau, between the coastal road and Maryut Lake. Permissions had been issued to companies and individuals for quarrying and are still being issued despite their negative impacts on the environment as pointed out in Box 4.2.

The structure planning recognized this problem; however, no strong action was taken. Two solutions were proposed, the first was to offer other sites for the companies in Gebel Maryut and on the southern plateau, south of El-Hammam. These places were proposed as they are near to the railway line where transporting the stones could be easier. However, the individuals and companies refused to move their investment and since they have direct and indirect political powers, this proposal was denied. The second alternative was to keep the work in the quarries under some kind of management where some recommendations were proposed:

- Quarrying is prohibited in the northern slope of the Abu Sir Plateau and is limited in the Southern slope from levels +20m to +0.5m above sea level.
- The raw materials should be transported through the proposed regional

**Box 4.2. The Problems Caused by the Stone Quarries**

Abdelaziz (1987) argues that quarrying is the greatest problem in the NWC region. He identifies five problems that were caused by the stone quarries that had affected tourism development. *First*, the pollution from the quarries affected air, plants, roads and buildings and this, of course, had been in conflict with tourism. *Second*, transporting the stones by trucks and lorries had a negative effect on the roads’ structures and caused more traffic congestion. The *third* concerns the environmental degradation. Parallel to the coast of the Mediterranean there had been a hill that slopes gently towards the sea with average height of 30 meters. This hill gives the region its distinctive character, and was used by the locals for agricultural purposes, especially fig trees. Therefore, when the hill was used as a stone quarry, this had not only caused environmental degradation, but also affected the lives of the locals. *Forth*, the removal of the hills and mountains by cutting them into stones affected the ecological balance of the region. Many ecological changes occurred, for example, the changes in the path of rainwater and in collecting and preserving it, which, in turn, affected the plants and the biological life of the species, in addition to the social consequences. *Finally*, the social and economic isolation of the backward areas that lie in the other side of the hills which would hinder the development of the hinterland. This is because that after the hills were cut into stones they were left sharp edged while the remaining stones were scattered and left randomly creating a barrier between the coastal and the backward areas. This, in turn, had been eliminating the chances of developing the backward areas, which was a main planning objective.
highway and the use of the coastal road is prohibited.

- The periods of work in the quarries must be organized so as not to be in conflict with the tourism season. This means that the works stop during summer.

- All the companies operating the quarries in one area are to do so at the same time and after finishing, they must all move to another area in order to leave the original location in peace.

- Work in the quarries must be done in a way that preserves the environment and the natural ecological characteristics.

These recommendations were not considered as the best remedies to solve the problem. The planners had no room for maneuver to stop the works in the quarries because the companies had legal rights over the quarries in the form of contracts with the Government. Therefore, if moving the quarrying activities to other sites was difficult to achieve, how will the management for preserving the environment and the natural ecological characteristics of the region be guaranteed?

Some of the actions and decisions were in accordance with policy recommendations and objectives. However, there are some clear conflicts between the pre-defined planning recommendations and implementation. For example, the establishment of the large cement factory adjacent to El-Hammam settlement, the direction from which the prevailing winds blow, indicates that the objective of providing an un-polluted environment for the inhabitants was not considered (Amer 1987). The same problem lies with the location of the gypsum factory, which is located at a close distance from El-Garbanniat settlement. Also, the permission given for the work in the stone quarries is in conflict with the goal of tourism development. Most of the construction in the region had been by stones as they can be easily brought from nearby quarries. However, the methods used in cutting the stones from the quarries had had a significant negative effect on the environment. Indeed, quarrying is the greatest problem of the region because it had hindered the growth of development towards backward areas (the Western Desert), which was a prime policy intention (see Box 4.2 and Figure 4.7).
In general, implementing the regional, tourism and structure plans which constituted the politically determined public policy for the development of the NWC region had been going in a direction that, not only, is different from the actual policy guidelines, but in a direction that was causing damages to the social and physical environments.

Chapter 5 argues that political expediency had been determining the development’s growth patterns, the distribution of land uses and economic activities, the allocation of government services, etc., even if these meant environmental damage, social problems, and economic losses. The discussion is extended in Section 4.4, referring to the public sector pilot projects, to illustrate how long-term economic benefit was neglected in favor of short-term political gain.

4.3 The Sustainability of Tourism in the NWC

Section 4.2 discussed the organization of studies for the NWC region that constituted its politically determined public policy. It noted, through several examples, that many policy objectives were not achieved. This section attempts to discuss, however, the goals and objectives of the NWC tourism public policy. It argues that the plans and policies aimed at achieving sustainable tourism development (STD). This discussion is necessary for the analysis of the policy to see how far had the policy succeeded in achieving STD objectives and how far its ‘promises’ were realized. This is a perquisite for policy evaluation and for the analysis of how, why and to what extent should the government be involved in formulating and implementing tourism policies.

For the tourism development of the region, it was clear that there existed several factors and dynamics that required the government’s intervention in managing development in the NWC. Prime among these factors is the protection of the
Implementing Tourism Public Policy: Findings from the Case Study

Environment since it is the resource base of the tourist industry and its enhancement is necessary for sustaining the benefits from tourism for future generations. **Second**, the implementation and guardianship of the building regulations, architectural styles, and carrying capacities\(^{20}\) to avoid any environmental and socio-cultural problems in the region. **Third**, establishing pilot projects to stimulate the private sector’s initiative and to act as an example for others to follow. **Finally**, to make sure that the tourism sector is not developed in isolation from all other economic sectors that together promote the region’s development. Accordingly, several governmental and ministerial decrees were issued to regulate the implementation of the public policy so as to achieve its objectives (see Appendix XI).

In general, the tourism policy was directed towards the attainment of certain pre-identified goals and objectives, which determined the Terms of Reference (TOR) that directed the planners’ concepts in the regional, tourism and structure plans. Some of the objectives were traditionally common to all spatial planning while others were derived from the political, economic and social requirements of Egypt (see Appendix XII). Finally, there were those objectives, which related specifically to the concerns of particular interest groups (PUD and ORplan 1978).

**The Principles of the Public Policy of the NWC**

Although the term STD was not explicitly mentioned in the plans (because it was not part of the development lexicon at that time), the policy principles were identical to those of STD. The tourism policy explicitly mentioned that the planning of the region:

> “must be directed towards the attainment of certain requirements that are considered as determinants for the development: these are futurity, environmental quality/integrity, equity, and efficiency”

(PUD and ORplan 1978).

Those determinants represented the guiding principles for the NWC region’s development plans.

The tourism public policy stressed the necessity of considering the concerns for **future generations**. The policy aimed at the:

> “realization of a balance between the present generation and future

---

\(^{20}\) The implementation of carrying capacities had been recognized as a prerequisite to the regional tourism development since the region aimed at accommodating not only its residents but the tourists whose numbers would even be greater than the resident population.
ones with the aim of prevention of damaging, exploiting or polluting the non-renewable resources” (PUD and Pacer 1983).

According to the tourism planning,

“The preservation and enrichment of the environment for future generations should be a consistent priority, as what we build today will affect the quality of life for future generations” (PUD and ORplan 1978).

In addition, the concern for environmental protection was also emphasized where the tourism plan stated that:

“locations’ decisions and urban growth’s control must be seriously considered with respect to the environment. For example: the beach, the main natural resource of the NWC, must be safeguarded from pollution, aiming to keep the natural environment free from any pollution of all kinds (from the land or from the sea). Water resources including the ground water table, must be preserved and utilized in a manner which least detracts from potability and from the fertility of the land. Agriculture and arable land should be preserved and extended. Fisheries should be protected and enhanced. Air quality must be monitored and controlled to avoid air pollution. Sewerage and solid waste should not be allowed to pollute the environment and, finally, cultural and historic assets should be preserved” (ibid.).

Moreover, the policy aimed at achieving equity among the population through participation and ensuring the accessibility of locals to all resources, areas, and facilities in the region. According to PUD and Pacer (1983) the policy aimed at:

“giving equal and fair chances to all social classes to benefit from available resources, such as shores, roads and others so that they do not become exclusive property to one class, group or cooperative”.

Moreover, the policy stated that:

“a general attitude of participation by the community and their satisfaction is to be encouraged. All sectors of the population must be allowed access to some or all parts of the area. A balanced resident population in terms of income should be achieved. Individuals and groups who benefit from the development of the region must pay the full and real costs yielding that benefit, and are not subsidized by public moneys. Individuals should be given the widest scope of choice possible, given the communal constraints. Legal and social stability and continuity are to be maintained” (PUD and ORplan 1978).

Efficiency in exploiting the natural resources was also stressed as well as efficiency of implementation. Accordingly, the policy stated that:

“the resources whether or not of monetary value, must be efficiently exploited. Any project that will be erected in the region
must be on a manageable scale. A valuation framework must be established. A realistic appraisal of present and future costs must be made and adhered to wherever possible “(ibid.).

Hence, the tourism public policy of the NWC region had referred to the same principles and dimensions of sustainable development (futurity, environmental protection, equity, participation, and efficiency), that were discussed in Section 2.4 and illustrated in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.9 in Chapter 2. Therefore, Table 4.7 compares the STD principles against the NWC policy principles and implementation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles of STD</th>
<th>NWC Policy</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Futurity</td>
<td>Was considered</td>
<td>Neglected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental considerations</td>
<td>Carefully thought about</td>
<td>Deteriorated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>Taken into account</td>
<td>Abandoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrating tourism with other economic sectors</td>
<td>Was given due consideration</td>
<td>Overlooked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity and involving local communities</td>
<td>Was carried out during planning</td>
<td>Dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing tourism</td>
<td>Was advised</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public awareness and research</td>
<td>Was minimal</td>
<td>Neglected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7. Comparing Policy and Practice against STD Principles

Futurity
The NWC tourism public policy revolved around the compatibility of the regional development with continued economic growth. The concern had been to enable present and future generations the opportunity of meeting basic needs through economic growth. In the case of tourism, as pointed out in Chapter 2, the continued growth of the sector depends primarily on the sustainability of the environment being the industry’s resource base. From the analysis of the policy’s recommendation, it can be assumed that it adopted the “industry” approach for its definition of STD (weak sustainability approach). The policy’s industry approach acknowledged that the aspects of tourism development such as its scale, diversity, ownership, carrying capacity, environmental protection, visitor’s satisfaction, etc., none of which operate in isolation. The policy simply acknowledged that developing merely “green products” is not realistic and a developing country like Egypt could not afford the discard of economic growth in favor of extreme resource preservation. However, the policy’s interpretation of the futurity principle can be defined as the promotion of a balanced resource exploitation that would secure some benefits for present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to acquire the same benefits. This was reflected in promoting urban growth towards the hinterland to prevent urban
sprawl and linear development so as to allow some “empty” areas along the coast for future expansions as well as to preserve the natural environment for the enjoyment of the people. In addition, the policy recommended the extension of roads and infrastructure towards the hinterland to promote agricultural and industrial activities where such activities would be able to expand indefinitely if they were directed towards the “vast” Western Desert.

The implementation of policy, however, had experienced a different position. Influenced by power struggles and private interests, the futurity principle had been neglected as Chapter 5 explains. The concessions that were offered to the housing cooperatives and owners of stone quarries for example, have been hindering the chances of future generations to benefit from such resources as the beach, the quarries and flora and fauna. There is hardly any vacant beachfront at present in the area between the 34th and the 100th km that can be used in the future for developing hotels, resorts, tourist attractions or even for promoting other activities like agriculture. Moreover, the growth towards the desert was overlooked where most infrastructures extended in a direction that is parallel to the coastline and consequently, urban growth towards the desert had been threatened. For example, the concentration on constructing second-homes for Egyptian families rather than tourists’ accommodations and beach facilities has been limiting the attractiveness of the region as a tourist destination. Consequently, this had adverse effects on employment, human settlements, and the encouragement of the economic activities that accompanies tourism development.

The Environmental Considerations
The physical and socio-cultural resources were given considerable attention in the NWC policy. The concern for avoiding irreversible changes to environmental assets had been a guiding principal for policy. With respect to the social and cultural environments the policy focused primarily on the integration of the local population into the Egyptian society as a whole in order to dissolve economic stagnation and social frustration. The policy recommended the preservation of the local traditions and cultures, indigenous architectural styles, traditional economic activities, etc. The policy also recommended that priority should be given to local people in employment opportunities in the industrial and touristic activities. In terms of the natural environment, the policy gave considerable attention to establishing carrying capacity
standards as well as building and planning regulations. Considerable attention was given to the allocation of industries that would pollute the environment (see Section 4.2).

However, preserving the natural environment for continuous use has not been receiving the same attention it received during policy formulation. The establishments of cement and gypsum factories in addition to other heavy industries have been in conflict with the objective of promoting tourism development. Proposing a nuclear power plant to be established in the region was a naïve idea that would have killed the attractiveness of the NWC as a tourist destination. Indeed, prior the approval and authorization of the tourism plan, the government invited more than twenty-five international investors to contribute to the tourism development of the NWC particularly the Alex-Imayid sub-region (the study area). The government prepared the Terms of Reference (PUD 1979) that describes and regulates investments. Several investors showed interest to invest in infrastructure, resorts, hotels, and many other activities. However, because they were faced by several complicating bureaucratic procedures, the investors lost interest. Some investors identified that the nuclear power plant proposed in Sidi Qreir was the main reason for their disinterest in investing in the NWC. Others required some initial government’s investment particularly in infrastructure development. In general, most investors were discouraged from the situation of the housing cooperatives. Although the government led some negotiations between the investors and the cooperatives to create joint beneficiary groups, most of the efforts flopped.

In addition, the works in the stone quarries along the coast has been causing visual pollution as well as changes in the ecological balance of the region. Furthermore, the case of the socio-cultural environment is similarly displeasing. Although the policy succeeded in decreasing the isolation of the Bedouin societies, local traditions and cultures have been disintegrating (Rose El Youssef 1998). This is reflected in the changes (influenced by immigrants and visitors) that occurred to the Bedouins’ clothes, food, houses, and lifestyles.

**Diversity**
The NWC tourism policy recommended the diversity of the tourist product. It proposed several activities including several types of tourist accommodation and
services (resorts, motels and hotels), sports activities (golf, water sports, horse and camel racing, etc.), maritime centers, exhibition and festival halls, conference centers, shopping centers, War museums, safaris, and many other different tourist activities. However, most of those activities did not see light and were displaced with second home developments in favor for fast return on investment, as shown in Figure 4.6.

**The Integration of Tourism with other Regional Economic Sectors**

Although the policy acknowledged the necessity of integrating tourism with all other regional economic sectors, this was not achieved in practice. The tourism development of the NWC region was integrated into a national and regional strategic planning framework. This is reflected in the different plans that suggested promoting tourism in the NWC starting from the October Working Paper through the regional planning, tourism plan and the structure planning of the NWC region. It was expected that such integration would avoid conflicts of interest and prevent the over-use of resources. Strengthened by government intervention in formulating and implementing the NWC policy, it was believed that tourism would not develop in isolation from other economic sectors; nor would it cause problems to the natural and socio-cultural environments. However in practice, not only the integration of tourism with the regional economic sectors had been absent, but tourism did not develop as it was conceived for it (as shown in Table 4.6 above). Conflicts of interests in resources exploitation had occurred in several instances. For example, a petro chemical plant was established in Sidi Qreir (the 34th km) between the coastal road and the Mediterranean, which eliminated the opportunity of establishing tourist attractions or accommodation. Similarly, the proposed nuclear power plant is in conflict with tourism development where it would not only occupy an extended beachfront area, but would affect the attractiveness of the whole region to tourists (see Box 4.1 above). Other examples include the conflict of interests between the quarrying activities along the coastline and the nature of tourism development as discussed in the previous section. Hence, although the policy was keen on integrating tourism with other regional economic sectors to avoid conflicts in resources exploitation, implementation had been indifferent. Moreover, the second home developments have been dominating the regional development not only at the expense of other economic sectors but also on the expense of tourism development.
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Equity and Involvement of Local Communities
Although the policy had stated that local community participation is a prerequisite for the NWC region’s development, there is hardly any evidence to support that participation took place. During the data collection stage of the tourism plan, the planners carried out extensive discussions with the Bedouins to identify their problems and needs. However, they were not involved in deciding the choice and distributions of different uses and economic sectors. The policy decisions have been ‘top down’ because “ignorant and illiterate societies require guidance and decisions from above” as the planners argued in a discussion with the researcher. The planners and policy makers identified the needs of the communities but chose to resolve only the problems that corresponded with the decision-makers’ values and ideals as Chapter 5 argues. Lack of coordination and consultation between the decision-makers and local communities had been constraining the implementation of the policy. For example, the Bedouins who owned lands suitable for quarrying activities felt that they would eventually lose their lands to the government for developmental purposes. They preferred to exploit the lands and thus established several stone quarries (in the absence of the government’s control) in order to acquire ‘any’ benefit from the lands before losing it. This resulted in the environmental problems that were discussed in the previous section, and also hindered the urban growth towards the desert. It can be argued, however, that if the Bedouins were consulted, and were aware of the impacts of their actions and the potential positive impacts of tourism development, they would have contributed to the environmental protection of their local area instead of exploiting the scarce natural resources before somebody else would!

Public Awareness and Research
Although the policy proposed that the government should increase the public awareness of the local population about the benefits associated with the tourism development of the NWC region (PUD and ORplan 1978), it didn’t explain how this would be carried out. The policy also recommended that local personnel should be recruited in the implementing institutions and tourism facilities and to be trained so as to encourage a sense of responsibility and environmental awareness (ibid.). In addition the Ex-minister of MOR announced that any research for the New Towns development and the NWC development would benefit from his personal grant to encourage research. However, the very few locals employed in the implementing
institutions were not trained to spread the environmental awareness and explain the benefits of the NWC tourism development. Research concerning the tourism development of the NWC region has been minimal. Except for very few dissertations that discussed some aspects of the development in the NWC (Amer 1987; Serag 1979), there is an obvious lack of ongoing research and monitoring by the tourist industry using effective data collection and analysis.

The former discussion realizes that although the tourism public policy of the NWC region aimed at realizing sustainable tourism development, this had been constrained by two main obstacles. First, the policy outlined the goals of the region’s development and identified some objectives but the strategy to realize those objectives (that translates policy to action) was not given enough consideration. Second, policy implementation was treated as a separate entity from the policy process and thus, had been vulnerable to conflicting interests and different translations of means and ends. At the time when several governmental and ministerial decrees were issued to implement policy as planned, laws or legal frameworks that would ensure effective implementation did not support those decrees. As a result, tourism public policy failed to realize most of the national and regional objectives that it aimed to accomplish.

4.4 From Policy to Action: Exploring the Performance of the Public Pilot Projects

As Chapter 3 and Sections 4.2 and 4.3 have illustrated, many national and regional objectives were not achieved (see also Appendix XII). Indeed, the NWC tourism public policy even failed to accomplish many of its own promises. As pointed out in Chapter 3, and as noted in the different plans for the region, the overall goal for development in the NWC region was to contribute to the resolution of Egypt’s human settlement problem. Accordingly, the policy recommended the establishment of several new human settlements and promoting the growth of existing settlements to accommodate between 2 and 3 million people in the NWC region by the year 2000 (see Chapter 3) based on tourism as the main economic activity for employment generation. However, as mentioned above, the settlements that were proposed in the tourism planning were not implemented; New Ameriyah City (NAC) attracted very few settlers; and the existing settlements had grown very little. Accordingly, in 1996
the population of Matrouh Governorate was less than 200,000 people\textsuperscript{21} (rising from 130,000 in 1976 and 156,000 in 1983) although its total area\textsuperscript{22} is more than 20 percent of the total area of Egypt (CAPMAS 1984; Matrouh Governorate 1997). Although the NWC region is included in three governorates (Alexandria, Matrouh, and Behira), more than 95 percent of the region is within Matrouh boundaries as shown in Figure 4.8.

**Figure 4.8. Matrouh Governorate**

Many developers, planners, observers, scholars, experts and even public officials regard this failure to the bad performance of the government in implementing the NWC tourism public policy (e.g. the President of PUD Consultants, the tourism planner of the NWC region, the ex-vice president of ANUC, the Ex-Chairman of GOPP, Hanna (1998), Ibrahim (1993), Business Today (1998) and others). Indeed, they argue that the example set by the government (particularly the public pilot projects) was a poor one. The public pilot projects were supposed to be the instrument for implementing the tourism public policy in the NWC, to be an example for other public and private projects and to stimulate the private sector’s initiative. However, they failed to generate the anticipated work opportunities needed to attract the population, and failed to achieve the objectives associated with their *raison d’être* as this section attempts to illustrate.

\textsuperscript{21} In contrast with the anticipated 2 to 3 millions as mentioned above.
\textsuperscript{22} The total area of Matrouh is about 212,000 km\textsuperscript{2}.
Having discussed the policy formulation stage of the policy process, it is the concern of this section to explore the process of translating the NWC tourism public policy to action. The review of the literature has identified that policies are translated to action through programmes and projects (Section 2.2.4). This means that the relationship between policies, programmes, and projects lies in the center of policy analysis. Therefore, in an attempt to extend the discussion on what had happened in the NWC, this section discusses the tourism pilot projects that were utilized to implement the tourism public policy of the NWC region.

4.4.1 Marakia Tourist Village

Marakia was implemented by the government aiming to set an example for future public and private sector developments and to stimulate private sector’s initiatives to develop the NWC (cited by PUD 1981). It was the first project to promote tourism development in accordance with the public policy of the NWC region. Therefore, in 1981 the government commissioned the private consulting firm (PUD Consultants), which was involved in the formulation of the NWC tourism policy, to design the project taking into account the policy decisions and recommendations. The government approved the design concept and decided that implementation would be under PUD’s supervision.

The Exigency for Marakia

Before the discussion of the project’s process, outcomes, and impacts it is necessary to outline the government’s rationale for implementing Marakia that was pointed out in the project’s Terms of Reference. In addition to being an example for future developments in the NWC and to stimulate the private sector, Marakia was needed to ease the pressure of domestic tourists on Alexandria\(^{23}\) and to accommodate the day-trippers coming from Cairo, Alexandria, the Delta, and New Ameriyah City (NAC).

More than one million Egyptian families went to the Mediterranean coasts to spend their summer vacations (El-Roubi 1987). Until mid 1980s, beach oriented tourism in Egypt had reached major proportions only in Alexandria. Unfortunately, most of the beaches near Alexandria have been polluted with oil, debris, and seaweed, and the beaches east of the city have been generally unattractive owing to dark, silted sand and unclear water. In the coastal area that extends about 500 km west of Alexandria,

\(^{23}\) As mentioned above, it was estimated that more than 1.5 million domestic tourists flock to Alexandria alone in summer (Abo-Gad 1997).
however, the beaches are generally endowed with fine white sand and clear blue-green water. Indeed, the NWC is among the least polluted waters in the Mediterranean vicinity (World Bank 1990). The best area lies between El Alamein and Aguiba (between the 100\textsuperscript{th} to the 300\textsuperscript{th} km west of Alexandria). Domestic tourists have continued to be attracted to the NWC region especially for day visits from Alexandria, where the beaches have been overcrowded in summer.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the New Ameriyah City (NAC) is part of the New Town national policy. It is located in the Alex-Imayid sub-region in the NWC region of Egypt. As mentioned before, the city was planned to accommodate 500,000 inhabitants. Tourism in the NWC region was seen as one of the main economic activities that would attract the population to settle in NAC. Employment opportunities were expected in activities that relate directly and indirectly to the tourist industry such as in hotels, resorts, restaurants, transport, airports, etc., as well as in the construction industry, agriculture, and manufacturing industries that serve tourists. In order to increase the attractiveness for NAC to attract the population from Egypt's densely populated areas, the NWC tourism public policy was keen on providing public areas along the Mediterranean for leisure and recreational purposes for NAC settlers and for day-trippers from Alexandria. Although this was difficult to achieve because of land ownership patterns along the Mediterranean, as mentioned in Section 4.2, the structure planning of the Alex-Imayid sub-region (the study area) was able to allocate the area between the 50\textsuperscript{th} and the 52\textsuperscript{nd} km for the establishment of the first tourist center in the NWC region to accommodate day-trippers. This was a result of fierce discussions and negotiations between the government, from one side, and the landowners (cooperative societies and the Bedouins), from the other. PUD Consultants was mediating and coordinating such discussions and negotiations being MOR’s consultants in the NWC region.

**Marakia in the Context of the NWC Public Policy**
Reference has been made in Section 4.2 that the tourism policy divided the study area into four zones each with its unique package of recreational activities (see Appendix IX). Zone A (between the 34\textsuperscript{th} and the 52\textsuperscript{nd} km) would include a sports and play center with a casino, race course, and a club area with various sports fields together with a reserved area for NAC day trippers. Zone B (between the 52\textsuperscript{nd} and the 63\textsuperscript{rd} km) would include a center for inland water activities, brought about by the development
of inland lakes, as well as a tourist cultural center at Al Hammam. Zone C (between the 63rd and the 80th km) would include cure facilities and an environment characterized by quietness and privacy and enhanced by the low density “country-house type of urban design.” Zone D (between the 80th and the 100th km) would include a maritime center with facilities for various water sports and recreational activity together with an integrated youth center. Each of the four zones was to include reserved areas for day-trippers who were estimated to reach 50,000 visitor in the year 2000. This number includes the expected day-trippers from New Ameriyah City (NAC), which was expected to reach 30,000 tourist in the year 2000. The reserved areas for day-trippers were planned to include a service center with public beach facilities and tourists’ services and attractions to diversify the tourist product.

According to the tourism public policy, the coastal area between the 50th and the 52nd km from Alexandria would be reserved for implementing a tourist center to accommodate the daily trippers and holidaymakers. Accordingly, the government approved the site selection and assigned an area of around 135 ha for implementing Marakia Tourists Center. As shown in Figure 4.9, Marakia lies between the sea in the north and the existing coastal road in the south, km 50 in the east and km 52 in the west. This location was selected as one of the sites that had least land-ownership problems.
The Terms of Reference for Marakia was based on the tourism public policy’s recommendation of providing a reserved beach area for the day-trippers from New Ameriyah City (NAC) to increase its attractiveness as a new town with unique recreational activities as shown in Figure 4.10.

Figure 4.9. The Location of Marakia Tourist Village

Figure 4.10. Marakia in Relation to NAC.
Therefore, Marakia was built by the government as an example to be followed by future developments whatever the nature of the developer (private or public) (Amer 1987). It was planned to accommodate 10,000 tourists (who neither owned the land property nor had representation in the cooperatives parcels), 3000 of which were expected to arrive daily from NAC and around 3500 from Cairo, 3000 from Alexandria and 500 from the Delta. The number of tourists who were expected to spend the night in Marakia was estimated to be only 20 percent of the total (PUD 1981). In addition, Marakia was expected to generate about 2000 job opportunity (direct employment) to serve the 10,000 tourists, in addition to indirect employment, after its expected completion in 1983 (ibid.).

Implementing Marakia
Because Marakia is a tourism project, it was recognized that its prosperity depends on the natural environment. In analyzing the natural environment, the designers (PUD Consultants) identified that it contains three main components (resources): the beach, the sand dunes, and the agricultural zone. The three natural resources extend along the Mediterranean between the coastline and the coastal road. According to PUD (1981) the protection and enhancement of the three resources is considered a prime design objective.

“The development of the day-trippers zone [Marakia] depends on the distribution of different activities and their relationship with the site’s natural environment” (PUD 1981).

Therefore, PUD (1981) recognized that the design concept for Marakia would be one of two alternatives as shown in Figure 4.11. First, a linear development pattern that depends on replicating tourist units each with 500 meters width and their length extends from the shoreline to the coastal road. Each unit includes several tourist attractions and activities. Second, a net development pattern that achieves the development of the whole project as one unit where the different activities would be interconnected where central activities would be allocated throughout the site and connected by a net system of roads. The design concept was in accordance with the second alternative because, as PUD (1981) argued, protects and enhances the natural environment.

“It gives the beach the opportunity to extend towards the depth so that it becomes a natural extension for the sand dunes zone that provides, with its height variation, an interesting aesthetic
component compared with the flat beach. At the same time, the net development pattern encourages the movement towards the depth to undertake other recreational activities and achieves diversity, and that would decrease the density of the tourists at the beach” (ibid).

In general, the design concept for Marakia was based on establishing several recreational activities for the day-trippers in addition to the accommodation facilities (mainly for day-use) for the holidaymakers. The distribution of activities and land uses are illustrated in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.12.

![Figure 4.11. The Two Design Alternatives for Marakia](image)

Source: PUD (1981)
## Table 4.8. The Distribution of Activities and Land Uses in Marakia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uses and Activities</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Area m²</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The beach area</strong></td>
<td>Life Guards, Changing rooms and toilets, First aid, Kiosks for fast food</td>
<td>248400</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artificial lakes and piazza</strong></td>
<td>Lake, Lake beaches, Day-Use Cabanas, Pedestrian promenades, Recreational Piazza that includes a cinema, a theatre, roller blades, gardens, children playground, cafeterias, restaurant, kiosks for fast food and pastries.</td>
<td>41400</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cabanas</strong></td>
<td>400 day-use cabanas, Changing rooms, Showers and toilets</td>
<td>16560</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accommodation</strong></td>
<td>Motel that includes 200 beds, Village hotel that includes 700 beds, Shops and bazaars, Cafeterias, restaurants and administration</td>
<td>27600</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central commercial area</strong></td>
<td>Shops, bazaars and pastry kiosks; Restaurant and cafeteria, Mosque, Polyclinic, Administration, Green and open spaces</td>
<td>6900</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roads and parking areas</strong></td>
<td>Access roads, Service roads, Parking areas</td>
<td>110400</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sports fields</strong></td>
<td>Football, tennis, basketball, volleyball courts.</td>
<td>41400</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camping areas</strong></td>
<td>150 tent near the beach, 250 tent at the lake, Services and administration area</td>
<td>17940</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural landscape</strong></td>
<td>Existing sand-dunes, Trees</td>
<td>552000</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Green areas</strong></td>
<td>Green belt, Palm trees</td>
<td>41400</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vegetation area</strong></td>
<td>Vegetables and fruits’ plantations, Flowers fields</td>
<td>55200</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural areas</strong></td>
<td>Figs and olives trees and barley fields, Dates, pistachios and other fruits</td>
<td>207000</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1366200 (325 fed)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PUD (1981)

During implementation and after the construction of about thirty buildings, the project was cancelled and withdrawn from PUD Consultants. Another consultant (Noaman and Associates) was commissioned to re-plan and re-design the settlement. The second consultant designed the settlement using concepts completely different from
those applied in the rejected project. The reasons for the withdrawal of the project from PUD Consultants are several, but do not include the firm’s incapability or inefficiency on continuing the project as will be discussed in Chapter 5. In addition, the project was implemented only on 1008000 square meters (240 fed.). The remaining area (358200 square meters or 85 fed) was owned by a housing cooperative that suddenly refused to reallocate as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.

The design concept for the new Marakia project aimed at exploiting the project’s site in a way that achieves the construction of the maximum number of built up areas to increase profit from selling them to buyers (Noaman 1997)\textsuperscript{24}. Indeed, the sand dunes (which were considered an important natural resource) had been modified artificially by cutting the high levels and filling in the low ones resulting in a single uniform slope towards the sea. This action was taken in order to provide the opportunity for all the dwelling units to overlook the sea and enjoy its prevailing environment as well as having the sea breeze and necessary air movements especially during summer (\textit{ibid.}).

Accordingly, the distribution of activities and land uses were amended, as shown in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uses and Activities</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Area m\textsuperscript{2}</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The beach area</td>
<td>Life Guards, Swimming Pools</td>
<td>191520</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Hotel, 4 storey buildings, Villas, Chalets</td>
<td>370944</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial areas</td>
<td>Shops, bazaars and pastry kiosks; Restaurants and cafeterias; Mosque; Polyclinic; Administration</td>
<td>52416</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads and Parking areas</td>
<td>Access roads, Service roads, Parking areas</td>
<td>115920</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports fields</td>
<td>Tennis, basketball, volleyball courts.</td>
<td>30240</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green areas</td>
<td>Gardens and open spaces</td>
<td>246960</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1008000 (240 fed)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.9, Marakia Tourists Center: The Implemented Project
Source: Marakia for Development and Tourism Management

\textsuperscript{24} In a discussion with the researcher in July 1997.
The implemented project has a beach area (of length 1500 meters and width 100 meters) with four swimming pools, which is separated from the residential area by a
pedestrian passage of about 7-meters wide. From this pedestrian passage the residential area extends for about 400 meters further south and contains some 1879 units distributed as 1267 bungalows, 72 villas, and 30 apartment buildings.

On the sea front, the settlement consists of 5 dwelling clusters, each of which comprises 5 parallel rows of buildings (2-storey high). Each residential cluster is detached and identified by 2 streets (cul-de-sac) running from south to north. These streets are provided with parking areas on both sides. This use of cul de sacs intended to allow pedestrians to reach the main entrance of the settlement where the administrative, commercial, and the recreational center lies and not to be constrained by traffic. This center is surrounded (except in the sea wards direction) by paved streets where parking areas are found for the mosque, restaurants, cinema, open theater, shops, etc. Services such as car repair shops, carpenters, plumbers, etc., were to be located in the proposed permanent settlement south of the existing coastal road (South Marakia Village).

To the west there is a three-storey hotel of 150 rooms. This hotel is fronted by a group of small bungalows (one storey high) planned around a court where there is a swimming pool, green areas, and sitting areas. To the south of the hotel there are 4-storey apartment buildings. Each building comprises 36 housing units distributed over three floors. The ground floor is reserved for shops, bazaars, halls, etc. These apartment buildings are in 10 groups (that have identical architecture, landscapes, and spaces). They overlook the coastal road, which runs from east to west and connects Marakia with the neighboring settlements to the west.

Along the inland edge of Marakia there is a service road from which the cul-de-sacs link the apartment buildings. The area between Marakia and the coastal road was to be used for recreational and sports activities by the residence and those coming from the surrounding settlements (who are not allowed to enter Marakia itself).

There are 2 patterns of spaces that can clearly be distinguished from Marakia’s layout. The first, and the dominating one, is the linear pattern resulting from the design of buildings around a semi-court. These buildings and semi-courts are repeated using the same characteristics of building and open spaces to form extended linear spaces running in east-west direction. The settlement form was determined by two actions
first by allowing the settlement to slope towards the sea and locating low-rise buildings in front and high buildings at the back. The settlement’s vast open spaces and their north south intersection indicate some intent with regard to climatic modification. However, Amer (1987) contends that Marakia’s adaptation to climatic conditions is inappropriate.

In his research about the relationship between Marakia’s design and its adaptability to its residents, Amer (1987) identified that the residents find it difficult to identify any relationship between their houses and the open spaces. Because of the similarity and the monotony of the form of the open spaces and buildings, the residents do not easily recognize their own spaces and houses. In addition, he points out:

“In the implemented part of the rejected project the site’s natural slopes towards the sea has been exploited providing the opportunity for one storey buildings to overlook the sea and it is prevailing environment. In this area the buildings are planned with irregular and dispersed patterns. This pattern resulted in differing courts each varies in its form size and distribution of buildings. Dispersed units of 3 or 4 buildings create distinct groups with different dimensions and arrangements. These different groups provide a layout pattern in which the residents can easily identify and recognize their houses and out side spaces” (ibid.).

The above discussion highlights that at the conclusion of Marakia’s development stages, two consultant bodies, commissioned by the same government, had produced two completely different design concepts for physical layout patterns and building form characteristics in one settlement. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 above highlight the differences between the two concepts in terms of land uses and the areas assigned to them. For example, the area assigned for accommodation in the initial project was less than 4.5% of the total project area, while in the implemented project it amounted to about 35%. In addition, the initial project attempted to include a diversity of tourism attractions and leisure facilities to attract tourists and diversify the tourist product while the implemented project focused on exploiting the area for holiday homes development. Furthermore, the implemented hotel in Marakia remained unused until 1997 (15 years) because hotel management companies\textsuperscript{25} saw that the design of the building was inappropriate to become a 5-star hotel and thus the building required major engineering changes. MOR refused to put more money in improving the hotel as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{25} In the opinions of Mr. I. Gharbawy, the manager of Pullman Hotels (in Alamein) and with Mr. M. Ibrahim, the Assistant Manager of Hilton Burg Al Arab in a discussion with the researcher.
In an attempt to compare between the initial design concept and the implemented project, Table 4.10 summarizes the design determinants as set by PUD Consultants (and approved by MOR) and the established project (see Figures 4.12 and 4.13).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Design Determinants</th>
<th>Implemented Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. The protection of the natural resources:</strong></td>
<td>The implemented project divided the beach into equal zones that are replicated longitudinally. This had prevented the extension of the sand dunes zones to the beach, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The beach</td>
<td>The design concept attempted to give the beach the opportunity to extend towards the depth so that it becomes a natural extension for the sand dunes zone to provide, with its height variations, an interesting aesthetic component compared</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with the flat beach. Moreover, the design concept was based on a net pattern to encourage the movement of people towards the depth to undertake the other recreational activities and that would decrease the density of the tourists at the beach.

**b) The sand dunes:**

The site has had different topographical levels with heights between 5 to 25 meters above sea level. The tourism public policy recommended that these natural variations were to be kept as one of the natural tourist attractions that characterize the region. Accordingly, the design concept considered such physical features as advantages. It attempted to integrate the natural physical features with the project’s components in a natural and homogenous unity.

**c) Agricultural lands:**

The design concept was based on treating the whole site as one integrated unit and accordingly there were minimum access points from the coastal road to limit the decrease of the agricultural land that lies between the coastal road and the sand dunes.

**II. The aesthetic values:**

The design concept attempted to use local building materials (limestone) and utilize local architectural styles to create a unique aesthetic value to the project and to the region in general. It also distributed the recreational components and attractions in a way that would achieve their integration with the natural environment as well as with each other.

The use of local materials was not considered as a determinant in the implemented project. Instead, most buildings are built with red bricks and concrete ceilings. The architectural styles are not unique and have no aesthetic appeal. Indeed, the users emphasize the project’s architecture as unattractive and monotonous.

**III. The flexibility in the development pattern:**

The initial design concept attempted to provide total flexibility in the urban design by applying a flexible net development pattern, which would have increased the aesthetic value and the unique urban character of the whole site as one unit.

The replication of the buildings and activities in the implemented project constrained the flexibility in urban design and the general site’s landscapes where the replication of the recreational activities lead to the monotony and the loss of the diversity of tourism activities.

**IV. Segregation between activities and accommodation:**

The design concept distributed activities in a way that isolates the accommodation areas from the noisy sports and leisure activities.

The replication the recreational activities in every unit in the implemented project restricted the opportunity for segregation and differentiation among quiet areas (accommodation) and the dynamic activities as sports and shopping areas.

**V. Diversity**

The design concept aimed to ensure diversity between the built and open areas by applying the net development pattern, which is neither geometric nor systematic.

The monotony created by the linear development pattern, which was adopted in the implemented project, resulted in a replication of identical built and open areas.

**VI. Pedestrian routes and ease of access to the different recreational activities:**

The design concept attempted to provide the users the opportunity to choose between different leisure activities through a network of pedestrian routes that join the project’s components. This, in turn, would have enhanced the social and economic benefits of the site.

Reaching different leisure activities in the implemented project requires a transport facility particularly because most of the main activities lie in one central location.

### Table 4.10. Comparing Marakia’s Initial Design Concept and Implementation

As Table 4.10 highlights, Marakia was a very poor example for others to follow. Accordingly, it failed to accommodate the day-trippers from NAC, Alexandria, Cairo, and the Delta. It employs less than 200 people rather than the estimated 2000. It did not abide by the guidelines of the tourism public policy particularly those relating to preserving the natural environment and enhancing the built environment by establishing tourist attractions and facilities that are architecturally and aesthetically.
pleasing to attract tourists. Indeed, Abo-Gad (1997) sees Marakia as an “unattractive village” while Business Today (1998) describes its architecture as “boxy and unimaginative.” Amer (1987) also contends that Marakia’s open spaces and buildings are “unsuitable” to the prevailing climate and “inappropriate” for residents (see the photographic images above).

However, Marakia sold so well that 2 years later, Marabella, its clone, was constructed.

**The Replication of Marakia**

Initially, the minister of MOR (1978-1994), (who personally approached other ministers and politicians), carried out the marketing and selling the holiday homes in Marakia. His objective was to collect enough finances to complete the project and to pay for the regional infrastructure without neither burdening the government’s budget nor acquiring external financial aid. Accordingly, he offered financial incentives and handpicked locations for the first buyers. As a result, many ministers and politicians showed interest in purchasing the holiday homes. According to Business Today (1998),

“The government ministers and those with close connection to the minister of MOR were allegedly given first dips on the beach front chalets. Once it became known that the political elite would be vacationing in Marakia others rushed to snap up property there.”

Indeed, Marakia was selling so well that property had risen in price from 20,000 L.E. in the early 1980s to 300,000 L.E. in the early 1990s for a two-bedroom chalet (*ibid.*). The demand for property in Marakia at the time was so high that MOR decided they wanted to double, then triple the number of units. When PUD Consultants (the initial designers of Marakia) refused to violate the carrying capacity standards that were set by the tourism policy, they were replaced with another consultant as mentioned above. The profits gained from Marakia were used to implement another project, Marabella:

“Again, completely disregarding the work of the urban planners who wanted to preserve the first 66 km of coast line as one homogenous beach for day trippers, limiting construction to further back into the desert” (Business Today 1998).

MOR commissioned Noaman and Associates (the designers of the implemented Marakia) to design Marabella. It is located between the 66.25th km and the 67th km
from Alexandria along the Mediterranean coastline. It includes 970 holiday homes distributed in apartment buildings, villas, and chalets. The design concept and the architecture styles were identical to Marakia’s. Figure 4.14 shows photographic images from Marabella.

Figure 4.14: Marabella Touristic Village

Again, Marabella sold so well that MOR decided to increase its profit and implement other projects to meet the high demand on buying beachfront holiday homes along the Mediterranean. Accordingly, MOR became a speculator in real estate market like a private developer. It not only aimed to increase profit by implementing more holiday homes, but also had, through its affiliate ANUC, acquired more land along the coast from Al-Awkaf and RLRA agencies and from some cooperatives who were unable to pay for the regional infrastructure. It acquired the authority to do so by convincing the government to issue the decree number 540 in 1980 to determine the NWC as a new urban settlement. As mentioned in Chapter 3, all new settlements are subject to MOR and are owned by the Authority for New Urban Settlements (ANUC). Therefore, building holiday homes and selling them to Egypt’s upper and middle-income citizens became the name of the game.

The housing co-operatives, who already owned the majority of the land on the coast, followed suit and thus the format currently clutters up the coastline.

“The NWC tourism policy was completely disregarded in lieu of constructing cheap vacation houses, which would bring about a fast return on investment. It was up to the government to care about development rather than just construction and making a quick profit” (Business Today 1998).
Unfortunately, as the regional planner\textsuperscript{26} argues it was a job that the government did not live up to.

\subsection*{4.4.2 Marina Al Alamein Tourists Center}

In mid 1980s, the President of Egypt had visited some Mediterranean countries. He was impressed with the way they developed their coastal regions in terms of architectural styles, landscaping, and the diversity of tourist attractions. Accordingly, he wanted to replicate the experience along Egypt’s Mediterranean coast. Having seen how Marakia was poorly designed, he told the minister of MOR to implement better projects\textsuperscript{27} to compete with tourism projects in the Mediterranean countries particularly those in Morocco and Tunisia.

When the minister of MOR terminated the contract with PUD Consultants to complete the implementation of Marakia, PUD took the issue to court. The case remained in court for 4 years. The court’s decision was to PUD’s benefit. To prevent the court’s decision to go to public, the minister offered compensation to PUD. The compensation was to study the possibilities of realizing the President’s wishes for improving the tourism development in the NWC. Then PUD could design and implement MOR’s third “touristic village” in the region and apply the planning prescriptions that it proposed in the tourism policy, particularly because they were not applied in Marakia. The planning prescriptions included the creation of unique local architectural styles, the implementation of economic activities that would attract permanent residents (hotels, motels, and tourist attractions such as a maritime center, a golf course, etc.), the planning regulations and carrying capacities, and reserved areas for day-trippers.

Accordingly, in 1984 PUD Consultants signed a contract with the ministry to select the site and prepare the development programme for implementing Marina Al-Alamein. The selected site met the location criteria of having good access to the road network, and provided a large developable site area with little existing land use development nor important value for other resource use, and included attractive beaches and large natural lakes connected to the Mediterranean. Moreover, the site is located in Alamein, which became very famous worldwide since 1942 because it was

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[26] In a discussion with the researcher in July 1997.
\item[27] In a discussion with H.E. the ex-minister of reconstruction.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
where the battle took place between the Germans and the Allies in World War II. Since then, Alamein became very attractive to certain types of international tourists who come to visit the museums and the cemetery where their relatives are buried.

MOR approved the site selection that PUD Consultants had proposed (which lies between the 94th and the 114th km\(^{28}\) from Alexandria and bounded by the Mediterranean coastline in the North and extends to about 500 meters to the south of the coastal road). This covers an area of about 35 km\(^2\) (20 km from east to west and between 1 to 2 km from north to south). Indeed, this was one of Egypt’s largest projects at the time (see Figure 1.6 in Chapter 1).

Accordingly, MOR issued a ministerial decree to assign the site for the purpose of implementing a major tourist center and decided that the development would be in two phases. The first phase is between the 94th and 104th km from Alexandria of area 1203 ha (2865 feddans or 2970 acres). The second phase is between the 104th and 114th km from Alexandria with an area of 2100 ha (5000 feddans or 5185 acres). According to the ministerial decree number 570 for 1990,

> “Marina Al Alamein extends from the 94th km to the 114th km from east to west, and from the Mediterranean in the north to 500 meters south of the coastal road (the area south of the coastal road amounts to 1000 ha)”.

\(^{28}\) The first phase has recently been extended to the 106th km from Alexandria.
Planning the Project
The first phase was also divided into two implementation stages as shown in Figure 4.15. The design concept was based on dividing the first stage into five main leisure centers (in addition to several other sub-centers), so that every center could have sufficient services and facilities that could easily be reached by tourists. The idea was to design and implement centers 1 and 2, as an experiment (between the 94th and the 100th km). While centers 3, 4 and 5 were to be implemented after the construction of the experimental area. Figure 4.16 shows centers 1 and 2 of the first stage (the experimental area).

The design concept for the experimental area was to create 2-tourist residential clusters (within centers 1 and 2) for second home development to bring about fast return on the government’s investment to finance the infrastructure and tourist attractions, accommodation and services. Center 1 serves the area between the 95th and the 97th km, while Center 2 serves the area between km 97.5 and the 100th km. The area between the two centers was not assigned any uses so that the tourists would enjoy the prevailing natural environment. The area between the 94th and the 95th km was assigned for implementing few large private villas to ensure low density at the beach. A large village for the employees was allocated in the southeastern edge of the project. The main components of the experimental area can be summarized as follows:

- Holiday homes to bring a quick return on investment (they could be sold during, and even before, construction);
- Two motels and a 5-star hotel, to attract international and domestic tourists and provide job opportunities;
- A marina to serve yachts coming from other Mediterranean countries;
- Fishponds, for fish raising;
- Cabanas, for day use only to encourage day-trippers from other areas to visit;
- A camping area, to attract camping and caravan tourists; and
Employees housing, to attract and accommodate the workforce.

As mentioned above, the experimental stage included two motels (120 rooms each) and a 5-star hotel (150 rooms). It also included 40 day-use cabanas, 220 villa, and
around 1500 chalets. Accordingly, it was estimated that around 12,500 people would be living in the holiday homes, in addition to the day-trippers and the tourists who would be using the cabanas and the hotels (around 200,000 tourist per year29). It was estimated that the experimental area would generate more than 10,500 job opportunities in hotels, motels, the marina, shops, maintenance, administration, security, and gardening. An additional 10,000-job opportunity was estimated at the completion of the first phase of the project. Table 4.11 illustrates the distribution of land uses in the experimental area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use</th>
<th>Area in Hectares</th>
<th>% (from Sub-Totals)</th>
<th>% (from Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sea Beaches</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Beaches</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Ponds</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Buffer Area</td>
<td>52.55</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer Trees</td>
<td>105.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetation and Open Areas</td>
<td>126.45</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and Tourists Housing</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourists Facilities and Services</td>
<td>23.35</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green and Open Areas</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Courts and Playgrounds</td>
<td>19.35</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads and Parking Areas</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>471.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1203.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.11: The Distribution of Land Uses in Marina Al Alamein (Centers 1 and 2)  
Source: PUD (1987)

As shown in Figure 4.16 and Table 4.11, the built up area for the experimental stage was less than 10 % of the project’s area. This was mainly because PUD Consultants expected that MOR would attempt to increase the number of holiday homes to increase its short-term profit and thus, PUD wanted some room to maneuver. This was proven to be correct. During implementation, the minister of MOR required to double the number of holiday homes in the experimental stage. PUD Consultants suggested that the demand for holiday homes could be met in the later development stages. However, the minister insisted to increase the built up area of the experimental stage.

29 Based on an extended season of 200 nights per year.
Implementing the Project

In 1992, the implementation of the experimental area was completed. That is the area between the 94th and 98th km from Alexandria (660 ha). The construction of the area between the 98th and the 100th km had been suspended because during construction, some ancient Roman remains were found buried in the site. The finding of the Roman remains necessitated that the Antiquities Authority had to prohibit the construction of the area until it investigates the historical significance of the remains. The designers thought that this would add to the attractiveness of the project and would increase the number of international and domestic tourists. The remaining part of the first phase (centers 3, 4 and 5), between the 100th and 104th km, was under construction at the time of this study and its completion is estimated to be in 1999.

As mentioned above, the minister of MOR insisted to intensify the holiday homes and increase the built up area of the experimental stage. Accordingly the open and green areas were replaced by holiday homes which had negatively affected the initial design concept as shown in Figure 4.17.

The number of holiday homes in the experimental area amounted to around 3500-holiday home (in comparison with the initial 1500 that were planned in the whole area including the excluded site of the Roman remains), and a number of shops, service centers, sports centers, restaurants and other utilities and services. Accordingly, the project is estimated to accommodate around 37,500 people at the completion of the first phase. Neither the hotel nor the motels were implemented. The day-use cabanas, employees housing, fishponds, and the camping area were also cancelled. Accordingly, there have been no places to accommodate day-trippers and international tourists.
In terms of employment, the project created around 1000 jobs in administration, security, and maintenance, as well as in shops, restaurants, and services. However, these jobs were seasonal. Indeed, in the off-season period the number of employees in Marina Al Alamein has been less than 200 people (in comparison with the estimated 10,500 employee). Most of them commute daily to Alexandria (fieldwork survey).

The quick return on investment in addition to the strong appeal of the holiday homes to the upper and middle class Egyptians meant an increase in their numbers. As mentioned above, they displaced several important components, for example, the fishponds, the camping area, the cabanas, the employees housing, and the motels. This affected the project in terms of its carrying capacity, attractiveness to international tourists, job opportunities and attractiveness to permanent population, and caused the obstruction of the scenic views (visual pollution).

In addition, the increase in holiday homes, and consequently the increase of holidaymakers, demanded an increase in swimming areas and beaches. Therefore, the implemented project included several breakwaters. The breakwaters were built to provide swimming areas that would be protected from water currents and strong waves. They were also built to facilitate the movement of ships to and from the marina. However, the construction of breakwaters had caused ecological problems. Indeed, the Integrated Management of Egypt’s Northern Coast Conference in 1998 contended that Marina Al Alamein’s breakwaters had caused the instability of the shoreline, the degradation of the Northern Coast and severe beach erosion (Saad and Mohamed 1998; Fereihy 1998; Fahmy 1998; Metawie and Elshibini 1998; Darwish 1998).

Although short-term economic gain was usually MOR’s sole objective (which constrained the implementation of national and regional objectives and caused some negative environmental and social effects) implementation was still under the control of PUD Consultants and this restrained the development to a great extent. Indeed, in the early 1990s, Marina Al Alamein was seen as a model for many projects in and outside the NWC and it became a fashionable resort. The architectural styles of Marina Al Alamein have been adopted in many other projects and created a unique local architecture for the NWC. Even the breakwaters were replicated in several other sites along the Mediterranean. The use of local materials in the construction of
buildings was replicated in many other projects. This, in turn, had affected the nature of the employment of the local population. They became experts in stone works and construction skills, and even started their own enterprises as contractors.

Upper and middle income Egyptians rushed to purchase holiday homes in the project. Many had even sold their properties in Marakia and Marabella for a chalet in Marina Al Alamein. Accordingly, beachfront property in Marina Al Alamein used to sell for L.E. 200,000 to L.E. 300,000 in 1992 and in 1998 they were sold for L.E. 2 million and up (Business Today 1998). Therefore, in 1992 the gross revenue from selling the holiday homes alone reached 389.3 million Egyptian Pounds, while the cost of construction, including infrastructure, the marina, green areas, etc. was L.E. 310 million (the Bank of Housing and Reconstruction), a net profit of around 20 percent.

However, the above mentioned shining marks are not what the NWC public policy had ‘promised’ to achieve. The public projects failed to attract the population from the Nile Valley and Delta because the tourist industry did not generate employment. Therefore, the NWC could not contribute to the resolution of Egypt’s human settlement and economic problems. Indeed, the total investment in the NWC to build the so-called ‘touristic villages’ (from the public and private sectors) amounted to
L.E. 15 billion (Rose El Youssef 1998)\textsuperscript{30}. Wouldn’t have such tremendous investment been spent in projects that would enhance the Egyptian economy or solve Egypt’s problems and not to benefit only a few of upper class citizens who use the region for few weeks every year? Indeed, seasonality is a major problem. During the slack season, the NWC suffers from extremely low occupancy levels and this has obvious implications for profitability and employment.

“The average Egyptian family spends no more than three weeks per year vacationing in the area, usually between mid-July and late August, leaving the villages completely vacant for 10 months of the year” (Business Today 1998).

During the peak months, the NWC suffers from problems of overcrowding, noise pollution, lack of proper medical facilities, and water shortage:

“Some areas go without water for a week at a time because the initial water pipeline was not intended to accommodate the large number of housing units that were constructed” (ibid.)

However, MOR not only pursued the implementation of the rest of the project, but also demanded more and more holiday homes in the experimental area. The minister also threatened to cancel the contract with PUD Consultants in several occasions when it objected the ‘intensification’. The consultants were able to somehow control the intensification and the continuous interference of the minister in lieu of protecting the project’s image and its carrying capacity until 1994. Another minister was assigned to MOR and demanded more holiday homes for his clans in the ‘fashionable’ experimental area. When PUD Consultants objected and exposed the issue to the property owners and the media, they were excluded from supervising the implementation of the rest of the project. Accordingly, the intensification of the holiday homes in Marina Al Alamein has continued, “transforming the once successful touristic village into hell” (Hanna 1998).

Therefore, the several examples of MOR’s short-term commercial behavior and economic and political expediencies that have been affecting the NWC development process challenge the sustainability of tourism development in the region.

\textsuperscript{30} According to H. E. Mohamed I. Soliman, the minister of Housing and Reconstruction, the government spent 3 billion Egyptian Pounds for establishing Marakia, Marabella and Marina Al Alamein while the private sector invested 12 billion pounds in establishing the touristic villages in the NWC region. He adds that the revenues from Marina Al Alamein alone amounted to 1.6 billion pounds (cited by Al Ahram newspaper on 24/11/98).
4.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has brought the several discussions of this study to the context of the North West Coast region (NWC). In its analysis of the tourism policy process the chapter attempted to explain what happened during the processes of policy formulation and implementation in the region. It discussed the regional, tourism and structure planning that constituted the politically determined public policy for the NWC region. The chapter also highlighted key issues that underpinned the policy formulation period. It extended to discuss the goals and objectives of the policy and argued that the policy’s intention had been to achieve sustainable tourism development in the NWC region. Finally, the chapter attempted to reveal the coherent histories of the public pilot projects that were implemented in the period between 1974-1994.

The discussion throughout this chapter showed that the study area had been transformed into a succession of touristic villages that occupies the shorefront to the neglect of the region’s hinterland. The policy’s prime objective to attract the population from the country’s major cities was not realized. Although billions of pounds from both public and private sector moneys were invested in the region, these investments fulfilled very little to Egypt’s requirements. During implementation, the establishment of tourism infrastructure and services and the integration of tourism with the other economic sectors were ignored. This can be due to the lack of awareness of the implementers of the importance of planning and the priorities of policy objectives. The implementing institutions were not aware of the importance of promoting international tourism and thus ignored the implementation of the activities and attractions that were prescribed in the policy. Instead, the focus was on establishing holiday homes to bring short-term financial returns, which has not only been causing environmental problems but also challenging the sustainability of tourism in the region. Indeed, the exploitation of scarce natural resources in the NWC challenges the ability of future generations to benefit from it.

This chapter presented the pilot projects in tourism development in the NWC of Egypt, as well as an analysis of the use of lessons learned, during the pilot experience, in other projects, and the potential it offers to the national programme of development in the future. Chapter 2 attempted to develop an understanding on how the
implementation of policy can be improved by better relationships among policies, programmes, and projects. The emphasis has been on whether the implementation would have been better if the projects were part of a programme to implement policy.

As noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.4), public policies are translated into action programmes that aim to achieve the ends stated in the policy and action programmes themselves may be disaggregated into more specific projects to be administered. Indeed, effective policy implementation is rarely realized when projects are not part of a programme. In addition, a project can serve more than one policy especially if it was designed as a part of a programme. The original Marakia project was planned to serve tourism and urban development policies. If there had been a programme to relate it to, this would have allowed it to get political support and achieve the policy objectives as well as serve other policies. For example, it could have an environmental objective in resource protection by adhering to STD principles in addition to employment generation, productivity, poverty alleviation, and empowerment. This reflects the importance of projects to be part of a programme.

As argued in Chapter 2, projects are perceived to be manageable, thus offer major advantages over policies and programmes. Thus, if the project is about promoting tourism development, it could easily shape up a programme through the replication of its successful outcomes and learning from the experience. Development management ensures that if a policy is not broken down to actions it can still be taken into consideration. Comprehensiveness is one of the major characteristics of development management and is necessary to improve the relationship between policies and projects. The managers need to have a comprehensive view in order to implement and inform more than one policy. They can better implement policies by negotiation, consultation, participation, enabling, and co-ordination between decision-makers, stakeholders, and experts. Participation of the beneficiaries in all stages of planning, implementation, and management is necessary for the success of projects and implementation of policies. Enabling (by providing skills, training, incentives, and even financial support) can mobilize the actors involved and strengthen their capacities to perform, and thus can achieve better results for projects and policy implementation. Finally, the co-ordination between different projects as well as between projects and programmes is a better way to implement policies. These tasks
can only be achieved under governments’ supervision because, as noted in Chapter 2, the rationale for their involvement has been based on the welfare arguments for the public interest and they are ‘supposedly’ preoccupied with regarding the social, cultural and environmental concerns rather than increasing financial profits. Unfortunately this was not the case in the NWC region. As this chapter pointed out, through illustrative examples, the commercial attitude and short-term economic expediency (of the government itself) constrained the implementation of policy objectives. Chapter 5 attempts to examine political expediency, which was a more driving force for constraining the implementation of national and regional objectives.

For the analysis of the policy it is necessary to identify the roles of different actors involved in the policy process. In order to test the research hypothesis outlined in Chapter 1, Chapter 5 will extend the discussion and argument to explain the rationale behind the decisions and actions and how political expediency constrained the implementation of national and regional objectives. Accordingly, it analyzes the characteristics of the actors involved in the policy process and the political positions of the principal actors and stakeholders. In particular, it attempts to illustrate how they used their positions and bargaining advantages to benefit their power and authority, how were the very many institutions involved had been in a struggle to control resources and implement their agendas, and how the differences in values, interests and motivations of actors and institutions affected implementation.
Chapter 5

CHARACTERISTICS OF ACTORS: CONSTRAINTS TO IMPLEMENTING POLICY OBJECTIVES
5.1 Introduction

As noted in Chapter 2, it is necessary for public policy analysis to have some understanding of the institutional arrangements where policy is formulated and implemented as well as to relate the public policy to the political system and the power structure of society as a whole. Therefore, Chapter 3 presented an overview of Egypt’s political and socio-economic environments. It discussed the country’s political system, central and local governments, the national policies that were addressed to resolve the country’s economic and human settlement problems, and the extent of realization of national policy objectives.

Chapter 4 brought the discussion to the context of the NWC region and outlined the different stages of the policy process. It analyzed the organization of studies for the region’s development that constituted its politically determined public policy. The objectives of the policy had been identified where it was argued that the policy aimed to achieve sustainable tourism. Thus, for evaluation and analytic purposes, the principles of the NWC tourism policy had been compared against the principles of sustainable tourism. In an attempt to elaborate on the evaluation of the NWC policy, it was necessary to identify how far it achieved its pre-identified objectives. This was carried out at the regional level and at the project level. It was illustrated that many policy objectives were not realized at both levels. This chapter, therefore, attempts to explain why had the policy failed to achieve its objectives. It discusses political

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1 As this study is concerned with the implementation phase of development policy, it does not consider a specific activity under the heading evaluation. However the whole of this research can itself be seen as an evaluation exercise. The subject being the examination of the way in which policy had been undertaken in order to determine why some policies had been more relevant to the development needs of Egypt, more effectively executed and are more capable of replication than others. With the aim, as explained in Chapter 1, to obtain a better understanding of the policy process for the benefit of future policies.
expediency and its implications on policy implementation and consequently on the implementation of national and regional objectives.

As noted in Chapter 2, any policy is executed in a unique action environment, which results from a particular mesh of group relationships. In the context of the NWC region, it is possible to map this environment simply as three groups of actors: the government, the interest groups, and the consultants (see Figure 5.1). However, this picture is incomplete unless it is able to indicate the dynamic nature of the environment, the nature and strength of the energy, which motivates the actor groups, their relationship to one another, and their changing relationships over time. These relationships can only be understood by reference to the activities in which the groups were involved during the stages of the policy process. Furthermore, this social process can be better understood when it is seen as part of the power relationships and the total political, economic and social fabric of the country in which it is occurring.

The policy process is shorthand for the sequence of activities relating to the process of identifying, formulating, implementing (including execution and supervision) and
evaluating the policy. This research used the policy process model (Figure 2.1) for two purposes: first as a simple summary of the tasks involved in the development cycle in order to place the roles and powers of actors in context. Second to obtain a perspective of the power relationship between them. The activities of identification, preparation of terms of reference, selection of consultants, project team recruitment, implementation, management and working relationships examined in this study fall under the model headings of: identification, formulation and implementation.

This chapter discusses these selected activities and indicates the significance of each for the completion of policy. It is divided into three sections: Section 5.2 discusses the policy identification stage; Section 5.3 is concerned with the policy formulation stage; and Section 5.4 analyzes the policy implementation stage of the NWC policy process.

As noted before, the study of the characteristics of actor groups and their relationships to one another needs to be related to the policy’s action environment. Therefore, the discussion throughout the chapter involves the analyses of institutional arrangements, power arrangements, and the values and interests of principal actors involved in the NWC policy process. Section 2.3 outlined a conceptual framework for understanding the elements of the policy process with particular reference to tourism public policy (Figure 2.6). Such framework sees the institutional arrangements, power arrangements and the values, motivation and interests of the actors as being the basic variables explaining the action environment. Therefore, Figure 5.2 depicts an analytical framework to provide a structure for understanding the interpersonal and interagency relationships between the groups of actors in the action environment. It is a participation matrix in which groups of actors are listed on one axis and the different stages of the policy process (shown in Figure 2.1) listed on the other. The social process can then be analyzed by first identifying the groups involved in each activity and then examining the nature of each group’s role in the different stages of the policy process. The focus of the analysis is on the political expediency that determined the actions of the actors, with particular reference to those that deviated from policy and the national and regional objectives.
There are two elements in this process: actor groups, with their power arrangements, values and motivational energy; and the activities in which they had participated (identification, formulation, and implementation). In order to understand the attitude, behavior, and the influence of the actor groups on the policy’s action environment, this chapter identifies the roles and characteristics of the actors involved in identifying, formulating and implementing the NWC policy. It will consider:

- Their relative positions in the total environment (institutional arrangements)
- The external influences on the groups and individuals (power arrangements)
- Their values, interests and motivation (or driving energy). These may be a desire for money, influence, position, power, or other things.

The discussion of the institutional arrangements examines the actors and their relative positions in the action environment. It lists the three major actor groups, and provides some of the constraints and opportunities posed by the environment in which they operate. The research had found evidence that not only the structure of the institutions themselves but also their operational systems, (i.e., guidelines and procedures which are established to guide and control the working of the institutions), can critically affect the relationships between actor groups. The issue, as identified by this research, is not solely whether the rules are kept or broken but what effect their existence has on
the relevance and quality of policy implementation. There is ample evidence from examination of the institutions, their structure and operational procedures, that they had had a direct influence on the prime actors and the policy process. The discussion of the structure, operational systems, and arrangements of institutions involved in the different activities of the policy process of the NWC region of Egypt emphasizes political expediency when institutions (each with its own preferences) struggle to control resources and implement their agendas.

The discussion of the power arrangements highlights the political positions of the principal actors and stakeholders and illustrates how they used their positions and bargaining advantages to benefit their power and authority. The discussion emphasizes political expediency when actor groups had been involved in political processes to influence policy in a struggle for power and authority and when certain concessions to a powerful clan or a kin were awarded to gain more political powers or to remain in authority.

The examination of the values, interests, and motivations of policy actors are also discussed to understand their effects on policy decisions and outcomes. The discussion of the motivations, values and interests of principal actors emphasizes political expediency when politicians and civil servants were found seeking special advantage through public policy rather than acting to pursue the public interest. The special advantage may be the desire for money, influence, position, power, and/or other things.

This chapter, therefore, attempts to draw examples of incidents from the NWC policy arena, which emphasize political expediency through an understanding of the arrangements, motives, values, and interests of decision-makers. The chapter provides evidence from the principal actors of their influence on prioritizing the policy problems and objectives, the quality of implementation, and the realization of national and regional objectives. That is to explain how and why the policy decisions were made, who made those decisions, and what influenced the making and implementation of policy.
5.2 Policy Identification (1974-1976)

The first stage in the policy making cycle is the policy identification process. Such process is fundamental because in a country of limited resources like Egypt, the most valuable policies are those which contribute in broad terms to its overall development and in specific terms to the needs of the policy’s beneficiaries. If the wrong policy is identified there can be little chance of an effective use of resources, either human or financial or of the longer-term success of the policy (Meikle 1987).

In order to assess the influence of the identification process on the execution of policy it is necessary to understand:

- who were the institutions responsible for identifying the NWC public policy?

- whether the policy was seen as part of a wider policy of national development or was merely furthering the aims of the most ‘powerful’ institutions?

- whether the parties involved shared common objectives for the policy? Or whose objectives were identified?

Reference had already been made to some organizations and actors who were involved in the tourism public policy process of the NWC region of Egypt. However, before discussing their institutional and power arrangements it is necessary to identify how regional development plans were supposed to process in Egypt:

According to the Constitution, regional development plans aim at achieving the objectives of the national development planning. The plans are done through coordination between the Central Government and Localities (Ibrahim, 1993). The following diagram illustrates the different steps in the regional development planning process in Egypt:

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3 The status of the sequence of the regional development planning process is a model for development plan actions, which has rarely been adhered to in most of Egypt’s new towns.
Figure 5.3 How Regional Development Plans were to be Processed in Egypt?
Source: cited by Ibrahim (1993)

1. The Central Government informs the Governorates and Local Authorities of the general policy and the main objectives of the national development planning which the Governorates study and then inform the Local Units in order to set out their local plans.

2. Local Units are responsible for the preparation of development plans for their local communities. The resources are allocated according to the priorities set in local plans. The Public Council of the Local Unit approves the budget plan and reports the plans and budgets to the Public Council of the Governorate.

3. The Planning Department of the Governorate, the Regional Planning Department, and the Planning Department of the Local Units study the proposed plans of the Local Public Council and submit the proposed annual plan and the annual budget to the Governorate’s Public Local Council.

4. After the annual plan and budget are approved by the Governorate’s Council, they are presented to the High Committee of Regional Planning which coordinates the plans of different governorates and prioritizes the proposed projects according to the available resources and then submits the plans to the Ministry of Planning.

5. The Ministry of Planning studies and coordinates the plans in the light of the objectives of the national plan and coordinates with the Ministry of Local Authorities, the Ministry of Finance and other relevant ministries.
6. The approved regional policies, development plans and budgets are then reported to the Governorates and Ministries for executing the local plans.

7. The follow up reports of executing the projects of the local plans are submitted periodically to the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Local Authority (according to a time schedule) to be evaluated.

With respect to the preparation of physical regional development plans, the Department of Urban Planning in the Governorates prepares the physical planning of the urban communities in the Governorate whether they are new settlements, or urban expansion of an existing community, or re-planning the existing towns, cities and settlements in the Governorate. The department can carry out the plan itself, or seek the assistance of planning experts, or commission a consulting firm to carry out the necessary studies and proposals.

Physical planning has to be reviewed and approved by the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) which also contributes, together with Local Governments, to financing the preparation of the studies. Then, the GOPP has to review the physical planning and may demand few changes or refuse it completely. GOPP has to approve the planning before the financial resources are allocated to the Governorate for implementing the plans.

Therefore, as shown in the above model, development policies are identified according to the needs and priorities of local communities within the framework of national development planning. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the above-mentioned sequence of development planning actions had been adhered to in most new communities in Egypt. Indeed, Meikle (1987) identified a different sequence in the reconstruction of the Canal Zone. Also, Ibrahim (1993) recognized the absence of Local Government and local communities in the development of the Tenth of Ramadan City. In addition, with respect to the NWC region, the preparation of the development planning for the study area (Alex-Imayid sub-region) was also carried out in a different manner. Table 5.1 outlines some of the reasons for the deviation from applying the model for development planning actions in the NWC, which could explain the variations in other areas in Egypt. The subsequent sections will discuss these reasons in further detail.

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4 An affiliate to the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR).
1. The centralized nature of the Egyptian Bureaucracy and the weakness of Local Government as Chapter 3 had illustrated. According to the Chairperson of GOPP, “the Governorates do not have the qualified staff and personnel to carry out the physical planning and thus commissions the GOPP to carry out the plans itself.”

2. The weakness of the Ministry of Planning (see Ayubi (1991) as discussed in Section 3.2).

3. The commercial attitude of the Government as Chapters 3 and 4 had discussed. Such attitude increased the competition among governmental institutions to control resources and increase revenues.

4. Issuing the Decree Number 540 for 1980 to convey the study area into a new urban community where it became under the influence of ANUC (Authority for New Urban Communities). Accordingly, the Ministry of Planning and Local Government were excluded from the decision making process.

5. The political sensitivity of the NWC region because it lies within three governorates (Matrouh, Alexandria and Behira). Therefore, it was believed that in order to avoid any conflict of interest or overlaps, the decisions concerning the development of the region had to come from Central Government.

6. The NWC region was looked at as an important resource for establishing a tourist industry and accordingly it was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Tourism (MOT).

7. The very many interest groups involved, particularly the housing cooperatives who owned most of the coastal land in the study area and who had significant political powers which required that resource allocation decisions had to come from above.

Table 5.1. Some Reasons for Deviation of the NWC Development Planning

5.2.1 Institutional Arrangements

Figure 5.4 not only lists the institutions responsible for policy identification but also institutions, which were present at the policy arena during the process (those who had affected the identification process either directly or indirectly).

The findings of this research revealed that not all parties involved in the identification process shared common objectives for the policy. They had different agendas and indeed different objectives as this sub-section and the following sections attempt to illustrate.
5.2.1.1 The Presidency

As noted in Chapter 3, the Egyptian President himself was involved in the policy identification process. The New Map Policy (of the October Working Paper) not only identified that the human settlement problem was a principal challenge to national development, but also identified the regions where the population would be accommodated. The President also identified the potential for developing the coastal regions for tourism purposes (Section 3.3.2 and Section 3.4) to generate income and employment and consequently attract the population. As noted in Chapter 1, his objective had been to redistribute the population throughout the whole country and increase/diversify the national income (see also Chapter 3).
5.2.1.2 The Central Government
As mentioned in Chapter 3, after the 1973 War the Egyptian government had been committed to achieve the national development goals mainly to save the agricultural land, further the economic growth and to provide jobs and houses away from the overcrowded cities particularly Cairo and Alexandria. Accordingly, as noted in Chapter 1, the NWC was looked at as a ‘priority region’ to attract the population, generate employment, and enhance the national economy. In addition, the NWC public policy was seen as part of the national development framework that aimed to solve Egypt’s human settlement and economic problems.

The Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR)
Therefore, the NWC regional development was assigned to the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) because it had the power, finances, and trained staff to develop and urbanize the region quicker than any other institution, including Local Government (see Section 3.3). Such arrangement was in conflict with how regional development was supposed to proceed (see Figure 5.3), as well as with overlapping with MOT’s (Ministry of Tourism) jurisdiction. However, it can be argued that in the light of the priorities of national development, at the time, an otherwise arrangement would have not gained political support and the region would have been unable to become on the national development agenda.

Reference had already been made in Chapters 3 and 4 to the establishment of the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR). The Ministry underwent many changes of ministers, names, scope, and responsibilities during the study period (1974-1994) as shown in Figure 3.4. In addition, it had witnessed many changes in structure (see for example, Figures 5.5, 5.8, and 5.10), but it had, for the whole period, been concerned with a programme of human settlement planning and development (Meikle 1987). Figure 5.5 shows the organization chart for the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) during the policy identification process.
As mentioned above, the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) became the main governmental institution responsible for the physical implementation of the national New Map Policy (of the October Working Paper). Accordingly, in 1974, two agencies were established within MOR for supervising development projects, aid-funded
projects, and human settlement projects in Egypt: the Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR)\(^6\) and an in-house consultant: Tippet, Abbott, MacCarthy and Stratton (TAMS). ACR was established to call for technical and financial offers submitted by urban planning consultants for major projects including the design of the new communities. The evaluation of those offers was entrusted to the in-house consultant (TAMS) to the Agency for Research and Projects (ARP), which acted as the technical secretariat to the Minister of Reconstruction. The Agency for Research and Projects (ARP) had been responsible for enforcing the decisions of the Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR). ARP was coordinating between ACR, TAMS, the Consultants, and the Minister of MOR. It prepared the studies for development projects and carried out feasibility studies and had been responsible for supervising the implementation of the design specifications and the Terms of Reference. According to its issuing decree, ARP was to be responsible for carrying out the following tasks:

- Conducting technical research and studies for planning new communities and coordinating with the relevant authorities;
- Conducting research in the field of urban development and urbanization as well as the feasibility studies of projects and establishing the technical specifications and design standards;
- Suggesting the ways and means of financing the development studies and drawing the policy of financing and investment according to priorities within the framework of the national development planning;
- Conducting competitions among the consulting planning firms and evaluating their proposals to determine the appropriate projects according to their feasibility and technical aspects. Also managing the procedures of commissioning the consulting firms, preparing the terms of reference (TOR) and ensuring their implementation, management, and follow up; and
- Setting up an information center and recording all general and detailed plans.

**Box 5.1: ARP: Tasks and Objectives**

Source: MOR

In addition, the Central Organization for Reconstruction (COR) was established to manage the implementation of the New Map Policy in the areas that were identified in the policy as “priority regions” (e.g. the Canal Zone, Greater Cairo, the NWC region) as discussed in Section 3.3.2. Accordingly, COR established regional departments (e.g. the NWCDA) located in the ‘priority regions’ to coordinate the implementation of the New Map Policy with Local Government and the Ministry of Planning (MOP) and to supervise the implementation of regional infrastructure.

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\(^6\) Advisory Committee on Reconstruction (ACR) formed under Ministerial Decree 103 in 1974. Initially it was composed of four members: Dr. Hassan Marei, Prof. Nabih Younis, Soliman Abdel Hai and Ali Salem Hamza. All had held post of cabinet-level or deputy minister rank and all had close association with the Minister (at the time), Osman A. Osman. Later, membership included other senior level officials of comparable distinction.
The Ministry of Planning (MOP)
MOP had been responsible for preparing the different development plans for Egypt, after defining the financial resources, studying the available financing opportunities and potential, and working out the planning alternatives. The Ministry then would distribute the investments among the different sectors of the economy and would coordinate the socio-economic planning and projects. It had also been responsible for following up the execution and evaluating performance.

A Presidential Decree divided the country into 8 planning regions: the Delta, Alexandria, Greater Cairo, Matrouh, North Upper Egypt, Suez Canal, South Upper Egypt and Assuit. Then it was amended by merging both Alexandria and Matrouh into one, decreasing the planning regions to 7. Accordingly, MOP established a Regional Planning Agency (RPA) in every region for managing its development. The Minister of Planning would define the organization structure of every agency and its relationship with the Governorates especially their Departments of Planning and Supervision. Law 43 for 1979 defined the structure and responsibilities of the Regional Planning Agencies (RPAs), which are summarized as follows:

- To carry out the necessary research and studies in order to determine potentialities as well as natural and human resources of the region, methods of their development, and their optimum use, beside suggesting the necessary projects for socio-economic development of the region.
- To set the necessary technical departments in order to conduct the studies, research and the planning operations at the regional level

Moreover, the law sets a higher committee for regional planning in each economic region. The committee is composed under the chairmanship of the governor of the region’s capital, and includes the following members:

- Governors of the constituent governorates in the region
- Heads of the local people’s councils of the constituent governorates
- Heads of the regional planning agency, as a secretary general for the committee
- Representatives of the ministries who are appointed each according to a decision taken by the minister involved

The higher committee for regional planning has to carry out the following tasks:

- To coordinate the plans of governorates, and to approve the priorities suggested by the regional planning agency, and which are taken as a base for laying down alternatives of the regional plans, in the light of available resources, both locally and regionally
- To consider the periodical report for following up the implementation of the plan, to study the changes made to the plan by the regional planning agency (RPA) according to the conditions facing its implementation and to submit its recommendations to the Higher Board for Local Authority.

Box 5.2. The Structure and Responsibilities of Regional Planning Agencies (RPAs).
Source: Ministry of Planning

According to the classification of regions, MOP would allocate budgetary finances for the regions’ development purposes. The NWC was included in Matrouh and Alexandria regions and thus received its share from the national budget from finances.
assigned to both regions according to five-year plans for social and economic development. However, the Ministry of Planning (MOP) had very little influence in the identification process of the NWC policy. MOP’s involvement was restricted in some existing towns and villages in the NWC, but its contribution in the identification process of the public policy of the study area was minimal because MOR had almost all the power and authority over the region.

Moreover, there were several overlaps and duplications in the responsibilities between departments and agencies within both MOR and MOP as seen in Boxes 5.1 and 5.2. Indeed, the duplication of the tasks and responsibilities of both ARP (Agency for Research and Projects) and RPA (Regional Planning Agency) included the preparation of planning studies for regional development, studying the existing physical and socio-economic conditions of regions, preparing the terms of reference and coordinating with Local Governments.

In addition, the duplication and overlaps existed also with the departments of Local Government. Figure 5.3 showed that within Local Governments, there exist regional and local planning departments, which had been responsible for the preparation of development plans of their local areas. Such duplication of responsibilities meant the wastage of time and effort, coordination problems and conflict of interest. In addition, the most powerful institution would be the one to identify the policy problem, formulate the policy, and implement its agenda.

The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)
As noted in Chapter 4, the first study to the NWC region was the comprehensive survey, prepared by a private consultant, and sponsored by FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) (FAO 1970). It aimed to increase the effectiveness of the government’s rural management policy and to study the suitability of promoting agricultural activities in the region. It recommended the reclamation of many areas along the region and proposed several new crops (see Richards 1986). Accordingly, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) was concerned with the implementation of the FAO recommendations and entrusted the responsibility of the implementation and management to the Reconstruction and Land Reclamation Agency (RLRA).
RLRA had acquired large areas of land along the NWC and had been responsible for implementing land reclamation projects, fisheries, and increasing the existing agricultural lands. In order to contribute to financing its agricultural projects, RLRA had been selling some lands to private developers particularly along the coastal strip. As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, the RLRA, as well as the Awkaf Ministry, were committed\(^7\) to sell lands with a minimum yearly value of 1 million Egyptian Pounds with the objective of both financing their projects and stimulating the private sector to urbanize the NWC.

RLRA’s and Awkaf’s concern to implement their agendas had significantly constrained the efforts to formulate the NWC policy. The selling of RLRA’s and Awkaf’s properties in the coastal area to the housing cooperatives had increased the number of landowners and other interest groups. This had shifted the emphasis of the policy from its concerns to implement the human settlement objectives and creating leisure and tourism attractions, to focusing on solving the problems of housing cooperatives and providing them with services and infrastructure.

**The Ministry of Tourism (MOT)**

Reference had already been made in Section 4.2 to the tourism development strategy for the NWC region. The strategy was in a form of report prepared by a German in-house consultant (Giersberger) to the Ministry of Tourism (MOT), which proposed some guidelines and building regulations for projects in the region (see Appendix VII). Accordingly, MOT had been concerned with the implementation of the report’s recommendations and regulations. According to the Regional Planner of the NWC region, such guidelines and recommendations were taken into account in the formulation of the NWC tourism public policy.

As noted in Chapter 3, the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) had been responsible for the development of Egypt’s tourism regions, which were determined in the early 1970’s. There had been a conflict between the role of MOR and the role of MOT in the NWC (see Section 3.4.3) concerning who had the right over the development of the region? MOT was supported by Law 2 for 1973 which entitled MOT the authority to reserve areas for tourism development and to plan and manage their developments, while

\(^7\) A decision made by the Minister of Land Reclamation, (part of the Ministry of Agriculture at the time).
MOR was supported by the Ministry’s hegemony and the Minister’s power and kinship to the President (as discussed in Section 3.3). The outcome was for MOR’s benefit, which succeeded in taking over the control over the NWC development.

However, in the late 1980’s, MOT, MOR, and the Ministry of Local Authority agreed on the ‘geographical boundaries’ of influence of each ministry where MOR obtained authority over the NWC region. Despite such arrangement, the ill feeling between MOT and MOR remained which constrained the establishment of the tourist industry in the NWC as explained in Chapter 4 and as will be discussed in further detail in Section 5.3.1.1.

5.2.1.3 The Local Government
As noted in Chapter 3, the Governor, who is assigned by a presidential decision, is the representative of the President in the Governorate and he, thus, supervises the execution of the national development policy; as well as having all the responsibilities and power of the Ministers in the Governorate. The Minister of Local Authority assigns a head for all central Local Units. Both, the Governor and the Head of Local Units organize Executive Councils to implement and manage the decisions and recommendations of Local Community Councils with elected members who approve or disprove the economic and social plans of the governorates according to the national strategy. However, this was not the case in the NWC region.

In the opinion of the Governor of Matrouh, as noted in Section 3.2.3, his Governorate is a local administration (in contrast to a local authority) which only administers the decisions and policies coming from the Central Government. In fact, the elected members of the Local Executive Councils did not review the NWC policy and did not have the opportunity to approve or disprove its decisions (the Governor of Matrouh, the President of PUD Consultants).

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8 Matrouh Governorate, which includes the most of the NWC region, has a governorate council, 8 district councils, the Mersa Matrouh (the capitol) city council and several village councils, each with executive and popular councils. The popular council is composed of 20 people from the community who serve for 4-5 years.

9 The Governor of Matrouh: General Abdelmoneim Said, in a discussion with the researcher.

10 As observed in the discussions during the fieldwork.
In addition, the successive Governors of Matrouh during the study period (1974-1994) had little influence on the identification, formulation, and implementation of the NWC policy. As noted in Section 3.2.3, in Egypt, the governor’s personality and managerial skills may be more crucial in determining the degree of decentralization of authority than the laws or rules and regulations presently established (Mayfield 1996). The research had found evidence that verified Mayfield’s observation. The development plans for the NWC region were presented for review and feedback to some governors and not to others. They were presented to those, for example, who had close association with the President, or had political powers or authority of some sort. For example, the development plan was presented to Ibrahim Nassar (Governor of Matrouh in the late 1970s) who was Head of Intelligence during the October 1973 War. The presentation of the development plan to the Governor at the time was to seek his assistance to persuade landowners to contribute to financing the establishment of a water pipeline to provide the NWC with drinking water. Moreover, the development plan was presented to Youssri El Shamy (Governor of Matrouh in mid 1980s), who had close association with the local elites in Matrouh, to influence the local economic organizations to stop their quarrying activities in the coastal zone. These were among the very few cases when Local Government was involved in the policy process of the NWC during the study period.

**5.2.2 Power Arrangements**

During the policy identification process, the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) was heavily involved in implementing the tourism development strategy for the NWC region that was prepared by its in-house German consultant Giersberger. The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) was implementing the rural management policy (through the Reconstruction and Land Reclamation Agency (RLRA)) in accordance with the recommendations of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In addition, the Ministry of Planning (MOP) was allocating budgetary finances to its Regional Development Agency (RDA) of the NWC for implementing infrastructure, roads, and utilities. Moreover, the Governorates of Alexandria, Behira, and Matrouh were concerned with the provision of basic services in the existing towns and villages in their local areas.
As noted before, the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) was entrusted the responsibility of formulating and implementing the NWC policy within the framework of the national development policy. Accordingly, MOR prepared the terms of reference for the regional planning of the NWC region. It also selected the consultants to carry out the studies and regional plans for the region.

MOR, as noted in Chapter 3, had an unusual and particularly advantageous position in terms of the scope of its responsibilities, its budget, its ability to bypass normal administrative procedures and the support it received from the President for its role in reconstruction and development. In addition, the Minister of MOR (Osman A. Osman) had had close association with the President (see Section 3.3.2). Accordingly, MOR was the most powerful institution in the policy arena of the NWC. It was able to set the ‘rules of the game’ in most issues that concerned the development of the region.

Within MOR, the Agency for Research and Projects (ARP) was coordinating between the Minister, the Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR) and the in-house consultant (TAMS) in the preparation of the Terms of Reference and the selection of consultants. Both, ACR and TAMS, had important and influential roles which had a direct influence on all Egyptian projects’ relevance and execution. Both were primarily engineers and construction-oriented and both were outside the formal civil service structure (see Meikle 1987). The former was an advisor to the Minister and the latter was an expatriate in-house advisor to the ACR and ARP.

Members of ACR had had close association with the Minister of MOR, and had significant political authority, as all ACR senior officials had held post of cabinet-level or deputy minister rank. The members were selected for their extensive technical and managerial experience in the construction industry, specifically on the Aswan High Dam project. This experience was seen, in the mid 1970s when attention was focused on the reconstruction of the Suez Canal Zone and the NWC region, as being particularly important. TAMS strength was also as engineers. They had had wide experience of large international consulting contracts and expertise in responding to terms of reference (TOR) and negotiating contracts. Their particular responsibility
within MOR was preparing the terms of reference, evaluating submissions, monitoring progress, and reviewing final reports (*ibid.*).

In Egypt during the 1970s and 1980s, as noted in Section 3.2.3, the Minister could exert influence and pressure on enterprise management to make the types of decisions required by the Government. In addition, management loyalty naturally rested with top government decision-makers and the choice of top managers was highly influenced by their social affiliation and political loyalty. These were evident in the NWC policy identification process. Osman was able to influence and pressure all decisions and actions not only within MOR but also he was able to exert his influence on other public institutions. Indeed, Osman’s great achievement as Minister was that he overcame (albeit temporarily) the bureaucratic inertia which besets the whole Egyptian system (as discussed in Section 3.2) to ensure effective and rapid action (Meikle 1987). Moreover, and as noted above, members of ACR had had close association with the Minister and were selected for their extensive technical and managerial experience in the construction industry. In addition, they all had held post of cabinet-level or deputy minister rank. Accordingly, ACR was the most influential institution within MOR. “Luckily,” as the regional planner points out, members of ACR “were taking decisions for achieving the public interest and for the welfare of all Egyptians, albeit temporarily.”

### 5.2.3 Values and Interests

As noted in Chapter 2, a systematic understanding of the values, experiences, and perceptions of policy actors and the political, historic and institutional context within which they operate is essential for policy analysis. However, the context within which policy actors operate is not structureless. It is made up of changing individuals, groups, and organizations with values and interests, operating alone or together over time (Figure 2.3). It is, however, problematic to identify the values of actors. Not only because they are numerous, changing, and politically sensitive, but also because they are hidden and speculative. A study that deals with such a sensitive area has to build

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11 In a discussion with Dr. A. Abdelaziz, the President of PUD Consultants in June 1998.

12 As noted in Chapter 2, values are ends, goals, interests, beliefs, ethics, biases, attitudes, traditions, morals and objectives that change with human perception and with time.
its arguments on theoretical assumptions\textsuperscript{13} and test whether they could be applied to explain events and actions.

In its attempt to explain policy ‘behavior’, Section 2.3.2 discussed the policy models that tend to draw explanations of the policy process and the actions of politicians. It noted that much of the public choice mode of analysis explains the policy process in the NWC region (Table 2.1).

Although the public choice view assumes that politicians and civil servants act solely in their own interests and pursue individual gain not the public good, this does not deny the fact that they are human agents who have multiple, often conflicting and sometimes changing political goals. In the light of the public choice view, political expediency is manifested when politicians and civil servants are found seeking special advantage through public policy. This sub-section and Sections 5.3.3 and 5.4 therefore, attempt to draw examples of incidents from the NWC policy arena, which substantiate such assumptions through an understanding of the motives, values, and interests of decision-makers.

As noted above, the President of Egypt was, himself, involved in the policy identification stage and in deciding which regions should be developed to implement the New Map policy. In order to identify the nature and extent of the President’s involvement, it is necessary to understand his values. According to McDermott (1988), President Sadat’s (1970-1981) aim was to play up his role as rabb-al-aila al-misriya (head of Egyptian family) extolling akhlaq al-qarya (village ethics).

“He was deliberately sticking a pose by projecting himself as the benevolent father of the nation, whose simple values he respected” (ibid.).

The implication of Sadat’s titles was that he, like most fathers, knew what best served the interests of the ‘national village’. This was amplified after the October 1973 War, where the Egyptian people acknowledged Sadat’s role as the benevolent father of the nation. As noted in Chapter 3, he completely decided the course the government (and

\textsuperscript{13} The policy process is complicated. Unless we are willing to make our assumptions about how it works and to subject these assumptions to empirical testing, we are unlikely to learn very much (Hall 1994). “Better to be clear and risk being wrong than be mushy and think you’re always right” (Sabatier 1991 cited by Hall 1994).
indeed the country) was to take. Accordingly, when he suggested the policies of the October Working Paper (President Sadat 1974), they became policies that had to be implemented without proper appraisal and assessment (as argued in Chapter 3). In addition, ‘his’ selection of ministers and politicians was unarguable. Therefore, when he selected Osman A. Osman as Minister for Reconstruction (1973-1976) to implement the New Map Policy, Osman had reflected Sadat’s hegemony within MOR. In addition, it can be safely assumed that Osman had worked to please the President and to realize his policies. Indeed, implementing the policies according to how the President had drawn them was necessary for Osman’s survival in office.

Accordingly, Osman had chosen the members of the Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR), where, as noted above, they had all held post of cabinet-level or deputy minister rank. Members of ACR were selected, as noted above, for their extensive technical and managerial experience in the construction industry. They had also the power and authority (being of ministerial ranks) to override any other department or agency of government which might constrain their work. Osman had also acquired the assistance of many expatriate consultants and experts to ensure the efficiency of implementing the New Map Policy.

If it was to assume that ACR and the in-house consultant (TAMS) had good intentions for national development (as it is the view of Welbanks (1982), Meikle (1987), and the NWC region’s planning consultants¹⁴), they had no control over implementation. In fact, Chapter 4 had praised the way policies were identified and formulated in the NWC, but criticized implementation.

In brief, the above discussion highlights that during the policy identification stage, there existed some institutions in the policy arena each with its own agenda. Although the different agendas affected the identification process in one way or another, the human settlement objective was the most dominant. The President of Egypt identified both the policy problem and the regions for implementing the national policies. Local Government, despite its constitutional role in identifying the policy problems in their local areas, was excluded from the decision-making process. The Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) became the sole institution responsible for identifying and

¹⁴ In a discussion with Dr. A. Abdelaziz the President of PUD Consultants.
formulating the NWC public policy to achieve the human settlement objective of the national policy. Within MOR, both the Minister and the Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR) had almost all the power to decide the course of action. Values and interests of the most powerful institutions and individuals, who had usually been chosen according to their social affiliation and political loyalty, influenced the course of action. They were accountable to the President (as opposed to local people or to their technical merits) in order to remain in authority.

5.3 Policy Formulation (1976-1983)

Formulation is the second stage of the policy cycle. Several activities were included in this stage. These include the preparation of studies for the existing physical, social and economic conditions of the NWC region; the preparation of the terms of reference for the different development plans; the selection of consultants; the recruitment of teams to implement and manage development; and the implementation of Marakia pilot project. The Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) was entrusted the responsibility to carry out the activities included in the policy formulation stage.

The formulation process witnessed major transformations in the arrangements of institutions responsible for the NWC development process particularly when the study area (Alex-Imayid sub-region) became a new urban community in 1980. It also witnessed the transformation in the scope of dealing with policy issues and problems where the initial policy objectives were changed over time to deal with other priorities and problems that emerged during the process. These paralleled the change in the leadership of MOR where Hassaballa El-Kafrawy became Minister of Reconstruction in 1977. Kafrawy not only had different values and objectives than his predecessor Osman A. Osman, but also his values and objectives had been changing to suit the changing political and socio-economic conditions in Egypt.

Therefore, this section attempts to elaborate on the above discussion. It lists the different institutions that were present during the formulation process. It highlights that the change in the power arrangements within MOR had constrained the implementation of the policy objectives particularly after the study area became among the new urban communities. The section also shows that the structure and operational procedures within MOR had a major effect on the relationships between
the actor groups. Some institutions were given more power over others with the objective of solving the problems of overlapping responsibilities and duplication of activities. However, lack of coordination between both the government ministries and also institutions within MOR had been responsible for many of the problems that were identified in Chapter 4.

5.3.1 Institutional Arrangements
The institutional arrangements during the formulation stage of the NWC policy process can be divided into two phases. The first phase (Figure 5.6) is the period between 1976 and 1980 in which the regional and tourism planning were carried out as well as the allocation project for the housing cooperatives. The second phase (Figure 5.7) started when the NWC became a new community (decree 540 for 1980) and witnessed the preparation of the structure planning and the implementation of Marakia pilot project.
The arrangements of governmental institutions in the first phase of policy formulation were similar to those in the problem identification stage as well as their power arrangements. As shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 the Presidency and the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) were absent in the process. Both the President and MOT, however, had indirect influences as will be discussed in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.1.1 respectively. According to the Governmental Decree 580 in 1980, the NWC became a new community. Accordingly, new institutions within MOR were involved in the second phase of the policy formulation stage as shown in Figure 5.7.

The interest groups and the consultants were involved in the policy formulation process. The interest groups (cooperatives and the landowners) wanted to legalize and formalize their land ownership. The consultants were preparing the NWC regional planning, the tourism planning, the allocation project, the structure planning, and the master plan of New Ameriyah City (NAC). The preparation of Marakia’s design concept was also carried out in this stage.
5.3.1.1 The Government

Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show that the pattern of public institutions in the NWC policy arena had changed in both phases of the policy formulation process. Although such change had affected the process either directly or indirectly particularly because it meant that the added institutions had more agendas to implement, the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) remained the most prominent. The Awkaf Ministry and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) were concerned with their ownership of land in the coastal area and particularly in selling the lands to cooperatives and companies to implement their agendas of selling land with a yearly value of 1 million Egyptian Pounds as mentioned before. The Ministry of Planning (MOP) through its Regional Development Agency (RDA) was implementing some infrastructure projects in the region. Alexandria and Matrouh Governorates were concerned with the provision of basic services in existing towns.
In the second phase of policy formulation, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), through its Investment Authority, was supervising some investment projects that were implemented in accordance with the recommendations of the regional planning (Ilaco and Pacer 1976) (e.g. the cement and gypsum factories). The Ministry of Energy (MOE) was concerned with the implementation of the Nuclear Power Plant (see Box 4.1) and the Qattara Depression project. The Qattara project was to link the Mediterranean with the depression through a long canal cutting through the NWC to generate electricity.

The Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR)
As noted above, MOR had had the major responsibility for the policy formulation process. The examination of the structure of MOR during the policy formulation process is necessary because of the importance of ensuring the right structure, objectives and staffing for efficient policy implementation.

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**Figure 5.8. MOR 1978-1980 Organization Chart**

Figure 5.8 shows the modification in the structure of MOR from the policy identification process. It is necessary to highlight two fundamental changes. First, the Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR) lost its privileged position as an advisor to the Minister to become among the executive and administrative
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departments. Second, a new organization was established: ANUC (Authority for New Urban Communities) to be responsible for the creation and management of new communities (including all New Towns in Egypt).

The Authority for New Urban Communities (ANUC)\textsuperscript{15} was established in 1977. Law 59 for 1979 defined its roles and assigned ANUC to become the sole governmental body responsible for the creation and management of new communities established outside the boundaries of existing towns and villages. It had been responsible for the overall development of new towns and new communities as well as for managing their utilities and projects. Initially it was under the direct authority of the Central Government where the Minister of MOR headed it and had been in charge for its decisions and actions.

ANUC became fully responsible for the development and management for the new communities until they are transferred to the Local Authorities after they are fully established. However, until the time of this study, none of the new communities ‘nationwide’ was transferred to the Local Authorities. According to Law 59 for 1979\textsuperscript{16}, the terms of reference of ANUC were as follows (cited by Ibrahim 1993):

- Proposing policies and working out plans and programmes of urban development for setting up new towns, and linking them to the plans and programmes of production and services;
- Studying and selecting the most suitable locations for the new towns;
- Organizing and coordinating the negotiations with the agencies, commissions and ministries working in the field of urbanization and its related fields. Also studying and executing regional utilities and services buildings for the new towns;
- Following up the execution of the new towns master plans and overcoming what may obstruct execution of technical or financial difficulties, as well as evaluating the plan’s achievements;
- Working out the master plan and detailed plan for the selected sites, also, working a way at carrying

\textsuperscript{15} According to Law 59 in 1979 ANUC is responsible to manage and exploit the desert areas other than the ones suitable for agriculture or defense purposes, and according to law 59 in 1979 these areas are given facilities, tax exemptions and incentives to encourage investments in them. The agency is also responsible (as a representative of the state) for the construction of infrastructure, public buildings and basic services.

\textsuperscript{16} Law No. 59 for 1979, for the setting of the Authority for New Urban Communities (the General Organization for Government Printing Affairs, 1988).
out operations and projects through public invitation to foreign or local tenders or through direct contracting according to the rules and regulations of the organization, in addition to this, supervising the execution of such projects either by itself or through the New Town Development Agency (NTDA) found in each new community;

- Considering the best ways to carry out the regional utilities on the sites of the new community in such a manner as to ensure the economic feasibility for the projects included in them, also undertaking land plotting and implementing utilities in the new community, whether by the organization itself or through the NTDA;
- Raising loans or getting funds according to the rules stated by the law, in addition to any other financial resources allocated for the authority to ensure sufficient finance for the projects;
- Helping in managing and supplying the equipment and materials necessary for carrying out projects;
- Promotion of selling, leasing or utilizing the lands of the new community among Egyptian and foreign investors with the aim of realizing an economic development of the projects.

### Box 5.3. ANUC: Tasks and Objectives

**Source:** MOR

As mentioned above and shown in Box 5.3, ANUC had been responsible for preparing master plans for new communities, within the framework of the national development strategy, and supervising the execution of development by supplying facilities, public utilities, housing, industrial development through the cooperation with other public agencies. Such responsibilities overlapped with those of the Regional Development Authority (RDA) of the Ministry of Planning, the Agency for Research and Projects (ARP) of the Ministry of Reconstruction, and the Planning Departments of Local Governments. Boxes 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 emphasize the overlap and duplication of responsibilities (see Section 5.2.1.2).

In addition, ANUC overtook many of the responsibilities of the Central Organization of Reconstruction (COR) which was responsible for managing the development of ‘priority regions’ that were identified in the New Map Policy as will be discussed in further detail in Section 5.4. It is necessary to highlight the difficulty in differentiating between ‘priority regions’ which COR was responsible for and the new communities, which ANUC was supposed to be managing.

As shown in Box 5.3, ANUC also supervises the NTDA (New Town Development Agency). According to its issuing decree, it had no authority for planning for urban expansion of existing communities and the natural growth of urbanization of existing cities. Therefore, ANUC dealt only with separate and independent new communities rather than the natural urban expansion. The responsibility of managing the urban expansion of existing communities falls under the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP).
GOPP was founded in 1973 and became one of MOR’s organizations responsible for planning existing cities and their extensions. It was created to help Local Governments with insufficient planning capacity to prepare their physical development plans. According to its issuing decree, GOPP would review and approve the physical planning of the existing towns and villages that the governorates carry out. As noted in Section 5.2, the Urban Planning Departments in the Governorates would either prepare the physical planning of the existing towns or assign a private consultant to do so (Figure 5.3). The physical plans had to be approved by GOPP so that the Ministry of Planning (MOP) could allocate the necessary finances from the national budget. However, in 1979 the framework for GOPP’s responsibility was amended to include the preparation of the physical plans itself because the financial and human resources of the Governorates proved to be incapable of either preparing or commissioning private consultants to prepare the physical plans. Another responsibility was added to GOPP, which was the preparation of the physical plans of new towns and villages in addition to the existing settlements.

This change in the organization’s operation framework was supported by a Presidential Decree 655 in 1980, which stated in its third clause that GOPP could charge the Governorates or the Central Government for its services. This change in GOPP’s operation framework had converted GOPP from a service to a production unit. Indeed, it led the organization to charge market rates and profit from the preparation of physical plans and to compete with private consultants in winning contracts and planning competitions in many urban planning projects in the country (which contradicts its function as a state institution concerned with achieving the public interest). The increased financing enabled higher salaries to be paid to staff members; thus helping to reduce the loss of experienced professionals and making it possible to hire additional staff for specific purposes. Nevertheless, GOPP saw itself, as explained by its then head, to be in direct competition with both ANUC and ARP.

It is obvious that the responsibilities of both GOPP and ANUC were overlapping. Initially there was a division in their functions and operational procedures. GOPP was

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17 According to a Presidential Decree No. 1093 for 1973. Initially GOPP was the Executive Agency for Planning Greater Cairo since 1965.
18 Mr. M. Foad, the ex-chairman of GOPP in a discussion with the researcher.
responsible for supervising Local Governments in preparing the development plans of existing cities while ANUC was responsible for preparing development plans for new communities. However, the change in GOPP’s operational framework led it to struggle for winning contracts for planning new regions. In fact, during the time of this study GOPP was preparing the development plan for the area between the 100th km from Alexandria to the Libyan boarders of the NWC region (GOPP 1998). Accordingly, and as Meikle (1987) had noted, there was evidence of ill feeling between ANUC, GOPP and ARP and also between ARP and TAMS. However, there is no evidence that any problems had arisen because they had all been under the authority of the Minister of Reconstruction. However, this means that a direct involvement of the Minister would be needed if any conflict of interest appears. In addition, overlapping responsibilities leads to the loss of resources, time, and effort.

The Ministry of Planning (MOP)
According to the Governmental Decree number 540 in 1980, the study area became a new urban community and accordingly it became under the authority of ANUC as noted above. It was believed that having one institution responsible for planning and developing the region would avoid coordination problems that would emerge if the region was divided between three Governorates (Alexandria, Matrouh and Behira) in two planning regions (Alexandria and Matrouh). ANUC’s power and authority was enhanced because of the traditional weakness of the Ministry of Planning (MOP) and the weakness of Local Government as noted above and as will be discussed in further detail in Section 5.3.2.

Logically, the Ministry of Planning (MOP) should be entrusted to administer the NWC policy, follow it up, and evaluate the performance and behavior of projects and investment and how they contributed to the progress of the Egyptian national planning as Figure 5.3 illustrates. The same Ministry should ensure that the proposed uses of Egypt’s resources (land, labor, and capital) are in line with the country’s overall development strategy. In addition, being tourism based, the NWC region required additional coordination with the Ministry of Tourism and the Tourism Department in the Local Government. What happened was exactly the opposite. As mentioned above, a new independent authority was created (ANUC) and entrusted to administer the new communities (and accordingly, the NWC tourism policy).
ANUC’s methods that were used in appraising tourism projects in the NWC had had the following criticism: -

- The objectives of ANUC was to approve as many projects as possible regardless their feasibility to achieve the urbanization of the region and to collect fees and taxes from the investors;

- The macro-economic and social benefits of projects were disregarded in lieu of getting fast returns to finance the implementation of other new communities nationwide;

- Conflicts between ANUC, Local Government, MOP, and MOT;

- The weak implementation ratio of projects.

Law 43 for 1979 had stated in its third clause that economic regions and RPAs (Regional Development Authority) form a part of the local authority system (i.e. part of local government). While clause 9 of the same law stated that RPAs follow the Ministry of Planning (MOP) and formed according to the decision of the Minister of MOP. Such contradiction in the same law resulted in confusion between Local and Central Authorities to where planning should be carried out. In addition, the existence of ANUC meant that MOP and Local Government would focus on the socio-economic development, to the neglect of the spatial dimension in the processes of comprehensive development and planning which comes within the responsibilities of ANUC and GOPP. This confusion had obstructed the influence of the Ministry of Planning (MOP) and the Regional Planning Agencies (RPA) on the development of the new communities.

Such confusion between the responsibilities of the Regional Planning Agency (RPA) and those of ANUC was increased by the existence of the department of housing, utilities, and urban planning in the RPAs. It was also increased by the existence of the departments of regional planning studies, drafting and developing the regional planning, follow up of implementation of the regional planning within the General Department of Drafting, which is a central department in the RPAs.
The Ministry of Tourism (MOT)

Although the Ministry of Tourism was not involved in the policy formulation process of the NWC region, it had an indirect influence. As noted before, MOR and MOT agreed on the separation of their influences where MOR could be responsible for the NWC, while MOT takes the Red Sea region and Sinai, in addition to Ras Al Hekma area in the NWC. This was in the light of the recommendations of a Tourist Development Unit (TDU) that was formed by the World Bank to formulate tourism development programmes in the form of structure plans for Egypt’s tourism regions to regulate the activities of investors in the tourist industry.

After the TDU had completed its preparation of the tourism development programmes for all Egypt’s tourism regions; a government authority was established under the name of the Tourist Development Authority (TDA). It was affiliated to the Ministry of Tourism (MOR) and was entrusted the responsibility of the realization of the structure plans that the TDU had established. Such responsibility included selling the lands in the tourism regions to investors, reviewing the tourism development programmes and supervising the execution of tourism projects both at the macro and micro levels and issuing building permissions. The TDA encouraged the investors to form companies to establish regional infrastructure (water supply, electricity, sewerage and the construction of roads) to fulfill the needs of their projects. This policy eased the pressure on the national budget that had traditionally been responsible for financing the regional infrastructure. The TDA had been selling the lands in the tourism areas (particularly along the Egyptian coasts) for the symbolic price of 1US$ per square meter in order to encourage and attract investment for the development of the tourism areas along the Red Sea coast and in Sinai. The role of the TDA in the NWC region had been limited to two areas: Ras El Hekma and Sidi Abdel Rahman. Accordingly, a development project (called the charter project) was issued in Ras El Hekma where the TDA sold lands to the private sector to carry out tourism projects for the promotion of international tourism.

There are risks involved, if National Tourism Authorities (NTAs) promote individual regions or sectors, it can lead to a conflict of interests since they often only promote regions which already have tourism potential (WTO 1993a). This means that other regions continue to suffer. This was evident in the case of Egypt where the NTA (in
Egypt called Tourism Development Authority, TDA) had been concerned to promote regions that have potential for developing international tourism as in Sinai, Luxor, Aswan and along the Red Sea coast. While in the case of the NWC region, the TDA thought that the region couldn’t afford to compete with other Mediterranean countries, which have more advanced tourist infrastructure, and thus, disregarded the tourism promotion in the NWC region. Hence, the region settled for focusing only on domestic tourism and the responsibility for tourism development has been under the jurisdiction of MOR.

Power struggle and conflict of interests between MOT and MOR led to the escape of the NWC region from TDA control. Although the state should function as an arbiter of inter-group conflicts in a society (see Appendix II), conflicts existed mainly between elements of the state system as well as between social groups. This gave rise for the MOT and MOR into becoming states within the state. They had divided the country’s resources among them where each could have the necessary power and authority in regions that are under its jurisdictions. In addition, an ill feeling between MOT and MOR existed, which constrained the establishment of the tourist industry in the NWC region (see Section 4.2.2). For example, on one hand the Local Government, MOP and MOT were treating the NWC as a tourism-based region and were keen on establishing the tourist industry in it, MOR, on the other hand, was treating the NWC as a new community. In this case, the attraction of the population to the new community (in MOR’s view that is to implement as many housing as possible) came first and the establishment of the tourist industry in the NWC came last on MOR’s agenda. In addition, the fulfillment of the needs of the local communities in creating and enhancing the leisure and tourism attractions along the Mediterranean was sacrificed in lieu of urbanization.

Local Government
As mentioned above, Law 59 for 1979 stated that the establishment and management of all new communities were the responsibility of ANUC. At the same time, Law 43 for 1979 concerning the responsibilities of Local Authorities stated that any project established within the administrative boundary of a governorate had to be approved by the Local Council before its implementation (cited by Abdel-Wahab 1991). Although most of new communities lie within the regional boundaries of a governorate, Local
Government had minimum influence on the establishment and management of new communities.

Such arrangement took place because the establishment of new communities had been the priority of the national development policy. It was believed that it would be easier and faster to inject budgetary finances directly to the new communities, because if the finances went through governorates, the money would dissolve and would be used to solve their problems rather than achieve the priorities of the national policy (i.e. establish the new community).

Accordingly, most of the new communities in Egypt (including the NWC) had been laid out as independent entities under the authority of ANUC. Most of the new communities had been separated from existing urban areas by a vast uninhabited desert, which kept them away from local authority systems.

As noted above, the new communities would be transferred into Local Government after they are ‘fully established’. However, as illustrated in Chapter 4, none of the new communities had achieved what was conceived for them in terms of size, population, jobs, etc. Also, as discussed in Chapter 4, it seems that the Egyptian new communities still need a longer period to be ‘fully established’. Consequently, the management and development of the new communities may continue for a long time as independent entities without linking them to a local authority system.

Now the discussion turns to look at the characteristics and structure of the other groups of actors involved in the policy formulation process. The concluding paragraph at the end of this section sums up the issues and analyses of the institutional arrangements at the formulation stage of the NWC policy process.

5.3.1.2 The Interest Groups
For the purposes of this thesis, an interest group is defined as any association or organization which makes a claim, either directly or indirectly, on government so as to influence public policy without itself being willing to exercise the formal powers of government. Politicians often cast the term *interest group* in a negative light.

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19 In a discussion with His Excellency: H. Kafrawy, the ex-minister of MOR in July 1997.
However, it must be emphasized that public policy analysts use the expression in a value-neutral way to refer to groups that attempt to influence public policy.

Several interest groups can be identified who either affected or been affected by the public policy of the NWC region. The housing cooperatives had a direct influence during policy formulation and also during implementation. The private sector in the form of companies or individuals who owned lands and who invested in projects had also a direct influence that varied according to their power and authority. Local landowners and the local economic organizations particularly those who had been involved in contracting and quarrying had also been affecting the policy process. Although the tourists and the local communities represent the main beneficiaries, they had lesser influence on the policy process. This sub-section examines the arrangements of the different interest groups.

The Housing Cooperatives
The housing cooperative societies were people who cooperated together to form a group to be able to acquire bank loans to purchase land and implement housing projects in the NWC region. The cooperatives were acquiring financial support from banks\(^2\) where they could be granted a twenty years loan with very little interest rate to encourage investment in the region. The loan could cover around 30 percent of the total cost of the project. The rest could be collected from the members during the course of the project’s implementation.

The societies were formed according to a common interest, which they all shared. For example, the syndicate of engineers called for forming a cooperative from its members who would be interested to invest in the NWC. The same went for, peasants, industrial unions, physicians, contractors, employees of a public company, officials in a particular ministry, etc.

The concept of cooperative societies in Egypt was as early as 1910 when the first agricultural cooperative was established (Hopwood 1982). After the 1952 revolution in Egypt, the first rural reform law decreed that all peasants who received land were to

\(^2\) The Bank of Housing and Reconstruction (BHR) was initially established to assist the housing cooperatives in the NWC to implement projects in the region. Later, it became the ‘private bank of MOR’ (Hanna 1998) that markets and sells the ministry’s touristic villages. Its jurisdiction increased to include all housing projects that the ministry carries out nationwide.
form cooperatives in their villages. It was believed that the cooperative system would
increase agricultural production in comparison to dividing agricultural lands between
numerous individuals. The government gradually extended the cooperative system to
cover most of Egypt influenced by the socialist ideals at the time. In 1970 some 5000
cooperatives had 3 million members (ibid.) representing all social classes of Egypt.
The move away from the socialist solution under Sadat meant that less attention was
paid to cooperatives. He was willing to import food in order to satisfy Egypt rather
than aim for a dramatic increase in production. He was also temperamentally opposed
to a large-scale coercion of the peasants, or of any other section of the population.

Reference had been made in Chapter 4 to how the housing cooperatives and their
patterns of ownership of the land parcels along the coastal area of the NWC region
had affected the policy process. The main objective of the tourism planning was to
allocate the cooperatives in a way that neither hinders the regional development
efforts nor disturb their legal ownership patterns. Indeed, the production of the
structure plan was delayed for two years until the cooperatives approved it.
Consequently, the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) had commissioned for the
preparation of an allocation project for the housing cooperatives in the light of the
public policy. The reallocation project assigned some lands in the south of the coastal
road to substitute for lands at the coastal area. The project assigned larger plots in the
southern area for the cooperatives aiming to encourage the development of the
hinterland. Initially, the cooperatives were happy with the solution and approved the
reallocation project.

The negotiations between MOR and the housing cooperatives were carried out in the
policy formulation stage to reallocate the cooperatives in the light of the tourism
planning and the reallocation project. The reallocation was necessary for
implementing the policy’s objectives particularly for providing public beach areas and
beach areas for day-trippers and to free the reserved area for implementing Marakia.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the reallocation aimed to encourage the development
growth toward the hinterland and prevent urban sprawl. The consultants were
coordinating the negotiations between MOR and the cooperatives.
In order to pay for regional infrastructure, MOR decreed that each cooperative that was allocated lands according to the reallocation project should pay around 3 Egyptian pounds per square meter (for both the lands that have a shorefront, and the lands that lie inland). Accordingly, the cooperatives relinquished the lands that had no shorefront to decrease their payments and decided to keep their old coastal plots. This had created a battle over land plots in the coastal area. MOR was unable to force the cooperatives to adhere to the policy principles because there were influential members in many cooperatives (see Section 5.3.3). Indeed, cooperatives included members of Unions (who had significant political power at the time), state officials, politicians, and/or their clans and relatives.

Therefore, the policy was unable to achieve its objective of allocating the cooperatives in 115 parcels along the coastal area and leaving the rest of the coastal area empty for day-trippers, campers, future development and for the provision of public beaches for the local communities. It was also unable to encourage their reallocation to lands that lie in the hinterland. Instead, the number of land parcels along the coast increased and occupied the whole coastal front (they reached around 150 parcels in the study area).

Furthermore, many cooperatives were unable to fulfill their obligations regarding their participation in the preliminary costs in regional infrastructure and utilities. The cooperatives had shown their limitation in financial ability when only 49 agreed to contribute in the costs of the first stage of implementing the regional infrastructure while only 4 cooperatives (out of 115) paid their share (Ministry of Reconstruction). Therefore, this also constrained the ability of MOR to supply the region with infrastructure and thus decided to sell more land plots to the private sector to acquire the necessary finances and to pay for the public pilot projects. Accordingly, MOR’s position as a coordinator, stimulator, enabler, and a facilitator for the development was transformed into a speculator’s role in real estate markets. MOR became a private developer that sells lands to the private sector and invests in building the ‘touristic villages’ and then sells the holiday homes to the people. With the profit from selling the holiday homes, it implements other ‘touristic villages’ and so on.
**Developers and Speculators**

The developers were attracted to the NWC when they saw MOR getting 'big profits' from the land speculation and real estate developments. The main objective of the developers had been to purchase the lands in the coastal area of the NWC region and then either resell them when prices increase, or carry out similar projects to those of the Government. Accordingly, most of the projects along the coast in the study area are replicates of the Marakia project, which MOR carried out. As noted in Chapter 4, billions of pounds were spent on the construction of touristic villages which are left empty most of the year and that created a greater supply of holiday homes in the region that exceeds the demand by far (Business Today 1998).

In the absence of Government control, and indeed in the absence of a good example to follow, developers constrained the implementation of policy. Motivated by fast return on their investment, the developers preferred land speculation and holiday homes construction rather than implementing the tourism activities determined by the policy. At the same time the government itself was heavily involved in land speculation and implementing holiday homes. Although the policy had established planning regulations, land use distribution, carrying capacity standards, and suggested architectural styles and urban design patterns, they were disregarded in most projects. How could the tourism policy objectives be fulfilled when the strategies to achieve them were ignored? How could the developers be concerned with implementing the policy recommendations while the government had been indifferent and itself had been the first violator of policy regulations?

**Local Economic Organizations**

As noted in Chapter 4, permissions had been issued to companies and individuals for quarrying activities in the NWC region. These were mainly local economic organizations, which expanded with the increasing demand for stones that accompanied the construction of projects in the NWC. The organizations had legal rights over the quarries in the form of contracts with the Government. The tourism policy recognized the environmental problems caused by quarrying. It was also recognized that quarrying hinders the growth towards the hinterland (see Box 4.2). Accordingly, the policy suggested alternative quarrying sites. However, the organizations refused to move their investment and reallocate to the suggested sites.
Indeed, as noted in Chapter 4, the local organizations believed that they would eventually lose their lands to the government for developmental purposes and thus should exploit their local natural resources (to acquire ‘any’ benefit) before somebody else would.

MOR was unable to force the reallocation because the owners of the quarries were from the local elites who had close connections with members of the Parliament and were supported by the local government. Matrouh Governorate had been benefiting from the tax and other revenues which quarrying was bringing to the governorate. Initially there was an ill feeling between MOR and local government, as noted before. Such ill feeling had been dependent on the personal relationship between Governors and the Minister of Reconstruction\(^{21}\). The quarrying activities continued until 1991 when the Governor of Matrouh decreed that quarrying was to be prohibited along the coastal areas. Accordingly, the local organizations acknowledged the intervention and decree of “their” Local Authority and quarrying was substantially decreased along the coast.

### 5.3.1.3 The Consultants

The consultants were professional organizations contracted to the client government (MOR), although a third party may pay the fees, to carry out the studies and plans for the NWC development. In contracting to carry out this work they may supply individual professional experts of the required caliber and experience. These experts may be permanent members of the consulting firm or, as had been increasingly happening, be brought into work on a specified project. These different approaches, as demonstrated by the findings of this study, had implications for the influence of the consultants on the individual experts and the achievement of the project’s tasks.

The consultants are the third group of actors who were involved in the formulation of the public policy of the NWC as shown in Figure 5.1. According to their power and influence, the consultants had affected the development process in varying degrees as will be illustrated in the subsequent sections. The consultants involved in the policy formulation stage can be classified into two groups.

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\(^{21}\) As it was gathered from a discussion with His Excellency H. Kafrawy, the Minister of Reconstruction.
The **first** group (Ilaco and Pacer consulting firms) carried out the regional planning of the NWC (Ilaco and Pacer 1976) as well as the master planning of New Ameriyah City (NAC) (Ilaco and Pacer 1978). It was a consortium of Egyptian and Dutch consultants headed by Dr. Hassan Ismail, the ex-Minister of Scientific Research. The commissioning to prepare the regional planning and the master planning of NAC was by direct contracting from MOR. The consortium included professional experts from different development disciplines including agriculture, architecture, housing, tourism, industry, economics, sociology, anthropology, and others. However, the main specialization of the consortium was land reclamation.

The **second** group (PUD and ORplan consulting firms) carried out the tourism planning of the area between the 34th and the 100th km from Alexandria (the study area) (PUD and Orplan 1978). It was also a consortium of Egyptian and German consultants headed by Dr. Abdalla Abdelaziz, an academic and a professional planner. The commissioning to prepare the tourism planning was through an international planning competition, which PUD had won, but had to include a foreign consultant mainly to receive some tax exemptions. The consortium also included professional experts from different disciplines including agriculture, regional planning, urban design, tourism, anthropology, etc. The main specialization of the consortium was architecture and urban and regional planning.

Both groups had joined to prepare the structure planning for the study area (PUD and Pacer 1983a) but the foreign consultants were excluded where Dr. Hassan Ismail headed the new consortium. The commissioning in this case was by direct contracting. The consortium had also carried out the master planning of the area between Al-Maxx in Alexandria till the 34th km from Alexandria along the Mediterranean that lies to the west of the study area (PUD and Pacer 1983b).

In addition, in 1985 Pacer and EGYPTEM carried out the physical planning of the area between the 100th and the 279th km from Alexandria along the Mediterranean that lies to the east of the study area. The same area is being re-planned, at the time of this study, by GOPP (GOPP 1998).
Finally, at the project level, the initial design for Marakia tourist village was carried out by PUD Consultants (PUD 1981), which also prepared a project for re-allocating the housing cooperatives in 1980. Noaman and Associates carried out the designs for the ‘implemented’ Marakia project as well as the design and supervision of Marabella tourist village in 1987. PUD Consultants carried out the design for Marina Al Alamein (PUD 1987).

As noted above MOR had had the major responsibility for the policy formulation process of the NWC public policy while the consultants usually gave the guidance. The amount, nature and detailed activities which are covered by the term ‘guidance’, and which fall within this phase, depended in large part on the consultants involved, the type of activity in question and the capabilities of MOR’s staff. In extreme cases, for example, the consultants had drawn up detailed terms of reference (e.g. PUD and ORplan 1978; PUD 1979), in other cases, consultants limited themselves to commenting on those provided by MOR (e.g. Ilaco and Pacer 1976). However, all consultants were concerned to ensure that the pre-eminent position of MOR was acknowledged.

Several important issues could be contended from the above examination of the institutional arrangements during the policy formulation stage of the NWC policy process. **First**, several overlaps and duplication in responsibilities existed between different state institutions and even between departments within the same institution. This not only meant wastage of time, money, and effort, but also resulted in a struggle for power and authority. Lack of coordination allowed the different institutions to implement their agendas whenever there was a chance to do so, which consequently constrained the performance of other institutions. **Second**, the structure of MOR had been changed and modified where many departments had been moved, regrouped empowered, disabled, added and removed to suit the variations in MOR’s ‘changing’ requirements. This was a major constraint to the consultants who received changing briefings during the course of their work. For example, during the policy identification process, the Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR) was concerned to establish a tourist industry in the NWC. However, when the Central Authority for Reconstruction (COR) represented in the North West Coast Development Authority (NWCDA) was in charge during the policy formulation process, its primary objective
was to provide the housing cooperatives with infrastructure. Later, when the Authority for New urban Communities (ANUC) became in authority, its agenda was to implement as many as possible of housing to urbanize the NWC thinking that by doing this it was establishing a ‘new community’. The consultants were in dilemma: whether they should adjust to the requirements of the ‘client’ or should obey their technical and professional merits?

5.3.2 Power Arrangements

Reference had already been made above and in Chapter 3 to the privileged position of MOR. During the policy identification and formulation stages it was restructured several times (see for example Figures 5.5 and 5.8) but, as noted above, retained its important role as commissioner and manager of human settlement development.

Its unique wide-ranging responsibilities and unusually powerful position for a line Ministry continued even when another Minister was appointed. Its powerful position resulted in ill feeling with a number of other Ministries and the Governorates (ibid.) who were, as a consequence, not enthusiastic about coordination on implementing the NWC public policy with, as explained by the relevant project directors, significant repercussions for policy implementation. It also led to the departure of some experienced key civil servants who found it difficult to accommodate the new Minister’s approach of giving more authority to ANUC and reducing the role of ACR; and ill feeling by some of those who remained within the Ministry towards the consultants who were brought in by the Minister. According to Meikle (1987), such ill feeling by members of at least two established agencies within MOR (GOPP and ARP), was generated because they felt threatened by the methods established by the Minister (see Section 4.4), and partly because of dissatisfaction with the roles defined for them.

It is questionable whether the Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR) and the in-house consultant TAMS were always the most appropriate teams for the work in hand. Primarily, engineering and construction oriented they were both very much the

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22 These include Dr. S. Abdel-Wahab: the head of the NWCDA and managers of private sector projects.
23 For example, Dr. A. El-Rimaly, the ex-Vice Minister of MOR.
24 As noted by Dr. A. Abdelaziz, the President of PUD Consultants.
type of groups which could be expected to usefully serve a public building (*ibid.*). Initially, during the post 1973 War reconstruction period when this was the prime role of MOR, this orientation was no problem (see Section 3.3.2). Over time, MOR took on broader responsibilities and became increasingly involved in a wider spectrum of human settlement projects, tourism projects, and land reclamation projects. There is evidence in the opinion of at least two consultants, (PUD and Pacer), that the shortfall in MORs expertise had direct and sometimes deleterious consequences for the NWC regional development.

For example, according to MOR’s senior officials, new communities were seen as primarily physical environments, created as a single model project (as if a town was what a single building is for an architect or a single construction project for an engineer), rather than an incremental creation responding to piecemeal demand. Because the ill feeling existed between MOR and other public institutions, co-operation and co-ordination between them was lacking. In addition, experts in other institutions did not complement the shortfall in MOR’s expertise as a direct result of their conflicting interests due to the overlapping and duplications of responsibilities between institutions.

It can be assumed that the government recognized such overlap and duplication because it allowed MOR to employ and consult professionals and experts from a wider array of disciplines. At the same time, and for the same purpose, the government gave more power to ANUC by assigning the Minister of Reconstruction to head the authority, which accordingly became the Ministry for New Urban Communities. However, ANUC’s increased authority and power was a constraint to the work of experts who saw ANUC implementing only what was compatible with its objectives.\(^\text{25}\) The power that was given to ANUC was enhanced due to the weakness of both the Ministry of Planning and Local Government as discussed in Chapter 3.

The only ‘obstacle’ that faced ANUC was the existence of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in the NWC policy arena as shown in Figure 5.6. As noted before, MOA, represented in its Reconstruction and Land Reclamation Agency (RLRA), was supposed to manage the implementation of the rural management policy under FAO recommendations. MOA had traditionally been one of the most powerful ministries in

\(^{25}\) In a discussion with Dr. A. El-Rimali, the ex-Vice Minister of MOR.
most successive Egyptian Governments. In order to complement the authority of MOR over the NWC, the Minister of Reconstruction convinced the Government to affiliate the RLRA to MOR. Therefore, when MOR was reorganized in 1980, it became the Ministry of Development and Ministry of State for Housing, Utilities, Land Reclamation, and New Communities (see Figure 3.4). This act meant that the authority of MOR over the NWC region was round out. Moreover, the implementation of the rural management policy became MOR’s responsibility until 1993 then the Ministry of Land Reclamation was returned to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).

The above discussion shows the political processes in which MOR was involved during the policy formulation stage to influence the NWC public policy in a struggle for power and authority. Gaining more political powers was MOR’s main objective. It used ANUC as a tool to complement its authority over the NWC region by giving it more power and neutralizing other institutions that might endanger its authority. Accordingly, MOR retained its position as the sole institution that had authority over the development in the NWC and indeed it had worked in isolation from most other public institutions. The Minister of MOR, therefore, was the sole decision-maker in the policy arena.

5.3.3 Values and Interests
As noted in Chapter 2 and above, much of the public choice model explains the behavior of actors involved in the NWC policy process (Table 2.1). The public choice perspective, discussed in Section 2.3.2, assumes that the political society is composed of organized interests. These interests are concerned with obtaining access to public resources. In this respect, public officials, who are fundamentally concerned with remaining in power, are interested in capturing favored status in the distribution of resources in society. In order to do so they consciously seek to provide benefits to a range of interests they believe will help them retain office. Accordingly, they systematically favor certain interests over others. These assumptions of the public choice perspective were detected during the policy formulation stage of the NWC policy process where politicians were found seeking special advantage through public policy.
The Regional Planning
When H. Kafrawy was appointed as Minister of Reconstruction (1977-1993), he inherited a very powerful ministry. The power not only came from his predecessor’s (Osman’s) personality and managerial skills, and MOR’s privileged position, but also came from the positions of the senior officials in the ministry particularly in ACR (see Section 5.2.2).

As noted in Section 5.2.3, members of ACR and the in-house consultants TAMS had good intentions for national development and were enthusiastic to ensure the efficiency of implementing the New Map and the NWC policies. Initially, Kafrawy respected the opinions of ACR and TAMS members and gave them all the liabilities and authorities they required. He facilitated the formulation phase for the NWC policy and issued the necessary ministerial decrees (see Chapter 4) to ensure efficient implementation and the removal of bureaucratic constraints, albeit temporarily.

According to the above discussion, it can be assumed that Kafrawy’s attitude towards the NWC policy formulation could be explained through one of the following. First, he also had good intentions for national development and was also enthusiastic to ensure the efficiency of implementing the New Map and the NWC policies. Or, second, he wanted to show that his opinions were in line with those of ACR members to gain their recognition and political support. The following paragraphs will highlight the most likely explanation.

The Tourism Planning
During the policy formulation stage, the housing cooperatives had acquired many land parcels along the Mediterranean coast. It can be safely assumed that Kafrawy was interested in gaining their political support because, as noted in Section 5.3.1.2, they included influential members. Not only because he ensured that the Terms of Reference for the preparation of the tourism planning (PUD and ORplan 1978) included the provision of infrastructure to the housing cooperatives and giving them titles to land, but also because he allowed the purchase of land to continue during the policy formulation stage despite the government’s decision to stop land acquisition until the planning was completed. On the other hand, land acquisition was prohibited
only for other landowners particularly those from the local community (Cole and Altorki 1998).

The Allocation Project
Also after the completion of the tourism planning, Kafrawy commissioned for the preparation of an allocation project (PUD 1979) as noted before. When the housing cooperatives refused to abide by the policy regulations and refused to re-allocate, Kafrawy couldn’t ‘upset’ the cooperatives and enforce policy regulations despite the opposition from the consultants, ACR and TAMS.26

The regional planner27 points out that MOR was unable to force the housing cooperatives to implement the guidelines of the NWC policy because the Minister of Reconstruction was keen on remaining on good terms with them due to their political positions. They had a considerable influence upon the nature and the direction of the development from two aspects. First, they had legally bought their lands and the law thus supports them; and second, most of the cooperative members were union members or public officials and were able to guard their personal interest.

Accordingly, the housing cooperatives retained their properties, violated policy regulations, constrained the growth towards the hinterlands, prevented the establishment of public beach areas, etc. They also had sold many of their plots to individuals, companies, developers, and speculators who had been (as well as the housing cooperatives) implementing several touristic villages in the study area. They were primarily concerned with financial returns, and struggled to implement their agendas. For example, the primary motive of the housing cooperative members, as discovered by this research, was to be able to own vacation houses along the Mediterranean while, due to their financial difficulties, pay as less as possible for that purpose. Accordingly, they were looking for developers who could implement “touristic villages” on their lands where the cooperative could obtain some of the holiday homes in return for the land value. This action had significantly violated the carrying capacity standards that were established by the public policy because the developers exploited as much as possible of the land to increase their profits.

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26 In a discussion with Dr. A. Abdelaziz, President of PUD Consultants who was mediating and coordinating the discussions and negotiations of reallocation between MOR and the cooperatives.
27 Ibid.
However, it was up to the government, in the favor of public interest, to regulate their actions within the framework of public policy.

**The Structure Planning**

The policy formulation stage paralleled the implementation of the Open Door Policy (*infitah*) which witnessed the calls for modernization, decreasing the role of the state, the openness to the outer world, and economic liberalization. Accordingly, tourism was seen as a way to attract foreigners (see Section 3.3.2), generate foreign exchange, and achieve rapid modernization. Initially, Kafrawy encouraged the ideas developed by the consultants in the NWC and praised the tourism attractions that were suggested in the tourism planning. Indeed, he approved, authorized, and adopted the planning approaches as noted in Chapter 4 and above. He also had encouraged the implementation of Marakia pilot project and approved its initial design concept.

However, when the regime changed after Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Kafrawy’s approach changed. Sadat’s predecessor, President Mubarak, initially called for decreasing government’s expenses, caring for low-income classes, structural adjustment, and economic reform. The President, in his early speeches, gave the impression of a return to socialist ideals. Accordingly, Kafrawy withdrew the ideas of modernization and openness to the outer world. There was less enthusiasm to encourage tourism development in the NWC. Implementing golf courses, horseracing tracks, maritime centers, hotels, resorts, and holiday homes for foreigners and upper class Egyptians seemed like a bad idea that would ‘upset the regime’ (*ibid.*). The concern for ‘not upsetting the regime’ to remain in office was stronger than implementing policy objectives.

The above discussion shows that political expediency determined many of the actions of key officials, which constrained the implementation of policy. The concessions that were awarded to the housing cooperatives to gain more political powers were major constraints to the implementation of policy objectives. Also the desire to remain in authority influenced the direction of policy and in prioritizing objective. However, the political processes in which politicians and public officials were involved during the

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28 Government regulations refer to state constraints on private activity in order to promote the public interest (Francis 1993 cited by Yishai, 1998).
policy implementation stage of the NWC policy process were even a more constraint to the implementation of national and regional objectives. There were also several cases during the policy implementation stage where politicians were found seeking special advantage (power, money influence) through public policy. These are taken up next.

### 5.4 Policy Implementation (1980-1994)

This section is concerned with the third stage of the policy cycle: policy implementation. It describes and analyzes the deviations and seemingly pragmatic changes to administrative structures in terms of political expediency. Also it attempts to highlight the political processes in which the principal actors were involved during policy implementation to control resources in a struggle for power and authority. Moreover, it utilizes the public choice model, discussed in Chapter 2, to explain some of the actions of politicians in the NWC policy arena with particular reference to those actions that deviated from policy. This section, however, focuses on the structure and actors of the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) being the prominent institution in this stage of the policy process. It also refers to other institutions and politicians involved in the NWC policy process.

Accordingly, in its discussion of the policy implementation stage, this section analyzes the implementation of MOR projects (Marakia, Marabella, and Marina Al Alamein), the development of the hinterland and also the implementation of the private sector projects: ‘the so called’ touristic villages.

It is necessary, however, to discuss the institutional arrangements and power arrangements of the different actors before illustrating how the differentiation of objectives, motives, values and interests as well as the characteristics of the regime, affected implementation. That is because the objectives of the most powerful actors and institutions were the ones that were prioritized.

#### 5.4.1 Institutional and Power Arrangements

Figure 5.9 illustrates the institutional arrangement that influenced the policy implementation stage of the NWC policy process. As shown in the figure, more departments were established within MOR that became involved in the NWC policy implementation. Accordingly, it can be assumed that MOR utilized the approach of
establishing more institutions as a method to complement its authority over the implementation process. Perhaps the Ministry believed that if it employed more people with varying political positions and had a larger bureaucracy, this would increase its authority and decrease its dependence on other state institutions.
In addition to MOR, the other institutions that were involved in the implementation stage of the policy process had, however, lesser, or no, influence on how decisions were being implemented. The Ministries of Finance (MOF), Planning (MOP), and Energy (MOE), were involved with implementing their agendas as Sections 5.2 and 5.3 had discussed. MOR was not threatened with these institutions because their agendas concerned areas other than the coastal zone. Indeed, MOR was more concerned to assert its authority over the coastal area because, as may be assumed, it is where the most valuable natural resource (the beach). However, many public institutions were interested in the study area and struggled to acquire beachfront areas. Two ministries were able to gain access to the coastal zone: the Ministry of Defense (MOD) (see Section 5.4.5) and the Ministry of Culture (MOC) (see Section 5.4.4). An unwritten agreement, however, between MOR and MOD entitled the latter some coastal lands in the NWC in the east and the west of Alex-Imayid sub-region (in Sidi Qreir and west of Marina Al Alamein) and some areas in the south of the coastal road. In addition, MOC represented in its Antiquities Authority had occupied the excavation site where the Roman remains were found (in Marina Al Alamein as discussed in Chapter 4 and will be discussed in Section 5.4.4). This site remained as ‘a needle in MOR’s neck’ as explained by the Minister of Reconstruction.29

During the policy implementation stage of the NWC policy process, the Authority for New Urban Communities (ANUC) was the most prominent institution within MOR, which decided the course of the regional development. The power and authority of ANUC stemmed from its head, who had been, as noted before, the Minister of

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29 His Excellency H. Kafrawy the ex-Minister of MOR, in a discussion with the researcher.
Reconstruction himself. He, according to many of his counterparts, utilized ANUC as a tool to realize his objectives against politicians and administrators in and outside MOR. It can be assumed that he wanted to centralize the decisions to be able to implement what he thought was appropriate and to avoid conflicting interests with others, in and outside MOR, who might disapprove, or argue against, his views.

Indeed, although the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) was, according to its issuing decree and as noted above, responsible for all physical plans nationwide, its input was negligible in the process. Although the Agency for Research and Projects (ARP) was directly involved with the consultants to comment on and approve the plans and their amendments, as noted above, ANUC was implementing what it thought was compatible with its objectives. Many of the new departments were affiliated to the Authority for New urban Communities (ANUC). Accordingly, it retained its powerful position in the policy arena. In addition, there was less coordination with the Ministry of Planning and the Local Government particularly when most of the responsibilities of the Central Organization for Reconstruction (COR) were overtaken by ANUC as will be discussed in Section 5.4.2.

The consultants were supervising the implementation of the development plan and were implementing Marakia, Marabella, Marina Al Alamein, and New Ameriyah City (NAC) according to the NWC policy recommendations. The consultants had an influential role during the policy formulation stage and during the early implementation stage particularly because they included an ex-Minister of Scientific Research. PUD Consultants had lesser influence particularly when its contract with MOR to implement Marakia was cancelled and they took the issue to court (see Chapter 4 and as will be discussed in Section 5.4.3). Later when PUD was commissioned to design and implement Marina Al Alamein they re-emerged as an influential actor backed by their scientific knowledge and experience. However, they were, as noted above, concerned to ensure that the pre-eminent position of MOR was acknowledged.

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30 For example, Dr. Hoda Sakr, the chairperson of GOPP, Mr. M. Shalata, the ex-chairman of GOPP, Dr. A. El-Rimaly, the ex-vice president of ANUC, Dr. A. Abdelaziz, the President of PUD Consultants.

31 In the light of the technical and scientific merits of its members and members of TAMS.

32 Dr. Hassan Ismail, the President of Pacer Consultants.
The consultants can be assumed, on one hand, that they had attempted to employ scientific techniques and professional expertise to help legitimize government action in the interest of capital by casting it in terms of the public interest, neutral professionalism, and scientific rationality. On the other hand, the traditional view of regional planning is that of a neutral, technical exercise, in which the consultant is regarded as an objective expert, who is able to recommend professionally determined solutions to technical problems to achieve the public interest. However, in both cases, the task of making choices belongs to the democratically elected politician (the decision-maker) to whom the consultant can provide neutral, professional advice on the technical merits of those choices.

With respect to the decisions and implementation of the regional development in the NWC, the involvement of local authorities had been absent as noted before. From the point of view of the Governor of Matrouh, the NWC ‘belongs’ to the MOR, (although most of it was within the Governorate’s jurisdiction). Consequently, the findings of the research affirmed that the outcomes of the policy in the NWC do not reflect the local population’s needs and aspirations. Many locals had identified that their major problem was not having access to the beach because the whole coastal area had been ‘occupied’ by touristic villages, which prohibited accessibility to the beach area. According to Cole and Altorki (1998),

“The walls of the touristic villages along the NWC region block most of the local people from access to areas that, with their development, have been lost to the Bedouin as part of their patrimonial heritage. The walls of the holiday resorts protect the elites from intrusion by ‘ordinary’ people from the masses who might spoil the scene with crowding, noise, and unstylish appearance.”

Not only the recreational needs of the local communities had not been fulfilled, but also several other needs had been abandoned including those needs that relate to proper housing, health facilities, food, water supply, sanitation, and telecommunication. More attention was paid to fulfilling the needs of the holidaymakers to the neglect of the needs of the Bedouins who have lived in the area for hundreds of years.

33 General A. Said, in a discussion with the researcher in August 1997.
34 In discussions with several members of the local community, e.g. (H. Awad, A. Dawood, I. Abdelhadi and others).
Even in terms of employment, holiday entertainment among the elites is private, with minor dependence on public places and events, a phenomenon that is also the case among the masses. Private entertainment among the elites usually involves heavy expenditure, for food and beverages, requires the work of servants, and provides employment and income for caterers and sometimes performers such as belly dancers and musicians. The food, beverages, and personal inputs for this entertainment style are mainly brought from Cairo or Alexandria. The villages thus provide few local employment opportunities for workers and have only small-scale need for the local establishment of commercial enterprises (ibid.).

Part of the role of government should be assessing conflicting claims. Indeed, planning and management are not about producing a technically perfect plan or devising a policy to bring about an ideal situation in which all will benefit equally. Rather it is about assessing conflicting claims and making choices. In the NWC, the choices were certainly in the favor of the interests, including private interests, of policy makers. These will be illustrated in the subsequent sub-sections.

5.4.2 The Administrative Structure of the Ministry of Reconstruction
As noted above, the structure of MOR was modified to suit its additional responsibility, as manager for the new communities and, as it is the case in the NWC, as manager of the tourism development process. Figure 5.10 shows the new structure of MOR and this sub-section attempts to highlight the roles and arrangements of the relevant departments within MOR.
The North West Coast Development Agency (NWCD\(A\)) was established as a response to the recommendation of the public policy of the NWC (Ilaco and Pacer 1976; PUD and ORplan 1978) to be responsible for managing the implementation of the development plans in the region and the implementation of planning regulations. It had been responsible for the management of infrastructure, tourism, industrial, and housing projects in the NWC region. In addition, it was responsible for the allocation of the housing co-operatives in the light of the tourism public policy of the NWC region and the legal status of the co-operatives, individuals, and companies investing...
in the region. Such policy recommendation aimed at creating a separate organization that coordinates all aspects and sectors of the development in the region. The NWCDA had been affiliated to the Central Organization for Reconstruction (COR) which had been responsible for, as noted above, managing the implementation of the New Map Policy in the areas that were identified in the policy as ‘priority regions’ that had development potential. During the initial phases of formulation and implementation of the public policy, the NWCDA was the main organization that supervised and managed the development of projects in the NWC. However, this was changed when the NWC became among the new urban communities in 1980 and accordingly ANUC, APO/ANUC, and the Agency for Touristic Villages (ATV) joined in.

As shown in Figure 5.10, two organizations were established within ANUC to manage the implementation of the NWC: the Agency for Tourist Villages (ATV) and the Agency for the Protection of Ownership of ANUC in the NWC region (APO/ANUC). They became the main institutions responsible for the NWC superseding all other institutions in and outside MOR including the NWCDA.

In 1988 and during the implementation of Marina Al Alamein Tourists Center, the Agency for Tourist Villages (ATV) was established (under the authority of ANUC) to be responsible for the supervision and the implementation of the project as well as the completion of Marakia and Marabella tourist villages. The ATV had been the New Town Development Agency (NTDA) responsible for the NWC region and acquired its name due to the nature of the NWC being a tourism region. Accordingly, the role of the NWCDA had decreased and was restricted to the management of other governmental projects such as the erection of roads and infrastructure in the NWC region. Its role had decreased further with the establishment of APO/ANUC.

It is necessary to point out here that NTDAs do not have investment capacities and they failed to achieve the goal of increasing the number of settlers in most of the new towns (see Chapter 4) because of financial and administrative difficulties. According to Ibrahim (1993), there is a contradiction in the organizational structure of the NTDAs in the sense that it is not clear whether they are considered executive bodies or agencies that have powers to set and implement policies and programmes within an
independent management system. The organizational structure for the NTDA consists of three main sectors. Each comprises a number of central departments, which in turn are divided into a number of general departments. According to Ibrahim (1993) this may be due to fulfill the policy of providing jobs for high cadre personnel more than being an administrative necessity coping with volumes of work. Ibrahim (1993) argues that a number of those departments do not exist and a number of them have no work.

The only NTDA that had significant work and authority was ATV because it was able to generate financial returns from building and selling the holiday homes as well as engaging in their maintenance, extensions, and modifications. MOR decreed that any modifications done by the owners to their holiday homes had to be approved by ATV. Therefore, many owners of holiday homes in Marakia, Marabella, and Marina Al Alamein contracted ATV, itself, to carry out changes they wished to implement in the interiors of their houses. Accordingly, ATV was able increase its profit.

The ‘Agency for the Protection of the Ownership of ANUC35 in the North West Coast Region’ (APO/ANUC) was established in the early 1990s to issue the licenses and supervise the projects that the housing cooperatives and private sector companies carry out in the NWC region. It is necessary to highlight that Law 59 in 1979, as noted above, entitled ANUC to be the owner of all lands that were included as ‘new urban communities’ until they are ‘fully established’ and then they return to their Local Government. Although there had been several new communities in Egypt, no other agency was established to protect ANUC’s ‘ownership’. Indeed, the Agency for the Protection of the Ownership of ANUC in the NWC region (APO/ANUC) was the only agency that was established for the purpose of ‘protecting’ the ownership of ANUC. Does this mean that other ANUC’s “ownership” are in no need for “protection”? And indeed, what is there to be ‘protected’?

Both ATV and APO/ANUC have had the same Head, who had been reporting directly to the Minister of Reconstruction. ATV had been responsible for only the public sector projects while APO/ANUC had been responsible for all other projects that were mandated to it by the Ministry of Housing.

35 After the NWC became a new urban settlement, the lands that were owned by the government in the NWC region became under the authority of ANUC including those lands that belonged to the Awkaf Agency and the Reconstruction and Land Reclamation Agency (RLRA).
being established in the region. Although the responsibilities of APO/ANUC included the NWC region at large, it had been concentrating on the narrow coastal strip between the 34th and the 100th km from Alexandria. It had been concentrating on issuing building licenses and giving ownership rights to companies, cooperatives and individuals who had to pay around 10 pounds per square meter of land to formalize their ownership. APO/ANUC had the authority to take the lands back if the new owners fail either to fulfill their financial commitments or fail to start construction before a two-year period.

The management and the operation of the three public sector projects (Marakia, Marabella and Marina Al Alamein) had been under the authority of Marakia for Development and Tourism Management (MDTM) which was established for the maintenance, security, irrigation and landscaping of the public sector ‘touristic villages. The head of MDTM was always an official in MOR, while the members of the board were, in the main, employees in MOR. Its responsibility had extended to be able to rent the holiday homes on behalf of the owners if the owners wished to let their holiday homes when they were not using them. It collected annually around 11 Egyptian pounds\(^{36}\) per each square meter of the floor area of the housing unit from the owners of Marakia, Marabella, and Marina Al Alamein to cover the expenses of maintenance and operation of the three projects. In addition, it invested in implementing additional holiday homes in the experimental area at Marina Al Alamein to finance the treatment of beach erosion (as a consequence of establishing breakwaters) and to finance the implementation of additional shops, leisure activities (e.g. a large amphitheater), and sports fields. ATV was contracted to construct the additional holiday homes, shops, and leisure activities and, until the time of this study, additional holiday homes were being implemented.

The above discussion emphasizes three important constraints to policy implementation. **First**, the responsibilities and authority of ANUC increased in the NWC region on the expense of those of the NWCDA. The former, although an MOR department, had been closer to Local Government because its offices were located in the NWC region (in Alexandria and Matrouh Cities) in contrast to ANUC which was

\(^{36}\) 10 pounds from the owners of Marakia, 11 pounds from the owners of Marabella and 12 pounds from the owners of Marina Al Alamein.
located in MOR’s central building in Cairo. Also, it had close association with the Ministry of Planning because budgetary finances were allocated directly to the NWCDCA for investing in infrastructure and roads construction in the NWC region. In addition, its first head was a tourism expert (Dr. Salah Abdel-Wahab) who was concerned with establishing a tourist industry in the NWC. Therefore, it was necessary to reduce the influence of the NWCDCA in the region to eliminate opposition to the Minister’s will to increase holiday homes on the expense of establishing tourism accommodation, facilities and attractions. The implications of this political expediency will be discussed in further detail in Section 5.4.3.

Second, the continuing intensification of holiday homes (even in areas that were completed according to their initial site plans), could be explained through the concern of MOR to keep its touristic villages in an ‘under construction’ state. According to the Law and as noted before, the new urban communities remain under the authority of ANUC until they are ‘fully established’ and then could by transferred to the Local Government. The ‘under construction’ state meant that those projects had not been fully established and accordingly they could remain under ANUC’s responsibility. This reflects that ANUC was violating policy regulations and carrying capacity standards so as to keep the touristic villages under its jurisdiction and to prohibit their transfer to Local Government because they were a major source for benefits. These benefits were not only financial, but the holiday homes were often awarded at very cheap prices for politicians in return for their political support as well as ‘buying’ the support of journalists to muzzle criticism (Cole and Altorki 1998).

Third, the commercial attitude of MOR. It was managing a tremendous investment that exceeded 50 billion L.E in the NWC region alone from both the public and private sector’s moneys (Ibid.). The government had entitled ANUC the right to profit from land acquisition and holiday home development to finance the establishment of new towns and new communities nationwide. However, as may be assumed, the Central Government became suspicious with ANUC’s methods to invest and profit from holiday home development in the NWC region and decreed in 1998 that the money generated by ANUC had to be deposited in the National Treasury Department.
of the Ministry of Finance. According to the Vice-President of APO/ANUC\textsuperscript{37}, this action was an utter disaster to ANUC’s staff and senior officials because this significantly decreased their bonuses and financial privileges, and indeed, their political position.

In summary, the discussion of the institutional arrangements and administrative structures during the NWC policy process showed the contradictions, overlaps, and duplications in the responsibilities of many institutions as well as coordination problems between them. Every institution claimed rights over the projects that were established in the region. Each had its own agenda and struggled to implement it, which, as a consequence, had significant repercussions on policy implementation. According to Ibrahim (1993) and the regional planner of the NWC,\textsuperscript{38} coordination between the institutions had proven impossible even among different departments within the same ministry. According to the ex-Minister of MOR\textsuperscript{39} the conflict between elements of the state and conflicting interests among some Ministries and even between organizations within the same Ministry constrained the achievement of many planning objectives. Although the Minister of Reconstruction had had the upper hand in decisions related to types and sizes of projects, building regulations, development priorities, etc., he was faced by a huge bureaucracy (of his creation) that, as he confessed in a discussion with the researcher,\textsuperscript{40} constrained the implementation of decisions. The top public officials who managed the different departments in the Ministry had had different and changing, and even conflicting, values and motivations. The top management had been changed, retired, and moved several times. Although (as may be assumed) they had all worked to please the Minister of Reconstruction so as to remain in power and authority, several conflicts had arisen among them and with the consultants. This had only increased the centralization of decisions where the Minister had to decide every little aspect that concerns the development in the NWC, which consequently affected his responsibilities towards other projects in the rest of the country.

\textsuperscript{37} Mr. I. El-Kabi, Vice-President of APO/ANUC in a discussion with the researcher in November 1998.
\textsuperscript{38} Dr. A. Abdelaziz, President of PUD Consultants.
\textsuperscript{39} His Excellency H. Kafrawy, the ex-minister of MOR in a discussion with the researcher.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
5.4.3 Marakia Pilot Project: Reasons of Deviation

Reference had been made in Section 5.3.3 to the change in Minister Kafrawy’s approach towards the implementation of the NWC policy. He became less enthusiastic to encourage tourism development in the NWC so as not to ‘upset’ the new President who gave the impression in his early speeches to a return to social ideals. Therefore, and as noted in Section 4.4.1, when the implementation of Marakia had already started, the Minister demanded major changes in the initial design concept (after it was approved by him and authorized by ACR and TAMS). According to the President of PUD Consultants 41, the Minister was concerned with what the new regime might think if the Ministry was implementing tourism projects for foreigners and upper class Egyptians rather than implementing projects for low-income Egyptians. Accordingly, Kafrawy insisted on building holiday homes for the ‘general public’ where they can be able to own affordable vacation houses along the Mediterranean (ibid.). The consultant explained that according to policy guidelines, Marakia was supposed to contribute to attract the population to New Ameriyah City (NAC) by generating employment in the tourist industry and accommodating day-trippers.

The consultant, in the light of the “client’s” insistence, included in his designs some housing for the “general public.” However, the project still included the activities that were recommended in the public policy. Later, the Minister demanded intensifying the holiday homes on the expense of the other project’s components. The consultants refused to violate the tourism policy principles and as a consequence the contract between MOR and PUD was cancelled. According to the President of PUD Consultants 42, the cancellation was because:

“After the Minister had approved and authorized the design concept of Marakia and implementation had gone a long way, he told me to change the design concept which was based on implementing hotels, motels, leisure and sports activities and providing a zone for day-trippers coming from NAC and Alexandria [which was in accordance with the policy requirements]. Instead he wanted to build multi-storey buildings to accommodate the holidaymakers who would be able to remain in Marakia for the whole of their vacation. Because I thought this would constrain the regional development objectives, and indeed the project’s raison d’être, I refused. In addition, he started interfering in all aspects of the design and implementation, applying unaccepted standards,

41 Dr. A. Abdelaziz, President of PUD Consultants.
42 Ibid.
demanding the use of building materials that did not correspond with the natural environment, and even interfering in the architectural styles that were in accordance with the local architecture. He did not accept any discussion or negotiation; and I did not want to apply design standards that were in conflict with my own scientific and technical experience.”

In a discussion with the Minister of Reconstruction, he confirmed that he demanded changing the design concept, and pointed out:

“Not because it was bad, but I couldn’t escape the pressure from other politicians, particularly members of the People’s Assembly, who wanted to own flats overlooking the Mediterranean. Therefore, I fired PUD Consultants because they refused to cooperate.”

The above quote highlights that the Minister instead of making sure that the policy recommendations and objectives were implemented (which he himself had approved) was more concerned with responding to the ‘pushing and hauling’ of other politicians. The result was that the locals and the day-trippers were prevented from using the beach and facilities, the activities that would have generated employment were cancelled, and the tourist attractions that would have gained long-term profits particularly in foreign currency were substituted by holiday homes. Indeed, the multi-storey buildings replaced most recreational activities, sports fields, tourist services and facilities, and green areas as discussed in Chapter 4.

In the light of the above, it can be argued that the Minister had a range of interests he believed would help him retain office (and indeed he succeeded where he was able to remain in office for more than 15 years).

First, he believed that the regime would not welcome the idea of implementing tourism attractions but would be inclined with the idea of implementing holiday homes for the general public.

Second, he believed that awarding some concessions for other politicians would gain him more political powers.

5.4.4 Marina Al Alamein: The Politics of Implementation

In mid 1980s the Egyptian President was looking at possibilities to diversify the national economy, earn foreign exchange, and improve people’s livelihood.

43 His Excellency, H. El-Kafrawy, the ex-Minister of Reconstruction in a discussion with the researcher in July 1998.
Accordingly, the regime took some decisive steps towards decentralization, structural adjustment, increasing production, encouraging the private sector, and enhancing Egypt’s ‘capitalist’ economy. Indeed, the socialist ideals that Kafrawy thought the regime was advocating proved to have been misleading.

Reference had been made in Chapter 4 to President Mubarak’s visit to some Mediterranean countries to look at their experience of promoting tourism in their coastal regions. He was searching for ways to diversify the national economy and increase foreign exchange. In the light of his visit to the Mediterranean countries, beach-oriented tourism was seen as one of the main solutions. Accordingly, he assigned the Minister of Reconstruction to implement a major tourism center in the NWC region to compete with those in Tunisia and Morocco.

As noted in Chapter 4, PUD Consultants were commissioned in 1984 to prepare the site planning and designs for Marina Al Alamein Tourists Center. Contracting PUD Consultants to prepare the project was for two main reasons. First, as a compensation for canceling its contract with MOR (for the continuity of supervising the implementation of Marakia) to avoid the public announcement of the court’s decision that was in PUD’s favor (see Section 4.4.2). Second, Minister Kafrawy believed that PUD Consultants were the most suitable planners to implement the tourist attractions and leisure activities that were outlined in the NWC policy because:

- They had extensive experience in planning for tourism development;
- They had been involved in the preparation of the NWC tourism policy; and
- Similar to the President of Egypt, they had been advocating the implementation of a major tourism center in the region and had already some ideas for some tourism attractions and facilities. Accordingly they could be able to produce the necessary plans to be presented to the President quicker than any other consultant could.

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44 As noted by Dr. A. Abdelaziz, the President of PUD Consultants in a discussion with the researcher.
45 As noted by the Minister of Reconstruction in a discussion with the researcher.
Accordingly, Minister Kafrawy commissioned PUD Consultants to prepare for the establishment of a major tourism center in the NWC region that would “impress the President”. Accordingly, the initial design concept of Marina Al Alamein included a diversity of tourism attractions including, as noted in Chapter 4, a golf course, a maritime center, three 5-star hotels, two motels, camping areas, and many other activities. According to MOR’s records, the project registered ten presidential visits (where the President was accompanied by visiting heads of states) to the project’s site in its first two years of implementation as well as at least two visits by the Minister per month during the implementation of Marina Al Alamein. This shows that the project was high on the political agenda and reflects the satisfaction of both the Minister and the President with its performance.

Several important points can be outlined from the above discussion. First, the methods for selecting the consultants to implement Marina Al Alamein tourists center was mainly to buy their ‘silence’ with regard to the court’s decision that was in PUD’s favor concerning Marakia’s contract. Second, the significance of the characteristics of the regime to which the Minister was changing his approach towards public policy implementation. Initially Kafrawy was in favor for encouraging international tourism during the policy formulation stage when President Sadat was advocating the ‘openness’ to the outer world. Later, when the regime changed, Kafrawy withdrew the ideas of encouraging international tourism when he thought that the regime was pro ‘socialism’. Later when it became clear that President Mubarak was encouraging the establishment of a capitalist economy, Minister Kafrawy returned to the ideas of establishing tourism attractions and facilities and implementing the NWC policy recommendations.

However, the Minister had to also respond to the ‘pushing and hauling’ of other political powers in society. For example, he responded to the high demands for holiday homes from many politicians and elites. He, as noted in Chapter 4 and above, demanded the intensification of holiday homes in the experimental area of Marina Al Alamein to meet the high demand. This action had significant repercussions on the implementation of the project as planned because the holiday homes, as noted in

46 In the words of Dr. A. Abdelaziz, the President of PUD Consultants.
Chapter 4, replaced “all” tourism attractions, hotels, and tourist facilities. According to Cole and Altorki (1998) the intensification was because,

“Many allege that cronyism plays a role in obtaining residences in the new villages by government ministries, other ranking officials, and their friends”.

Cole and Altorki (1998) cited the standpoint of a professor emeritus in Cairo with long experience in the NWC,

“They first obtained villas very cheaply in Abo Sultan near Ismailia on the Suez Canal. They never used these villas but obtained other villas in Marakia. Later on they moved to Marabella when it was developed because Marakia began to be too popular. More recently they moved to Marina. The ministers were able to sell the villas they abandoned in the various villages for handsome profits.”

Indeed, “state patronage” is also said to be a factor in the new beachfront development particularly in Marakia, Marabella and Marina Al Alamein as well as in many other areas along the NWC region as will be discussed in Section 5.4.5 and shown in Boxes 5.4 and 5.5.

Indeed, “state patronage” is also said to be a factor in the new beachfront development particularly in Marakia, Marabella and Marina Al Alamein as well as in many other areas along the NWC region as will be discussed in Section 5.4.5 and shown in Boxes 5.4 and 5.5.

“Journalists, university professors, and other professionals cheaply acquire beach residences, as the state allegedly buys their political support and muzzles criticism, especially by journalists” (ibid.).

In addition, MOR had been intensifying the holiday homes to meet the high demand from the elites who were involved in processes of speculation and money laundering. This could be the only explanation for spending billions of pounds by upper class Egyptians in second homes that had been only used for less than 20 days per year. Indeed, Cole and Altorki (1998) argue that the very rich had been laundering their money in Marina Al Alamein.

“Speculation and allegations of cronyism, patronage and money laundering taint the new holiday resorts, but most citizens who have
purchased housing in the villages are ordinary people from the elites with significant financial assets (ibid.)

The above discussion shows that the state invests directly in developing holiday resorts in the NWC and indirectly supports private investors through the sale of desert land at very cheap prices. Therefore all Egyptians, including the masses, subsidize the elites who are the main beneficiaries of this beachfront development. In addition, MOR utilized the public projects for gaining political support and increasing profits. Accordingly, the heavy reliance on holiday home construction and their intensification had significantly violated the policy regulations and replaced the activities that were prescribed in the policy to achieve the national and regional objectives. Indeed, political expediency constrained the implementation of the activities cited in the tourism public policy. The ‘non implementation’ of those activities had a direct effect on the implementation of the policy ‘promises’ in terms of employment generation and consequently the attraction of population. In addition, attracting international tourists, increasing foreign exchange, diversifying the Egyptian economy, generating employment, and the development of backward areas were sacrificed in lieu of getting fast return on investment and gaining political support.

Furthermore, MOR’s attitude and violation of policy regulations ‘opened the door’ for other state institutions (e.g. Local Government, the Ministry of Culture, and the Military) to acquire similar benefits to those achieved by MOR (see Boxes 5.4 and 5.5).

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**Box 5.4. State Patronage**  
**Source:** Cole and Altorki (1998)  
Matrouh Governorate planned for implementing Aguiba touristic village near Mersa Matrouh City with an initial size of 328 chalets. According to one of the chalet owners in Aguiba “I was sitting here, and the governor and the Prime Minister said, ‘I need one or two chalets’. He liked the place. So, they built six more chalets where they were not supposed to be built. The law at that time forbade building within 500 meters from the sea. Now, the limit is 200 meters. They built his chalets directly on the sea, not even one-meter

**Box 5.5. The ‘Expropriations’ of Land by the State**  
**Source:** Cole and Altorki (1998)  
People in the NWC speak of ‘expropriations’ of land by the state, particularly the military. Cole and Altorki (1998) illustrated one notable case, which they classify, as ‘expropriation’ is the area at Sidi Qreir. “Bedouin say they were approached by representatives from the military who informed them they would have to move away from this land to make way for a new strategic airport to be built on the site. Bedouin say the officers told them that the desert is wide and that they could relocate themselves somewhere else. Bedouin say they would
away. Those six chalets became sixteen. Every minister wanted one, but they never used them. Their chalets were larger and I think they paid 32,000 pounds for each. They sold them for a hundred to a hundred and fifty thousand pounds each.” Eventually, an additional 128 chalets were built and sold by the government. About 25 of the original chalets owners (other than the ministers) are said to have sold their chalets for handsome profits. As many as 107 chalets have never been used by the owners, some of whom are said to have never visited Aguiba. Only 56 of the chalets were occupied at the apex of the summer season (August 1994).

countered that this was their ancestral land, that this was prime land for fig production, that other areas could not compensate for the loss of their fig orchards, and that, moreover, the desert was not empty but already occupied by other Bedouins with their own patrimonial claims to the land. Bedouin say the area was then surrounded by tanks, and they were ordered to leave. A standoff ensued while the Bedouins sent a delegation to Cairo to present their case to sympathetic representatives in the People’s Assembly and to lobby high state officials on their behalf. Bedouins say they found support for their cause, but the order was not rescinded. They had to abandon the land. The strategic airport was never built, but the area was developed as a summer resort.”

The following example shows the political processes in which the Ministry of Culture (MOC) was involved to control resources for its private benefit from Marina Al Alamein particularly when it became a ‘fashionable’ resort with significantly high land value as noted in Chapter 4.

Initially, MOC was not involved in the policy process of the NWC. However, as noted in Section 4.4.2, in 1989 and during the construction of Marina Al Alamein project, some ancient Roman remains were found buried in the site. Accordingly, the Antiquities Authority (an affiliate to MOC) prohibited the construction of the excavation area until it investigates the historical significance of the remains. As noted in Chapter 4, the consultants welcomed the idea of including the remains into an open-air museum to add to the project’s attractiveness to tourists. The site was discovered to be an ancient Roman village and a Marina with significant historic value. Accordingly, the Antiquities Authority had increased the excavation site and had been occupying the area until the time of this study. No action was taken to exploit the area as an open-air museum. Instead the Antiquities Authority had implemented some houses where the senior officials of the authority had been seen vacationing in the area (Al Ahram Al Arabi, 1999)\(^\text{47}\). On the other hand, MOR had been (by force) trying to implement some holiday homes in the restricted area. As a consequence, parts of the Roman village were ruined and the Antiquities Authority took the case to court\(^\text{48}\) (ibid.).

\(^{47}\) For further discussion on the issue, see the article entitled, “A Disaster in Marina”, in Al-Ahram Al-Arabi Weekly Magazine, on Saturday June 12\(^{th}\) 1999, Issue No. 116.

\(^{48}\) Case Number 75 in 1994 at the Dekheila’s District Attorney’s office in Alexandria.
This action had had several consequences. **First**, it had divided Marina Al Alamein into two separate zones, which in turn affected the circulation and caused the duplication of services and infrastructure. **Second**, it constrained the implementation of the 5-stars hotel that was supposed to be located in the area, and consequently affected employment and revenues. The two consequences could have been justified if the site was ‘properly’ exploited. However, **third**, the project lost such a valuable resource (the ancient Roman village) that would have enhanced its attractiveness to both domestic and international tourists.

Due to constraints of time and space, emphasis has been given to the above cases of political expediency. However, several other examples existed which provide ample scope for further research. The next sub-section, however, investigates what happened to the development of the ‘backward’ area of the NWC region.

### 5.4.5 The Hinterland Development

As mentioned before, the NWC region lies within three Governorates: Alexandria, Matrouh, and Behira. Initially, the study area (between the 34th and the 100th km from Alexandria) was within Matrouh’s jurisdiction. However, the Governor of Alexandria\(^49\) was lobbying to add parts of the study area to Alexandria. His argument was based on the fact that Alexandria had been providing the whole NWC region (including Matrouh City) with water, electricity, and telecommunication. In addition, the rate of growth of urbanization in Alexandria was so high that it needed an extension to accommodate the growth of urbanization and the population increases. His aim was to add the area between the 34th km and the 66th km from east to west and from the Mediterranean to New Ameriyah City (around 7 km) from north to south to the governorate. The stretch of land along the Mediterranean (32-km) was even longer than the existing sea frontage of Alexandria. This area included Marakia and Marabella touristic villages as well as New Ameriyah City (NAC), Burg Al Arab, Bahig, Gharbaniat, and Al Hammam towns. The addition of the area would mean extra budgetary allocation from Central Government to Alexandria to finance development projects in the new added area for the new added population. It also would mean that the Governorate would receive extra tax revenues from the added population, the industries in NAC and the owners of holiday homes in the touristic

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\(^{49}\) His Excellency, I. El-Gawsaky, Governor of Alexandria (1983-1997).
villages. Accordingly, in the late 1980s the area became under Alexandria’s jurisdiction.

The Governor offered the Minister of Reconstruction, in order to get his political support in this matter, to contribute to supplying the NWC with regional infrastructure and to link NAC to Alexandria with transport facilities to encourage the population to work in the new town. The Minister of Reconstruction welcomed such arrangement because his motive\textsuperscript{50} was to prove that the new town (NAC) succeeded in attracting population and created jobs. Accordingly, the added area became under the administrative jurisdiction of Alexandria, while at the same time, it was under the authority of MOR being part of the new urban community of the NWC.

However, the above mentioned arrangement had direct and sometimes disastrous consequences to the NWC such as those identified by some academics and planning consultants.\textsuperscript{51} In their view, NAC was transformed into a satellite town for Alexandria where people commuted daily to and from the city. Indeed, there were industries established and jobs created, but the millions of pounds invested in the establishment of housing, basic services, utilities and infrastructure did not achieve the new town’s raison d’être. Very few workers resided in the city (see Chapter 3), and the few who migrated worked in manufacturing industries, which meant that the city accommodated less diversified social classes which is contradictory to Town Planning concepts and approaches. In addition, as the regional planner of the NWC pointed out\textsuperscript{52}, “NAC wasn’t utilized for the prosperity of the NWC region”. What was conceived for the city was to accommodate the workers in the tourist industry (including hotel managers, tour operators, owners of shops, restaurants, cinemas, theatres, etc., and their employees) as well as in agriculture and light industries that serve tourism. However, NAC was transformed into an industrial city, and tourism was never the main economic mainstay of the NWC region.

The addition of parts of the NWC region to Alexandria governorate had other implications. As noted above, MOR was more concerned to express its authority over

\textsuperscript{50} His Excellency: H. Kafrawy, the ex-minister of MOR pointed out in a discussion with the researcher that his overall objective was to ‘make the new towns work’ and in his opinion he was successful.

\textsuperscript{51} For example, Dr. R. Helmy, Dr. A. Ibrahim, Dr. M. Hanna, Dr. A. El-Rimaly and others.

\textsuperscript{52} Dr. A. Abdelaziz In a discussion with the researcher in June 1998.
the coastal zone. Therefore, Alexandria governorate looked for resources to exploit elsewhere so as not to create any conflicts with MOR. Accordingly, the governorate established several projects around Maryut Lake. Chapter 4 had noted that the lake was reclaimed and filled for the purpose of implementing several projects to serve the governorate. Indeed, several industrial activities were established on reclaimed parts of the lake. As a consequence, and as reported in Al-Ahram53 newspaper, the lake’s size and its fish production decreased considerably. According to the same article,

“Alexandria governorate utilized the lake as a disposal area for solid and industrial wastes. In addition, it had assigned around 500 feddans from the lake for establishing Mubarak Sports City. Several industrial activities were also established on vast reclaimed areas. The regional highway and the implementation of the International Garden had cropped considerable water areas.”

The above discussion shows that Alexandria Governorate was also involved in political processes to gain access to land, which had significant repercussions on the implementation of the NWC policy. The transfer of New Ameriyah City (NAC) to Alexandria Governorate constrained the establishment of the tourist industry in the NWC region as illustrated above. In addition, the exploitation of Maryut Lake as an industrial area degraded an important resource for tourism development, and also constrained the growth of development towards the hinterland. Indeed, land is a source of wealth and many institutions wanted to grab the lands of the NWC and get ‘any’ benefit.

The above examples support the public choice view that assumes, as noted in Chapter 2, that non-elected officials respond to the pushing and hauling of politicians, elites, and interest groups because they can derive rents from providing favored access to public goods, services and regulations (see Colander 1984). However, this is not to assume that officials are corrupt but, as noted in Chapter 2, they are human agents who have multiple, often conflicting, and sometimes changing political goals and their values and interests are changed accordingly. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2 and illustrated above, value and value change lie in the heart of public policy analysis.

53 Al Ahram daily newspaper, (1999),”Maryut Lake is Facing Death”, Friday May 7th. See also Al Ahram on Friday June 11th 1999.
5.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has demonstrated that tourism is part of the struggle for the control of space in which social groups are continually engaged, a struggle in which the dominant group seeks to legitimate, through statute, its understanding of the appropriate use of space. However, geographical space is a strictly limited resource: a resource that belongs to the local population of the geographical space. Locational conflict represents an overt public debate over some actual or proposed land use or property development. Tourism types, land use, and the location of tourism infrastructure can lead to substantial opposition from some interests in the destination region as this chapter has demonstrated.

Despite the government’s good intentions in the beginning, it has not been tourism per se that had caused problems in the NWC, but rather the lack of enforcement of existing rules and regulations designed to guide the development of tourism along a more sustainable path. Because profit from holiday homes was so great that the government focused willy nilly on implementing touristic villages and holiday homes, and the concept of sustainable tourism that would programme developments for the community as a whole took a second place to the immediate needs of profit. Despite the existence of a number of economic, social, cultural and environmental objectives within national and regional governments’ tourism policies as illustrated in Chapter 4, economic objectives lie at the top of the policy agenda. Unfortunately, the effectiveness and success of tourism policy are invariably set according to the number of tourists that arrive at particular destinations (in the case of NWC, the number of houses sold) rather than the net benefit that tourism brings to the destination.

This chapter has illustrated the arrangements of the institutions involved in the policy process in the NWC region. It has identified, through several illustrative examples, that each institution had its own preferences. The preferences were conflicting and sometimes contradicting with those of the other institutions. In addition, both the structures of the institutions and their operational systems had been affecting the relationships between the different actor groups. Moreover, it became clear that political expediency constrained the region’s contribution to the resolution of Egypt’s human settlement planning objective. Indeed, the struggle between the numerous
institutions over resources and over power had constrained the implementation of such prime national objective.

In the light of the discussion of the arrangements of public institutions it can be contended that such arrangement was the main reason for failure of the new communities to attract the population and indeed achieve their *raison d’être*. ANUC became preoccupied with the implementation of settlements in the new communities, seen as primarily physical environments, created as a single model project (as if a town was what a single building is for an architect or a single construction project for an engineer), rather than an incremental creation responding to piecemeal demand. In the absence of the Ministry of Planning as well as local involvement, there was a striking lack of concern with the new communities as specialised elements in a national territorial economy or as complexes of social interaction (where normally economic and social interaction determine the physical form rather than the reverse). New communities require long periods of gestation (25 to 30 years) and it becomes extremely difficult to sustain programmes of public investment over such a long time, especially where administrations change and external economic events force radical changes in governmental policy. Financing was also made difficult because so much capital was required in the early phases, long before any returns were available. Therefore, there was a need to make rapid sales of land, which consequently had negative implications. Because sales were induced by subsidising land prices, it encouraged the speculative purchase of land to be held as an asset rather than for development. A designed settlement also required all elements to be completed in time, so that there was little flexibility in reshaping the project because of changed financial priorities (unlike settlements created incrementally as populations increase). These problems were made worse where co-ordination of the different parts was weak, so that some were completed but remained for long unutilised, leading to a waste of investment.

The problem of overlapping responsibilities between the many public institutions cannot be solved by giving more power to some over others, but needs coordination and definitions for the roles of every institution and determining the mechanism for coordination, supervision and monitoring. There exist some bodies without a well-defined objective, or they may have had particular roles and responsibilities but were unable to be effective due to deficiencies in the regulations and laws that define their
functions. For example, the planning regions of Egypt that were determined by the Ministry of Planning (MOP) after dividing the country into eight regions with a high committee for regional planning in every region headed by a deputy minister who resides in the region. These committees never had real authority nor well-defined roles and tasks or even skilled personnel capable of undertaking the responsibility of planning. It can be argued that such committees could have been more efficient and effective in planning and implementing regional developments in cooperation with local governments as stated by the Egyptian Constitution (see Figure 5.3).

Policies designed to provide economic growth and employment cannot be divorced from the interests, values, and power of those who formulate and implement them. The formal organization of the state is assumed to serve the long-term public interests by creating and maintaining conditions conductive to the efficient use of resources, subordinating the conflicting short-run interests of the capital to the long-run interests of the public. What happened in the NWC was the opposite. The state, as demonstrated in this study, served its own interests to the neglect of the long-term interests of the public.

However, perhaps there are still other explanations to the questions posed by an ordinary citizen from the NWC region who asked two question that still remain to be answered; and indeed they provide an ample scope for further research:

“A major problem with all new coastal villages: what is the usefulness of investing people’s savings and the government’s money in houses that are used for only 2 months a year or may be not used at all? Also why do we always block the shore with structures that end up being walls to prevent ordinary people from enjoying the view.”
Chapter 6

SUSTAINABLE TOURISM: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY ISSUES
6.1 Overview
This study has succeeded in achieving two major aims set out in Chapter 1. Firstly it has successfully drawn from the diverse and complicated events that occurred in Egypt between 1974 and 1994 a coherent history of Egypt’s tourism public policy process in the NWC region that was utilized to contribute to the resolution of Egypt’s human settlement and economic problems. The study provided in Chapters 4 and 5 a clear outline of that policy, the sequence of events, and those who were involved. Accordingly it succeeded to obtain an insight into the reasons for differences and conflicts between the national and regional policy objectives and the outcomes of development. Especially in terms of the efficiency of government and accountability of government officials throughout the decision-making cycle, the effectiveness of the administrative structures, and the inherent difficulties associated with implementation.

This history is significant because it reveals what was achieved in Egypt when tourism was adopted as a catalyst for developing isolated regions. The lessons, which can be learnt from the difficulties revealed by this research, despite the specific nature of events described in Chapters 4, because of common experiences with regional development and tourism, are relevant for many other countries.

Secondly the study has analyzed the NWC tourism public policy in terms of institutional arrangements, power arrangements, and values and interests of the policy actors. In doing this, the study, as described in Chapter 5, has succeeded in obtaining insight into, and demonstrating the reasons for, the nature of constraints that affected the realization of policy objectives. It demonstrated that political expediency, (institutions struggle to control resources and implement their agendas, politicians involved in political processes to influence policy in a struggle for power and authority, actors seeking to benefit from public offices, and awarding concessions to a powerful clan or kin to gain more political
powers), are together in large part responsible for the policy behavior.

Although the institutional arrangements, power arrangements, and values and interests have been referred to in general terms in the existing literature (Chapter 2) the findings of this research provide a degree of specificity, previously lacking. Consequently, this not only greatly increases the understanding of the politics of implementing tourism public policy, but can also be used, if applied to future policies, as a basis for ensuring greater relevance and effectiveness.

The rest of this chapter is in three sections. Section 6.2 summarizes the findings of the research. Section 6.3 discusses the significance of these findings for the future of development policies towards a more sustainable path for development. Finally, Section 6.4 indicates possible directions for future research.

6.2 The Findings of the Research

6.2.1 The Research Methods

Analytical Tools
The analytical tools: the framework for understanding policy behavior (institutional arrangements, power arrangements, values and interests) during the different stages of the policy cycle (identification, formulation, and implementation); and the principles of sustainable tourism described in Chapter 2, worked well. The framework adapted for use in this study proved to be a mechanism by which the diverse data from the case study could be systematically organized with both the general literature and with data on other policies in Egypt. As a result of using the framework in this way it was possible to analyze the policy process for the NWC region and also obtain a much clearer understanding of the action environment of public policies in general.

The use of sustainability principles resulted in the successful analysis of the NWC policy. The comparative evaluation of the policy against STD principles highlighted the constraints to achieve the policy ‘promises’. It was also possible to understand some of the reasons for these constraints.
The Explanatory Variables
The pictures obtained of the action environment of the NWC policy confirm and add specific details to the generalized statements of the literature on institutional arrangements, power arrangements and the values and interests of principal actors, which, as discussed in Chapter 5, are seen to be significant in explaining the constraints to implementing policy objectives.

The Case Study
The NWC region proved to be a good case for examination. In this region, as explained in Chapters 1 and 3, it was possible due to being a priority region for implementing national (human settlement) and regional (tourism) objectives, to examine the tourism policy process. Examples of political expediencies were clear in the case study and also their effects on constraining the implementation of national and regional objectives.

The Tourism Public Policy
The policy selected proved to be a satisfactory cross-section as it provided a variety of experience both in terms of approach to the various activities of the policy cycle (described in Figure 2.1) and the way in which the actor groups were organized to carry out the different activities. This variety made comparison between them particularly interesting and valuable as it revealed and highlighted the variation in performance, which contributed to a greater understanding of policy action environment. Indeed, the selection of the tourism public policy of the NWC region confirmed the views of Mowforth and Munt (1998) that the study of the politics of tourism policy “is another way of exploring unequal and uneven development.”

The Semi-Structured Discussion
The method of using semi-structured discussion to obtain data worked well. It proved possible, as explained in detail in Section 1.8, to obtain more than one interpretation of a situation. Discussions were held with representatives of the three main actor groups: Government, interest groups, and consultants.

A total of 60 persons out of 62 approached agreed to be interviewed. The two refusals as explained in Section 1.8 were concerned about organizational confidentiality.
6.2.2 The NWC Policy Process

The research successfully revealed a clear history of Egypt’s national development policies and the history of the NWC tourism public policy process. The history provides a valuable case study of what had happened when Egypt adopted a policy for promoting tourism to contribute to the resolution of its human settlement and economic problems. The history of the NWC policy process not only links the information of what actually occurred in a real situation to the existing general hypotheses as expressed in the literature (Chapter 2), but it also provides, for other contexts, examples of the inherent difficulties associated with policy implementation.

The wider Egyptian history also provides valuable information on the political, economic and social contexts in which development policies were being carried out during the study period (1974-1994). The analysis of the NWC policy against this myriad of detailed information, on Egypt and the Ministry of Reconstruction, contributed greatly to the understanding of the nature of the inter-relationships between the actor groups.

The NWC also served to illustrate the relationship between the analyses of the politics of national development and regional tourism development and highlighted the significance of the allocation of power, institutional arrangements and the values and interests of significant individuals in the tourism development process. Accordingly, these provided a descriptive approach to the tourism public policy process to serve future policies. Indeed, as Hall (1994) had noted, appropriate tourism policy decisions are dependent on knowledge of how such decisions were made in the real world of policy and how they were, in turn, implemented. However, it is still vital that further studies are undertaken which illustrate how policies are made and whose interests they favour.

6.2.3 Actor Groups and the Policy Process

The findings of the research confirms what was recognized in the literature, namely in Section 2.2.2, that it has been a persistent myth to anticipate implementation as simply about doing what has already been decided. Indeed, what had been implemented in the NWC region was different from what the policy had decided, as illustrated in Chapter 4. As noted in Chapter 2, non-implementation of policy means that there has been wastage of resources, time and expertise spent in formulating policy and the problems, which the
policy was designed to solve, may become more acute.

It cannot be assumed that the non-implementation or its deviation from the original policy requirements was due to lack of political will because, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, there was a strong political will behind the implementation of the NWC policy. However, the findings of this research (which accord with the views of Hogwood and Gunn (1993) as discussed in Section 2.2.2) identified that the main problem was that the actors involved did not share common objectives. In fact they had different motives, values and interests which had also been changing during the course of implementation.

In addition, the findings of the research support Grindle’s (1980) views, (as discussed in Section 2.2.2) in which she argues that the process of implementation may vary considerably depending upon whether the political regime is an authoritarian one or a more open system where elections impose a greater degree of responsiveness on both political and administrative officials. These issues were detected in the NWC policy as discussed in Chapter 5.

This research supported the opinions expressed in the general literature, reviewed in Chapter 2, that institutional arrangements, power arrangements, values, and interests affect the implementation of policy. However, unlike the published literature, which tends to emphasize the need to understand the political, economic and social environments, this research revealed the necessity to relate the tourism policy to a wider political scene. Egypt’s development policies, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, can only fully be understood when they are seen as part of the political context in which they were set. President Sadat aimed, with the confidence engendered by Egypt’s victory in the 1973 War, to establish new economic and human settlement policies, which were intended to redistribute the population and promote national development. This political determination, engendered by socio-economic necessity, to develop the NWC region had specific implications for the execution of the policy.

**Institutional Arrangements**

The research found evidence, which showed that while the institutional structure of MOR, established by Osman A. Osman (and discussed in Section 5.2) had a generally
beneficial influence on the policy identification stage, this was not always the case. The ill feeling of other ministries and organizations, engendered by jealousy of the exceptional position of MOR, resulted in difficulties of coordination between them. The result was a fierce struggle for power and authority to control resources where state institutions and departments were involved in political processes to implement their different agendas.

In addition, during the policy implementation stage, the lack of coordination, overlapping responsibilities, and ill feelings between different departments within MOR resulted in constraining the implementation of policy objectives. Accordingly, the administrative structure was changed during the policy formulation and implementation stages in an attempt to solve the coordination problems and to decrease the influence of other institutions and actors that opposed the Minister’s approaches. Therefore the Authority for New Urban Communities (ANUC) was given more power and responsibilities to ‘marginalize’ the influence of other institutions. However, ANUC’s engineering background and limited understanding and empathy with other disciplines (particularly tourism) had resulted in less than satisfactory management of development and thus the institutional structure could be shown to have had a detrimental effect on policy.

The findings also support the generally accepted wisdom of the literature concerning institutional strengthening. The research demonstrated that strengthening the wrong institutions could impede the development of true governing capacity as Bikales (1997) and Grindle (1997) had noted. Indeed, the power and authority that were entrusted to ANUC had significant repercussions on policy implementation as argued in Chapter 5.

Given a principal focus on the public policy process and on the activities that are considered the proper domain of government, the question remains as to what needs to be done to strengthen the ability of governments to perform efficiently, effectively, and responsively. Answers to this question have changed over time\(^1\), reflecting changing

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1 As outlined by Morgan (1993), efforts of the 1950s and 1960s tended to focus on institution building, involving initiatives to put in place basic public sector institutions that would allow post-independence governments to deliver on promises for rapid economic and social development. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, concern for institutional strengthening indicated growing concern that institutions already in existence were falling far short of expectations. Then the idea of development management was
needs, as well as frustration with prior intervention strategies for their inability to fix the problem. Interventions to develop more capable states require analytic tools that explore the roots of poor performance and that provide insights into the process of change.

**Power Arrangements**
The case study of tourism development in Alex-Imayid sub-region of the NWC region indicates the political complexities of regional development in general and tourism policy implementation in particular. Interest groups, who clearly have much to gain financially, the tourism industry, the consultants, and state institutions, may well have a different set of objectives in promoting tourism development than local communities. In addition, different actors and institutions may as well have a different set of objectives. In the case study, the rules of the game were established by MOR; and it was only when interest groups were able to gain access to institutions within the decision making process that they were able to promote their interests.

In the NWC, power generally did not lie within the constitutional decision making structures of the Ministry of Planning (MOP) and the Local Government (Figure 5.3), but instead was mediated within other state institutions. Power is never evenly allocated within a society but, at least in many western societies, there is usually some attempt to provide equitable access to the decision making process. Struggle to control resources, of which coastal land is only one component, transformed constitutional power arrangements. Significant individuals in traditional power structures may either be bypassed by new institutional arrangements or they may become interest groups (e.g. the local economic organisations), thereby utilising particular institutional arrangements and relationships to reinforce their own interests.

**Values and Interests**
The findings of the research revealed that policy decisions had been determined by the
decisions taken by Central Government officials, and those decisions were not necessarily reflecting the public interest but were rather affected by the officials’ self interests as well as many other political influences. Indeed, in the real world, human societies are not composed entirely of rational and selfless people; people are not equal; people’s needs and wants are not fully met; there are haves and have-nots; they contain limited resources. That is they contain a potential for conflicts for politics (Jaensch 1992 cited in Hall 1994).

The notion of interests is a useful one in focusing attention on which groups, organizations, and institutions have influence and power in decision making. Though governments may have some impact on the configuration of social forces, they inevitably represent the interests of certain groups more than others and operate within limits that are fairly narrow at one time. The political processes witnessed in the case study are not restricted to the NWC in Egypt. While actors, power, values, and interests change, the interaction of values, interests and power is universal to any situation in which tourism development is occurring. Unfortunately, many researchers often ignore this.

6.3 The Implications for Sustainable Tourism Development

This thesis is significant, firstly because it has contributed to the existing knowledge on tourism policy analysis by understanding the politics of the NWC tourism policy implementation. In doing this, as noted above, it adds a previously lacking specificity to the general hypotheses of the literature particularly to those searching for policy that contributes to sustainable development. Secondly it provides through the analysis of the NWC policy history an insight into the constraints to implementing a tourism policy that ‘promised’ to achieve sustainable tourism. Thirdly, the analytical framework and the principles of sustainable tourism described in Chapter 2 and utilized in Chapter 4 can be seen to have a utility beyond the Egyptian context for which they have been developed and used in this study.

This study, through its search for the reasons of failure to implement sustainable tourism development, focused on the characteristics of policy actors and on the political expediency that determined their actions. This research has discovered significant
findings for the future of tourism policies towards a more sustainable path for development. In addition, the findings of the research contribute to the enhancement of the definition of principles for sustainable tourism.

**Tourism Policy Implementation**

The slogan that tourism is a "smokeless" industry is only half-true. The research found evidence that improperly developed tourism can erode the physical and social environments. If tourism is to yield the benefits that are possible and proven, the concept of planning for sustainable tourism is essential. However, it is not enough to produce plans and policies that ‘promise’ to adhere to sustainable development principles, but implementation has to be recognized as a major constituent of the policy process. The principal role of government is to make sure that the adherence to those principles is a shared objective of all actors involved and in all stages of the policy process.

“Tourism can easily be a blessing to individuals and countries and a passport to the development of many regions.”

These were bold objectives but lacked the means to pursue them in the Egyptian case. They can only be achieved if tourism is planned and implemented in such a manner that its natural and socio-cultural resources are not depleted nor degraded, but maintained as viable resources on a permanent basis for continuous future use. Sustainability depends on how well policy is formulated relative to the specific characteristics of an area's environment, economy, and society and on the effectiveness of policy implementation and continuous management of tourism. The environmental and socio-cultural conservation approach, while achieving ‘long-term’ economic benefits, must be applied throughout the whole policy process.

If the area had good beaches, and reasonable weather, and was not much farther from tourists' residences than competing destinations, the human and financial resources required to construct and operate facilities for tourists could be easily secured. Indeed, the NWC region was able to attract billions of pounds from both the public and private sectors as Chapters 4 and 5 had demonstrated. While this feature made tourism an appealing choice for the rapid stimulation of large-scale development, it also had negative social and physical implications as demonstrated in this study. The tremendous
investment that was attracted to the NWC region could have been utilized more efficiently for improving the conditions in existing cities, for the welfare of the population and for the benefit of the regional and national economy.

In Egypt, economic objectives have loomed much larger than in many countries. These have included aims to increase national and regional income, expand industry, diversify and improve employment opportunities. The NWC public policy was to improve the national economy, earn foreign exchange, increase output and employment, attract long-term foreign investment and redistribute the population. These were also bold objectives, and also lacked the means to pursue them. Initially, the NWC region was planned to promote tourism as its economic mainstay. Later, it was decreed a ‘new community’ and, consequently, more attention was paid to urbanisation and on the implementation of infrastructure and housing. Indeed, this research has demonstrated that some policies often do not get implemented at all, and those which manage to get through the tortuous process of implementation often look very different from what their framers originally intended (see Chapter 2). Tourism development was forgotten and accordingly less attention was paid to its resource base. However, the opportunity costs, in terms of piecemeal improvements of the worst conditions in existing cities, were even higher. More importantly, new communities’ programmes were nowhere an alternative to the piecemeal improvement of existing cities (although they may have reduced the supply of available funds for this task). In addition, the economic basis of the ‘new community’ tended to be peculiar, calling on only particular types of workers (and exclude the unskilled, casual workers, the elderly, single parent families, etc.). Also, subsidised land prices encouraged speculation and a failure to develop the land; this would block off the possibility of full development of housing and would ensure public services were under-utilised.

What had happened in the NWC had kept no choices open for future generations. The long-term economic gain from the tourist industry was substituted for short-term fast return on investment, while the possibility for future generations to benefit from the natural resources became significantly limited. Political expediency is a ‘mild’ explanation of what had happened. Indeed, it is a ‘neutral’ justification for the actions of actors in the NWC region.
Coordination

Much discussion of tourism’s contribution to regional development, and to economic development in general concerns the way in which expenditure on tourism filters throughout the economy, stimulating other sectors as it does so (Pearce 1989). This is known as the ‘multiplier effect’. The multiplier is a measure of the impact of extra expenditure introduced into an economy, in this case through tourism, aiming at diversifying the sources of income, generating employment, increasing production, increasing foreign exchange earnings, etc. However, in the Egyptian case, the focus on holiday homes development superseded most regional economic activities. Indeed, in the NWC region, tourism’s contribution to regional development and to economic development in general was negligible. Despite the emphasis that was given in the tourism policy to other development sectors and activities in the NWC region, emphasis had not been given during implementation to international tourism nor to other supporting activities and to resulting administrative, health, agricultural, and industrial requirements of the expected tourism growth.

To the extent that the NWC was "well" planned, and was part of a more comprehensive national development plan, some problems arose because many elements and recommendations of the national, regional and site plans were not considered, because the private benefits particularly the economic one was usually an exclusive goal that controlled the tourist market and products. This, in turn, had many negative impacts on the environment and the local residents. What was lacking in the NWC had been the coordination between state institutions as well as between the Government, the consultants, the environment, and the tourist industry. In addition, tourism was developed in isolation from most other regional economic sectors, which meant the loss of resources and investment. Coordination is a prerequisite for sustainable tourism where it is necessary for all actors to work together and share common objectives.

As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the problem of overlapping responsibilities between the many public institutions cannot be solved by giving more power to some over others but needs coordination and definitions for the roles of every institution and determining the mechanism for coordination, supervision and monitoring. In addition, more attention
should be paid to the relationships between strategies, programmes, and projects that translate policy into action. As argued in Chapter 2, coordination between different projects as well as between projects and programmes is a better way to implement policies. Policies can better implemented by negotiation, consultation, participation, enabling, and co-ordination between decision-makers, stakeholders, and experts. Participation of the beneficiaries in all stages of planning, implementation, and management is necessary for the success of projects and implementation of policies. These tasks can only be achieved under governments’ supervision because, as noted in Chapter 2, the rationale for their involvement has been based on the welfare arguments for the public interest and they are ‘supposedly’ preoccupied with regarding the social, cultural and environmental concerns rather than increasing financial profits. However, public officials need to be aware of the ‘potential’ problems that could occur when policy implementation is under way. Awareness, training, research, strengthening, and coordination are more appropriate tools than giving more power and authority to the ‘sometimes’ wrong institutions and decision-makers.

**Strengthening Local Government**
Can it be concluded that the many changes this study accords adds up to development? Despite the existence of disparities, this study stresses that it observed much that could be considered to be highly positive. For example, the attraction of investment to an uninhabited region and indeed its urbanization, the employment generated in the construction industry, the integration of the Bedouins into the Egyptian society, the establishment of infrastructure and basic services that were lacking in the region, the empowerment of local economic organizations, etc. However, if development is defined as an ‘integrated’, ‘sustainable’ process of ‘incremental’ change leading to high physical standards of living; cultural, social, and psychological well-being for the wide majority of local people; and their effective participation in political decision-making, then the transformation long underway in the NWC is not development.

Certainly, the NWC has experienced its fair share of formal, state-sponsored ‘development’ programmes and projects. The region currently experiences strong dose of private-business driven ‘development’, especially in the tourism and holidaymaking field
but also, and increasingly, in the export-oriented livestock sector. However, much of the luxury there is exorbitant (for a poor country like Egypt). And there is the waste, so many unfinished building, not to mention that many finished ones that are not used. Moreover, one can argue with justification that the ‘incremental’, ‘integrated’, and ‘sustainable’ dimensions used to define change as development are little more than slogans. As such, they constitute elements of a concept of change derived more from 19th century Euro-American theories of the notion of progress than from empirical reality among people. Perhaps the uneven and unbalanced dimensions of empirical change in the NWC are nothing more than inevitable bumps on a long road leading from tradition to modernity. It is left to the future to discover that.

As demonstrated in this study, local people were unable to exercise their interests over regional developments because Local Government was excluded from the decision-making process. The absence of the local authorities in implementing the plans and policies had been a major detriment in the failure of policies to achieve their objectives. Substantive local participation in planning requires well-defined local powers. Given appropriate powers, local institutions need appropriately trained people to formulate plans and implement them. As discussed in Chapter 2, Local Government has been recognized as being the most important authority in establishing tourism development policies (Madrigal 1995; Bouquet and Winter 1987; Pearce 1989). Although upper tier governments have almost all the power, financial and legal, that power has to be given to Local Governments to have authority because they are the legitimate legal representatives of the local people. Indeed, in an environment of absence of elections, unrepresentative local government, and existence of relationships based on common interests, the ‘grounds were clear’ for political expediency. It can be safely assumed that Local Government will do better to think of themselves as long-term investors in regional development. They can identify the region’s potential competitive advantages, then build on the strengths through public and private investment, flexible business regulations, and efforts to control the local cost structure. However as discussed in Chapter 2, urban areas are part of a national and international economy, and even the best designed local strategy cannot overcome market, and other disadvantages. It is in this respect that national strategies can play a role; and the need is stressed for mediating mechanisms to be established so that local
enterprise can be recognized and supported from the center.

6.4 Issues for Future Research and Policy Makers

The breadth of the research reported in this thesis means that a wide number of issues have been touched upon but not examined in depth. Several questions, which are central to this study and justify further research, are discussed below in no particular order of importance.

1. While it is recognized that this thesis does not provide a complete analysis of the politics of tourism it is hoped that it will constitute the point of departure for future research which will take account of the fact that institutional arrangements, power arrangements, and values and interests of actors significantly determine policy outcomes.

2. Yet, given the global structure change towards service sector economies and the growing importance of tourism within them, further contributions towards explanation, prediction, and quantification of tourism phenomena are necessary. The onus on the tourism policy analyst is to demonstrate the relevance of his subject’s concepts and methods to both theoretical and empirical analyses of tourism. Equally those and other disciplines should take account of political perspectives.

3. For the general assumption that the greater the degree of government control, the greater the supposed sustainability and the wider the distribution of benefits within the community, does not always hold true. Sustainability principles differ according to the interests of those who are defining them, and the interests of Central Government will not necessarily coincide with those of Local Government; nor is it likely that the interests of the local community will be the same for all within the community. Even where Central Governments have attempted to follow environmentally benign, socially and economically beneficial, and culturally sensitive tourism developments, forces beyond their control have subverted the policies and have served only to emphasize seemingly ever-widening gaps. Accordingly, further research is needed to examine the different values and interests affecting interpretations and definitions of sustainable development and the politics involved in
deciding which definitions are being adopted, and whose interests they favor.

4. While this research has evaluated the performance of the NWC when the government had been fully involved in the policy process, it has not compared the performance where the government has not been involved, or has been less involved. Further research is needed to compare such arrangements. Such a comparison would help to determine first of all the extent of government’s involvement in identifying, formulating and implementing tourism policy and produce a better scenario along the public-private divide.

5. Within the current debate on the politics of sustainable tourism, the focus is primarily on ecological and, narrowly defined economic processes, rather than the cultural and political framework within which policy choices are made. Further research is required to analyze the politics of sustainable tourism in terms of who controls and who benefits from development.

6. Central to the discussion presented in this thesis has been the perceived influence of the action environment on the relevance and quality of execution of policy. This thesis, as explained in Chapter 1, started with the assumption that the characteristics of actors and the policy action environment were the most significant influence on the policy behavior. While this study has supported the assumption that policy internal dynamic is significant, it has also, by highlighting the significance of what have been termed in this thesis the explanatory variables (institutions, power and values), shown their implications, which together can be seen as the context in which the policy is executed. This raises a further question, which remains to be answered. That is whether policy internal dynamic (administrative structures, allocation of power, accountability of decision-makers and implementers, etc.) is a more or less important influence in policy behavior than the context in which it is operating?

7. This thesis provides an interesting case study of the Egyptian experience between 1974-1994 when the government adopted a policy of promoting tourism in the NWC region to contribute to the resolution of human settlement problems. Whilst
this research has increased the specificity of the general literature on the politics of tourism policy implementation by showing how a number of explanatory variables identified in the literature were influential in determining the performance of the NWC policy. It is left to future research to determine the extent to which similar results would be found outside Egypt.

8. A large and well-illustrated plan document can look very impressive in the politician’s office, and can give the impression that action is on the way (Aguilar, 1987). The donor agency too needs a plan document to provide a basis for drawing up its aid programme and to provide the necessary information on which to design its projects (Devas, 1993). Have these been the reasons for producing master plans in the NWC region of Egypt? Was implementing those development plans not a concern of the state? These questions can be answered through further research.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I

The Research Methodology

A. Method

The research was conducted in four stages. The first obtained, by reference to existing literature, an understanding of the general parameters of the subject areas: tourism public policy analysis and the politics of sustainable tourism development. The findings of this stage are summarized in Chapters 1 and 2.

The second used the knowledge gained from the first stage to adapt the outline of a framework, described in Section 2.3 in Chapter 2, which was used to obtain a clearer profile for the explanations of the behavior of tourism public policy processes (Figure 2.6).

The third stage used in-depth semi-structured discussions, described in Section 1.8 in Chapter 1, and referred to documents, plans, reports, and maps, to collect the relevant data for the selected case study: the NWC region of Egypt. The outlines of the discussions together with the list of the people interviewed are discussed below.

The forth and final stage was in two parts. First the analytical framework was refined and used to obtain structured and coherent exposes of the case study. Secondly, a set of sustainability criteria, described in Chapters 2 and 6, were used to compare and evaluate the performance of the tourism public projects (Marakia, Marabella and Marina Al Alamein) in order to obtain insight into the reasons for divergence from achieving the national and regional policy objectives.

B. Actor Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Officials</th>
<th>Interest and Local Groups</th>
<th>Consultants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians/administrators</td>
<td>Housing Cooperatives</td>
<td>Egyptian experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In authority</td>
<td>Local economic organizations</td>
<td>Expatriate experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were in authority</td>
<td>Landowners</td>
<td>Academics, scientists and experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Staff</td>
<td>Environmentalists</td>
<td>Private planning consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptians</td>
<td>Developers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expatriate</td>
<td>Local community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>Chiefs Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. Discussion Outline

The sequence of the questions asked and issues pursued broadly followed that of the cycle of the policy process. Discussion outlines started with issues relating to the problem identification then examined issues relating to preparation, formulation, and implementation and ended with an opportunity for interviewees to comment on and evaluate their experience of working on the development process.

1. Policy Formulation
   **General Issues Covered:**
   Terms of Reference, Objectives, Priorities, Selection of Consultants, Commissioning of Consultants, Submissions, Negotiations, Briefing, Selection of Projects, Selection of Implementers (Individuals and Organizations).

   **Sample of Questions Asked**
   - What are your previous technical experiences?
   - What was your position prior to appointment and now?
   - Who is responsible for problem identification and diagnosis?
   - How were all or any of the pilot projects identified?
   - Is there any person or group of persons (now or historically) responsible for defining or agreeing on plans, policies, and projects?
   - Who was responsible for writing TORs?
   - What were the priority policy objectives?
   - Who was responsible for selecting the consultants?
   - Was the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) responsible for negotiation directly with the consultants?
   - What were the personal contractual arrangements?
   - In what way were the identified pilot projects related to the national policy or local (governorate) plans? (e.g. how were the ministries of planning, local governments, tourism, finance and the governorates involved?)
   - What is the structure within MOR for management of development policies and projects?
   - Has there been regular meetings with the consultants? What is their frequency? What is their purpose?
   - Are the same people responsible for all projects? Are these meetings held in MOR? Are joint or individual minutes kept of the meetings?
   - Apart from formal meetings, was there easy, informal access to the ministry staff?

2. Policy Implementation
   **General Issues Covered**
   Project Organization, Management and Working Relationships, Responsibilities, Supervision, Priorities, Finances, Constraints, Training.

   **Sample of Questions Asked**
   - Did staff receive special training for management of tourism projects?
   - What sort of people at what level, had received any type of training?
   - What were the administrative and operational constraints of the development experience?
   - What were the reasons for not implementing some of the policy recommendations? E.g. airport construction, allocation of cooperatives, etc.
   - Why weren’t foreign and domestic grants allocated to the NWC region to facilitate policy implementation?
   - Was the Ministry of Tourism involved in the tourism policy process of the NWC? If yes, how was this coordinated? If no, why?
   - In your opinion, what could be the best scenario for coordinating the efforts of MOR, MOT and local government in implementing tourism policies in the NWC?
   - Were the public pilot projects good examples for the private sector’s initiative?
   - In your opinion, had the NWC became competitive with other Mediterranean tourism regions? If not why? If yes, how can you explain the low number of tourists’ arrivals?
What happened to the revenues from selling lands and holiday homes in the NWC?
Was the financial return more important than the environmental and social ones?
How do you explain the overlapping of responsibilities between departments within MOR? Did this facilitate or constrain the implementation process?
What were the administrative difficulties that faced the implementation of the policy?

3. Policy Evaluation

General Issues Covered
Final Comments, Monitoring, Research, Awareness, Responses, and Opinions.

Sample of Questions Asked
Had contracts generally been adhered to? If not why?
Had TORs generally been adhered to? If not, under what circumstances were they changed?
What were the benefits and costs, in your opinion, of the development in the NWC region? National, social, environmental, regional.
What were the lessons learnt from the experience?
What were the techniques for monitoring and appraising the development process?
Was there any research to evaluate the experience?
Do you consider the policy experience a success? If no why? If yes, what are the criteria?
### D. Persons Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor Groups</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOR</td>
<td>General Ahmed Abdel-Rahman</td>
<td>Ex Chairman of Egyptian Agency for Administration Auditing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hassaballah El Kafrawy</td>
<td>Governor of Dumiat President of ANUC Ex Minister of MOR Consultant</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Talaat Tawfik</td>
<td>Ex Minister of Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Mustapha Hifnawy</td>
<td>Ex Chairman of ARP Ex Minister of Housing Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Milad Hanna</td>
<td>Ex Minister of Housing Ex Member of Board of MDTM Consultant and Writer</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mahmoud El-Sarnagawy</td>
<td>Vice President ANUC Vice Minister MOR Senior Official MOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michele Fouad</td>
<td>Ex Chairman GOPP Consultant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr. Hoda Sakr</td>
<td>Chairman GOPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Abdelhalim El-Rimaly</td>
<td>Ex Vice President ANUC Professor of Urban Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wagdi Shabaan</td>
<td>Ex Member of ACR Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohamed Rasmi</td>
<td>Chairman MDTM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kamal El-Kahky</td>
<td>Ex Chairman MDTM Vice President of NAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ibrahim Sabry (refused to be interviewed)</td>
<td>President of ATV President of APOANUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdalla Tag</td>
<td>Ex President of ATV Ex President of APOANUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ibrahim El-Kabi</td>
<td>Vice President of APOANUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohamed Shalata</td>
<td>Ex Vice President of GOPP Ex Chairman ARP</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Effat Atallah</td>
<td>Ex President NWCDA Ex Chairman MDTM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor Groups</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor Groups</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOR, continued</td>
<td>Mokhtar Kandil</td>
<td>Chairman of NWCDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hossam Abdel-Moneim</td>
<td>President NAC Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khalifa Ali</td>
<td>General Manager of Marakia and marabella Tourists Villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Osama Abdel-Ghani</td>
<td>Manager, Technical Department ATV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Manal Batran</td>
<td>Manager, GOPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mona Karoura</td>
<td>Project Manager ATV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hisham Gharbawy</td>
<td>Manager, Projects Administration, ATV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khaled Mostafa</td>
<td>Technical Department, ATV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adel Qonsoua</td>
<td>Manager, Technical Department, MDTM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdo Hammad</td>
<td>Manager, Implementation Department, Burg El Arab City</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mohamed Allam</td>
<td>Computer Department, MDTM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sameh Francis</td>
<td>Architect, ATV</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Said El-Seesee</td>
<td>Lawyer, MDTM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mahdi Abd Raboh</td>
<td>Accountant, MDTM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ibrahim Abdel-Hadi</td>
<td>Project Manager, APOANUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT</td>
<td>Adel Radi</td>
<td>President, TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Raouf Helmi</td>
<td>Consultant, TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Essam Badran</td>
<td>Consultant, TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>General Abdelmonein Said</td>
<td>Ex Governor of Red Sea Governor of Matrouh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdelhadi Zikri</td>
<td>Manager, Labor Force Administration, Al Hammam City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmed Al-Tairy</td>
<td>Population Department, Al Hammam City Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2. Consultants                      | Dr. Salah Abdel-Wahab | Ex-President NWCDA
                                   | Dr. Abdalla Abdelaziz | President of PUD Consultants
                                   | Mahmoud Hassan          | Lawyer, PUD
                                   | Dr. Rafik Farid          | Ex Regional Planner, PUD
                                   | Dr. Mohamed Al Adly      | Consultant
                                   | Ibrahim El-Dessouki      | Architect, PUD
                                   | Mohamed Ghorab          | Ex Project Manager, PUD
                                   | Dr. Wolfgang Everts     | Consultant, MOR
                                   | Dr. Amr Noaman          | Senior Planner, Orplan
                                   | Dr. Ezzat Nabih         | Architect and Planner for
                                   |                           | Marakia and Marabella
                                   |                           | Planner for Alamein City
| 3. Local and Interest Groups       | Ahmed Gharbawy         | Arab Contractors Cooperative
                                   | Ahmed Samaha            | Petroleum Engineers Cooperative
                                   | Awad Dawood El-Koreiy   | Chief of Bedouin Tribe
                                   | Magdi Ghobashi          | Owner of Jomana Restaurant, Marina Al Alamein
                                   | Sherif Delawar          | Chairman, ADCON
                                   | Ahmed El-Sherif         | Chairman, Samala & Alam El-Rom For Tourism Development
                                   | Ali Abo-Kandil          | Marine Scientists and Coastal Zone Manager
                                   | Akram El Hosseiny       | Consultant, UNDP
                                   | Hassan Awad             | General Manager, Pullman Hotels, Sidi Abd-Elrahman
                                   |                          | Manager, Hilton Marakia
                                   | Ibrahim El-Gharbawy     | World Bank Planning Expert
                                   | Mostafa Ibrahim         |
E. The Management of Data

Raw data had to undergo some form of transformation into useful and relevant information for the specific purposes of this study. According to Aronoff (1989), “data is of no value unless the right data can be at the right place and at the right time.” Three principles had to be considered; the nature (form) of data, the purpose for which the data is needed and the use of this data:

- The *nature* of the data: the data collected is of very diverse nature in both form and source: spatial, maps, drawings, statistical, census data, observational, reports, analysis, etc.

- The *purpose* for which the data is needed: where a prerequisite is to identify why is this data needed and how is it going to be used? The answer to these is basically to identify the resources, the needs, and the alternative options.

- The *use* of data: in this study, data has been used to describe, analyze, and conclude.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of the Study</th>
<th>Time Span</th>
<th>Sampling Method</th>
<th>Data Gathering Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Appendix II
Governments and Sustainable Tourism Development

A. Why Do Governments Intervene in Planning for Sustainable Tourism?

Governments intervene to achieve the so-called ‘public interest’ and they are particularly interested in the tourist industry because of its many socio-economic benefits primarily its employment and income producing possibilities. Moreover, the issue of sustainability adds to the responsibilities of governments to regulate and control development to ensure the intergenerational equity, resource protection, and long term economic gain, as pointed out Chapter 2. However, the literature that discusses the reason for the government’s involvement is not as straight forward. Therefore, it is necessary to review the literature in the light of the three different dimensions involved in the above question. The three dimensions are: planning as a government activity, the government’s interest in tourism, and the government’s responsibility for achieving sustainable tourism.

Planning and Public Intervention

The dispute over whether planning should be a state’s activity or left to the market has been a concern of many scholars and writers (e.g. Alexander 1994; Friedman 1987; Davidoff 1965; Klosterman 1985; Campbell and Fainstein 1996). The modern planning profession originated at the turn of the century in response to the widespread dissatisfaction with the results of existing market and political processes reflected in the physical disorder and political corruption of the industrial city. The profession’s political roots in progressive reform were reflected in arguments for planning as an independent ‘fourth power’ of government promoting the general or public interest over the narrow, conflicting interests of individuals and groups (Klosterman, 1985). There are several definitions of planning in the literature (e.g. Keeble 1964; Davidoff and Reiner 1962; Taylor and Williams 1982; Franklin 1979; Fainstein and Fainstein 1996). Faludi (1973), for example, defines planning as ‘the process of preparing a set of decisions for action in the future, directed at achieving goals by preferable means’. The concern for deciding future actions and achieving goals pleads the question of who takes the decisions, and who decides the goals which may give rise to conflict of interest and power struggle. That is why planning has traditionally been associated...
with public intervention (Klosterman 1985), and the rationale for planning has been based on the welfare economic arguments for public interest and government action (Moore, 1978). Therefore, governments intervene in planning to ensure that the public interests are met. However, questions concerning whether planning is independent, or whether the government intervenes to promote the general or public interest, are investigated and debated in the literature. Planners continue to face the central controversy of whether there is indeed a single public interest and whether they recognize and serve it. Campbell and Fainstein (1996) argue that incremental planners claimed that the excessive complexity of the comprehensive public interest prevented the planner from directly serving it, while advocate planners argued that what was portrayed as the public interest, in fact, represented merely the interest of the privileged. More recently, postmodernists have challenged the universal master narrative that gives voice to the public interest, seeing instead a heterogeneous public with many voices and interests. However, this still supports the argument that public intervention is needed because it is impossible for the market mechanisms to deal with the many voices and interests especially if they are in conflict with the private sector’s profit making objectives. Moreover, urban politics, in an era of increasing government activity in planning and welfare, must balance the demands for ever-increasing central bureaucratic control against the demands for increased concern for the unique requirements of local, specialized interests (Davidoff 1965). Marxists interpret planners’ actions as primarily serving the interests of the capital at the expense of the rest of society. The formal organization of the state, as Klosterman (1985) argues, is assumed to serve the long term interests of capital by creating and maintaining conditions conducive to the efficient accumulation of capital in the private sector, subordinating the conflicting short-run interests of the factions of capital to the long-run interests of the capitalist class. Because urban growth is so great that planning focused willy nilly on urban housing and infrastructure, and the concept of a master plan that would programme developments for the community as a whole took a second place to the immediate needs of urban growth. (This is precisely obvious in the case of the NWC region in Egypt, where the implementation of the regional plans shifted away from achieving benefits for the communities to coping with the immediate needs of the rapid urban growth and increasing demands for housing as Chapters 4 and 5 discuss).
Campbell and Fainstein (1996) argue that although it is most commonly assumed that the alternative of planning is the free market, it could equally be chaos or myopic self-interest. Devas and Rakodi (1993) argue that while the market mechanism offers considerable benefits as a system of economic management, it frequently does not produce a socially desirable outcome. Moreover, the role of the state is to protect the poor from being further disadvantaged by the operations of the market and to redress at least some of the inequalities in income and wealth. Alexander (1994) argues that questions about the scope of planning ‘to plan or not to plan’ are not about whether planned public intervention is warranted, or whether a problem should be resolved by leaving it to the market or at most by trying to manipulate market interactions by introducing some extraneous incentives. Rather, as Alexander (1994) contends, the question is what are the transaction costs of market type collective decisions, whether economic or political? Are they lower or higher than the costs of hierarchical organization and the planning that goes with it? According to Foglesong (1986), the market system cannot meet the consumption needs of the working class in a manner capable of maintaining capitalism because there are a variety of problems arising from relying upon the market system to guide development. This according to Castels (cited by Foglesong 1986), is the reason for the growth of urban planning and state intervention. ‘To the extent that the state picks up the slack and assumes this responsibility, there occurs a transformation of the process of consumption, from individualized consumption through the market to collective consumption organized through the state’ (Foglesong 1986).

Tourism and Governments

The second dimension concerns the government’s interest in the tourism sector. Tourism is subject to direct and indirect government intervention primarily because of its employment and income producing possibilities (Hall and Jenkins 1995). Tourism is much more than an economic phenomenon with sociological and cultural repercussions: it has become a ‘phenomenon of civilization’ (WTO 1985), and that is why most governments are interested in the tourism sector. Frequently, the intervention of government is justified by reference to the merits of tourism itself and its contribution to economic growth, the balance of payments, employment, regional development, inner city regeneration, etc. (Middleton 1974). Governments are
therefore, bound to have an interest in tourism because of its potential in contributing to the achievement of government objectives. It may, however, be difficult to justify government involvement on these grounds since there are many other forms of activity which may have the same merits (Graham 1988). Choy (1991) argues that governments should leave the private sector to be responsible for tourism and should seek only to resolve issues of market failure which may arise because of externalities, for example, property rights which may only be resolvable by government, and public goods provision, which government can ensure that all citizens are included. However, even where market failure is acknowledged to occur, it is not self-evident that government should intervene. The intervention requires resources and may even, itself generate further distortions (Johnson and Thomas 1992a). Hughes (1994) argues that the concept of market failure is vague and imprecise, may prove very little guidance to policy making and may be used to justify many forms of intervention by vested interests (Hartley and Hooper, 1992).

On the other hand, the WTO (1993) argues that tourism which is, by its very nature, principally the responsibility of the private sector, can nevertheless develop only if the state provides it with the appropriate legal, regulatory and fiscal framework. Cooper et al (1993), for example, argue that the nature of the tourism industry does require a clear public sector involvement. Unless the state and if need be, regional or local authorities play their part in training, protection of the natural and cultural environment, promotion and facilitation, tourism left to market forces alone, cannot achieve the degree of development that today’s society expects of it (WTO 1993; Cooper et al 1993). Inskeep (1991) argues that a completely market-led approach to tourism development that provides whatever attractions, facilities and services the tourist market may demand, could result in environmental degradation and loss of socio-cultural integrity of the tourism area, even though it brings short-term economic benefits. Elliott (1997) argues that governments control the tourist industry and its activities in order to ensure that activities and safety standards are maintained in the ‘public interest’. Central governments are involved in policy formulation because it is their responsibility to formulate national objectives and make the major decisions. They have the power, the information on the total situation and the legitimacy to define public interest and public need (Elliott 1997).
It is incumbent on the state, as the WTO (1985) argues, to endeavor to define development objectives and establish an effective structure for a tourism programme of action. In the case of countries with market economies, state participation in tourism activity is justified because the socio-economic system is mixed, and market forces are not considered sufficient to ensure tourism development commensurate with the general objectives of the economy and society in general. Cooper et al (1993) argue that it is unlikely that private markets will satisfy all the tourism policy objectives of a country and thus governments must intervene to assist and regulate the private sector. According to WTO (1988), the state must, therefore, cover the costs of general infrastructure and tourism facilities, complement the efforts and resources of private initiative in certain specific areas and sectors and protect the natural and socio-cultural resources.

Moreover, a growing concern is that tourism should stimulate regional development and raise rural incomes and should do this in such a way that there is a growing indigenisation of ownership of tourism facilities and operations of those facilities by local people. Governments by training and educational policies, must try to develop a management cadre and, eventually, an indigenous top managerial class (Jenkins 1994), the same is for local top managers substituting central government management. These tasks cannot be done by the private sector, and it is only government that can ensure the involvement of local communities. Furthermore, Jenkins (1994) explains that market sensitivity and the need for a greater involvement of the private sector diminishes the role of government in an operational but not in a control sense. Government still is responsible for the overall acceptability of the type of tourism that is developed. It also has a social responsibility to ensure that the benefits of tourism are not gained to the major detriment of social, cultural and environmental standards.

The problem facing the development of tourism is that tourism often is most influenced by externalities. Externalities, such as a serious downturn in the economies of major tourism generating countries, can have dramatic and rapid effects in the tourist receiving countries. It is for these reasons that governments often find it difficult to react to market changes. It is the competitive nature of the market which suggests that the private sector is likely to best influence tourism development and can
be proactive rather than simply reactive to market forces. Jenkins (1994) also argues that the private sector should also be involved in tourism planning and policy formulation. This reflects the fact that governments have very limited budgets and therefore cannot invest in tourism or in any other sector of the economy without limitation. However, government is very much the hidden hand which guides policy while ensuring that the services which, to a large extent, make up the satisfaction for foreign tourists, are actually offered by those best able to provide them. This means that even when the private sector may be more appropriate to react to market changes, governments have a responsibility to coordinate the private sector’s efforts and to ensure that the principles and the guidelines are established.

In post World War II years, due to shortage of hard currency, tourism promotional activities under official auspices were thus seen as a means of bringing in hard currency (WTO 1993). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the main emphasis of national tourism policies thus lay on advertising and information. Governments were thus primarily concerned with boosting international tourism, which was gradually becoming a mass phenomenon. In some countries therefore, the role of the National Tourism Administrations (TDA) was characterized initially by an almost excessive emphasis on promotional activities. If national tourism promotion and marketing were left entirely to the private sector, as the WTO (1993) argues, this could result in the unbalanced development of infrastructure and market expansion, with the risk of growing congestion and increased pressure on environmental resources.

**Sustainable Tourism and the Government’s Responsibility**

The *third* dimension involves the government’s responsibility for achieving sustainable tourism. The concept of sustainable development, as Cooper et al (1993) point out, challenges the ability of private markets to improve the distribution of income and protect the environment.

De Kadt (1992) places the responsibility of achieving sustainable development on governments, ‘It is only the state which can provide the conditions for movement toward greater sustainability’. According to Wanhill (1994), the concept of sustainable development challenges the ability of the private markets to improve the distribution of income and protect the environment. According to the WTO (1983), ‘the
governments alone can ensure that tourism is developing in the best interests of the community.’ The baseline scenario for sustainable development, as Cooper et al (1993) argue, is the alleviation of absolute poverty and the replenishment of the resource stock so that at a minimum no one generation is worse off than any other. The lessons of the past indicate that it is unwise for the state to abandon its ability to influence the direction of tourism development (Cooper et al 1993) whether through the provision of finance or through legislation. The short term gains sought by capital markets are often at odds with the long term sustainability of tourism environments (Wanhill 1994).

B. Who is Involved in Tourism Management?

Governments at all levels, from central through regional to local governments can all be involved in the management of tourism. Tourism ministries and departments and National Tourist Administrations (NTAs) are particularly important. Most of the industry is in the private sector but it also includes profit-making organizations in the public sector. The line between the public sector and private sector is not always clear (Elliott 1997). The term ‘public sector’ covers the whole range of public organizations from national government ministries and departments to government business enterprises and local government tourism departments. Just as tourism is an extremely diverse and complex industry so also is the public sector, with its wide range of organisations of tremendous variety, linked together in complex structures and relationships (Elliott 1997). The definitions of the term ‘public sector’ in the literature, however, are all concerned with the functioning of the public sector with its responsibility to serve the public interest and as it works to achieve public objectives (Hughes 1994; Elliott 1997). There are also numerous organizations, which are part of the tourism community but not part of the profit-making tourism industry. These include interest or pressure groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This section aims to offer a brief identification for the role of different sectors and institutions in the management of tourism development.

The State

States play an increasingly active part in the connection between the tourism industry and the established political power, not only because they have the task of defining
tourism policy in the light of national objectives, but also because they assume an increasingly important role in promotion, co-ordination and planning, and providing financial backing. Hall (1994) argues that it is necessary to centralize the policy making powers in the hands of the state so that it can take the appropriate measures for creating a suitable framework for the promotion and development of tourism by the various sectors concerned.

The main institutions of the state are: the central government, administrative departments, the courts and judiciary, enforcement agencies, other levels of government (provincial, regional, municipal, local, etc.), government business enterprises, regulatory and assistance authorities, and a range of semi-state organizations (Deutsch, 1986; Davis et al., 1993). The government, elected or unelected, is one of the central institutions of the state, and government maintains political authority within the state.

An ongoing problem in organizing the tourism sector is finding the right balance between the role of central government and that of regional or local authorities. In recent years, the trend in major tourism countries of Europe has undoubtedly been towards greater decentralization. Local government has been recognized as being the most important authority in establishing tourism development policies (Bouquet and Winter 1987; Pearce 1989; Madrigal 1995) because it is at this level where the impacts of development (both positive and negative) are felt most acutely. In Great Britain for example, England, Scotland, Wales each has a tourist board, totally separate from the others and from the national tourism promotion office (the British Tourist Authority), and local authorities also play a prominent role. The Development of Tourism Act 1969, which remains in force, established four statutory boards. Hughes (1994) points out that the main functions of the British Tourist Boards was, and remains, that of marketing and promotion. There has been a particular concern with the unsatisfactory nature of the Act itself which, it is felt, led to confusion of roles and duplication of effort by the boards (Hughes, 1994), where the division of responsibilities has led to disproportionate funding of the natural boards (Wanhill 1988). The differences in funding owe more to political pressure than to any overall strategic decision (Hughes 1994). Spain and Italy have decentralized to a greater extent in favor of the regional authorities. France also has regionalised its promotion,
though to a lesser extent, and the four levels of administration (state, the region, the department, and the commune) each has its tourism functions. In Germany, as well as in the Netherlands and several other European countries, responsibility for tourism at national level is confined to promotion abroad.

**The National Tourist Administration (NTA)**

The lack of a single authority responsible for all aspects of tourism development within a state may lead to substantial confusion between central government, local authorities, and the private sector over roles within tourism development and planning process. Government ministers and ministries have power, but it is often the national tourism administration, which has the expertise, and direct relationships with the industry. Hall (1994) stresses the need for a body (department, division or section of the office of planning) to coordinate vertically (the tourism development plan and the economic and social development plan) and horizontally (between local, regional and state tourism development plans). This body must be staffed with competent technical and multidisciplinary team (architects, economists, sociologists, tourism experts) in order to contend with the complex tasks and activities of tourism planning. Tourism planning and national, regional and local economic planning must be coordinated. However, in practice, this coordination does not always take place. In some countries, for example, there is insufficient coordination between economic and social planning conducted by the National Tourism Administration (NTA). This lack of coordination results from the non-availability, in most countries, of macroeconomics data on tourism or a precise delineation of the sector, which prevents officials in the offices of planning from identifying and evaluating the functions and role that tourism plays in the economy and society as a whole. Another reason for the lack of coordination is that the NTA often lacks the material and human means necessary to conduct the research needed to integrate tourism in the national accounting system and, eventually, in the economic and social process in general (Hall 1994). However, the WTO (1985b) argues that even if foreign consultants can contribute to preparing tourism development plans, implementation of these plans cannot be assured without the assistance of the NTA, which is needed to launch and conduct a tourism development plan on the national level which takes account of national priorities, of the features of the tourist market as well as of the need to implement this plan. The NTA, as the
WTO (1985a) maintains, should be capable of covering all tourism activities as promotion and development of tourism and of the various professional activities as training, management and regulations; and integrating tourism into all economic, social, political and cultural activities of the nation. Coordination involves a number of organizations and persons who have specific interests in tourism development, including: public authorities, public or private tourism organizations, private entrepreneurs and the population of tourism areas. Coordination of tourism with other domestic sectors means the existence of an NTA at the same hierarchical level as the administrations for other national activities. The NTA can take responsibility for coordination, needs to be able to oversee the implementation of tourism development plans and the NTA ought to have the competence and power to act in the field of regulations (WTO 1985a).

The WTO (1993a) identifies the characteristics of NTAs in some European countries. Most NTAs are funded by central government, partly by regional or local authorities, and partly by the private sector. The national institute of tourism promotion in Spain derives its core funding totally from public sources. In Sweden, the basic principal of a new policy regarding tourism is that the tourism sector should be treated as any other branch of industry and the individual enterprise should be fully responsible for its destiny. The government’s role is simply to create general conditions that are favorable to business, and interventions in markets should be limited to a minimum. Only in one respect does the Swedish government see justification in involving public sector efforts. This is the case of more general promotional activities abroad, which would benefit tourism and other Swedish industries. Between those two extremes, there are other examples of approaches taken by other European countries, for example, the Maison de la France, the promotional arm of the French Ministry of Tourism, refers to itself as a grouping of economic interests, or a partnership linking the interests of the state, local communities and the operating sector, whether totally private or parastatal. It conducts domestic as well as international tourism promotion and marketing and provides information services to the traveling public. In the UK the British Tourist Authority relies heavily on private sector support to fund promotional campaigns and other activities, but the authority is core-funded by the government because it acknowledges that there are market failures in the tourism industry.
Whilst there seems to be a consensus on the marketing function of NTAs (as agents of government) there is less agreement on the developmental and other roles. Central government need not be directly involved in tourism at all (Hughes 1994). At least it may seek only to set guidelines for the development of tourism, leaving tourism as a private sector activity. It may see its role as a facilitator of the development of tourism and creating a positive climate within which it may operate i.e. to remove unnecessary obstacles and correct market failure (Hughes 1994).

**Local Communities**

Murphy (1985) advocated the use of a community approach to tourism planning which emphasizes the need for local control over the development process. One of the key components of the approach is the notion that in satisfying local needs it may also be possible to satisfy the needs of the tourist. A community approach to tourism planning is a ‘bottom up’ form of planning, which emphasizes development in the community rather than development of the community (Hall 1991). A community approach to tourism planning implies that there will be the community control of the tourism development process. However, such a community approach has generally not been adopted by government authorities, instead, the level of public involvement in tourism planning can be more accurately described as a form of tokenism in which decisions or the direction of decisions has already been prescribed by government.

Community participation is widely regarded as an essential ingredient in tourism planning and policy making (Inskeep 1991, Gunn 1994). Public participation refers to ‘decision making by the target group, the general public, relevant interest groups, or other types of decision makers whose involvement appeals to our desire to use democratic procedures for achieving given goals (Nagel 1990). Under the approach of community involvement, residents are regarded as the focal point of the tourism planning exercise, not the tourists, and the community, which is often equated with a region of local government, is regarded as the basic planning unit. However, Haywood (1988) argues that public participation in tourism planning may be more a form of placation than a means of giving power to communities to form their own decision. Hall and Jenkins (1995) argue that participation ought not to be assumed to affect planning outcomes. ‘Alternatives may have already been defined before public
participation began, while any changes which do occur may simply be changes at the margin’ (Hall and Jenkins 1995). In the case of urban planning for example, advocacy planning (community participation in planning) means speaking for those who will actually use the building, instead of doing research about them for those who hold power (Forester 1988). It means ‘helping people in a community do their own planning’ (Goleman 1992). Such an approach will challenge many ideas about the role of government in the tourism planning and policy process, particularly with respect to the roles of the bureaucratic expert and interest groups (Hall and Jenkins 1995). The approach advocates that tourism must be appropriate to indigenous communities rather than local elites or foreign investors.

**Interest Groups**

Tourism interest groups go well beyond those which are part of the tourism industry and include a vast array of community, public and special interest groups (Hall and Jenkins 1995). Mathews (1980) classifies interest groups according to their degree of institutionalization, as producer groups, non producer groups and single interest groups. Producer groups have a high level of credibility in bargaining and negotiations with government and other interest groups such as business organizations, labor organizations, and professional associations. They also have the ability to gain access to government. Non producer groups such as consumer and environment groups have a common interest of continuing relevance to members. Single interest groups are likely to disappear altogether once their interests have been achieved or have been rendered unattainable. The relationship between interest groups and government clearly raises questions about the extent to which established policy processes lead to outcomes which are in the public interest rather than simply a deal between politicians and sectional interests.

Hence, the road toward more sustainable development policies, globally or nationally, will not be easy or smooth, as De Kadt (1992) argues. Because of the widespread ramifications of sustainable development policies there will be many obstacles to their implementation. But, there are opportunities too. If moves toward a more sustainable tourism development pattern are to be successful, attention will need to be paid to institution building in the spheres of policy management and implementation.
Governments have leverage to influence the development of tourism in specific areas or particular ways: they set the conditions of investment and access, determine what concessions will be given to foreign enterprises, and they can legislate about access to land, such as, for example, by not allowing straight purchase, but only long term leases. In general, they can and do include tourism in their development plans (Richter 1984), and they often play a major role in providing infrastructure for tourism development. It helps if sustainability, as a general issue, is high on the agenda of government policy as this can draw attention to sensitive issues such as restrictions on physical development or the effects on local populations. As they can for conventional tourism, governments can create an appropriate incentive structure for sustainable tourism (De Kadt 1992). Perhaps the most formidable task on the road to sustainable development, and tourism development, is that of building the institutions needed for policy implementation. The Brundtland Commission, too, regards this as the greatest challenge (WCED 1987).

**C. How Do Governments Intervene in Tourism Management?**

Government agencies at every level from the international down to small towns, as Smith (1989) points out, have adopted a progressively more active role in the use of tourism as a development tool. No matter what type of political structure a country has, there is invariably some form of government intervention in tourism. The significance of power arrangements, which determine policy selection, must be recognized. It is the nature of governments to respond to powerful pressures. Tourism does not have such power, and therefore it has been given minimal real support and subject to almost being neglect (WTO 1985). This reflects the necessity of the state’s involvement in the tourism sector. The dominant ideological and philosophical beliefs and values of the political system, as Elliott (1997) argues, will determine how far governments will intervene in the economic system, what will be the role of the private sector, and how much support and finance will be given to tourism. The political system is defined by Dahl (1970) as ‘any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule of authority’ (cited by Hall and Jenkins 1995). The politicians in a political system desire power, as Elliott (1997) argues, and this can make their input dynamic but also irrational and impermanent, for in any situation they will usually act to retain or acquire power. In
contrast, management ideally is rational, permanent, formal, and efficient. However, in practice politics operates within management and organizations leading to power struggles just as there are among politicians. The power holders in any political or administrative system are important because ‘power is the capacity to overcome resistance, the capacity to change the behavior of others and stop them from getting what they want. It determines who gets what, when and how’ (Lasswell 1951). For Elliott (1997) public sector management is involved in the political system and society because there are certain general principles which should be followed and governments are responsible for implementing them while the private sector has its own principles and priorities.

Elliott (1997) identifies five main principles of public sector management of tourism development. The public interest is one main principle where public needs and demands should always be met first, before private demands. The second general principle that of public service provision. It suggests that the basic role of governments should be service to the people. Public sector management has a responsibility not just for achieving economic objectives and responding to market demands but also for social objectives, social justice and equity. Tourism is market driven for economic gain but the public interest demands that public sector management should also be service driven. Third, effectiveness is taken as the achievement of the goals and objectives of the government. If objectives are not achieved the competence and value of the manager or organization must be in doubt unless the objectives set were unrealistic or unattainable. The most effective policy is one which achieves all its objectives. Forth, efficiency is the gaining of the best possible value from the expenditure of public money. Efficiency is ‘the extent to which maximum output is achieved in relation to given costs or inputs, and effectiveness is used to refer to the extent to which overall goals are achieved’ (Chapman 1988). The fifth general principle, that of accountability. Accountability is the fundamental prerequisite for preventing the abuse of delegated power and for ensuring instead that power is directed toward the achievement of broadly accepted national goals with the greatest possible degree of efficiency, effectiveness, probity and prudence.
The evaluation of public management performance in the tourism sector is a difficult management task because of the complexity and variety of government and tourism industry organizations, processes and problems. It is made more difficult and stressful, or challenging, because it is performed under public scrutiny (Elliott, 1997). Managers who are responsible for control are themselves under scrutiny. The most comprehensive way to carry out evaluation of the impact of tourism, including environmental and other unquantifiable effects, would be social cost-benefit analysis (Murphy, 1985) but the demanding data requirements and assumptions that have to be made in quantifying all the costs and benefits, as Jackson (1986) argues, make its use within the constraints of tourism projects impracticable (Jackson and Bruce 1992), and that explains why it has been little used in tourism impact studies as Mathieson and Wall (1982) point out. However, adherence to such principles (public interest, public service, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability), that Elliott (1997) suggests, makes for higher quality management which is more responsive to society and the needs of the tourist industry. Principles and their enforcement are a safeguard against political and managerial abuse and corruption. Principles are necessary to evaluate organizations and management by monitoring the performance against those principles.

Tourism is concentrated in both time and space because of the tendency for tourism flows to congregate in certain areas with suitable infrastructure and attractions (Williams and Shaw 1988). The very nature of tourism, with its heavy spatial and seasonal polarization, usually requires some form of intervention, whether it be distributive or ameliorative. Therefore, the issue is not whether government should have a role but what the nature of that role should actually be. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss briefly the roles that the state may play in tourism development in order to identify the extent to which the government can intervene in managing tourism development. This is particularly important to facilitate the evaluation of the Egyptian government’s performance in the development of the NWC region. Because the Ministry of Reconstruction, alone, (and not the local authorities nor the TDA) has been responsible for planning, implementing and managing tourism development in the NWC region, it was able to carry out only few of the tasks mentioned below. The ministry had been unable to carry out many important tasks such as coordination,
promotion and marketing, legislation and regulation, and social tourism promotion (which are tasks that are usually carried out by local governments and National Tourism Administrations) because it is only a sectoral ministry. It only focused on planning, entrepreneurship, and stimulation, which are hardly enough to promote long term sustainable tourism. The following roles of the state in tourism are modified from Hall (1994) and WTO (1993):

**Coordination**

Since tourism is a modified activity consisting of numerous units with divergent and often conflicting interests, it devolves on the state, which is concerned with the optimum promotion and development of tourism in the national interest, to harmonize and coordinate all tourist activities (IOUTO, 1974). Probably the most important role of the state in tourism is that of coordination. Coordination is a political activity, which is why it can prove extremely difficult especially when there are a large number of parties involved in the decision making. The need for a coordinated tourism strategy has become one of the great truisms of tourism policy and planning (Smith, 1986; Lamb, 1988; Jansen-Verbeke, 1989; McKercher, 1993). However, many commentators have failed to indicate what is meant by the concept of coordination (Hall 1994). Coordination, as Spann (1979), for example, points out, usually refers to the problem of relating units or decisions so that they fit in with one another, are not at cross-purposes, and operate in ways that are reasonably consistent and coherent. However, there are two different types of coordination covered under this definition: administrative coordination and policy coordination (Spann 1979). The need for administrative coordination can be said to occur when there has been agreement on aims, objectives and policies between the parties that have to be coordinated but the mechanism of coordination is undecided or there are inconsistencies in implementation. The necessity for policy coordination arises when there is a conflict over the objectives of the policy that has to be coordinated and implemented. Undoubtedly, the two types of coordination may sometimes be hard to distinguish, as coordination will nearly always mean that one policy or decision will be dominant over others.
Planning

Planning is rarely exclusively devoted to tourism per se. Instead, planning for tourism tends to be an amalgam of political, economic, socio-cultural and environmental considerations which reflects the diversity of the factors which influence tourism development (Heeley, 1981). Planning for tourism will reflect the political, economic, environmental and social goals of government at whichever level the planning process is being carried out. Nevertheless, as in the formation of policy, planning is an essentially political process (Smith B. 1987; Low 1991; Fainstein and Fainstein 1996), the results of which may be indicative of the dominance of certain stakeholders’ interests and values over other interests and values (Hall 1994). Moreover, although a plan once enacted constitutes a politically determined public policy (Fainstein and Fainstein 1996; Devas and Rakodi 1993), it differs from other kinds of political decisions in that it is based on formal rationality and is explicit about ends and means. This specifically is in sharp contrast to many other public decisions, which are left purposefully vague and ambiguous so as to mitigate controversy.

Planning for tourism has traditionally been associated with land use zoning or development planning at the local government level. Concerns have typically focused on site development, accommodation and building regulations, the density of tourist development, the presentation of cultural, historical and natural tourist features, and the provision of infrastructure including roads and sewage. However, in recent years tourism planning at all levels of government has had to adapt its programme to include environmental considerations, concerns over the social impacts of tourism, demands for greater community participation and somewhat paradoxically, demands for smaller government (Hall 1994). The latter trend has led to government often becoming entrepreneurial in its involvement with tourism in order to increase the financial contribution of tourism to government income. Therefore, government has increasingly been involved in the promotion and marketing of destinations, and involved in the joint development of tourist attractions or facilities with the private sector. Gunn, (1977) observed, because of the fragmented growth of the tourism industry “the overall planning of the total tourism system is long overdue. There is no overall policy, philosophy or coordinating force that brings the many pieces of tourism into harmony and assures their continued harmonious function.” More recently,
Lickorish et al. (1991) argued that ‘without government involvement in tourism planning, development of the industry will lack cohesion, direction, and short term initiatives might well jeopardize longer term potential.’ Government tourism planning therefore serves as an arbiter between competing interests.

Promotion and Marketing

Promotion is an activity that is evidently suited to a joint approach within a partnership mechanism separate from the state (a national promotion board, usually the NTA) where the various partners can meet. One advantage of such arrangement as the WTO (1993) points out, is that the board can, as a rule, apply flexible internal management methods and rules and, if appropriate, escape the onerous procedures and constraints often found in public administrations.

The WTO (1993) point out that there are three primary reasons for government involvement in national tourism promotion. The first is to promote the image of the nation as a whole. The importance of images, as Gilbert (1989) points out, is that they form part of the decision making process and influence the choices to travel to a particular country or region. The improvement of the country’s (or a region) image brought about by marketing can not only attract tourists, but enhance a community’s pride in its country or region. The second is to maximize potential benefits for the national economy. For example, countries recognize that by promoting domestic tourism, they are effectively also discouraging expenditure on travel abroad. Finally, the third is to offset market failure. For example, the National Tourism Agencies (including Ministry of Tourism, NTAs) act as regulators, helping to promote fair competition and foster the growth of small scale enterprises and poorer regions of their countries. Governments have, therefore, been involved in the provision of help and guidance to the tourism industry in setting up boards which include departments with tourism marketing expertise. The boards have been attempting to improve the industry’s marketing expertise by providing, for example, a range of booklets, pamphlets and guidelines which help explain marketing functions and give ideas for the solution of problems (Gilbert 1989).
Legislation and Regulation

This function of the state depends on the national political system of the country. The WTO (1993) argues that legislation, stipulating regulations and terms under which activities related to tourism take place is a state responsibility. Establishing regulations for the protection and preservation of the tourist wealth and resources of the country, natural, historical and cultural, is also state responsibility. Moreover, the enforcement of regulations is also a state responsibility, as the WTO (1993) maintains, where the state through public mechanisms, has the duty to ascertain that all regulations which deal with tourist services offered to the consumer, be it a foreign citizen or a national of the country, are followed, and to impose the appropriate sanctions in case of breach of the regulations in order to ensure proper protection of customers.

The World Tourism organization (WTO 1985) states that there are three sets of measures in which the state can act to regulate and promote tourism development. The first is setting some legal measures, where such regulations should aim at ensuring the smooth operation of travel destinations. The creation of future destinations, protection of the environment, decisions regarding what areas are to be built up, determination of carrying capacity and saturation thresholds require a series of laws and decrees that constitute the legal basis for the activities undertaken by bodies responsible for carrying out an operation. Measures to protect tourists as consumers from poor quality services, misleading publicity, etc. are also legal in nature. The second is setting organizational measures. For example, the state’s intervention involves decisions regarding the creation of different bodies and the appointment of persons to them, establishment of the statutes of these bodies, regulations concerning cooperation with different community organizations, etc. The third is setting financial and fiscal measures where the state must establish financial and fiscal rules for the start up and completion of projects and for the actual operation of the travel destination.

Governments as Entrepreneurs

Traditionally, the private sector has been giving priority to the development of accommodation, as this is a major source of revenue generation. While, for governments interested in international tourism, airport developments, for example,
have been of critical importance (Wanhill 1994). Now, it is common in many countries (Egypt is an example) to find governments owning and managing hotels, transport facilities, tourists agencies, etc. According to Hall (1994), governments may not only provide basic infrastructure such as roads and sewage, but also may own and operate tourist ventures including airlines, hotels and travel companies. This is the process by which the state subsidizes part of the cost of production, for instance, by assisting in the provision of infrastructure or by investing in a tourism project where private venture capital is otherwise unavailable. Moreover, in the 1960s in several countries, bodies were set up independently of the tourist authorities to protect nature and to promote open air activities. The initiatives in these new areas were thus taken by the state itself and not by tourists authorities. This helped to strengthen the image of a tourist industry that did not care about protecting the national heritage as the WTO (1993) argues. However, Choy (1991) argues that government efforts might be better spent on resolving three kinds of market failure. The first is the provision of public or collective goods. The second is the positive and negative externalities which impact on individuals not directly involved with project or activities. The third is the costs and benefits which are not reflected in market prices. Therefore, the role of the state as entrepreneur in tourist development must be limited and only focused towards areas where the market fails in order to concentrate on coordinating the private sector’s efforts.

**Stimulation**

In the 1960s, the fact that travel was becoming within the reach of more and more people pushed up demand for medium grade hotels and for supplementary forms of accommodation. Government had to inject a massive amount of public funds to compensate for the private sector’s initial lack of interest in this type of accommodation. In the 1960s a new dimension was therefore added to the national tourism policies of many countries. Policies focused increasingly on channeling as well as increasing tourism. This concern went hand in hand with land use planning. New developments in the regions drew tourists to them. According to Mill and Morrison (1985) governments can stimulate tourism in three ways. The *first* way is financial incentives such as low-interest loans or a depreciation allowance on tourist accommodation. The *second* possibility is sponsoring research for the general benefit
of the tourism industry rather than for specific individual organizations and associations. *Thirdly* tourism can be stimulated by marketing, promotion and visitor servicing, generally aimed at generating tourism demand.

Incentives given by governments for tourist development are the instruments used to realize the objectives set by the country’s tourism policy. Governments have intervened to assist and regulate the private sector in the development of tourism. This is because the complex nature of the tourism product makes it unlikely that private markets will satisfy a country’s tourism policy objectives to produce a balance of facilities that meet the needs of the visitor, benefit the host community and are compatible with the wishes of that same community. Incentives, as Wanhill (1994) argues, are policy instruments that can be used to correct the market failure and ensure a developmental partnership between the public and private sectors. Bodlender (1982) and Jenkins (1982) have considered the variety of incentives that are available in tourism, and these may be broadly classified as financial incentives and investment security. The objective of financial incentives is to improve returns to capital so as to attract developers and investors. Wanhill (1994) points out that where there is obvious market potential, the government may only have to demonstrate its commitment to tourism by providing the necessary climate for investment security. It is important to note that there are frequent instances where it is gross uncertainty, as in times of recession, rather than limited potential that prevents the private sector investing. In such situations the principal role of government intervention is to act as a catalyst to give confidence to investors. The public funds are able, as Wanhill (1994) argues, to lever in private money by nature of the government’s commitment and enable the market potential of an area to be realized. The financial incentives include reduction in capital cost and reduction in operating cost. Incentives to reduce capital costs may include capital grants, soft loans (that are funds provided on preferential terms of low interest rate or relief on commercial loans), equity participation, provision of infrastructure, provision of land on concessional terms and tariff exemption on construction material. The reduction in operating cost may include direct and indirect tax exemptions, a labor or training subsidy, special depreciation allowances and double taxation or unilateral relief.
The objective of providing investment security is to win investors’ confidence in an industry which is very sensitive to the political environment and the economic climate. Actions here would include: guarantees against nationalization, ensuring the availability of trained staff, free availability of foreign exchange, repatriation of invested capital, profits dividends and interest, loan guarantees, provision of work permits for key personnel, and availability of technical advice.

Social Tourism

Hall (1994) defines social tourism as ‘the relationships and phenomena in the field of tourism resulting from participation in travel by economically weak or otherwise disadvantaged elements of society’. Gilg (1988) argues that tourism is a vital attribute of a healthy and sane society. Access to tourism by certain low-income groups constitutes a basic right, as stated in WTO (1983), and indirectly contributes to short- and long-term productivity. Therefore, in order to maintain healthy communities, the state must intervene to ensure the participation in travel and tourism by the disadvantaged elements of society. Within the former state socialist countries, tourism was seen as a form of creative leisure and served a socio-economic function by restoring the health and well-being of the industrial workers through youth camps, holiday homes, educational tourism, trade union sponsored tourism and subsidized holidays (Hall D, 1991).

D. To What Extent Can Governments Be Involved?

The extent of the state’s involvement in tourism varies according to the conditions and circumstances peculiar to each country (polito-economic-constitutional system, socio-economic development, degree of tourism development) (IOUTO, 1974). There are different views about the role, forms, and extent of intervention by national governments. At one extreme, as Akehurst (1992) points out, there are interventionists who believe that states should intervene strategically, via state agencies, state ownership and subsidies, throughout an economy, at industry and firm levels, because of imperfections and failures in the market-place (see for example Baumol, 1965). At the other extreme, there is the laissez-faire approach, which believes that every economic activity should be left to market forces. This means a smaller public sector, deregulation, reduction and finally withdrawal of industrial subsidies, enhanced
competition policies and so on. The state in this approach is minimalist and is interpreted as ‘an umbrella organization and sanctuary for widely different and antagonist individual visions of the future’ (Nozick’s 1974). Between the two extremes, there are several other positions and functions of the state (see for example Clark and Dear, 1984).

Many governments around the world have shown themselves to be entrepreneurs in tourism development. Pearce (1992) draws an example of the New Zealand Tourism Department which has been involved in tourism, through such commercial activities as running hotels, travel agencies and coach tours, and operating as a booking center for tourist activities, and instead has concentrated on marketing and promotion. In Greece, for example, the government has been engaged in very strong promotion and advertising, in the improvements to harbors, ports and in the construction of marinas and roads as well as the usual utility services (Maison, 1975). The US federal government, has not been active in support for the tourism industry, while Cuba under Castro has owned and supported the industry totally. Under the 1981 National Tourism Policy Act, the US government formally accepted considerable responsibility for tourism (Elliott 1997). In Britain government believes that the best way it can help any sector of business to flourish is not by intervening, but by providing a general economic framework, which encourages growth, and at the same time removing unnecessary restriction or burdens (UK, Cabinet Offices 1985). De Kadt (1979) identifies the active role of the state in some Mediterranean countries. In Spain, the state itself took an active role in the tourism industry, running a network of reasonably priced state owned hotels (paradores), usually built and furnished in harmony with the historical environment. Cyprus offers an interesting comparison, with less formal control over the tourism industry and less active state participation than in Spain. Foreign participation in Cyprus appears to have been kept intentionally to a minimum. In spite of these nuances, the ideological context of tourism development has been similar in both Spain and Cyprus, as De Kadt (1979) argues, while the sociopolitical structure has clearly leaned heavily toward individualism, free enterprise, and capitalism. In Tunisia, the state actively stimulated the emergence of private enterprise tourism sector by giving entrepreneurs substantial aid and incentives, after assuming the risks of developing the first major tourism facilities. Between 1960 and 1965, 40
percent of the bed capacity was constructed by the state itself, but since the end of the
1960s virtually all construction has been by the private sector or by mixed private and
government enterprises (Huit 1979). In such economies, an important component of
tourism policy is to reconcile any conflict between the pursuit of private profit and the
desire for social gains. Where the state is determined to maximize social benefits,
investors will tend to find its regulations onerous, and they will probably exert
themselves considerably to avoid those regulations. Then it becomes a question of
finding loopholes in the law or of corrupting officials to bend the rules (De Kadt
1979).

Therefore, how far the responsibility of the state will extend depend on the ideology of
the government of the day and the prevailing political structure of the country. While
one government may tend to be non-interventionist and leave the industry to compete
in the international and domestic market place, another government may be active in
supporting the industry in various ways. However, tourism requires a good
relationship between the public and private sectors if it is to survive and prosper. The
private sector formulates and implements the project, and takes the financial risk.
Private management provides the tourism experience and skills but also the
specialised technical skills through consultants, planners, architects, engineers,
designers, lawyers, project managers and builders. Governments, as Elliott (1997)
argues, cannot provide all of these functions nor the whole range of other service
functions involved, such as accommodation, food and beverages, transportation and
retail shopping. The movement towards privatization of public organizations is
recognition of the value of private sector management. Elliott (1997) points out that
the marketing of tourism, especially overseas, is a good example of where government
intervention is necessary. Because of the diversity and differences in the industry, it is
difficult to get agreement and raise funds for marketing promotion, and therefore
government organization and funds are necessary. The need for state intervention in
the services sector, and specifically in tourism, is greater than that in the goods
producing sector, in view of tourism’s social, educational, political and economic
functions (WTO 1988). The question therefore, is not whether or not the state should
intervene in tourism activity, but rather how to define the possibilities and limits, that
is, the degree of intervention. The various degrees of state intervention in tourism
activity are summarized by the WTO (1988) in three functions. The *first* is organizing and orienting, in order to establish the rules of the game for the exercise of tourism activity (for example, by establishing regulations on tourism services). The *second* is facilitating and stimulating tourism development (for example, through credit policy for tourism plan and tourism supply in general). *Finally*, the third is financing and directly managing tourism activity (for example, by creating publicly run accommodation facilities).

Therefore, the state intervenes in the tourism sector in very different ways depending, as mentioned above, on the country, and this is reflected in the level and structure of public spending. It is useful, in this regard, to distinguish between operating expenses and investment. Operating expenses generally connected with indirect state intervention in the tourism sector, preparation and collection of statistics, regulation and control of the tourism sector, and in particular, promotion. Tourism developments not only involve state-operating expenditure but also investment. The construction of general infrastructure (airports, roads, etc.) required for short-term tourism development, by its very nature, stimulates other economic activities (agriculture, industry, and services). Consequently, it is recommended in these cases that tourism development be integrated within a social and economic development plan for the area or region in order to obtain the greatest social benefit from this type of infrastructural investment. In the developed countries, for example, regional development plans are being implemented in areas with little industrial development potential to attract mass tourism demand and create sufficient supply to restructure traditional activities and promote economic development in the region. An already classic example in this regard is the Languedoc-Roussillon region in France. In these cases, public sector intervention has been important, providing a series of direct incentives (creation of infrastructure and equipment) and indirect incentives (fiscal credit, etc.) in order to promote the development of backward areas. Tourism has thus had an impact on regional development, whose objectives and fundamental effects have been to bring about a more equitable standard of living in less developed regions, to improve local and regional environment by creating and improving infrastructure and facilities in these areas, to stimulate regional development, since the development and improvement of the infrastructure and facilities necessary for tourism
simultaneously facilitate or stimulate the establishment of other activities in the region, and to decongest saturated tourist areas in some countries (WTO 1988). Such objectives to benefit regional development are primarily the reason for state intervention in both developed and developing countries and have also been adopted by the Egyptian government to achieve the regional development of the NWC region.
Appendix III

Issues in the Infitah Economic Policy for Promoting Tourism
Modified from Ikram (1980), Middle East Research Institute (1985)

For the implementation of the open door policy and in order to keep pace with the expected increase in the touristic movement and following the October War, plans, and programs for the promotion of tourism in Egypt were set up and aimed at the following:

1. Attracting Arab, foreign and local public sector capital for the financing and administration of touristic projects serving the purposes of foreign tourism
2. Consolidating international touristic relations for exchange of expertise

The high committee for political and economic planning agreed to the encouragement of the private sector to invest funds in the field of tourism as follows:

1. The real estate bank offers loans (within the limits of 6% of the value of the land and construction on a long-term loan up to 20 years), with the current rate of interest. Commercial banks offer loans for furnishing and preparation, where the State providing 3% of the rate of interest on these loans.
2. The beneficiary is offered a period of grace for the implementation of his project of a maximum of 3 years, after which he begins to pay installments.
3. Speedy issue of construction licenses and the provision of public utilities and basic services
4. Sorting out state-owned plots of land suitable for touristic resorts.
5. Establishment of a specialized body, the purpose of which is to provide land for touristic projects. It would first purchase the land and then sell it or loan it to investors.
Appendix IV

(PLAN FOR THE YEAR 2000)

In the mid seventies it was considered desirable to draw up a long-term, and futuristic, plan for the development of Egypt’s economy in the year 2000, within which the usual Five-Year Plans for economic and social development, could periodically be fitted. This plan was published in 1978 and stipulated the promotion of productive economic activities for regions outside the existing heavily congested urban and rural areas, in order to attract labor from the cities, to reduce rural-urban migration, and to provide areas capable of absorbing the expected population increase. It aimed for a more balanced population structure, as well as for the improvement of living standards in various parts of the country (Ayubi 1991). In this grand design for the future, there were hopes that between 1978 and the year 2000, around six million feddans would be reclaimed for cultivation. Although it is well known that such activities yield very little short-run capital return-over on investments, the Egyptian authorities were inclined to feel that the long-term advantages would be worth it.

Within the long-term plan for the year 2000, three groups of desert and marginal areas were designated for reclamation, settlement and development (Ikram 1991). According to the Ministry of Planning (1978), proposals for these three groups (northern, western and eastern zones) included the following:

The Northern Development Belt (North Delta)

The outline for development in this area concentrated on one axis extending all the way along the Delta on the Mediterranean coast. There are four types of projects. The first included the constructions of an extensive network of agricultural settlements within an agricultural reclamation of the northern Delta zone. Second, the construction of summer resorts along the North Coast of the Delta and exploitation of fish resources. Third, agricultural reclamation of the Salihiya Valley located in the Suez Canal zone. The forth was promoting agricultural projects in the Western Delta, extending from Ameriyah and Mariut to the Natrun Valley. This area would see extensive cultivation as well as the construction of new cities, such as Sadat City.

The Western Development Belt (the Western Desert)

Western Desert development would be concentrated in two areas: the North Western Coast (along the Mediterranean) between the Delta and Egypt’s western boundary (with Libya), and
the South Western Desert. Parts of this region would be highly suitable for the development of seaside resorts. The region included the Qattara Depression, which includes the Qattara Depression Project for electrical energy that could produce approximately five times the amount of power generated by the HDam at Aswan. Moreover, digging the Toshka Canal to channel overflow waters from Lake Nasser into the Kharga region could enable 1.3 million feddans to be cultivated south of the Western Desert Belt.

The Eastern Development Belt (Eastern Desert)

Along the Red Sea coast, development activities would include tourism, exploitation of petroleum, and other mineral resources, in addition to the reclamation for cultivation of small areas near the Nile Valley.

Within the framework of this long term master plan for the year 2000, the five year development plan for 1977-82, (which was later somehow adjusted to cover the period 1980-84), also attached higher priority within its investment strategy to those projects which respond to the needs of the masses: 'food security’, clothing, housing, strategic storage and distribution, and the absorptive capacity of ports. This plan is only the second ‘fixed’ plan after the 1960-65 plan. The 1977-82 plan (although issued by law) was a rolling plan in which goals shifted from one year to the next as the Ministry of Planning (1982) describes. According to Ahmed (1988), the national development plan (1977-82) depended on three means in order to achieve its general targets. These means are as follows: -

1. Reducing the population in overcrowded areas, and evacuating other over populated ones to new areas;
2. Building new settlements and towns on a well established economic base, so as to attract investments and people from overcrowded areas;
3. Exploiting uninhabited but rich in resources areas in order to attract more people to venture there. Thus decreasing the pressure on other heavily populated areas.

On the basis of these three means to achieve the national strategy, the general targets for such strategy are determined. They are divided into two main parts, the first is to raise the productive capacity of the national economy, and the second is to improve the general living standards. The means by which these targets can be met is explained as follows: -

I. Increasing the production capacity of the national economy, which can be achieved through the following means: -

1. To maintain agricultural land and protect it against urbanization;
2. To nationalize the policy of industrial settlement by carrying out industrial projects in certain areas where resources are available;
3. Organizing the urban fabric with the view to reduce waste of time and costs of goods and transport;
4. Realization of the optimum use of the existing infrastructure facilities and guarding against their deterioration;

5. Protection of historic and archaeological areas that are considered a sign of human heritage and a likely source of tourist income;

6. Making use of available resources in the desert areas and carrying out infrastructure projects in these areas;

7. Raising the private sector contribution for production, by carrying out projects in new areas after establishing their basic utilities; and

8. Achieving a balanced regional development

II. Improvement of the living environment, through achieving the following:

1. Realization of decentralization of urbanization by restricting urban growth in existing urban areas;

2. Supplying the land necessary for building dwellings, for replacement and renewal and the improvement of a family’s average share in dwelling units;

3. Improving the average use of public services projects;

4. Improving an individual’s average share in the public utilities, and its efficient operation;

5. Protecting the environment against pollution by controlling all sources of pollution;

6. Re-planning old areas in the cities to make them feasible for development;

7. Preserving water supplies by reducing the leakage in the networks;

8. Reforming national demographic charts and reducing population density in heavily populated areas;

9. Setting up places for recreation; and

10. Raising the average income of individuals as a result of the productivity and all around general increase in production

Another Five-Year Plan was adopted for the period 1982 to 1987, which took more account of Egypt’s dependence on external sources, and which was divided into almost self-contained annual plans. Typically, Egyptian development plans have embodied rather unrealistic growth projections based on investment levels that could not be generated or sustained. The 1982-1987 Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, however, received cautious praise from international experts, who saw it as a thorough re-evaluation of the country’s development strategy in view of recent developments, embodying more mature (if still ambitious) objectives in the form of a package of far reaching adjustments.
Appendix V

National Goals for Tourism Development

The Egyptian national goals for tourism development, as cited by Abdel-Wahab, (1991), are economic, social, political, environmental and technical:

I. The economic goals:

1. Increasing the rate of growth of tourism to contribute to the gross national product of the country, and the balance of payments through increasing tourists nights, selecting the type of tourists, increase the length of stay, and increasing the tourist expenditure.

2. Increase the contribution of tourism to the national income through increasing tourist expenditure (both domestic and international).

3. Ensuring the contribution of tourism to the regional development through creating integrated resorts and tourist centers in areas away from urban agglomerations where tourism become the mainstay of those regions and the prime axis of development growth, for example, along the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts, Sinai, Nasser lake in Aswan and Al-Wadi Al-Gadid.

4. Increasing the employment opportunities and developing the workforce through training to ensure efficient productivity.

5. Finding ways to avoid the negative economic aspects of tourism through preparing well structured economic policies.

II. Social and Political Goals

1. Enhancing the Egyptian tourism image abroad through scientific methods of marketing and promotion

2. Protecting the social and cultural values and tradition of the Egyptian society together with encouraging the ordered mingling and mixing between tourists and locals to increase the social integration and building cooperation, relationships and respect among them.

3. Encouraging domestic tourism to ensure the positive psychological benefits and exploiting the spare time of Egyptians.

4. Ensuring the public awareness of the value of architecture and heritage and to avoid polluting the residential districts to become a tourist attraction

5. Promoting handicrafts and local artisans to revive the heritage and local cultures

6. Ensuring the hospitality of locals to visitors

7. Avoiding the negative social aspects and protecting cultural, religious and behavior values of the society.

III. Environmental Goals

1. Protecting the natural environment (air, water, soil, etc) from degradation and pollution, and protecting the historic, cultural and archeological heritage from depletion, and avoiding the unplanned informal growth of urbanization that destroys the economic, ecological and natural resources through establishing building regulations and planning standards and respecting the carrying capacities in tourism
projects; and increasing the share of the Egyptian citizen from green areas and controlling pollution, congestion and health standards.

2. Protecting the rights of future generations to benefit from the natural and cultural Egyptian heritage.

3. Ensuring that the tourism development strategies are within the national financial capacity and are not in conflict with other national interests through controlling the use of energy and natural resources and regulating the distribution of land uses and the specifications and regulations for development to prevent the natural informal growth of urban areas form deteriorating the natural resources and the cultural values and heritage that are the resource base of tourism.

4. Establishing the necessary laws and legislation to regulate the development in vulnerable areas including areas with unique natural, political, and urban environments; and producing laws that protect the national parks.

5. Protecting the River Nile being the prime Egyptian resource and a major tourist attraction.

IV. Technical Goals

1. Considering tourism as a production sector that has a national priority, and an economic industry that depends of scientific methods

2. Working towards increasing Egypt’s share from international markets through scientific planning through enhancing and diversifying the tourist product and not concentrating on historic tourism only, and through adopting modern marketing and promotion techniques and through encouraging the investment in tourism through incentives and facilitation.

3. Establishing coordination, homogeneity and cooperation among all government institutions and NGOs that affect tourism directly and indirectly under the umbrella of the ministry of tourism

4. Facilitating the contribution of the public and private sectors to the tourist industry according to the laws and regulations that the state puts and under the state’s supervision

5. Ensuring the development and protection of the human resource being the primary factor that contributes to achieving sustainable tourism and the success of tourism projects.

6. Ensuring the development of an Egyptian management system for the operation of the tourism projects to decrease the dependency of foreign operating companies, and to promote the local workforce.

7. Reviewing the existing tourism legislation and laws to ensure the accomplishment of the above mentioned goals.

8. Upgrading the air transport facilities and expanding the existing airports while ensuring their safety and security.
Appendix VI


The short-term strategy aimed at:

1. Achieving the coordination between central and local authorities (Ministry of Reconstruction, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of agriculture, Investment authority, Archeology department, governorates. etc);
2. Enhancing the performance of implementing organizations and contractors and setting time schedules for implementing tourism projects and infrastructure;
3. Appraising the pricing of tourist facilities to attract domestic and international tourists especially in off-season;
4. Improving the status of employees in the tourism sector.

The Medium term strategy aimed at:

1. Achieving a realistic view of all the circumstances concerning the national development plan and
2. The gradual increase in supplying the tourist facilities and hotels with their needs of supplies, utilities and construction materials from local supplies.
3. Giving the private sector a primary role in implementing the planning programs especially with regards to lodging, transport, tourist agencies, restaurants etc., while the public sector is responsible for renovations and finishing of projects under construction.
4. Encouraging the private sector by facilitating the investment of local and foreign investors.
5. Upgrading existing tourist attractions and creating new tourist areas in the Red Sea and NWC regions.
6. Increasing the length of stay of international visitors by encouraging recreational tourism and conference tourism and increasing tourist attractions.
7. Encouraging domestic tourism by supplying tourist facilities that suit the income of different community groups.
8. Increase the concern for marketing and promotion especially in new international markets.
9. Achieving regional cooperation with near-by countries especially in promotion and marketing.
10. Undergoing research and analytical studies in training, public sector development, tourism awareness, and small-scale industries that serve tourism.
Appendix VII

The Regulations of the Ministry of Tourism to be Applied in the NWC

Law no 2 in 1973 stated that the NWC region is a tourist region in the first degree, and that the following conditions should be carried out:

1. Preparing a comprehensive plan for developing and exploiting the tourism areas
2. Regulating the tourism development in the region according to the carrying capacities, densities, specifications, and building regulations of the ministry of tourism in the light of the holistic plan of tourism development.
3. Preparing an execution programme and time schedule for exploiting the tourism areas and supplying them with the necessary services and infrastructure.
4. No person or agency may exploit or benefit or use any area of the NWC without a previous agreement with the ministry of tourism.

Accordingly, the Ministry of Tourism prepared the following development regulations, which are to be applied in NWC

☐ Any person who wish to exploit any site or develop any project in the area between km. 12 from Alexandria to the Libyan borders along the Mediterranean should apply to the ministry of tourism and describe the project’s objectives and reasons for development in addition to a feasibility study if the project is of a touristic nature.

☐ A coastal strip with a minimum depth of 100m from the coastline should be left as a beach and freed from any developments.

☐ The built up area should not exceed 25% of the area allocated to the project

☐ A maximum height of 12 meters for any building along the coast must be maintained

☐ The maximum density of permanent residents should not exceed 5000 persons per km²

☐ Cars should be prevented from reaching the beaches and other modes of light transport facilities should be accommodated for transporting the tourists

☐ Terraced housing should be used in order not to obstruct the view of residents.
Appendix VIII

The 1981 Governmental Decree for Regulating the Activities of the Housing Cooperatives

The Prime Minister issued a decree in 1981, which included the following decisions;

1. Cooperatives, who have legally bought their lands, are given the rights to develop their land according to the master plan. But, cooperatives who bought lands through illegal channels will submit their lands to the NWC Development Authority and receive either a financial compensation or will be given lands in other sites.

2. If the cooperatives who have the right to direct their land development by themselves do not follow either the planning recommendations and regulations, or its scheduled time for implementation, their lands will be withdrawn and the NWC Development Authority will take charge.
Appendix IX

The Structure Planning of the NWC Between the 34th and the 100th km from Alexandria

The Four Planning Zones

Zone A
This zone extends from the 34th to the 52nd km. west of Alexandria and was planned to accommodate 80,000 inhabitants of which some 73,000 are tourists (seasonal settlers). The remainder is service population of a semi-permanent nature. A sport center was proposed, while the coastal strip to the north of the coastal road, was planned to accommodate tourists in nine tourists’ centers. The south of the coastal road was planned to include two settlements, which lie to the north of Maryut Lake, which has been used for fish farming. The area between the 47th and the 52nd km was planned to accommodate the daily visitors (day-trippers).

Zone B
This zone extends from the 52nd to the 64th km west of zone A, and was planned to accommodate 67,000 inhabitants by the year 2000. The tourists (seasonal settlers) represent 57,000 of the population, while the remaining 10,000 people are the service population. The zone was planned to include two settlements to the south of the coastal road. In this zone there exist large natural salt marshes, which were to be upgraded and linked with the sea by a navigable channel, and thus some water sports could be created along the lakes and the channel. The lakes were planned to create a spatial and functional connection between the tourists centers, the settlements, and Al Hammam settlement which the planning propose its expansion to become a major regional service center.

Zone C
This zone extends from the 64th to the 80th km and was planned to accommodate 95,658 inhabitants of which 75,658 are tourists. They would be distributed in specific tourist centers between the sea and the existing road. The south of the coastal road was planned to accommodate the service population in two settlements. Between the coastal road and the proposed hinterland highway, country houses were planned which have separate, reserved beaches on the seashore. The zone was planned to include plantation, animal farms, country houses, and camping facilities.

Zone D
It extends from the 81st km. to the 94th km, and was planned to accommodate 101,252 inhabitants, 71,252 of which are tourists who are distributed along the coastal strip. The service populations are accommodated in two settlements located to the south of the coastal road. A marine center was planned to be included in this zone which includes the facilities necessary for water and marine activities. This zone was planned to attract international tourists. A major sport center was planned to be included in this zone which includes tracks for horse racing and car racing that can have access to the beach.
The Tourism Planning: Zone A (Land Use, Urban Design and Planning Regulations)
The Tourism Planning: Zone B (Land Use, Urban Design and Planning Regulations)
The Tourism Planning: Zone C (Land Use, Urban Design and Planning Regulations)
The Tourism Planning: Zone D (Land Use, Urban Design and Planning Regulations)
Appendix X
Recommendations for Settlements’ Types, Population Densities, Building and Urban Design Regulations in the NWC

I. Settlement Types
1. Tourist Settlements

The structure planning suggested the creation of tourists’ settlements. This was based on devising a grouped housing pattern as a building block that would enable an orderly progression of the settlements’ development. These patterns differ from one area to another, according to variations in the natural characteristics of the area. The natural variations include the following:

1. Along the coast, the distance between the sea and the road ranges from 600 to 1500m.
2. The area on the shoreline available for sitting and swimming varies from one area to another and becomes narrow in some areas where it is limited by sand dunes.
3. Areas suitable for construction are limited and controlled in some areas by sand dunes, derelict land (abandoned) or agricultural land. In some areas this problem extends inland for 250-550m.
4. White sand dunes in some areas are considered as a valuable natural element and must be kept, instead of removing or building on them at high cost. The depth of this layer varies with a maximum of 45m. in some areas.
5. Abandoned land can be found close to the existing road (with a maximum width of 400m). Building on this area is expensive and also the sea view is broken by sand dunes.
6. There are areas cultivated with figs and dates which sometimes extend from 50-200m inland.

The structure planning suggested that every three cooperatives are combined together to form one settlement while 15 percent will be taken from each cooperative’s share of land to provide services centers. This proposal was based on the following criteria:

1. It provides flexibility in selecting the nature and extent of the area for services best adapted to the site constraints and the needs of day trippers in some areas along the coast.
2. It will facilitate free mobility and choice between different activities, which in turn will achieve social and economic benefits. The service center is intended to provide for daily needs only, but services needed for stays of one week or more will be found in the development settlements proposed for that purpose.
3. It will provide an identifiable character and nature with each tourist center reflecting its own nature and conditions.
4. It will be easy to control the building and urban design regulations in a unified area instead of three with different conditions.
Tourist settlements’ types and distributions were constrained by the following issues:

- The requirements of the cooperatives are largely influencing the form and pattern of development. This influence can clearly be seen in the dominant linear pattern of the tourists settlements, restricted as they are to the narrow coastal strip (between the sea and the existing road). This pattern may well lead to a continuous fence of built area along the coast. It can be argued that it would be more appropriate to break the continuity of these settlements by locating some of them inland. A hinterland location would make use of the natural and proposed recreational activities (hinterland lakes and proposed sports activities); increase the area available for development to compensate for the areas which must be left vacant because of dereliction and agricultural requirements; help in creating a better visual aspect for the area; avoid the potential change in natural features of the area and allow the summer sea breeze to penetrate into the inland activities.

- The part played by the cooperatives can also be recognized in the determination of building and urban design regulations. These have been formulated in response to the pressures of the property development process rather than relating to the features of the natural environment. The resulting building forms are to be left to the personal attitudes of different cooperatives and their architects. This may well lead to the creation of a plethora of settlement forms, adapted to any environment other than the NWC of Egypt.

- Negotiations and discussions have taken place for many years to produce a final master plan, which would satisfy cooperatives, because most of the decision takers who must approve the plan are members of cooperatives. This indicates how personal interests have influenced the direction of the development process.

2. Permanent Settlements

There are two types of permanently occupied settlement; the first group (new settlements) which is to be located immediately south of the existing coastal road, with two in each of the four zones. These settlements (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, D1, and D2) are to accommodate permanent inhabitants working mainly in services to support the foundation of the tourist settlements on the coastal strip. The second type is the group of existing hinterland settlements located along the railway line. Agricultural and industrial activities (established after the regional plan of 1976) lead to the need to redevelop these settlements and they will also supply the labor force required to implement the regional development. These settlements can also be grouped in terms of their population and administrative functions. The first group comprises El-Hammam Settlement (the largest, with a population of 8000) and Burg El-Arab (the second biggest with a population of 4000). The second group (existing settlements) consists of Bahig and El-Omayed settlements, each had a population of 1500. The third group consists of some small communities for farmers, the most important of which are El-Garbaniat, El-Roissat and El-Omayed El-Shemaleya).
2.1. Proposed (New) Permanent Settlements

The proposed settlements were planned to accommodate 10,000 inhabitants each. They are located south of the existing coastal road, adjacent to the tourists settlements located at the coastal strip (two in each zone). They are divided into two groups in terms of function. The first group combines tourist and permanent inhabitants and can be found in zones A and B. The second group will be inhabited solely by permanent inhabitants and are located in zones C and D. However, the foundation of the development settlements is based on the following considerations:

1. There is a need to compensate some cooperative members with other sites placed prepared for tourists instead of their original lands, which they will have to evacuate according to the recommendations of the master plan.

2. There is a need to develop areas for domestic tourism for people other than the cooperative members and to be supplementary to the areas considered in the coastal strip for the day-trippers.

3. The creation of service facilities in the tourist centers sufficient for all the people’s needs is undesirable from an economical point of view. It would waste the more valuable land of the coastal strip when services can be established just as easily south of the existing road.

4. It is deemed necessary to collect the Bedouins scattered in the area both north and south of the existing road in legal communities where they can be supplied with services. They will also find opportunities to work in services such as infrastructure maintenance, construction, tourism, restaurants, hotels etc., which will be close to their residence.

5. Creating these settlements will provide more activity within the area especially during the winter months when most of the tourist settlements are un-occupied. The foundation of these settlements may attract tourists to the area during winter if permanent services are made available.

2.2 Existing Permanent Settlements

El-Hammam settlement had been taken as an example of the existing hinterland settlements which, are according to the master plan, to be upgraded, re-developed and promoted to grow. The master plan aimed to transform El-Hammam into the second largest urban center in the NWC region after New Ameriyah City. The existing circumstance of the settlement in terms of its regional function, location, and population density are briefly reviewed in order to identify the extent to which the existing hinterland settlements were taken into account in the master plan.

El-Hammam had a population of 8000 inhabitants and is located adjacent to the railway line. There is an existing road of length 5 km. to link the settlement with the coastal road at the km. 60 from Alexandria. Most of the population are Bedouins who have been settling for many years and work in agriculture, sheep trade, and cutting stones from the nearby quarries.
The labor force needed to work in the recently reclaimed land for agriculture, the proposed industrial activities (cement and gypsum industries) and the construction works that accompanies the region’s development added to the importance of El-Hammam to accommodate the work force and to offer local population work opportunities. El-Hammam was planned to accommodate 35 000 people by the year 2000 in the master plan. However, the growth of the settlement was constrained. In the east and west of the settlement the only available possible depth for growth ranges between 200 to 600m. While to the northeast and north, the available depth is about 500m until the proposed regional highway. Towards the northeast direction lies the proposed cement factory. And towards the south lies the existed and reclaimed agricultural lands.

The proposed form of development and growth takes a linear, counter direction in relation to the existing road that passes the settlement from north to south. In the planning proposal, the redeveloped form consists of seven neighborhoods, each with a specified population density, socio-economic class structure, and a range of different economic activities. In addition to the cement factory that was proposed on the northwestern side of the settlement, other light industries are proposed on the southeastern side.

From the above illustration, it seems that El-Hammam had been given adequate emphasis in the region’s structure planning, however, the development was expected to face some difficulties. The residents may not accept any redevelopment, which may bring new residents (strangers) to the settlement.

3. Combined Settlements

The settlements that combine both tourists and permanent inhabitants were to be located on Abu Sir Plateau, adjacent to the tourist centers located in the coastal strip. The locations selected are: A1 (between the 37.5 km to the 39.5 km); A2 (43 to 45.250); B1 (50 to 52) and B2 (53.5 to 57). These locations were decided on the basis of the following:

☐ Abu Sir Plateau slopes upwards naturally from the existing coastal road southwards, ranging from 5m to 25m above sea level. These level differences can create steps to provide the opportunity for all tourists to enjoy the view, vista, and the sea breeze.

☐ The plateau is from limestone, which is more feasible for construction because it will reduce the costs of foundations.

☐ The availability of agricultural lands which will act as a buffer between the tourists settlements and the permanent settlements.

☐ Proximity to the existing roads, passages, and most of the existing that are scattered in the area will be advantageous in minimizing the infrastructure costs.
The settlement had two tourist clusters to the north, each with its services center for daily shopping, while between each of them a tourist center will be developed. The area prepared for the permanent inhabitants also consists of two neighborhoods. Between them is the main service center, which will serve the settlement as a whole and other tourist centers in the coastal strip. On the eastern side of the permanent area, light industry and services are to be located.

The second type of permanently inhabited settlements in zones C and D will be located in the middle to link the tourist centers on the coast and the rural tourism areas south of the coastal road. In terms of the distribution of land uses, they are to be the same as the area prepared for the permanent residence as explained above.

II. Population Distribution in Permanent (Existing and Proposed) Settlements

It was targeted that by the year 1985 a population of 250,000 inhabitants are to be distributed over the above mentioned settlements. The final master plan distributed the population according to the following criteria:

1. On the bases of the hierarchy of the administrative system in Egypt, in descending order: The Governorate; The Markaz (the governorate’s capital; The Magles Al-Karawi (the villages’ local center); and The Karia (the village).
2. The relation between function, site and resultant size of each settl(existing or proposed).
3. The economic and physical resources within the boundary of each settlement (existing or proposed).

Based on the above considerations, three alternatives were proposed for the distribution of the population to the permanent settlements (existing and proposed). The third alternative that was selected was based on the following:

1. Ten small-proposed settlements are to be developed with a population ranging from 6000 to 14,000 inhabitants. Between these settlements, another eight new settlements (two in every zone) proposed with a population of 10,000 inhabitants each. The rest are to be located on the railway line where the agricultural activities can be found.
2. Five existing settlements are to be redeveloped to reach a population of 23,000 inhabitants. These settlements are Burg El-Arab, El-Omayed El-Shamaleya, El-Kasmia, El-Garbaniat and El-Roissat.
3. El-Hammam settlement will be redeveloped to reach a population of 35,000 inhabitants, to become the second ranked capital city of the NWC region after Al-Ameriyah City.

III. Building and Urban Design Regulations

In determining the building and urban design regulations, two directions were discussed. The first concept was to closely control such detailed design factors such as size, pattern, form
and character of buildings. However, the concept was avoided because it would need politically powerful authorities for its implementation or an advanced level of understanding and acceptance among the cooperatives and their planners and architects which was unlikely to be achieved. The second concept was to establish broad and simple conditions that can be easily understood and implemented as follows:

1. Building boundaries were determined in relation to the shoreline and the existing road, where 130 m. are to be reserved as a beach front and for beach uses; and 50 m. are reserved as a buffer area from each side of the main road.

2. The built up area (total ground floor area) is not to exceed 10 percent of the site’s area; while the plot ratio (total floor area) is not to exceed 25 percent of the site’s area.

3. Building heights were determined in relation to every site, however they must not exceed 8 m. above sea level.

4. The gross population density should not exceed 5000 persons per 2 km. length of coastline (50 persons per Hectare) for areas assigned to domestic tourists; while areas assigned for international tourists were allowed 3000 persons per 2 km. length of the coastline (30 persons per Hectare).
Appendix XI

Laws & Decisions Affecting the Study Area

1. A governmental decree no. 540 in 1980 decided that the NWC is a new urban settlement between km 34 west of Alexandria and the Egyptian Western borders, and bounded by the Mediterranean sea from the North and Contour 200m from the South. The decree assigned the tasks of developing the region to the Ministry of Reconstruction, Housing and Land Reclamation (MOR).

2. Law no. 59 in 1979 defined new urban settlements as an integrated human settlement which aims to create new urban centers that achieves social stability and economic prosperity (based on agriculture, industry, commercial, touristic and any other economic activity) for the reasons of redistribution of population by providing new attractive areas for the population away from existing cities or villages.

   - Law no. 59, clause no. 50 in 1979 stated that the new urban settlements’ authority and administration would be transferred to the local authority after their execution. Until that time, the Authority for New Urban Communities, ANUC (or any of its organizations, departments and units) is the body responsible for planning, implementing, administrating and managing their developments; in addition; ANUC would receive the financial resources assigned to the local authorities.

   - Law no. 59 in 1979 also stated that ANUC is the body responsible to select the appropriate sites to create the new settlements and to prepare the necessary studies and master plans and detailed plans either the Authority itself or any of its organisations or departments, or by contracting individuals, companies, consultants or expertts (Egyptians or expatriate).

   - Law no 59 in 1979 forbids the development of new settlements on agricultural lands.

3. Law no 3 for urban planning in 1982 stated that in its first clause that the local authorities (the governorates, urban centers, towns, districts and villages) are responsible for regulating and controlling urban development within their effective areas through a committee of urban planning in every governorate which is responsible for preparing master plans for the cities, towns and villages.

   - Law no 3 for urban planning in 1982 stated in its seventh clause that after the master plan is approved (by GOPP) the local units may prepare the detailed planning projects for the areas that constitute the master plan of the cities and villages.
Appendix XII

National Goals Influencing the NWC Region

The tourism public policy of the NWC region stated that the development of the NWC region aims to realize six national objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Objectives</th>
<th>Actual Achievements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Diversification of the national economy:</td>
<td>The region attracted only seasonal domestic tourists and few Arab tourists while the number of international tourists has been negligible. The reclamation of 300,000 feddans in Nubariya and the introduction of 2000 feddans of fisheries took place. In addition to the cement and gypsum industries, several industries had been established in NAC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promoting domestic and international tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land reclamation for agriculture</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Introducing fisheries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Employment generation.</td>
<td>Employment in the tourist industry does not exceed 2000 people who work only in summer. Several jobs have been offered in construction. Employment have lately been generated in agriculture (in Nubariya) and in manufacturing industries in NAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the tourist industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial activities</td>
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<td>III. Foreign exchange</td>
<td>The policy succeeded in stimulating Egyptians to spend their holidays within the country and thus saved large amounts of foreign currency. However, the absence of international tourists led to the loss of the anticipated amounts of foreign currency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>From international tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>By stimulating Egyptians to spend their holidays within their country</td>
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<td>IV. Regional integration</td>
<td>The integration of the region with the rest of the country was achieved by the erection of extensive transportation networks, regional infrastructure, educational and health services and energy sources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>By developing infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Developments in Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increasing health, educational and commercial services</td>
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<td>V. Population dispersion</td>
<td>Only 21,000 people moved to NAC, which is the only established new settlement in the NWC. The uncontrolled urbanization of existing settlements has been taking place. In the absence of government control, the urbanization has been decreasing the attractiveness of the region as having clean environment and good services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creating new settlements to attract population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upgrading existing settlements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increasing the attractiveness of the region by offering a clean environment, new jobs, good services, and utilities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VI. Minimum government financial and administrative involvement</td>
<td>The private sector and housing cooperatives shared in the cost of regional infrastructure (water supply, electricity and communications). The region has been dependent on central government budgetary allocations for the provision of services, utilities, and investments. There is hardly any evidence that local authorities had been involved in the decision-making of the regional development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging the private sector’s investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhancing the region’s economic self-sufficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Involving local authorities</td>
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